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 This thesis examines the implementation of the international Anti-Money 
Laundering (AML) standards regarding the role of Financial Intelligence Units (FIU) 
under the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations. The main 
research questions focus on ‘What is the AML policy relating to the roles of the 
Thailand FIU?’; ‘How effective has Thailand’s FIU been in implementing the FATF 
standards?’; ‘What additional strategies should Thailand implement to counter 
money laundering?’; as well as ‘What are the lessons that Thailand should learn 
lessons from the UK and Singapore?’ This examination aims to determine whether 
the current role of Thailand FIU is ‘appropriate’ for the international AML standards.  
The thesis considers the extent to which the AML policies on the FIUs are 
implemented in the United Kingdom and Singapore to determine if there are any 
meaningful suggestions possibly adopted in Thailand. For this thesis, the term 
‘appropriate’ means the AML legislation should support the FIU in operating its 
functions independently, and be able to apply to the FATF standards. 
 Applied by doctrinal, socio-legal, and comparative law research methods, the 
thesis responds to criticisms that the level of independence of the Thailand FIU is 
‘ambiguous’, the rationale being that certain provisions relevant to its FIU  regarding 
with sufficient operational independence from the government. The most serious 
criticism is that the Anti-Money Laundering Board (AMLB) can hold and use 
significant influence over the Transaction Committee, the Secretary-General and the 
Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO) according to section 25(3) of the Anti-
Money Laundering Act 1999 (AMLA) that may undermine the AMLO’s functions. 
The thesis argues that the role is inappropriate, but it affects the independence of the 
Thailand FIU. The approach used to address this issue is the adaptation of the 
administrative-FIU model into Thailand’s FIU; as well as the implementation of soft 
law (i.e. FATF Recommendations, best practices, and industry guidelines). The thesis 
concludes that the AMLA 1999 is inconsistent with FATF Recommendation 29.  
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 Money laundering is the process of the conversion or transaction of an asset 
obtained from a criminal offence and illegal activities purposely to conceal, hide, or 
disguise the unlawful source of criminal property (i.e. the true origin). In some cases, 
it is the process to help any person involved with the criminal offence and realised 
that the asset is obtained from such offence to exploit to generate a crime profit and 
then make them legitimate.1 Reuter and Truman identified that money laundering is 
the act of converting money from illicit activities into dirty money that finally ap-
pears legitimate, and its origin cannot be traced and investigated to the criminal pro-
ceedings.2  
 Ryder defined money laundering as an act of concealing the illicit origins of 
the proceeds of crimes to present themselves as a legitimate capital.3 Fisher noted 
                                                 
1 See discussion in chapter 3; see also Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘What is money launder-
ing’ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/faq/moneylaundering/> accessed 3 October 2017; see also Joint 
Money Laundering Steering Group (JMLSG), Prevention of Money Laundering/Combating Terrorist 
Financing Guidance for the UK Financial Sector: Part 1 (JMLSG 2011) 8. 
2 For example, human trafficking, government corruption, drug dealing, corporate fraud, arm sales, 
smuggling, prostitution rings, human trafficking, drug trafficking, illegal log trading, bribery, embez-
zlement, computer fraud schemes, tax, and insider trading, and terror financing; see Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF), Global Money Laundering & Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment Report 
(FATF 2010); see also Financial Action Task Force (n 1); see also Peter Reuter and Edwin M Truman, 
Chasing Dirty Money: The Fight against Money Laundering (Institute for International Economics 
2004) 9; Nicholas Ryder, ‘The financial services authority and money laundering: A game of cat and 
mouse’ (2008) 67(3) Cambridge Law Journal 635, 635.  
3 Nicholas Ryder, Money Laundering - An Endless Cycle? A Comparative Analysis of the Anti-Money 
Laundering Policies in the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada  
(Routledge 2012) 1, 11; see International Monetary Fund (IMF), ‘Anti-Money Laundering/Combat-
ing the Financing of Terrorism’                        <https://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/am-
lcft/eng/aml1.htm> accessed 30 May 2015; see also Peter Alldridge, Money Laundering Law: For-
feiture, Confiscation, Civil Recovery, Criminal Laundering and Taxation of the Proceeds of Crime  
(Hart 2003) 3.  
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that money launderers attempt to disguise illegal funds and hidden assets from rele-
vant authorities and make them appear legitimate by using legislative obstacles.4 
Reuter and Truman argued that money launderers hide the origins of their dirty 
money and clean it into legitimate to avoid suspicion.5 Gleeson noted that money 
laundering is a separate offence that commences with the illegal purpose to hide pro-
ceeds of crime and prevent the detection of a criminal offence.6 Gallant argues that 
money laundering is the circulation of the proceeds of crime by recycling or moving 
illicit money, which causes damage to the reputation of financial institutions, as well 
as the stability of the economic system.7 
1.2 Research Context 
 The United Kingdom (UK) Financial Services Authority (FSA) asserted that 
the launderers use complicated techniques that appear to have a lawful origin in order 
to retain the asset permanently or recycle it to fund further crimes.8 The United Na-
tions Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) identified that the launderers try to ob-
scure the ownership or application of the proceeds of crime to avoid the suspension 
                                                 
4 Jonathan Fisher, ‘Confiscating the proceeds of crime – Chapter four’ in Arun Srivastava, Mark 
Simpson and Nina Moffatt (eds), International Guide to Money Laundering Law and Practice (4th 
edn, Bloomsbury 2013) 183, 207; see James O Finckenauer, ‘Problems of definition: What is organ-
ised crime?’ (2005) 8(3) Trends in Organised Crime 63, 66; see Jack A Blum, Michael Levi, R 
Thomas Naylor and Phil Williams, Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money-Laundering Tech-
nical Series Issue 8 (UNDCP 1998) 6, 8; see also Ryder (n 2) 635, 635; Frances R Hill, ‘Dark money 
in motion: Mapping issues along the money trail’ (2015) 49 Valparaiso University Law Review 505, 
507.  
5 Guy Stessens, Money Laundering – A New International Enforcement Model (CUP 2000); Mary 
Michelle Gallant, Money Laundering and the Proceeds of Crime: Economic Crime and Civil Reme-
dies (Edward Elgar 2005) 1; see also Jeffrey Robinson, The Laundrymen: Inside the World’s Third 
Largest Business (Simon and Schuster 1994) 12, 213; see also Reuter and Truman (n 2) 32.  
6 Simon Gleeson, ‘The involuntary launderer:  The banker’s liability for deposits of the proceeds of 
crime’ in Peter BH Birks (ed), Laundering and Tracing (Oxford University Press 1995) 115.  
7 William C Gilmore, Dirty Money: The Evolution of Money Laundering Counter-Measures (Council 
of Europe 1995) 16; see also Gallant (n 5) 4. 
8 Paragraph 2.1 of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) Consultation Paper 46 (CP46); see Finan-
cial Services Authority (FSA), ‘Money Laundering: the FSA’s new role’ (April 2000) at 7 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp46.pdf> accessed 23 July 2018; see also Nicholas Ryder, Finan-
cial Crime in the 21st Century: Law and Policy (Edward Elgar 2011) 13.  
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of anti-money laundering (AML) authorities and refrain from leaving a trail of crim-
inal evidence.9 For example, launderers transferred their dirty money to various 
countries through credit card clearances at high speed.10 Such secret characteristic of 
the laundering activity makes it difficult for governments and relevant agencies to 
trace dirty money and estimate the amount of money laundered in the world each 
year.11 Therefore, it is difficult to identify and quantify how much money was laun-
dered because it is an unquantifiable dark figure, which was not reported or prose-
cuted.12 However, Robinson argued that money laundering is the World’s third-larg-
est industry after a currency exchange and the oil trade.13 
 Gallant noted that in the early 1990s, the annual amount of laundered funds 
was approximately $1trn, or between three and five per cent of the world Gross Do-
mestic Product (GDP).14 In 1990 the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) estimated 
that the proceeds of drug sales in the US and Europe approximately $85bn annually 
were used for laundering and investment.15 However, Walker argued that criminals 
launder approximately $2.85tn per year.16 Conversely, Allen noted that the total 
worldwide amount for money laundering is between $800bn and $1.5tn.17  
                                                 
9  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), ‘Introduction to money laundering’ 
<https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money-laundering/introduction.html> accessed 1 April 2018.   
10 Peter Grabosky, ‘Globalisation and white-collar crime’ in Sally S Simpson and David Weisburd 
(eds), The Criminology of White-Collar Crime (Springer 2009) 135. 
11 Brigitte Unger and Elena Madalina Busuioic, The Scale and Impacts of Money Laundering (Edward 
Elgar 2007) 9; see Gallant (n 5) 11; see also HM Government, ‘Serious an Organised Crime Strategy’ 
Present to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Maj-
esty, Policy paper (October 2013) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/serious-organised-
crime-strategy> accessed 27 March 2018; see also Reuter and Truman (n 2). 
12 Alldridge (n 3) 4. 
13 Robinson (n 5) 12. 
14 Gallant (n 5) 12. 
15 William C Gilmore, ‘International efforts to combat money laundering’ (1992) 18 Cambridge Uni-
versity Press 1129, 1130.   
16 John Walker, ‘Just How Big is Global Money Laundering?’ (John Walker Crime Trends Analysis) 
<https://www.academia.edu/568761/How_big_is_global_money_laundering> accessed 22 February 
2016. 
17 Daren Allen (ed), Butterworths Money Laundering Law (Butterworths 1998); see Simon Maylam, 
‘Prosecution for money laundering in the UK’ (2003) 10(2) Journal of Financial Crime 157, 158; see 
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 Interestingly, in 1998 the US State Department’s Bureau for International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs asserted that $300bn and $500bn was laun-
dered, while the International Monetary Fund (IMF) declared that the scale of money 
laundering transactions was about two and five per cent of the world GDP.18 Unger 
studied that the effects of money laundering can bring about the losses due to crime, 
or approximately €2bn or about 0.4% of World GDP annually, including distorting 
of investment or savings through criminal activity, contamination of specific sectors 
with a crime, and the increase in crime rates.19 
 The UNODC assumed that criminal proceeds amounted to approximately 3.6 
per cent of the world GDP, but there may have been laundered about $1.6trn or 
around 2.7 per cent of GDP in 2009.20 To fully understand the scale of money laun-
dering, this amount represents about four times the 2013 GDP of Thailand21 or 
$387.3bn.22 The UK Serious and Organised Crime Strategy23 also asserted that or-
ganised crime in the UK laundered dirty money more than £1bn via money service 
                                                 
also Ryder (n 2) 635, 636; see also Nicholas Ryder, ‘The fight against illicit finance: A critical review 
of the Labour government’s policy’ (2011) 12(3) Journal of Banking Regulation 252, 275  
18 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Annual Report 1997-1998 (FATF 1998) 37 <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/1997%201998%20ENG.pdf> accessed 27 March 2018; see 
also Gilmore (n 7) 21.  
19 Brigitte Unger, Melissa Siegel, Greg Rawlings, Joras Ferwerda, Wouter de Kruijf, Madalina Busui-
oic and Kristen Wokke, The Amounts and the Effects of Money Laundering, Report for the Ministry 
of Finance on 16 February 2006 at 3, 8. 
20 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘How much money is laundered per year?’ <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/faq/moneylaundering/> accessed 23 February 2018; see also United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC), ‘Illicit money: how much is out there?’ (25 October 2011) 
<https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2011/October/illicit-money_-how-much-is-out-
there.html> accessed 23 February 2018; see also United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting from Drug Trafficking and other Transna-
tional Organised Crimes Research Report (2011).  
21 Government Digital Service, ‘Thailand’ (GOV.UK, 11 February 2016) <https://www.gov.uk/for-
eign-travel-advice/thailand> accessed 27 July 2019.  
22 World Bank, ‘Thailand’ <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/Thailand> accessed 28 May 2015; 
see Gilmore (n 7) 322. 
23 HM Government (n 11).   
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businesses annually.24 The National Crime Agency (NCA) and the UK Financial In-
telligence Unit (FIU) estimates that there are several billion pounds of international 
dirty money laundered via the banks in the UK and their subsidiaries every year.25 
Furthermore, Gilmore asserted that criminal money is laundered internationally be-
tween $300bn and $500bn.26 
 There are three stages to transform dirty money into a legitimate capital, 
namely placement, layering, and integration.27 The first stage is the placement stage, 
which is the initial action for criminally gained money or other proceeds of crime, to 
change its pattern, source, originality, or location to place such illicit proceeds of 
crime into the typical financial system, such as banks, or place dirty money into ac-
counts outside the jurisdiction of law enforcement.28 For example, such a process 
includes the blending of illegal funds into bank complicity and asset purchases.29 
The criminals usually divide money into smaller sums, which are then deposited into 
various bank accounts in order to avoid the AML regulations, such as the suspicious 
transaction reports (STRs) or suspicious activity reports (SARs) to the FIUs in each 
country.30 Simser identified this process as ‘smurfing,’ where launderers attempt to 
                                                 
24 Barry Rider, Kern Alexander, Stuart Bazley and Jeffrey Bryant, Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 
(3rd edn, Bloomsbury 2016) 179. 
25 Basia Spalek, ‘Regulation, white-collar crime and the bank of credit and commerce international’ 
(2001) 40(2) The Howard Journal 166, 173; see also National Crime Agency (NCA), ‘The scale of 
the problem’ <http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/crime-threats/money-laundering> accessed 
14 January 2018.  
26 Gilmore (n 7) 21. 
27 Ryder (n 3) 12; see Robinson (n 5) 12; see also Dong Hopton, Money Laundering: A Concise Guide 
for All Business (2nd edn, Routledge 2009) 2, 3; Stessens (n 5) 4, 113; Unger and Busuioic (n 11) 4. 
28  Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘How is money laundered?’ <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/faq/moneylaundering/> accessed 23 February 2018; see Ryder (n 3) 12. 
29 Sarah N Welling, ‘Smurfs, money laundering, and the federal criminal law: the crime of structuring 
transactions’ (1989) 41 Florida Law Review 287, 289.  
30 Ryder (n 3) 12. 
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enter dirty money into a financial institution that is lower than the STR/SAR require-
ments.31 For example, to avoid the money laundering reporting officer (MLRO) re-
porting the suspicious transactions, launderers conduct several cash transfers from 
bank to other banks just below the reporting threshold (including converting the bulk 
dirty cash into the cashier’s checks, money order, and traveller’s checks) to finish 
transactions without the trace for competent authorities.32  
 The second stage is the layering stage, which is the process of dividing the 
proceeds of crime or profits from their sources by putting them through numerous 
transactions, the online-banking system, letter of credit, smart cards, and insurance-
based products in order to separate and distance the illicit funds from their original 
suspicious sources.33 The criminals might disguise the transaction as payments for 
services or goods in any jurisdictions that do not cooperate in AML investigations to 
convert illicit funds to licit and inconspicuous form.34 To avoid the investigation of 
law enforcement authorities (LEAs), launders use several complex transactions, such 
as transferring money through a legal bank account from another jurisdiction, includ-
ing offshore banks to purchase luxury goods, for example, yacht, car, estate, or invest 
in the stock market.35 Launderers widely also use mobile and electronic payment 
services via smartphones for the transaction of their dirty money.36  
                                                 
31 Jeffrey Simser, ‘Money laundering and asset cloaking techniques’ (2008) 11(1) Journal of Money 
Laundering Control 15, 15; see also Welling (n 29) 287, 288.  
32 Bonnie Buchanan, ‘Money Laundering – A global obstacle’ (2004) 18 Research in International 
Business and Finance 115, 117; see also Welling (n 29) 287, 289.  
33 Ryder (n 3) 12. 
34 Financial Action Task Force (n 28). 
35 Jonathan E Turner, Money Laundering Prevention: Deterring, Detecting and Resolving Financial 
Fraud (John Wiley & Sons 2011) 9.  
36 Sandra L Suarez, ‘Poor people’s money: the politics of mobile money in Mexico and Kenya’ (2016) 
40 Telecommunications Policy 945, 950; see also Celina B Realuyo, ‘It’s all about the money: Ad-
vancing Anti-Money Laundering efforts in the U.S. and Mexico to combat transnational organised 
crime’ (2012) Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars 1, 12. 
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 The final stage is the integration stage, where the launderers re-enter their 
money to the legally financial system.37 For example, such funds are usually laun-
derer via investing their funds into routine living and lifestyle expenses, such as real 
estate, luxury assets, high levels of conspicuous consumption, or moving large 
amounts of money to invest in legitimate businesses in other countries or shell cor-
porations, overseas bank complicity and fake import-export invoices for transfers.38 
Conversely, Koningsveld argued that the money laundering process should be di-
vided into four stages, namely the placement, layering, justification, and invest-
ment.39 He criticised that the final process should be separated into two processes; 
justification and investigation (namely integration). 
 The money laundering process can be operated by the organised crimes them-
selves or via other methods, including their accountants, trust and company for-
mation agents, investment bankers, lawyers, or other intermediaries.40 Such secret 
and complex processes make it difficult, if not impossible, for the governments and 
FIUs to tackle.41 The successful money launderers and criminals use the gaps among 
various legislative systems of jurisdictions in different parts of the world financial 
system to abuse and obtain access to commit their crimes.42 They attempt to hide 
                                                 
37 Ryder (n 3) 12. 
38 Financial Action Task Force (n 28); see Ryder (n 3) 12. 
39 Jan van Koningsveld, ‘Money laundering – you don’t see it, until you understand it: rethinking the 
stages of the money laundering process to make enforcement more effective’ in Brigitte Unger and 
Daan van der Linde (eds) Research Handbook on Money Laundering  (Edward Elgar 2013) 435, 451. 
40  National Crime Agency (NCA), ‘Money laundering’ <http://www.nationalcri-
meagency.gov.uk/crime-threats/money-laundering> accessed 15 May 2018; see Australian Transac-
tion Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), Strategic Analysis Brief: Money Laundering through 
Legal Practitioners (AUSTRAC 2015) 8; see also Keith Nuthall, ‘Revealed: accountants aiding 
money laundering’ (Accountancy Age, 7 April 2004) <https://www.accountancyage.com/aa/analy-
sis/1782104/revealed-accountants-aiding-money-laundering> accessed 15 May 2018; see also Ryder 
(n 3) 11. 
41 Unger and Busuioic (n 11) 4; Financial Action Task Force (n 1); see Jeffrey Lowell Quillen, ‘The 
international attack on money laundering: European initiatives’ (1991) Duke Journal of Comparative 
& International Law 213, 214. 
42 Norman Mugarura, ‘The global anti-money laundering court as a judicial and institutional impera-
tive’ (2011) 14(1) Journal of Money Laundering Control 60, 61.  
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their real origin of illicit proceeds to ensure that the illegal transactions or activities 
of money laundering are concealed without the detection of authorities.43  
 To respond to this international problem, the United Nations (UN) introduced 
three important agreements regarding money laundering, namely the Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988 (Vienna 
Convention);44 the Convention against Transnational Organised Crime 2000 (Pa-
lermo Convention);45  and the Convention against Corruption 2003 (UNCAC or 
Merida Convention).46 In 1989, the G-7 countries established the FATF, and the or-
ganisation developed its Recommendations to form the global AML standards.47 
However, the effectiveness of the FATF measures depends on the compliance among 
its member participation.48 Each country has a different response to the threat of 
money laundering.49 For example, the Member States of the European Union imple-
ments the FATF Recommendations into their regional Directives that forces its 
Member States to transpose its Directives into their national legislation.50 Failure to 
                                                 
43 Stessens (n 5); see Gallant (n 5) 1.  
44 See discussion in chapter 3; see United Nations (UN), United Nations Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988 <https://www.unodc.org/pdf/conven-
tion_1988_en.pdf> accessed 20 February 2016.  
45 See discussion in chapter 3; see United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime and The Protocols Thereto (UNODC 2004); see also Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, ‘Enhancing Contributions to Combating Money 
Laundering: Policy Paper’ (April 26, 2001) 24 <www.imf.org/exter-
nal/np/ml/2001/eng/042601.pdf>accessed 21 May 2015. 
46 See discussion in chapter 3; see United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNODC 2004). 
47 Financial Action Task Force (n 1). 
48 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), High-Level Principles and Objectives for FATF and FATF-
Style Regional Bodies (FATF 2018) 1; see also Kenneth S Blazejewski, ‘The FATF and its institu-
tional partners: Improving the effectiveness and accountability of transgovernmental networks’ 
(2008) 22(1) Temple INT’L & Comp. L.J. 1, 22. 
49 Miriam Goldby, ‘Anti-money laundering reporting requirements imposed by English law: measur-
ing effectiveness and gauging the needs for reform ’(2013) 4 Journal of Business Law 367, 368; see 
also HM Treasury and Home Office, UK National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Ter-
rorist Financing (OGL 2015) 3. 
50 Amandine Scherrer, ‘Explaining Compliance with International Commitments to Combat Financial 
Crime: The G8 and FATF’ (Paper presented at the 47th Annual Convention of the International Studies 
Association, San Diego, 22-25 March 2006). 
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comply with the FATF standards may result in FATF sanctioning countires and ad-
ding them to the Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories (NCCTs) list.51 For in-
stance, in 2012 the FATF identified Thailand as a jurisdiction with strategic anti-
money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) deficiencies 
because Thailand lacked the criminalisation of a robust AML/CFT supervision and 
the terrorist financing appropriately.52 Therefore, the thesis examines the legislative 
frameworks and the roles of the FIUs in Thailand, the UK and Singapore. To under-
stand the subject of this thesis, it is crucial to define the term ‘FIU,’ outline the ap-
plicable concepts that justify the FIU as a ‘financial disclosure unit’ and briefly dis-
cuss the historical development of the evolution of the FIUs in three countries.53  
 Therefore, the FIU is responsible for mainly gathering, analysing, and dis-
seminating the STRs/SARs to relevant law enforcement authorities for further inves-
tigating and prosecuting money laundering activities.54 Additionally, the Egmont 
Group of Financial Intelligence Units defined the FIUs based on their three core 
roles, which comprise receiving (and as permitted, requesting), analysing infor-
mation relevant to suspected proceeds of crime and financing of terrorism, and dis-
seminating financial intelligence to competent AML agencies.55 The IMF and World 
                                                 
51 Gregory C Shaffer and Mark A Pollack, ‘Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements and An-
tagonists in International Governance’ (Legal studies research series research paper no. 09-23, June 
26, 2009, University of Minnesota Law School) <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=1426123> accessed 21 June 2015. 
52 See discussion in chapter 4; see also Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘High-risk and non-
cooperative jurisdictions’ (27 February 2015) <www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/high-rishandnon-cooera-
tivejurisdictions/documents/publi-statement-february-2015.html> accessed 20 May 2015; see Finan-
cial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘FATF Public Statement – 19 October 2012’ (19 October 2012) 
<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions/documents/fat-
fpublicstatement-19october2012.html> accessed 9 February 2018. 
53 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), ‘The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence 
Units’ <https://www.fincen.gov/resources/international/egmont-group-financial-intelligence-units> 
accessed 3 August 2018.  
54 The FATF Recommendations 29. 
55 International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, Financial Intelligence Units: An Overview 
(IMF 2004) 32. 
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Bank define the FIUs as agencies who receive STRs from the financial sectors and 
other individuals, report entities and analyse them, and if the conclusion of the re-
ports shows underlying criminal activity, refer them to relevant competent AML au-
thorities and international FIUs.56  
 The thesis focuses on the Recommendation 29 regarding the role of FIU in 
the implementation of international initiatives into the national legislation, in partic-
ular, the operational independence.57 It is a challenge to examine how each country 
deals with the role of FIU in order to meet the international requirements. For exam-
ple, s. 25(3) of the Thailand Anti-Money Laundering Act 1999 (AMLA) empowers 
the Anti-Money Laundering Board (AMLB) a significant power over the Anti-
Money Laundering Office (AMLO).58 FATF criticised that the AMLO has an issue 
regarding sufficient operational independence that might compromise its functions 
in countering money laundering.59 Consequently, the FATF rated Thailand a ‘largely 
compliant’ level for implementing FATF Recommendation 29.60 Conversely, Thai-
land had faced a number of the military coups that affected the democratic proce-
dures in enacting the AML laws in line with the international instruments. It is chal-
lenging as the UK and Singapore use the administrative-FIU model for their FIU 
whether their FIU model supports the role of FIUs relating to the operational inde-
pendence in fighting money laundering. 
                                                 
56 International Monetary Fund and World Bank (n 55); see also Nomzi Gwintsa, ‘Challenge of Es-
tablishing Financial Intelligence Units (June 2006)  <https://issafrica.org/chapter-3-challenges-of-es-
tablishing-financial-intelligence-units> accessed 4 August 2018.  
57 FATF Recommendation 29. 
58 AMLA 1999, s. 25(3). 
59 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist 
Financing Measures – Thailand Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (APG 2017) 182. 
60 Ibid., 183. 
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 The Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs) noted that the FIU is operational au-
tonomy and independence to ensure that the responsibilities and roles of the FIU 
must be free from political interference and influence.61 Furthermore, an FIU’s au-
thority is supported by national law and regulations.62 Schott recommended that each 
government should empower the FIU to operate its core functions effectively and 
independently.63 Sanchez and Hughes noted that the FIU institutes rules and proce-
dures for reporting entities, especially the banking sector to create fruitful utilisation 
of financial information and reduce business information waste,64 namely defensive 
reporting.65 Furthermore, Sathye and Patel noted that the model of the FIU strength-
ens the prevention of money laundering in the STR regime.66 They also argued that 
the FIU evaluates and analyses financial information and then it becomes financial 
intelligence for delivering to relevant law enforcement authorities.67 Besides, the 
FIU’s function is to provide helpful, timely and valuable feedback in the written form 
to the reporting sectors and persons in order to assist in identifying potential money 
laundering risk.68 The FATF noted the most powerful instrument to deal with this 
                                                 
61 World Bank Group, ‘Module 2: Role of the Financial Intelligence Unit (incorporating peer review-
ers comments)’ at 4 <http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/834721427730119379/AML-Module-2.pdf> 
accessed 4 August 2018.  
62 The supreme legislation in Thailand is the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand; see U.S. De-
partment of State, ‘2016 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR)’  (1 March 2016) 
<https://definedterm.com/financial_intelligence_unit_fiu> accessed 6 August 2018.  
63 Paul Allan Schott, Reference Guide to Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of 
Terrorism (2nd and Supplement on Special Recommendation IX, the World Bank 2006). 
64 Gonzalo Sanchez & Carmina Hughes, ‘Separating gold from garbage in BSA/AML digging’ (2009) 
ABA Banking Journal 50, 50. 
65 Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), Review of the Suspicious Activity Report Regime (2006) 
para 35; see also Goldby (n 49) 367, 375; see also Ryder (n 3) 64, 93; see also Angela Veng Mei 
Leong, ‘Chasing dirty money: domestic and international measures against money laundering’ (2007) 
10(2) Journal of Money Laundering Control 140, 142. 
66 See discussion in chapter 3; see Milind Sathye and Chris Patel, ‘Developing financial intelligence: 
an assessment of the FIUs in Australia and India’ (2007) 10(4) Journal of Money Laundering Control 
391, 403. 
67 Ibid., 391, 394. 
68 EU Financial Intelligence Units’ Platform, ‘Report on Feedback on Money Laundering and Terror-
ist Financing Cases and Typologies’ (2008) at 2 <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/com-
pany/docs/financial-crime/fiu_report_en.pdf> accessed 11 August 2018; see also Waleed Alhosani, 
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issue is the FIU.69 In consequence, the FIU is the main mechanism of the AML sys-
tem under international standards to prevent the use of the global financial market 
from being misused under the purposes of money laundering crime.70 
 The United States (US) Department of State identified that Thailand became 
one of the prevalent money laundering countries in 2016 because it is at risk of 
money laundering and cross-border crime.71 For example, wildlife trafficking, illegal 
narcotics, human trafficking, a centre for the fraudulent travel document, illicit gam-
ing, official corruption, underground lotteries, illegal remittances, and other contra-
band smugglings.72 To achieve the research objectives, this research has chosen the 
UK and Singapore as the best practices of the financial centres because the UK has 
adopted an aggressive legislative AML framework towards money laundering.73 The 
US Department of State noted that the UK acts as a leading role in European and 
international finance.74 In addition, Singapore is one of the lowest domestic crime 
rates in the world.75 The FATF also identified that Singapore has a well-established 
and comprehensive legal structure in combating money laundering and terrorist fi-
nancing effectively.76  
                                                 
Anti-Money Laundering: A Comparative and Critical Analysis of the UK and UAE’s Financial Intel-
ligence Units (Palgrave Macmillan 2016) 9. 
69 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), International Standards on Combating Money Laundering 
and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation: The FATF Recommendations (FATF 2012) 24.   
70 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach: Effective Supervision 
and Enforcement by AML/CFT Supervisors of the Financial Sector and Law Enforcement (FATF 
2015) 35. 
71 United States Department of State, ‘International Narcotics Control Strategy Report Volume II 
Money Laundering and Financial Crimes’ (US Department of State 2017) 8, 172 
<https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/268024.pdf> accessed 15 August 2018. 
72 ibid. 
73 Ryder (n 3) 4. 
74 United States Department of State (n 71). 
75 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Anti-
Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing measures – Singapore Fourth Round Mutual 
Evaluation Report of Singapore (FATF 2016) 5. 
76 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing 
measures Third Round Mutual Evaluation Report of United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
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1.3. Research Importance and Contribution to Knowledge 
 It is questionable whether the role of Thailand’s FIU should only receive, 
analyse and disseminate the intelligence as an administrative-model FIU or should 
have powers to obtain, analyse, disseminate the intelligence, seize the asset, confis-
cate asset, investigate the case, and arrest money launderer and supporter as hybrid-
model FIU.77 In other words, Thailand’s FIU (namely, hybrid-model FIU) should 
change its FIU style into the UK and Singapore’s FIU style (namely, administrative-
model FIU).78 This thesis analyses to understand how the FIUs of the UK and Sin-
gapore work under their domestic laws in line with international standards.79 As be-
ing discussed in chapters four, five, and six, the FIU legislative framework has 
helped the development of FIU in the UK, Singapore and Thailand. 
 Consequently, this thesis hopes to discover how the government of Thailand 
can learn to benefit from the lesson of relevant AML legal provisions in the UK and 
Singapore. The thesis aims to (1) examine the AML legislation framework of FIU in 
Thailand; (2) evaluate how effective the Thailand FIU has been in implementing 
international standards; (3) consider whether Thailand FIU should implement further 
strategies against money laundering; and (4) Thailand should learn lessons from the 
UK and Singapore. To achieve such objectives, this thesis will address the following 
four research questions: 
                                                 
Ireland’ (FATF 2007) <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/documents/documents/mutualevaluationofunited-
kingdomofgreatbritainandnorthernireland.html> accessed 9 February 2018; see Monetary Authority 
of Singapore (MAS), ‘Singapore has strong framework for combating money laundering and terror-
ism financing’ (26 November 2016)  <http://www.mas.gov.sg/News-and-Publications/Media-Re-
leases/2016/Singapore-Has-Strong-Framework-for-Combatting-Money-Laundering-and-Terrorism-
Financing.aspx> accessed 9 February 2018.   
77 See discussion in chapter 6. 
78 See discussion in chapters 4 and 5. 
79 See discussion in chapters 4 and 5; Thailand’s main AML law is the Anti-Money Laundering 1999, 
the UK’s main AML law is the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002; the Singapore’s main AML law is the 
Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act 1992 (Chapter 
65A) (CDSA). 
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1. What are the legislative frameworks governing the FIU in Thailand? 
2. How effective has the Thailand FIU implemented international standards?’ 
3. What additional strategies should the Thailand FIU implement to counter 
money laundering? 
4. What are the lessons that Thailand should learn lessons from the UK and Sin-
gapore? 
 Since 2001, the FATF determined that the FIU deals with money laundering 
and the financing of terrorism by issuing the Eight Special Recommendations to 
tackling the terrorist financing threat. Then in 2004, it further launched the Ninth 
Special Recommendations.80 This thesis will only discuss the legal framework be-
cause the financing of terrorism is different legal elements and laws. For instance, 
Thailand has a separate law on the financing of terrorism, namely the Counter-Ter-
rorism and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Financing Act B.E. 2559 
(2016) (‘CTPF Act’), but Thailand’s primary AML legislation is the Anti-Money 
Laundering Act B.E. 2542 (1999).81 In the UK, the primary AML legislation is the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA), but the Terrorism Act 2006 (TA) deals with 
the financing of terrorism.82 In the case of Singapore, the main AML law is the Cor-
ruption, Drug Trafficking, and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act 
1992 (Chapter 65A) (CDSA), but the Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act 1992 
concerns any terrorist financing offence.83  
                                                 
80  Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘FATF Recommendations’ <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/about/historyofthefatf/> accessed 14 August 2018. 
81 See discussion in chapter 6. 
82 See discussion in chapter 4. 
83 Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act (Cap. 65A) 
1992 (CDSA) ss 43(1), 44(1), 46(1), (2), (3), 47(1), (2), (3); see discussion in chapter 5. 
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 Although the FATF recommends jurisdiction to adopt a risk-based approach 
(RBA) to identify and mitigate the money laundering and terrorist financing risks, 
the objectives of terrorist financing and money laundering are different. For instance, 
terrorist financing mainly involves a national security priority, as well as relates to 
the Terrorist Financing Convention.84 Cassella defines the financing of terrorism as 
the process of reverse money laundering because the money is  transferred from le-
gitimate sources and that then it is conveyed to illicit objectives.85 Consequently, 
terrorist financing is committed to supporting its political influence, including its 
funds may be obtained from illegal or legal sources.86  
 Conversely, money laundering fund comes from criminal activities by the 
organised crime groups and the launderers. The origin of the fund will be disguised,  
and then the fund entered into the financial system for generating profits.87 Gener-
ally, money laundering is a paperless crime and can be a victimless crime, in other 
words, without any physical attack or violence at victims.88 However, the legitimate 
                                                 
84 FATF Recommendation 29 involves with the FIU to manage the STR/SAR regime (i.e. the FATF 
launched the 40 Recommendations on money laundering+9 Special Recommendations on terrorist 
financing); normally the money laundering concerns with the three conventions, namely, the Vienna, 
Palermo and Merida Conventions, while the terrorist financing relates to the International Convention 
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999 (Terrorist Financing Convention). 
85 Stefan Dante Cassella, ‘Reverse money laundering’ (2004) 7(1) Journal of Money Laundering Con-
trol 92, 93. 
86 International Monetary Fund (IMF), ‘IMF and the fight against money laundering and financing of 
terrorism’ (30 October 2017) at 1 <https://www.imf.org/en/About/Fact-
sheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/31/Fight-Against-Money-Laundering-the-Financing-of-Terrorism> ac-
cessed 6 February 2018. 
87 This issue was discussed in Chapter 3; see U.S. Department of State, ‘Money laundering and ter-
rorist financing: A global threat’ (1 March 2004) 
<https://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2003/vol2/html/29843.htm> accessed 6 February 2018.   
88 Rowan Bosworth-Davies, ‘Money laundering: chapter five – the implications of global money laun-
dering laws’ (2007) 10(2) Journal of Money Laundering Control 189, 202; see World Bank, Domestic 
(Inter-Agency) and International Cooperation: Workbook (International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development/World Bank 2009) 6; see also European Parliament, Offshore activities and money 
laundering: recent findings and challenge (European Parliament 2017) 1, 30; see also Anja P Jakobi, 
‘Governing illicit finance in transnational security spaces: the FATF and anti-money laundering’ 
(2018) 69 Crime Law Soc Change 173, 180; see also Gooch Graham and Michael Williams, A Dic-
tionary of Law Enforcement (Oxford 2014); see also HG Mane, Insider Trading and the Stock Market 
(1st edn, New York Press 1966). 
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money can be brought into the jurisdiction to finance a specific terrorist activity 
through the channel that is not notoriously to spot, such as a money remitter, a hu-
manitarian charity, imported goods exchange, political or religious activities.89  
 The following chapter consists of a detailed research method. It illustrates 
and justifies the research methodological approach applied to gather data for this 
thesis. It examines the concept and background of the application of different re-
search methods. It also reviews the literature on the FIU development identifying 
gaps within the literature and focusing the conclusion of the studies. An analysis of 
the historical evolution of FIU under international standards in chapter three deter-
mines the role of FIU (including competent AML authorities) of each country in 
implementing such regulations to counter money laundering. Chapters four, five, and 
six critically analyse and compare the impact of FIU legislative frameworks upon 
the development of FIUs in Thailand and best practices (namely the UK and Singa-
pore, respectively), including an assessment of their implementation of international 
standards. Chapter seven provides comparative analysis in the context of the com-
parison of operational independence of the three FIUs in the UK, Singapore and 
Thailand.  Finally, Chapter eight concludes and recommends the preceding chapters 
upon the additional AML strategies relevant to FIU from such countries. 
 
                                                 
89 Stefan Dante Cassella, ‘Terrorism and the financial sector: are the right prosecutorial tools being 
used?’ (2004) 7(3) Journal of Money Laundering Control 281, 281. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Research Methodology and Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 To develop the anti-money laundering (AML) strategies of Thailand’s finan-
cial intelligence unit (FIU), the thesis compares the roles of the United Kingdom 
(UK), Singapore and Thailand’s FIU in preventing money laundering. This thesis 
comparatively examines the function of the Thailand FIU under the international 
standards of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Therefore, the thesis poses 
four research questions.  Firstly, what is the AML policy relating to the role of the 
Thailand FIU? Secondly, how effective has Thailand’s FIU implemented the FATF 
standards? Thirdly, what additional strategies should Thailand implement to counter 
money laundering? Fourth, what are the lessons that Thailand could learn from the 
UK and Singapore?  
 Thus, the comparison between the three countries illustrates several com-
monalities and differences in the FIUs in order to acknowledge the alternative ways 
to enhance the international financial-intelligence regime.1 The examination of the 
literature illustrates that there are four factors to overcome money laundering.  
Firstly, strengthening internal auditing mechanisms. Secondly, emphasizing bank 
staff training.  Thirdly, enhancing collaboration and finally, establishing a mecha-
nism for preventing money laundering via cyber payments.2 To achieve the second 
and third research objectives, it is essential to study the competent authorities and 
                                                 
1
 Milind Sathye and Chris Patel, ‘Developing financial intelligence: an assessment of the FIUs in 
Australia and India’ (2007) 10(4) Journal of Money Laundering Control 391, 392. 
2
 Hsiao-Ming Wang and Dan TE Chan, ‘A review of Taiwan’s Money Laundering Act of 1997’ 
(2003) 27(1) International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 107-116, 113.  
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FIUs in order to determine how effectively the Thailand FIU has implemented the 
FATF Recommendations.3 Under the FATF Mutual Evaluation methodology, the 
comparison of the Thailand FIU with the best practices, of the FIUs in the UK and 
Singapore, assists the Thailand government to improve its FIU.4  
 The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part examines the research 
methodologies used in this thesis consisting mainly of doctrinal research in conjunc-
tion with socio-legal and comparative law methods. The second part presents the 
relevant literature looking at the international standards, the FATF Recommenda-
tions, and the soft laws that countries are required to acknowledge and transpose into 
their regional and domestic legislation. The next section of the chapter explains and 
justifies the research methodology adopted in this thesis. 
 
2.2 Research Methodology  
 This section presents the research methodology,5 which is employed system-
atically and practically to examine the data to answer the research questions.6 The 
thesis reviews the appropriate methods to interpret and analyse the AML policies, 
including the relevant international standards, legislation, regulations, rules, codes 
of conduct, reports, commentary, and case law in order to understand the AML pol-
                                                 
3
 Sathye and Patel (n 1) 391, 392.  
4
 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘FATF Methodology for assessing compliance with the FATF 
Recommendations and the effectiveness of AML/CFT systems’ (FATF 2013) <https://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/mutualevaluations/documents/fatf-methodology.html> accessed 26 May 2019.  
5
  David Silverman, Doing Qualitative Research (4th edn, Sage 2013) 446; see Dawn Watkins and 
Mandy Burton, ‘Introduction’ in Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton, Research Methods in Law 
(Routledge 2013) 2; see also Tamara Hervey, Rob Cryer and Bal Sokhi-Bulley, ‘Legal Research 
Methodologies in European Union & International Law: Research Notes (Part 1)’ (2008) 3(2) Journal 
of Contemporary European Research 161, 162. 
6
 Matt Henn, Mark Weinstein and Nick Foard, A Short Introduction to Social Research (Sage 2005) 
9; see Silverman (n 5) 446. 
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icies. Then the thesis examines how effective the Thailand FIU has been in imple-
menting the international standards by analysing and synthesising Thailand’s Mutual 
Evaluation Report (MER), including relevant official reports to answer the second 
research question. In order to answer the third research question, this thesis uses the 
comparative method to compare different jurisdictions with differing legislative 
standards.7  
2.2.1 Doctrinal Research Method 
 The doctrinal research method, or black letter methodology,8 focuses on the 
nature of law, and the theories behind certain areas of law such as liability, legislative 
authority, political, criminal law, constitutional law and justice.9 This method exam-
ines the concepts of law by analysing materials including legislation, case law, text-
books, commentaries, official periodicals, or websites to formulate a conclusion.10 
Therefore, the examination of the legislation is the application of the related laws to 
the specific facts in the situation.11 Additionally, the doctrinal research method as-
sists in providing an enhanced understanding of how the law operates in each coun-
try,12 as well as to understanding the AML laws.13 There are two processes of the 
doctrinal research method starting with locating the sources of the law, which relates 
to legislation, case law, regulations, rules, academic journal articles, law reform re-
port, parliamentary material, and policy documents. Secondly, it is to analyse such 
                                                 
7
 Selina Keesoony, ‘International anti-money laundering laws: the problems with enforcement’ 
(2016) 19(2) Journal of Money Laundering Control 130, 131. 
8
 Michael Doherty and Patricia Leighton, ‘Research in law: who funds it and what is funded? A pre-
liminary investigation’ (2004) 38(2) Law Teacher 182, 183. 
9
 Paul Chynoweth, ‘legal research’ in Andrew Knight and Les Ruddock (eds), Advanced Research 
Methods in the Built Environment (Blackwell 2008) 29. 
10
 Ibid., 30. 
11 Ibid., 29. 
12 Michael Salter and Julie Mason, Writing Law Dissertations: An Introduction and Guide to the Con-
duct of Legal Research (Pearson 2007) 112-113. 
13 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2012). 
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legal texts in order to illustrate the systematic description of the regulations, the re-
lationship between regulations, problem area.14     
 In answer to the first research question, this thesis looks at the AML policies, 
including the international AML regulations, interpretive guidelines, codes of con-
duct, judicial precedent, as well as legal commentary in the selected three countries. 
Therefore, the doctrinal research asks what law is on specific issues in order to iden-
tify and interpret the legal principles and rules.15 The doctrinal research method also 
involves the analysis of the legal doctrine and how it has been enhanced and applied 
by presenting the content of existing legislation in a systematic approach.16 Smits 
stated that the traditional doctrinal work is still the most vital type of research in 
which legal academics engage.17 The scope of the approach is narrow, limited, and 
restricted to emphasising the principle of law by using any interpretive instruments 
and analytical techniques to systemise and assess legislative regulations and then 
create suggestions on what legislative rules should be.18 Therefore, the doctrinalists 
as legal academics know what they do, and this knowledge is implicit.19 McDrudden 
noted that the doctrinal approach is like mother’s milk to academic lawyers in the 
way students learn to consider cases like a lawyer.20 
                                                 
14 Bryan A Garner (ed), Black’s Law Dictionary (Deluxe 9th edn, Westlaw International 2009); see 
also Terry Hutchinson, Researching and Writing in Law (3rd edn, Reuters Thomson 2010) 37; see also 
Terry Hutchinson, ‘The transnational lawyer: GATS, globalisation and the effects on legal education’ 
(2006) 11(2) Australian and New Zealand Journal of Legal Education 93, 94, 97, 100. 
15
 Mark Van Hoecke (ed), Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind 
of Discipline? (Hart 2011) vi.  
16
 Fabio Perin Shecaira, ‘Legal arguments from scholarly authority’ (2017) 30(3) Ratio Juris 305, 
306. 
17
 Jan M Smits, ‘What is legal doctrine? On the aims and methods of legal-dogmatic research’ (Sep-
tember 2015) Maastricht European Private Law Institute Working Paper No.2015/06, 3.    
18
 Douglas W Vick, ‘Interdisciplinarity and the discipline of law’ (2004) 31(2) Journal of Law and 
Society 163 165. 
19
 Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Re-
search’ (2012) 17(1) Deakin Law Review 83, 99. 
20
 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Legal research and the social science’ (2006) 122 Law Quarterly Review 
632, 634.  
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 However, the interpretation in the doctrinal research method differs from the 
Verstehen tradition of the social sciences. The Verstehen approach is traditionally 
based on the collection of empirical data for the basis for its theories or testing them 
by a procedure of empirical investigation. Schwandt asserted that the validity of the 
doctrinal research method findings is not affected by the empirical standard.21 In 
other words, the authoritative rules command how people ought to conduct their be-
haviour, but they do not describe, predict, or understand individual behaviour.22  
 This thesis applies a doctrinal research methodology intending to critically 
analyse the AML policies, legislation, regulations, and relevant case law in each of 
the three countries.23 Ogus supports that the analysis of law requires a systematic 
comparison of common law and continental civil law systems, which may present 
the benefits gained from the harmonisation between different legal systems of each 
jurisdiction.24  
 In achieving the thesis’ goals, it is necessary to undertake a comprehensive 
assessment of the primary sources of AML policies, legislation, rules, and case law 
in Thailand, and then to compare them with the UK and Singapore by studying the 
relevant measures concentrated on its doctrine, including asking ‘what is the law?’25 
Such authoritative rules generally prescribe what the duty is and inform how people 
                                                 
21
 Thomas A Schwandt, ‘Three epistemological stances for qualitative inquiry: Interpretivism, her-
meneutics and social constructionism’ in Norman K Denzin and Yvonna S Lincoln (eds), Handbook 
of Qualitative Research (2nd edn, Sage 2000) 190. 
22
 Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law (Max Knight tr, University of California Press 1967).  
23
 Terry Hutchinson, ‘Interdisciplinary methods in reforming the law’ (2015) 3ELR 130, 131; see 
also Chynoweth (n 9) 29.  
24
 Anthony Ogus, ‘What legal scholars can learn from law and economics’ (2004) 79(2) Chicago-
Kent Law Review 383, 392; Salter and Mason (n 12) 185, 186. 
25
 The AML policy in this thesis includes the UN conventions, FATF Recommendations and the 
relevant AML policies of three countries; see Hutchinson and Duncan (n 19) 83, 101, 116; see Barry 
Rider and Jeffrey Bryant, Market abuse and insider dealing (3rd edn, Bloomsbury Professional 2016) 
148; see also Chynoweth (n 9) 30.   
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ought to conduct their behaviour.26 Furthermore, the laws do not try either to forecast 
or even to understand human behaviour.27 
 Therefore, to answer the first research question, this thesis applies the doctri-
nal research method,28 focusing on studying the research in law29 or the legal texts 
themselves and closely linking them with the doctrine of judicial precedent30 to ex-
plore and examine what such law state on a specific issue and why it states it.31 The 
thesis acknowledges that this research method also concerns a systematic examina-
tion of the regulations, norms, and principles about a specific component of the law.32 
The doctrinal research method helps explain how the FATF Recommendations are 
placed in the Thailand AML policies by analysing and synthesising the related poli-
cies, legislation, case law and guidelines.33 
 The research starts with the identification of the international AML stand-
ards, such as the relevant United Nations (UN) Conventions (Vienna, Palermo and 
Merida Convention) and the FATF Recommendations. It then looks at the AML na-
tional policies and laws of three jurisdictions to examine what they are and to assess 
whether they are consistent with the international standards.34 Consequently, the 
                                                 
26
 Kelsen (n 22).  
27
 Ibid.  
28
 Vick (n 18) 163, 163; see Salter and Mason (n 12) 44; see also Chynoweth (n 9) 29.  
29
 Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law, Law and Learning: Report to the Social 
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (The Council 1983).  
30
 Hutchinson and Duncan (n 19) 83, 84. 
31
 Salter and Mason (n 12) 44; see also Graham Virgo, ‘Doctrinal Legal Research’ <http://www.ox-
fordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199290543.001.0001/acref-9780199290543-e-674> ac-
cessed 21 February 2016.  
32
 Content analysis has been compared to doctrinal research. Content analysis refers to an analysis of 
documents and texts that need to quantify the content in terms of predetermined types and the sys-
tematic and replicable manner; see Hutchinson and Duncan (n 19) 83, 101; see also Alan Bryman, 
Social Research Methods (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2008) 692. 
33
 Hutchinson and Duncan (n 19) 83, 84. 
34
 The Thailand Anti-Money Laundering Act 1999; the UK Proceeds of Crime Act 2002; as well as 
The Singapore Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) 
Act 1992. 
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doctrinal research method systemises and helps the researcher to evaluate the FATF 
rules and suggest what the Thailand AML policies should be.35  
 In summary, this thesis examines, interprets, and analyses the AML policies 
at various levels about the international, regional, and national contexts in order to 
understand and explore the original rules of law, authoritative advice, and guidance  
by using the interpretative approach.36 For example, the Vienna Convention, the Pa-
lermo Convention, the Merida Convention, or the FATF Recommendations relate to 
the interpretation of statutory provisions because these international laws require le-
gal entities37 to transpose them into the national laws.38 The implication of such en-
actment will help the researcher to understand those policies clearly. 
  
2.2.2 Socio-Legal Method 
 This thesis applies the ‘implementation of AML policies’ as a conceptual 
framework to address the critiques of a socio-legal method and to highlight the main 
aspects of the independence of the Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO) struc-
ture. The FATF Recommendations provide a conceptual basis in this literature of the 
thesis.  
 In order to determine the extent and effectiveness of how the Thailand FIU 
has implemented the international AML standards, the use of the doctrinal research 
method alone cannot answer the second, third, and fourth research questions because 
the legal doctrine is insufficient to identify the results of the levels of the international 
                                                 
35
 Vick (n 18) 163, 165. 
36
 James A Holland and Julian S Webb, Learning Legal Rules: A Students ’Guide to Legal Method 
and Reasoning (9th edn, Oxford University Press 2016) 16. 
37
 Ibid., 6. 
38
 Ibid., 179. 
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regulations.39 The doctrinal legal method could be construed as being far too narrow 
from an inter-disciplinary research project.40 Therefore, the socio-legal approach is 
applied in this thesis to evaluate of legal instruments, case law, and secondary 
sources. Furthermore, the socio-legal method supplements the doctrinal approach 
because it looks beyond legal texts, inter alia, conventions, statutes, and case law, 
and seeking to acknowledge social considerations, which are crucial to complement 
the analysis of relevant law to understand the role of law in context.41 That means 
not only critically assessing different regulations but also assessing the implications 
of the legislation.42 It applies to secondary sources, such as the MER43 of the three 
countries to identify, interpret, clarify, and evaluate how effective the FIUs have 
been implementing the international AML standards.  
 This research examines the deeper meaning of legal texts via the doctrinal 
approach to understand the roles and responsibilities of the FIU and related compe-
tent authorities in a wider context.44 Cownie and Bradney note that the socio-legal 
method considers legal context, including sociology, history, economy, and geogra-
phy.45 Therefore, this approach is beneficial as it assists to explore how the AML 
legislation is applied, created, abolished, and amended to answer research question 
                                                 
39
 George L Priest, ‘The growth of interdisciplinary research and the industrial structure of the pro-
duction of legal ideas: A reply to Judge Edwards’ (1993) 1929 Mich. L. Rev.  
40
 Smits (n 17) 4.   
41
 Roger Cotterrel, ‘Why must legal ideas be interpreted sociologically’ (1998) 25(2) Journal of Law 
and Society 171, 173. 
42
 Amanda Kerry-Pessaris, ‘What does it mean to take a social-legal approach to international eco-
nomic law’ in Amanda Kerry-Pessaris (ed), Socio-Legal Approaches to International Economic Law: 
Text, Context, Subtext (Routledge 2013) 3. 
43
 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘Topic: Mutual Evaluations’ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pub-
lications/mutualevaluations/?hf=10&b=0&s=desc(fatf_releasedate)> accessed 27 June 2018.     
44
 Salter and Mason (n 12) 112-113. 
45
 Fiona Cownie and Anthony Bradney, ‘Socio-legal studies’ in Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton 
(eds), Research Methods in Law (Routledge 2013) 35. 
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number two, which aims to evaluate the effectiveness of Thailand’s FIU in imple-
menting such standards. 
 Therefore, the thesis adopts a socio-legal approach to examine Thailand 
FIU’s application of the FATF Recommendations.46 It aims to help Thailand learn 
apply the FATF Recommendations in order to meet international requirements.47 
The use of a socio-legal approach helps understand and predict future develop-
ments,48 to determine how to make effective decisions in different types of cases,49 
and learn how the FATF Recommendations work in practice and how legislative 
instruments are affected by political, economic and social contexts in Thailand as in 
the case of the FATF blacklisting Thailand in 2012.50 The socio-legal method pre-
sents a normative and analytical way to determine how and why such a blacklist 
affected Thailand.51  
 
2.2.3 Comparative Law Method 
 The comparative law method involves the interpretation of national rules of 
law to understand the differences and similarities of more than one legal system.52 
Dannemann explains that the comparative law method assists the researcher to com-
prehend the different legal systems (namely, Civil law and Common Law) with sim-
ilar contexts (i.e. the implementation of the FATF Recommendations) in order to 
                                                 
46
 Michael Hill and Peter Hupe, Implementing Public Policy: Governance in Theory and in Practice 
(SAGE 2002) 118. 
47
 Holland and Webb (n 36) 297. 
48
 Terry Hutchison, ‘Developing Legal Research Skills: Expanding the Paradigm’ (2008) 32 Mel-
bourne University Law Review 1065, 1068.   
49
 Aleksander Peczenik, ‘Legal research and growth of science’ <http://biblio.jurid-
icas.unam.mx/libros/1 468/3.pdf > accessed 16 June 2015.  
50
 Cownie and Bradney (n 45) 35. 
51
 Kerry-Pessaris (n 42) 3.  
52
 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Tony Weir tr, 3rd edn, 
Oxford University Press 1998) 4, 18. 
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deal with particular legal issues, such as the problems of the FIU’s implementation 
of the FATF standards in Thailand, the UK and Singapore.53  
 Thailand uses civil law while the UK and Singapore employ the common 
law. However, the three countries have AML legislation in the form of written law, 
such as the Singapore Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Con-
fiscation of Benefits) Act 1992 (Chapter 65A) (CDSA),54 the UK Proceeds of Crime 
Act 2002 (POCA),55 and Thailand Anti-Money Laundering Act B.E.2542 (1999) 
(AMLA).56 Therefore, this thesis analyses the two primary legal systems, namely the 
civil law system and the common law system.57 As mentioned above, the thesis ex-
amines the AML policies in three jurisdictions in order to explore the alternative 
AML strategies as the most appropriate FIU model that should be implemented by 
Thailand’s FIU to fight money laundering effectively.  
 It may be essential to conduct comparisons of several laws of the different 
legal systems such as those in Thailand, Singapore and the UK. Conversely, the com-
parison can be made in a legal system, such as between different paragraphs of Thai-
land Civil Code.58 This thesis will look beyond national boundaries (including the 
                                                 
53
 Gerhard Dannemann, ‘Comparative law: Study of similarities and differences?’ in Mathias 
Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford Uni-
versity Press 2006) 411; see also Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, Constitutional Identify (Harvard University 
Press 2010) 144. 
54
 Singapore Government, ‘Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of 
Benefits) Act (Chapter 65A)’ (Singapore Statute Online 1 September 2014) 
<https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/CDTOSCCBA1992> Accessed 21 June 2018. 
55
 National Archives, ‘Proceeds of Crime Act 2002’ <http://www.legisla-
tion.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/29/contents> accessed 21 June 2018. 
56
 Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO), ‘Anti-Money Laundering Act B.E.2542 (1999)’ 
<http://www.amlo.go.th/amlo-intranet/en/files/AMLA%20No%201-4(1).pdf> accessed 11 June 
2019.  
57
 Joseph Dainow, ‘The Civil Law and the Common Law: Some points of comparison’ (1966-1967) 
15(3) The American Journal of Comparative Law 419, 419. 
58
 Comparative law started in Paris in 1900, the year of the World Exhibition; see Zweigert and Kotz 
(n 52) 2. 
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FATF Recommendations) to find solutions to the AML legal problem that all juris-
dictions have faced. Each country has different cultures, legal systems, and legisla-
tive frameworks, which are the important elements to respond to the threat of money 
laundering. Nevertheless, Del Bufalo said that international cooperation, as well as 
the exchange of information among relevant competent authorities and FIUs, enable 
countries and the private sectors to deal with the money laundering risks.59 
 Murphy et al. noted that the variety of legal systems, such as differences be-
tween common and civil law systems, across the FATF Member States and incom-
patibilities between them could impact the effectiveness of the implementation of 
the international AML standards.60 The relevant provisions of the international as-
sessment are applied when it becomes an issue of implementing the processes of the 
three FIUs. The reason why we are using the UK and Singapore in this study is that 
the FATF rated them as best practices for the robust AML measures.61 
 Thailand, the researcher’s home country, will be used as a case study, firstly 
because it is a developing country that needs foreign investment to promote its econ-
omy. Secondly, a part of Thailand is an area of the ‘golden triangle,’ where there are 
several narcotics trafficked to the illegal world drug market.62 Therefore, improving 
                                                 
59
 Giancarlo Del Bufalo, the President of the FATF between 2011-2012. 
60
 Cian C Murphy, Aldo Zammit Borda and Lucy Hoyte, ‘The perspectives of counter-terrorism op-
eratives on EU counter-terrorism law and policy’ in Fiona de Londras and Josephine Doody, The 
Impact, Legitimacy and Effectiveness of EU Counter-Terrorism (Routledge 2015) 171. 
61
 Secretary of State for the Home Department, Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism 
(The Stationery Office 2009) 9; Nicholas Ryder, Money Laundering: An Endless Cycle? A Compar-
ative Analysis of the Anti-Money Laundering Policies in the United States of America, the United 
Kingdom, Australia and Canada (Routledge 2012) 160; see also Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 
‘Singapore’s measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing’ <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/countries/s-t/singapore/documents/mer-singapore-2016.html> accessed 8 August 2018.  
62
 The Golden Triangle is the geographic center of the Greater Mekong Sub-region, and plans are 
well underway to expand transport and infrastructure and lower trade barriers and border controls 
across the region. The organized criminal networks that benefit from Southeast Asia’s illicit drug 
trade are well positioned to take advantage of regional integration. Consequently, opium poppy cul-
tivation in Southeast Asia’s Golden Triangle of Myanmar, Lao PDR and Thailand rose for the seventh 
consecutive year, see also United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), ‘Southeast Asia 
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the effectiveness of the fight against money laundering in Thailand would contribute 
to the international efforts to solve such problems. Thirdly, Thailand is a member of 
the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units and the Asia/Pacific Group on 
Money Laundering (APG), which promotes the adoption, implementation, and en-
forcement of globally accepted AML standards. Thus, the study of the Thailand re-
gime in fighting money laundering will be useful to other countries which share sim-
ilar circumstance to Thailand and seek to strengthen the implementation of AML 
legislation.    
 The doctrinal research will identify the AML policy relating to the roles of 
the Thailand FIU. The doctrinal approach can address the first research question, but 
for the other research questions, this thesis also applies the socio-legal and compar-
ative law method to answer such research questions. The evaluation of the imple-
mentation of international law and its role in the three jurisdictions needs to consider 
all aspects, including the government, competent AML authorities, and the inde-
pendence of the FIUs. The thesis illustrates how effective the Thailand FIU has been 
in implementing international standards to combat money laundering, and the find-
ings will indicate whether the AML legislation can address the money-laundering 
problem. This thesis will also answer research question number three, which asks 
whether Thailand needs to implement other strategies in fighting money laundering 
or not. Finally, the study considers what lessons Thailand should adopt the UK and 
Singapore. Therefore, these methodologies will help find ways to improve the per-
formance of relevant actors in the AML regime. 
                                                 
Opium Survey 2013: Lao PDR and Myanmar’ <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crop-monitoring/in-
dex.html> accessed 13 February 2016. 
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 This thesis will also examine reliable non-legal sources to present the analy-
sis with statistics (Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs)/Suspicious Activity Re-
ports (SARs)), prosecution and conviction for money laundering offences, and rele-
vant data which include formal annual reports issued by the FATF, such as the FATF 
Public Statement, the MER and government publications (i.e. legislation and the in-
ternational agreement). The analysis of the thesis will be augmented with secondary 
sources, academic texts, and journal articles. The literature review aims to build up 
a robust conceptual framework. This legislative framework will help to clarify the 
gap of knowledge in this thesis involving the implementation of AML legislation by 
competent authorities. The main sources are from the AMLO, including the Thailand 
Government, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Finance, Royal Thailand Police (RTP), 
Office of Narcotics Control Board (ONCB), National Anti-Corruption Commission 
(NACC), Department of Special Investigation (DSI) and Thailand Chamber of Com-
merce, in addition to all formal documents from the UK, Singapore and international 
organizations, such as the FATF, the Egmont Group, the IMF, the World Bank, and 
the APG).  
 The study will carry out the following tasks: collecting relevant information; 
reviewing the literature on AML legislation and its implementation; and analysing 
the international AML standards and Thailand Anti-Money Laundering Act 
B.E.2542 (1999) (AMLA), the UK’s POCA 2002 (POCA) and Singapore’s CDSA 
1992; as well as using data obtained from analysing the abovementioned legislation 
to evaluate the level of implementation of AML legislation and justify whether Thai-
land requires further strategies to fight money laundering regimes. 
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 2.3 Ethical Considerations 
 This dissertation will not involve human subjects. The author will apply and 
utilise documentary research mainly via library and database research. 
 
2.4 Literature Review  
 Cooper noted that a literature review attempts to illustrate, encapsulate, as-
sess, clarify, and amalgamate the content of primary research.63 The objectives of 
relevant literature reviews include an examination of previous research on what 
should be studied further to identify the topics, ideas, strengths and weaknesses of 
the texts, and a map of the subject knowledge in current debates in this subject area.64 
Furthermore, the thesis critically evaluates the quality of previous works  and iden-
tifies the appropriate research methods, practices in this thesis.65  
 Literature reviews can assist in putting the thesis in context by identifying, 
analysing, and synthesising66 the main points, gaps, inconsistencies,67 issues, find-
ings, research methods, and reasons in a body of existing knowledge to see how it 
                                                 
63
 Harris M Cooper, ‘Organising knowledge syntheses: A taxonomy of literature reviews’ (1988) 1 
Knowledge in Society 104, 126; see also David N Boote and Penny Beile, ‘Scholars before research-
ers: on the centrality of the dissertation literature review in research preparation’ (2005) 34(6) Edu-
cational Researcher 3, 3. 
64
 Chris Hart, Doing a Literature Review: Releasing the Research Imagination (2nd edn, SAGE 2018) 
32. 
65
 Ibid; see also Patricia Cronin, Frances Ryan and Michael Coughlan, ‘Undertaking a literature re-
view: a step-by-step approach’ (2008) 17(1) British Journal of Nursing 38, 38; see also University of 
West Florida (UWF), ‘Literature review: conducting & writing’ <https://lib-
guides.uwf.edu/c.php?g=215199&p=1420520> accessed 13 July 2018. 
66
 Hart (n 64) 15. 
67
 Denise F Polit and Cheryl Beck, Essentials of Nursing Research: Methods, Appraisal, and Utili-
sation (6th edn, Lippincott Williams & Wilkins 2006).  
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differs from that of other scholar research. The literature reviews also help the re-
searcher understand the problem clearly in order to make a new contribution to the 
subject area.68 
 This thesis was conducted to obtain an overview of what the roles of the FIUs 
are; what factors or areas related to the roles of the FIUs were identified by other 
scholars; key scholars in this field; what questions are asked; what appropriate and 
useful research methodologies were used to examine the roles of the FIUs; what ad-
vantages or disadvantages of such research methods are; and what principles other 
scholars apply to explain the roles of the FIUs.69 
 This thesis is conducted to ensure that the roles, administration, responsibil-
ities, and the level of the operational independence of Thailand’s FIU is free from 
undue industry, government, and political influence and interference.70 Thailand’s 
MER noted that Thailand’s FIU does not have sufficient operational independence 
and autonomy in its roles and responsibilities.71 The APG rated Thailand’s FIU as 
‘largely compliant’ with Recommendation 29 of the 2012 FATF Recommenda-
tions.72 Section 40(1) of the AMLA 1999 provides that Thailand’s FIU shall carry 
out acts in the implementation of resolutions of the Anti-Money Laundering Board 
                                                 
68
 Hart (n 64) 41, 45; see Boote and Beile (n 63) 3, 3; see also David Nunan, Research Methods in 
Language Learning (Cambridge University Press 1992) 217. 
69
 Emerald Publishing, ‘How to write a literature review: Part 1’ <http://www.emeraldgrouppublish-
ing.com/authors/guides/write/literature.htm> accessed 14 July 2018.  
70
 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), International Standards on Combating Money Laundering 
and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation: The FATF Recommendations (FATF 2012) 99.  
71
 Sections 25, 40, 41 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act B.E. 2542 (1999); see Asia/Pacific Group 
on Money Laundering, Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures: Thai-
land Mutual Evaluation Report (FATF 2017) 183. 
72
 Ibid. 
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(AMLB).73 Moreover, s. 41 of the AMLA 1999 determines that the Secretary-Gen-
eral shall act its roles independently as provided by the AMLA 1999.74  
 Furthermore, s. 25 of the AMLA 1999 identifies that the AMLB has the pow-
ers and responsibilities to oversee, supervise, and control Thailand FIU, the Trans-
action Committee (TC), and the Secretary-General to act in their roles independently, 
including to restrain and hold any actions of Thailand FIU, the Secretary-General or 
the TC, which the AMLB sees as violation or discrimination of fundamental human 
rights.75 Significantly, s. 40(5) of the AMLA 1999 determines that Thailand’s FIU 
receives evidence to take legislative proceedings against criminals under the AMLA 
1999, such as investigation or prosecution.76 Nevertheless, Thailand is required to 
strengthen its legislation concerning the powers and responsibilities of Thailand’s 
FIU to deal with the ambiguity issue of the level of its independence and the quality 
of the STRs. Accordingly, it is vital to analyse comparatively whether Thailand’s 
FIU abides by international standards, as well as to evaluate whether Thailand’s FIU 
has adequately independent and autonomous roles to cope with the STRs regime and 
undue political and government interference or influence. 
 The thesis argues that the AMLA 1999 should assure a degree of independ-
ence of Thailand’s FIU from an undue government, industry, and political influence 
or interference in order to support its roles and responsibilities to deal with the STRs 
regime effectively, especially in amending the legal provision of Thailand FIU under 
the control of the AMLB. The APG’s MER stated that available sanctions for 
AML/CFT failures are low, and the process for application of fines for breaches is 
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 Section 40(1) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act B.E. 2542 (1999). 
74
 Section 41 para 2 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act B.E. 2542 (1999).  
75
 Section 25 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act B.E. 2542 (1999). 
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 Section 40(5) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act B.E. 2542 (1999). 
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limited to criminal prosecutions and related settling mechanisms, which undermines 
effective enforcement.77 Consequently, the significance of this study is to examine 
the effectiveness of the AMLA 1999 in implementing international AML standards. 
The research findings might serve as information for the Thailand government to 
consider whether Thailand needs to provide further AML strategies for competent 
authorities to strengthen the implementation of the AMLA 1999. Policymakers and 
FIU authorities of Thailand working in the same context would also be particularly 
interested in improving their units and comparing themselves with other jurisdictions 
and standards. 
 The main area for examination in this thesis is the role of the FIUs under 
international standards.78 The research includes looking closely at the wording of the 
legal provisions that describe the roles of the FIUs and examining its main require-
ments in terms of the international AML standards. Furthermore, it explores the im-
pact of the roles of Thailand’s FIU under Thailand AMLA 1999.79 Next, the thesis 
will also examine the gaps in the AMLA 1999 in the interpreting of the FATF Rec-
ommendation 29 and its Interpretive Note, especially the level of independence of 
Thailand’s FIU through a comparative examination of best practices in the UK80 and 
Singapore.81 Lastly, the thesis will seek to investigate if the comparison of such best 
practices could improve Thailand’s FIU functions.82 The next section examines the 
central theme of this thesis. 
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 Financial Action Task Force (n 71) 5. 
78
 See discussion in chapter 3. 
79
 See discussion in chapter 4. 
80
 See discussion in chapter 5. 
81
 See discussion in chapter 6. 
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 See discussion in chapter 4. 
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2.5 Central Themes 
 The thesis presents a literature review determining primary themes and the 
areas of examination. Therefore, this literature review aims to present an academic 
commentary in the areas of the role of the FIU as an important AML mechanism in 
fighting against money laundering issues under the FATF Recommendation 29. The 
criteria of discussion in the literature review proceed on the fundamental of those 
sources that are chosen to cover the related themes for examination in this thesis. 
The central themes in this thesis are as follows: 
 
2.5.1 The Role of Thailand’s Financial Intelligence Unit 
 The FATF Recommendation 29 suggests that its Member States, including 
the UK, and Singapore, and other FATF-style bodies, such as Thailand, commit the 
implementation of this Recommendation without exception by establishing the FIU 
as a national centre to deal with the suspicious transactions or suspicious activities 
and financial intelligence consistent with the requirements of the international stand-
ards and the AMLA 1999.83 Therefore, Thailand should amend the AMLA 1999 re-
lated to the role of the FIU in AML/CFT to achieve the FATF’s goal.84  
 There are several types of FIU that the Egmont Group of FIU introduces four 
FIU models,85 including administrative, law-enforcement, judicial, and hybrid type 
of FIU that are adopted to fight against money laundering. 86 The UK and Singapore 
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 FATF Recommendation 29, s. 40(2) of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA 
(No.4) B.E.2556 (2013); see Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Methodology for Assessing Tech-
nical Compliance with the FATF Recommendations and the Effectiveness of AML/CFT Systems 
(FATF 2013) 114. 
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 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), ‘About APG’ <http://www.apgml.org/about-
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 Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, ‘Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs)’ <https://eg-
montgroup.org/en/content/financial-intelligence-units-fius> accessed 16 July 2018.  
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adopt the administrative-FIU model,87 but Thailand uses the hybrid-FIU model com-
prising administrative, law enforcement, and judicial-FIU model.88  
 The thesis will concentrate on the main area in examining the role of Thai-
land’s FIU in implementing international standards when fighting money laundering 
as the central theme. This thesis discusses the s. 40 of the AMLA 1999 relating to 
the powers and duties of Thailand’s FIU.89  
 
2.5.2 The Operational Independence of Thailand’s Financial Intelligence Unit 
 As mentioned above, the main requirement of the FATF Recommendation 
29 aims to provide the FIU the operational independence, including having the au-
thority and capacity to operate its functions independently and the autonomous de-
cision to carry out its powers.90 Section 40 of the AMLA 1999 determines that the 
AMLO is not under the Prime Minister’s Office, Ministry, or Sub-Ministry and to 
function neutrally and independently.91 Thus, the second theme involves the level of 
the operational independence of Thailand’s FIU, which is a valuable sub-theme 
throughout the thesis comparing those of the UK and Singapore. This thesis focuses 
on s. 25(3) of the AMLA 1999 relating to the powers and duties of the Anti-Money 
Laundering Board (AMLB) because this Provision provides the judicial power to the 
AMLB to control, hold, or restrain any activities of the AMLO, the TC, and the Sec-
retary-General when the AMLB considers such the activities discrimination or 
                                                 
87
 See discussion in chapters 4 and 5, respectively. 
88
 See discussion in chapters 6. 
89
 Section 40 of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.4) B.E.2556 (2013).  
90
 Section 40 of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.4) B.E.2556 (2013); 
see Financial Action Task Force (n 95) 114. 
91
 Section 40 of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.4) B.E.2556 (2013).   
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breach of fundamental human rights.92 This section may cause minor issues regard-
ing sufficient operational independence of the AMLO under the FATF standards.93  
 To reach the research objectives, the thesis analyses various academic com-
mentaries on the role of Thailand’s FIUs and its independence under the FATF Rec-
ommendations by comparing the best practices applied in the UK and Singapore via 
the FATF MERs. Stessens chose the comparative method to compare legislation 
contexts in the Benelux countries, Switzerland, the UK, and the US’s national 
AML,94 including the various kinds of confiscation of the proceeds of crime (includ-
ing concerning specific property, value-confiscation, and object-confiscation), crim-
inalisation of money laundering property, and the evolution of the money laundering 
offence and its associated predicate offences. Moreover, he explained the importance 
of AML instrument in the prevention of money laundering, namely the FIU, and the 
regulatory or supervisory bodies in each country.95 He also examined the FIU models 
in such countries, such as the UK FIU, and the National Crime Intelligence Service 
(NCIS), as a law enforcement-FIU model, but he did not discuss the level of the 
operational independence of the UK FIU.96 This thesis favours the comparative anal-
ysis between Thailand’s FIU duties and best practices of the FIUs in the UK and 
Singapore to see whether Thailand’s FIU is consistent with international standards, 
especially the FATF Recommendation 29. The thesis points out the alternative AML 
                                                 
92
 Section 25(3) of the AMLA B.E. 2542 (1999) as additionally amended by the Order of the Head 
of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) No. 38/2560 (2017) Re: The Revision of the 
Powers and Duties of the Anti-Money Laundering Board; s. 38 of the AMLA 1999. 
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 Financial Action Task Force (n 71) 183. 
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 Guy Stessens, Money Laundering: A New International Law Enforcement Model (Cambridge Uni-
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strategies for enhancing the Thai AML policy in fighting money laundering. There-
fore, this thesis contributes to knowledge to improve the FIU.  
 Next, Alldridge focused on the confiscation of proceeds of money laundering 
offences in the UK in line with the UK Money Laundering Regulations 1993 
(MLRs).97 However, he described an introduction to the UK AML legislation and its 
characteristics in the 2000s. He generally studied the roles of the regulatory agencies, 
such as the Assets Recovery Agency (ARA)98 and the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA), but he did not emphasise the FIU in implementing international AML stand-
ards.99 He critically examined the history, theory, and development of the POCA 
2002 under international standards, for example, the UN AML Conventions, the EU 
directives, the Conventions of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (OECD) and the Council of Europe, as the member states of such soft 
law.100 He stated that the NCIS, the then UK FIU, was established by Part 1 of the 
Police Act 1997 as an enforcement agency.101 He explained that the roles of the UK 
FIU included receiving and analysing intelligence information to disseminate intel-
ligence to national police forces.102  
 The NCIS also cooperated with financial sectors and regulatory authorities 
regarding the training of money laundering reporting officer (MLRO),103 as well as 
                                                 
97
 Peter Alldridge, Money Laundering Law: Forfeiture, Confiscation, Civil Recovery, Criminal Laun-
dering and Taxation of the Proceeds of Crime (Hart 2003). 
98
 Assets Recovery Agency (ARA) was the UK independently non-ministerial government depart-
ment under the Proceeds of Crime 2002 (POCA), i.e. it was responsible for reducing crime by con-
fiscating the proceeds of any crime. The ARA answered to the UK Parliament directly rather than to 
a minister. Then, it was merged with the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) in 2006; see 
National Audit Office (NAO), ‘The Assets Recovery Agency’ <https://www.nao.org.uk/report/the-
assets-recovery-agency/> accessed 12 July 2018.  
99
 Alldridge (n 97). 
100
 Ibid., 13. 
101
 Ibid., 17. 
102  Ibid., 17. 
103
 Ibid., 260. 
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the coordination of international FIUs for exchanging financial intelligence.104 Alt-
hough the UK FIU has now become the National Crime Agency (NCA) since 2013 
under the Crime and Courts Act 2013, he noted that the low quality of the suspicious 
activity/transaction reports (SARs/STRs), namely ‘defensive reporting’, has contin-
ued.105 He discussed the formation of the FIU in the UK under art 6 of the Money 
Laundering Directive 1991 (MLD), which identified the three FIU models, namely 
judicial, police, and independent-FIU models.106  
 The thesis favours the comparison between Thailand’s FIU and those of best 
practices (i.e. the UK and Singapore) whether they are consistent with international 
standards, especially the FATF Recommendation 29. The thesis points out the alter-
native AML strategies for enhancing the Thai AML policy in fighting against money 
laundering and contributes to the knowledge on the subject.   
 Pieth and Aiolfi presented efforts to fight money laundering and the efforts 
of the AML legislation and regulations in four major financial centres (i.e. the UK, 
the USA, Singapore and Switzerland) until 2003.107 They studied the evolution of 
the AML paradigm from its origins as an instrument to counter drug trafficking and 
financing of terrorism in order to examine whether the levels of implementation of 
the AML systems in these countries meet the international standards. They focused 
on the roles of financial institutions in implementing the international, national AML 
standards, including customer due diligence (CDD) and risk-based approach (RBA) 
                                                 
104
 See discussion in chapter 4. 
105 See discussion in chapter 4; see also Alldridge (n 97) 260. 
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 Ibid., 99. 
107
 Mark Pieth and Gemma Aiolfi (eds), A Comparative Guide to Anti-Money Laundering: A Critical 
Analysis of Systems in Singapore, Switzerland, the UK and the USA (Edward Elgar 2004).  
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standards. This report was published in 2004.108 However, several pieces of legisla-
tion and regulations, such as the FATF Recommendations, have changed as they 
were revised in 2012. In the case of the UK, the Money Laundering Regulations 2003 
(MLRs) were replaced by the 2007 MLRs, the 2017 MLRs and the 2020 MLR, re-
spectively.109 The UK government implemented the EU Commission’s Third Money 
Laundering Directive 2007 by transposing such the international AML instruments 
into the UK 2007 MLRs.  
 To deter and detect money laundering regime effectively,110 the UK govern-
ment enacted several AML regulations, such as the Serious Crime Act 2015 to 
strengthen the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 in order to increase the protection from 
civil liability for companies conducting authorised money laundering disclosures.111 
Additionally, the UK parliament passed the Criminal Finances Act 2017 (CFA), the 
Joint Money Laundering Steering Group (JMLSG) guidance, the FCA Handbook, 
Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls Sourcebook (SYSC), in-
cluding the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, which created signifi-
cant changes, especially in respect of the Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) re-
gime to oblige all reporting entities (Res).112 Furthermore, the UK FIU has changed 
                                                 
108 Ibid. 
109
 The Money Laundering Regulations 2003 (SI2003 No. 3075) (2003 MLRs); The Money Laun-
dering Regulations 2007 (SI 2007 No. 2157); The Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (EU) 
2015/894 (MLD4); the Fifth Money Laundering Directive 2018/843 (MLD5); the Sixth Money Laun-
dering Directive 2018/1673 (MLD6). 
110
 The Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) 
Regulations 2017 (SI 2017 No. 692) (2017 MLRs).  
111
 Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales (ICAEW), ‘UK legislation and regula-
tions’ <https://www.icaew.com/library/subject-gateways/law/money-laundering/uk-legislation-and-
regulations> accessed 9 July 2018.   
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 Lexis PSL, ‘Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist – issues for financial services firms’ 
<https://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/lexispsl/financialservices/synopsis/146930:146936/Financial-
crime/Anti-money-laundering-and-counter-terrorist-financing%E2%80%94issues-for-financial-ser-
vices-firms> accessed 10 July 2018; see also ACA Compliance (Europe), ‘UK’s anti-money launder-
ing legislation – understanding the recent changes and impact on your firm’s procedure’ (6 July 2017) 
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from the NCIS,113 to the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA),114 into the NCA 
to be responsible for the UK FIU in line with the Crime and Courts Act 2013.115 
However, Pieth and Aiolfi did not focus on the different FIU models and the FIU’s 
roles in the SAR regime. They, however, studied Singapore’s AML legislation, rules, 
and practice by obtaining relevant data from the official media releases, legislation, 
academic texts, commentaries, and unofficial interviews with bankers and officials 
in Singapore since 2003, which were out of date. Therefore, this thesis will present 
seeks to deepen the understanding of the AML regimes in the UK, Singapore and 
Thailand. The thesis can consequently contribute to knowledge. 
 Further, Campbell focused on the FSA, a regulatory authority to fight against 
financial crime pursuant to the 1993 MLRs.116 He noted that the FSA would create 
the AML culture in the reporting entities, for instance, financial institutions under 
the AML regulations, such as the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
(FSMA).117 Although the FSA had the power to authorise firms, to produce the AML 
regulations, to supervise and enforce all reporting entities, it failed to achieve the UK 
government’s objectives.118 He also studied the role of the FSA in preventing money 
laundering problems that is monitoring financial institutions to ensure they complied 
                                                 
<http://www.acacomplianceeurope.com/news/compliance-alert/uks-anti-money-laundering-legisla-
tion-understanding-recent-changes-and-impact> accessed 9 July 2018.  
113
 The National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), the UK FIU funding by the Home Office, was 
established in 1997 by the Part 1 of the Police Act 1997 and then replaced by the Serious Organised 
Crime Agency (SOCA) in 2006.  
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 The Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 established the Serious Organised Crime 
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 Government Digital Service, ‘Serious Organised Crime Agency has closed’ (7 October 2013) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/serious-organised-crime-agency. Accessed 9 July 
2018.   
116
 Andrew Campbell, ‘The Financial Services Authority and the Prevention of Money Laundering’ 
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with the AML requirements, especially the MLRs 2007.119 He and Campbell criti-
cally analysed the role of solicitors in fighting money laundering.120 Additionally, he 
and Cartwright examined the function of the legislation in preventing banks from 
failing to comply with international AML standards in the UK, Sweden, Italy, 
France, Austria, New Zealand, the US, and Canada.121 Consequently, it is important 
to use his literature to examine the roles of FIUs in preventing money laundering and 
meeting the international AML standards by looking at the UK FSA’s development 
and failure in the past. Formerly in the UK, the FSA and the NCIS co-operated in 
fighting against money laundering. Now the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and 
the NCA deal with such problems.122  
 Ryder considered the extent to which the international AML best practices 
and industry guidelines, which pre-dates the instruments introduced by the UN, the 
FATF, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the Wolfsberg Group, the In-
ternational Organisation of Securities Commission, and the Egmont Group of Finan-
cial Intelligence Units, have been transposed into the national aggressive measures 
of the USA, the UK, Australia and Canada in tackling money laundering.123 He ar-
gued that the UK’s AML framework goes beyond the fundamental requirements of 
such AML standards. Moreover, he examined and compared the roles of govern-
ment, competent AML authorities, as well as the FIUs in each jurisdiction. He high-
lighted the evolution of the FIUs. However, he argued that the NCIS was merged 
into the SOCA because the NCIS did not achieve the UK government’s goals. 
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 Furthermore, the SOCA arose due to pressure from the UK government and 
commentators, which stated the SOCA must be transferred to the NCA. He identified 
that the impact of the domestic AML regulations and the roles of FIUs caused de-
fensive reporting and compliance cost to the reporting entities. Interestingly, he pro-
vided a detailed explanation of AML policies and regulatory frameworks in each 
jurisdiction, as well as examining how effective such countries have been in adopting 
international AML standards to fight against money laundering. He noted that the 
government should encourage the operational autonomy of the FIUs. This thesis will 
focus on the level of the operational independence of FIUs in three countries in order 
to assess their effectiveness pursuant to the FATF Recommendation 29 and the Eg-
mont Group’s objectives that FIUs must be free from the undue interfere and influ-
ence. Interestingly, he identified that the results of compliance of the aggressive 
AML measures cause defensive reporting to avoid punishment by the FIUs, as well 
as compliance costs for the reporting entities in SAR regimes. This thesis will also 
seek such a result in Thailand and Singapore.  
 Rider focused on economic crime, namely fraud, market abuse, insider deal-
ing, corruption, money laundering, and the roles of regulatory and law enforcement 
agencies, especially financial regulators on countering misconduct through legisla-
tive intervention.124 He argued that the use of civil enforcement and the good gov-
ernance structure and procedures in companies could control financial crime.125 In-
terestingly, Rider also argued that the transparency and disclosure of individuals and 
                                                 
124
 Barry Rider (ed), Research Handbook on International Financial Crime (Edward Elgar 2015) 
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125
 Barry Rider, ‘Strategic tools – for now and perhaps the future? in Barry Rider (ed), Research 
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organisations could be effective control instruments against financial crimes.126 He 
stressed the importance of the independence of the Public Prosecution, which should 
be free from government intervention.127  
 The FATF Mutual Evaluation Reports identifies to what degree each country 
complies with the FATF standards; and to know how well such country implements 
the standards in practice.128 However, the reports process is not complete until the 
MER is published, as well as this process can promote the transparency into the ME 
process which the country can understand and improve global compliance with the 
FATF standards. In addition, transparency and good governance must be inplace to 
adjudge a AML programme as efficient.129 
 Gallant stresses on the regulation of financial crimes and money laundering, 
especially the international and national governance of tainted funds.130 She argued 
that the primary crime control is the pursuit of monetary proceeds of criminal activ-
ity.131 She also noted that the approach of criminal prosecutions has changed into 
civil legal instruments, descriptively disclosure of the STRs/SARs. The study by 
Gallant was published in 2005, and despite its merits, several sections of the research 
are out-of-date and its scope is narrower than this thesis. 
 Finally, Goldby studied the financial services providers in particular banks 
to report suspicious activities to the UK FIU pursuant to AML requirements under 
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the UK 2007 MLRs.132 She argued that the coordination of the reporting entities in 
disclosing the high quality of information via the STR regime could help promote 
the effectiveness of the SAR system, including reducing defensive reporting.133 Fur-
thermore, she focused on the roles of the UK FIU, the SOCA (i.e. it was already 
taken the place by the NCA), with respect to the feedback to the reporting entities.134  
Consequently, the review of literature helps the researcher shape the research meth-
ods and the way to make a contribution to knowledge effectively. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 Although there are several scholarly publications related to the AML policy 
on FIUs, this thesis will emphasise small areas for examination, namely the roles of 
the FIUs in implementing international AML instruments. Furthermore, the roles of 
Thailand’s FIU remain under-researched in the sense that there are not many sources 
published looking at the roles of Thailand’s FIU completely, such as what the pieces 
of AML legislation are relevant to Thailand FIU’s responsibilities, how effective it 
has been in implementing international standards, and what additional strategies 
should be implemented.  
 In answer to the research questions, the thesis examines an academic com-
mentary in the subjects of the role of the FIU as the theme and the independence of 
the FIU because they are the essential areas in supporting the implementation of the 
FATF Recommendations in fighting money laundering in Thailand. This thesis 
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achieves the research questions by comparing Thailand’s FIU with the best practices 
under international standards, namely the UK and Singapore. 
 Chapter two of this thesis explores the research methodology applied, namely 
the adoption of the doctrinal legal method, socio-legal method, and comparative 
method, including an analysis of their advantages and disadvantages. This thesis ap-
plies those three research methods to answer the research questions. First, the thesis 
uses a doctrinal research method to interpret and understand various sources, such as 
legislation, commentary, and case law concerning the provisions of international 
AML regulations legislative frameworks in the UK, Singapore, and Thailand. Sec-
ond, the thesis applies a socio-legal method to assess the effectiveness of the FIUs 
in implementing the international AML rules. Third, the thesis uses the comparative 
law method to look at the impact of the legislative framework of the roles of the FIUs 
in cross-cultural studies to determine, analyse, explain, and synthesise similarities 
and differences across jurisdictions, especially the respective legislation, and illus-
trate the significance of these for the evolution of the FIUs. 
 The existing literature generally looks at issues such as the implementation 
of the FATF, money laundering offences, FATF’s sanctions, risk-based approaches, 
and the STR/SAR regime. This thesis will further examine the FATF Recommenda-
tion 29 for interpreting and understanding the roles of the FIU. This thesis will look 
at other provisions relating to the roles of the FIU, including the roles of competent 
authorities, the compliance of reporting entities, defensive reporting, compliance 
costs, and other things relevant to the central theme, which could assist in finding the 
gaps of knowledge in order to obtain the alternative AML policies to meet interna-
tional requirements effectively.  
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 The next chapter will examine the international AML standards to 
acknowledge their history, scope, and objective. It will focus on the FATF Recom-
mendations and their interpretation to understand how they can be applied to prevent 
and control money laundering problems, and also look at how the roles and respon-
sibilities of the FIUs along with the sanctions to the countries which fail to comply 
with the standards. 
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 CHAPTER THREE 
International, Regional and National Anti-Money Laundering Standards 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 Since President Richard Nixon instigated the War on Drugs in the 1970s, the 
international community has attempted to tackle the increasing threat presented by-
money laundering and its associated crimes (such as fraud, cybercrime, tax evasion, 
timber trafficking, corruption, drug-trafficking, or terrorism). As outlined in chapter 
one, money laundering involves criminals attempting to disguise their proceeds of 
crime, especially in countries with a weak anti-money laundering (AML) legislative 
framework.1 Money laundering has a destructive impact on the economy, society, 
and on the integrity and reputation of the world’s financial systems.2 Criminals try 
to disguise or hide the nature, origin, or control of their illegal gains in order to make 
it legitimate.3 Thus, it is difficult for authorities to identify and trace how much dirty 
money is laundered at national and international levels.4  
                                                 
1 John Walker, A logical Approach to the Quantification of Global Money Laundering from the Illicit 
Drugs Trade (Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre 1999).  
2 United States Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) Fin-
CEN Advisory (March 1996) 1(1) at 2; see also Peter Lilley, Dirty Dealing: The Untold Truth about 
Global Money Laundering, International Crime and Terrorism (2nd edn, Kogan Page 2003) vii. 
3 Michael Levi, ‘E-gaming and money laundering risks: a European overview’ (2009) 10 ERA Forum 
533, 534; see Secretary of the Treasury, A Report to Congress in Accordance with Section 356(c) of 
the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act) (December 2002) <https://www.treas-
ury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/356report.pdf> accessed 5 June 2018; see also Hin-
nerk Gnutzmann, Killian J McCarthy and Brigitte Unger, ‘Dancing with the devil: Country size and 
the incentive to tolerate money laundering’ (2010) 30 International Review of Law and Economics 
244, 244; see also Ismail A Odeh, Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Terrorist Financing for 
Financial Institutions (Dorrance 2010) 1.   
4 Nella Hendriyetty and Bhajan S Grewal, ‘Macroeconomics of money laundering: effects and meas-
urements’ (2017) 24(1) Journal of Financial Crime 65, 77; see Peter Reuter and Edwin M Truman, 
Chasing Dirty Money: The Fight against Money Laundering (Institute for International Economics 
2004) 6, 102; see also Nicholas Ryder, Money Laundering – An Endless Cycle?: A Comparative 
Analysis of the Anti-Money Laundering Policies in the United States of America, the United Kingdom, 
Australia and Canada (Routledge 2012) 2; see also Antoinette Verhage, ‘Great expectations but little 
evidence: Policing money laundering’ (2017) 37(7/8) International Journal of Sociology and Social 
Policy 477, 479. 
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 Hopton noted that any countries that fail to comply with the FATF recom-
mendations would have a negative impact on the integrity of its financial system 
because the FATF would call its members to request their financial sectors to pay 
special attention to their businesses and transactions with individuals, including fi-
nancial institutions.5 The FATF defines the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) as a 
national centre body that receives and analyse the suspicious transaction reports 
(STRs) and other financial information related to money laundering, as well as de-
livering the results of its analysis to relevant competent AML authorities.6 Conse-
quently, the FIU cannot produce effective intelligence to the law enforcement agency 
(LEA) to investigate and prosecute the offender. 
 Efforts to control money laundering depend on the implementation of the 
global AML initiatives and the level of compliance with such instruments.7 The the-
sis categorises the global AML policy into three sections: (1) the implementation of 
international legal AML frameworks such as the United Nations AML Conventions;8 
(2) the implementation of the regional legal AML framework;9 and (3) the imple-
mentation of the global best practices and industry guidelines.10 
 The United Nations (UN) effort to counter the threat of money laundering is   
focused in three UN Conventions, including the international best practices and in-
dustry guidelines, which countries are required to implement into their national AML 
                                                 
5 Doug Hopton, Money Laundering: A Concise Guide for All Business (2nd end, Routledge 2009) 19, 
20. 
6 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendation 29; see Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 
International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Prolif-
eration: The FATF Recommendations (FATF 2012) 24. 
7 Ryder (n 4) 2, 11.   
8 The United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances (1988); the United Nations; the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime (2000); and the United Nations Convention Corruption (2003).  
9 The European Union Money Laundering Directives. 
10 For example, the FATF Recommendation, the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, the 
Basel Committee, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. 
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legislation.11 Members of the UN are expected to comply with the international AML 
standards.12 Gilmore noted that international co-operation and coordination are re-
quired to tackle money laundering.13  
 In this study, the AML instruments and proposals by several institutions, in-
cluding the UN, the FATF, the European Union (EU), and the Asia/Pacific Group 
on Money Laundering (APG) are closely investigated. The thesis also examines the 
traditional global AML strategies, such as the Recommendation of the FATF and 
international best practices and industry guidance14 in place, the implementation of 
such instruments, and the role of competent authorities and the FIUs that are the key 
players in coping with money laundering risk.15  
 Although the FATF requires FIUs shall be independent body without the in-
terference and influence whether government or industry.16 In certain country, in par-
ticular Thailand become more dependent from government control and political pro-
cess for example, there were several military coups and the head of the coups has 
appointed the Thailand FIU’s Sectary-General from the Royal Thai Police Force be-
cause they were the part of military coups, which are able to order confidentially and 
control easily rather than the civil servant. As reasons mentioned above, it is chal-
lenging to research how to adapt and increase the independence of the Thailand FIU 
                                                 
11 Reuter and Truman (n 4) 89. 
12 European Union Council, ‘Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 October 2005 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laun-
dering and terrorist financing’ (2005) Official Journal of the European Union L 309/15 <https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32005L0060&from=EN> accessed 25 Au-
gust 2018.  
13 William C Gilmore, Dirty Money – The Evaluation of International Measures to counter Money 
Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism (Council of European 2004) 51.  
14 For example, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the Wolfsberg Group, the Egmont 
Group of Financial Intelligence Unit, and the International Organisation of Securities Commission. 
15 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘What do we do’ <https://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/what-
wedo/> accessed 2 July 2019.  
16 FAFT Recommendation 29.  
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under the unstable politics in Thailand by learning from the best international prac-
tices. Regarding the independence of the FIU, this thesis focuses on the international 
AML instruments (e.g. the UN Conventions, EU Directives, FATF, Egmont Group 
and Basel) in order to examine such provisions how they refer to the FIU’s inde-
pendence. Then, the thesis compares and analyses how three countries work with 
these standards. The next section examines the main legal AML framework for an 
international standard. 
  
3.2 Implementation of the International Legal AML Framework 
 The international AML efforts are heavily associated with the UN’s drug 
policy, such as the Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous 
Drugs (1939), which provides that competent authorities are able to confiscate the 
proceeds of drug trades.17 Due to the inadequacies of the 1939 Convention, the Sin-
gle Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961)18 and the Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances (1971)19 were introduced. Subsequently, the UN enacted the Convention 
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988) to 




                                                 
17 Article 10 of the Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs (1939). 
18 Lane Porter, ‘Comparative drug treatment policies and legislation’ (1995) 29(3) The International 
Lawyer 697, 697. 
19 Duncan E Alford, ‘Anti-money laundering regulations: A burden on financial institutions’ (1994) 
19(3) North Carolina Journal International Law and Commercial Regulation 437, 441-442. 
20 Ryder (n 4) 12. 
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3.2.1 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances (1988) 
 This Convention focused on tackling the manufacturing and distribution of 
unlawful drugs and the related money laundering.21 The Vienna Convention was the 
first international instrument to establish the confiscation of the proceeds of crime 
related to drug trafficking by providing the criminal offences of money laundering 
and empowering the authorities to detect, seize, and confiscate such criminal pro-
ceeds.22 The Convention encourages assistance in investigations, judicial cases, and 
court proceedings between the countries.23 Gilmore identified that this Convention 
is one of the most important measures to counter the international traffic of illegal 
drugs.24 
 The Vienna Convention determines that signatories have to transpose all 
measures into their national regulations. 25  This includes the criminalization of 
money laundering, confiscation of the proceeds of crime, extradition procedures, in-
formation sharing mechanisms, mutual legal assistance, and a risk-based approach 
                                                 
21 The Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988); see 
also Peter Lilley, ‘The Asian money laundering explosion’ (2006) 15 <http://www.dirtydeal-
ing.org/IMAGES/writing_presntation_slides/fightingcorruptioninasia.pdf> accessed 28 August 
2018.  
22 Articles 3 and 5 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances (1988); see United Nations,  ‘United Nations Convention against Illicit Traf-
fic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988’  <https://www.unodc.org/pdf/conven-
tion_1988_en.pdf> accessed 24 March 2018; see Cheong-Ann Png, ‘International Legal Sources I – 
The United Nations Conventions’ in William Blair, Richard Brent and Tom Grant (eds) Banks and 
Financial Crime: The International Law of Tainted Money (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2017) 
17; see also Abdullahi Y Shehu, ‘International initiatives against corruption and money laundering: 
An overview’ (2005) 12(3) Journal of Financial Crime 221, 222.  
23 Lilley (n 21). 
24 Gilmore (n 13) 53; see also Ryder (n 4) 9.   
25 DW Sproule and Paul St-Denis, ‘The UN Drug Trafficking Convention: An ambitious step’ (1989) 
27 Can YB Int’l L 263, 269. 
CHAPTER THREE: International, Regional and National Anti-Money Laundering Stand-
ards 
52 
into their national AML regulations.26 Sproule and St-Denis argued that the effec-
tiveness of the Convention relies on the determination of countries to coordinate in 
creating robust measures against the drug trade.27 Therefore, all policy-makers, com-
petent authorities, and FIUs have to implement the Convention’s measures into their 
domestic policies.28  
 Article 3(1)(a) of the Convention only applies to the proceeds of a crime re-
lating to drug dealing but allows countries to determine additional forms of criminal 
activity.29 Article 3(b)(i) also defines what activity of money laundering is.30 Article 
3(b)(ii) determines that the activity of concealing or disguising, including all means 
characteristic of the purpose to hide or disguise.31 Additionally, Article 5 provides 
the power to confiscate the proceeds of drug trafficking derived from criminal of-
fences under art 3 of the Convention.32 Article 7 of the Convention involves interna-
tional mutual legal assistance.33  
                                                 
26 Karen Harrison and Nicholas Ryder, The Law Relating to Financial Crime in the United Kingdom 
(2nd edn, Routledge 2016) 21; see also Nicholas Ryder, ‘The fight against illicit finance: A critical 
review of the Labour government’s policy’ (2011) 12(3) Journal of Banking Regulation 252, 254. 
27 Sproule and ST-Denis (n 25) 263, 291. 
28 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendation 2. 
29 Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psycho-
tropic Substances (1988); Article 3(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention, the Council Directive 
91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money 
laundering; see also Guy Stessens, Money Laundering – A New International Law Enforcement Model 
(Cambridge University Press 2008) 113.  
30 Article 3(b)(i) of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psy-
chotropic Substances (1988). 
31 Article 3(b)(ii) of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psy-
chotropic Substances (1988); see United Nations, ‘Commentary on the United Nations Convention 
Against Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1998’ at 64  
<https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/organized_crime/Drug%20Convention/Commen-
tary_on_the_united_nations_convention_1988_E.pdf> accessed 31 August 2018.  
32 Article 5(1-9) of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psy-
chotropic Substances (1988). 
33 Article 7 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psycho-
tropic Substances (1988). 
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 To tackle money laundering, the legislation should be applied in each stage 
of its process.34 Therefore, the signatories have to improve its national criminal jus-
tice systems to enhance the law enforcement risk by criminalising money laundering 
in order to trace, freeze and confiscate the proceeds of criminal assets and profits 
received from the illegal activities or transactions.35  
 In order to achieve the Vienna Convention’s objectives, the FIUs play an 
essential role in overseeing the private sector and public authorities whether they 
comply with the risk-based approach to protect the international financial system 
from abuse and to ensure that they can tackle money laundering risk and threat,  re-
main relevant, and be up to date.36 The Vienna convention provides the competent 
authorities or the FIUs with powers to impose the reporting obligations on the re-
porting entities (REs) comprising the financial institutions (FIs) and the designated 
non-financial business and professions (DNFBPs) in accordance with Article 
3(1)(b)(c) and Article 3(2) of the Vienna Convention.  The reporting entities are re-
quired to submit suspicious transaction to the FIUs, who disseminates the intelli-
gence to the competent authorities.37  
 The FIUs and the competent authorities adopt the preventive AML measures, 
which can be referred to as the ‘know your client (KYC),’ the ‘customer due dili-
gence (CDD)’or the suspicious transaction/activity reports (STRs/SARs) provision 
to order the REs. For example, banking and other financial institutions report the 
                                                 
34 Barry Rider, Lisa Linklater and Stuart Bazley, Market abuse and insider dealing (2nd edn, Tottel 
2009) 148. 
35 Gilmore (n 13) 257. 
36  Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Annual Report 2017-2018 (FATF 2018) 28 
<https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/brochuresannualreports/FATF-annual-report-
2017-2018.pdf> accessed 2 July 2019. 
37 Article 3(1)(b)(c) and Article 3(2) of the Vienna Convention. 
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STRs/SARs to the FIUs to produce financial intelligence and disseminate to the rel-
evant LEA for prosecuting offenders under the FATF Recommendation 29 and Ar-
ticle 5(3) of the Vienna Convention.38 The creation of the FIU and these preventive 
measures are an essential part of the global AML procedures, AML policies, the 
FATF Recommendations, and the international advisory regulations, which the 
UN’s Parties have implemented into their national AML legislation.39 Otherwise, 
there will be sanctions, namely the civil and penal sanctions for the natural or legal 
persons who do not comply with the AML regulations.40 Furthermore, the Vienna 
Convention encourages its Parties to improve a network of mutual legal assistance, 
including sharing intelligence in relation to money laundering and associated predi-
cate offences for supporting the FIU in obtaining evidence for use in the investiga-
tions and prosecutions of such offences.41  
 Thus, it can be said that the effectiveness of the preventive AML measures 
and FIU in implementing the international standards was highlighted by the FATF, 
which relates to a number of money laundering prosecutions. Therefore, the preven-
tive AML measure (such as the risk-based approach) affiliates the FIUs to focus risk 
close to the predicate offences, control cash transactions, to enhance regulations to 
oversee transfer, and to gather financial information flowing between the interna-
tional and domestic financial institutions in order to detect, seize, confiscate and 
prosecute the drug proceeds under the Vienna Convention.42 The FIU and competent 
                                                 
38 FATF Recommendation 29 and Article 5(3) of the Vienna Convention. 
39 Ryder (n 4) 39. 
40 FATF Recommendation 35. 
41 Article 7 of the Vienna Convention and FATF Recommendations 37, 38. 
42 Mark Pieth and Gemma Aiolfi, ‘Synthesis: comparative international standards and their imple-
mentation’ in Mark Pieth and Gemma Aiolfi (Eds), A Comparative Guide to Anti-Money Laundering: 
A Critical Analysis of System in Singapore, Switzerland, the UK and the USA (Edward Elgar 2004) 
416. 
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authorities use a stockpile of information and the STRs/SARs for generating finan-
cial intelligence to prosecute money laundering. 
 This Convention defines money laundering as a criminal activity aiming to 
disguise to conceal their illegal origins involving drug trade, as well as recommends 
the countries to criminalise in line with the Convention.43 However, the Vienna Con-
vention does not refer to the independence of FIU. It is essential to investigate the 
other AML instruments to analyse the reference of the independence of the FIU in 
order to answer the research questions regarding how evaluate the countries have 
implemented the international AML standards and how Thailand adapts the valuable 
lessons from the best practices. Next the thesis examines the United Nations Con-
vention against Transnational Organised Crime (2000).   
 
3.2.2 United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime 
(2000) 
  The UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (2000), or Pa-
lermo Convention, extended the narrow regarding remit of the Vienna Convention 
to other profit-driven crimes.44 The Palermo Convention expanded the scope of the 
Vienna Convention by further covering ‘the proceeds of serious crime.’45 The Con-
                                                 
43 The United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotrophic Sub-
stances (1988). 
44 Article 6 of The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (2000); see 
David Chaikin and JC Sharman, Corruption and Money Laundering: A Symbiotic Relationship (Pal-
grave Macmillan 2009) 16. 
45 Hopton (n 5) 10. 
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vention aims to tackle international organsied crime, including Mafia-type organisa-
tions or criminal networks.46 It extends the definition of money laundering,47 and it 
encourages the signatories to establish an FIU.48 The Convention affiliates the gov-
ernments to apply the international guidelines against money laundering49 and en-
hances international cooperation among FIU, financial regulatory, judicial, and rel-
evant law enforcement authorities to fight money laundering.50 In consequence, the 
private sector has to implement a comprehensive set of preventive measures, such as 
customer due diligence, record-keeping obligations, and the suspicious transac-
tions/activities (STR/SAR) to the FIUs.51  
 The Palermo Convention extended the scope of Article 3 of the Vienna Con-
vention regarding the criminalisation of drug trafficking to all serious crimes, which 
was introduced in the FATF Recommendations and the EU Money Laundering Di-
rectives.52 Therefore, the Convention needs its Parties and their FIUs to focus on 
confiscation of the proceeds of serious crime, especially the act of organised crime, 
namely participation in money laundering, an organised criminal group, obstruction 
of justice, and corruption.53 The role of the FIU is to reduce the impact of money 
laundering by managing its confiscation regime via the preventive measures relating 
                                                 
46 Michael Levi, ‘Drug Law Enforcement and Financial Investigation Strategies: Modernising Drug 
Law Enforcement Report 5’ International Drug Policy Consortium (2013) 2 
<http://orca.cf.ac.uk/88170/1/MDLE-5-drug-law-enforcement-financial-investigation-strate-
gies.pdf> accessed 26 March 2018.         
47 Article 6(1-2) of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (2000). 
48 Article 7(1)(b) of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (2000). 
49 Article 7(3)(4) of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (2000); 
The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (2000), art 32; see also Gil-
more (n 13).  
50 The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (2000), art 7(1)(b). 
51 Article 7(1)(b) of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (2000).  
52 Article 3 of the Vienna Convention and art 6 of the Palermo Convention; see Png (n 22) 16.  
53 Palermo Convention, Articles 5, 6, 12, and 23. 
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to the risk-based approach, the pre-placement, the KYC, the CDD, client-identifica-
tion-record keeping, risk assessment, the STRs/SARs, and the cooperation between 
the FIUs under the FATF Recommendations.54  
 The FIU assists competent authorities to identify, trace, evaluate a property, 
which is subject to confiscation, including carrying out any appropriate investigative 
measure, as well as provisional AML measures, such as freezing and seizing in order 
to prevent people transacting illegal property.55 However, the FIU recognises the 
rights of the third parties in good faith regarding the confiscation of criminal pro-
ceeds pursuant to Article 12(8) of the Convention.56 The Convention ensures that the 
FIU has the capacity to cooperate, share, or exchange financial information at the 
domestic and international levels under the national law.57 Furthermore, the Conven-
tion provides broad AML measures of mutual legal assistance to foreign FIUs and 
competent authorities for increasing the number of criminal investigations, prosecu-
tions, and relevant proceedings for money laundering offence.58 For example, Article 
13 of the Convention provides the essential measures to support the competent au-
thorities and FIUs for developing the level of international cooperation for purposes 
of confiscation of the proceeds of crimes.59  
 This Convention determines that States Parties must set the legislative, ad-
ministrative and prosecutorial measures to enhance their integrity and to prevent, 
detect and punish the corruption of public officers.60 However, this Convention does 
                                                 
54 Harrison and Ryder (n 26) 224; see also Png (n 22) 20. 
55 FATF Recommendation 3. 
56 Article 12(8) of the Palermo Convention. 
57 Article 7(1)(b) of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (2000).  
58 Ryder (n 4) 59.   
59 Article 13 of the Palermo Convention and FATF Recommendation 3. 
60 The United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotrophic Sub-
stances (1988). 
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not refer exactly to the independence of FIU similar to the Vienna Convention.61 
However, article 7 of the Palermo Convention regarding measures to combating 
money-laundering provides that the AML competent authorities shall have the abil-
ity to cooperate and exchange information at both levels, national and international 
levels, as well as each country shall establish its FIU to serve the core functions, 
collection, analysis and dissemination of AML intelligence to fight money launder-
ing.62  Next the thesis examines the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Corruption (2003).   
 
3.2.3 United Nations Convention against Corruption (2003) 
 The United Nations Convention against Corruption (2003), or Merida Con-
vention, requires its signatories to criminalise the corruption-related offences, such 
as ‘bribery of public officials’,63 ‘bribery of foreign public officials and officials of 
public international organisation’,64 ‘embezzlement, misappropriate or other diver-
sions of property by a public official’,65 ‘trading in influence’,66 ‘abuse functions’,67 
‘illegal enrichment’,68 ‘bribery in the private sector’,69 ‘embezzlement of property 
in the private sector’,70 ‘laundering of proceeds of crime’,71 and the ‘the conceal-
ment72 and the obstruction of justice’.73  
                                                 
61 Article 9(1). Those doing the prevention, detection and punishment must be provided with adequate 
independence. 
62 Article 7 of the Palermo Convention 
63 Article 15 of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (2000). 
64 Article 16 of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (2000). 
65 Article 17 of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (2000). 
66 Article 18 of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (2000). 
67 Article 19 of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (2000). 
68 Article 20 of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (2000). 
69 Article 21 of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (2000). 
70 Article 22 of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (2000). 
71 Article 23 of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (2000). 
72 Article 24 of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (2000). 
73 Article 25 of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (2003).  
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 The Merida Convention goes beyond the Palermo Convention because it ap-
plies the money laundering offence to the broadest scope of the predicate offences.74 
For example, Article 14 (1)(b) of this Convention determines the measures to protect 
money laundering regarding the establishment of a comprehensive domestic regula-
tory and supervisory regime (namely, an effective customer and beneficial owner 
identification, an accurate record-keeping, and an appropriate mechanism for the re-
porting of suspicious activities/transactions) to prevent money laundering.75 Conse-
quently, the FATF Recommendations cover all transactions, which provide the pen-
alties for reporting entities failing to submit the suspicious activities/transactions re-
ports (SARs/STRs).76 However, legal systems in each country have several laws in 
dealing with criminal proceeds, but each government needs to promote the identifi-
cation, pursuit, seizure, confiscation, or forfeiture of proceeds of crime.77 Therefore, 
this Convention ensures that the FIUs in each country can cooperate and share finan-
cial information at national and international levels.78  
 The Convention introduces legal standards to support the FIUs and compe-
tent authorities to confiscate both criminal proceeds and instrumentalities.79 For ex-
ample, Article 14(b) encourages the FIUs and competent authorities to cooperate and 
exchange financial intelligence.80 Article 36 determines that the FIUs and the com-
petent authorities shall have the operational independence to carry out their duties 
                                                 
74 Article 23(2) of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (2003). 
75 Article 14 (1)(a) of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (2003).  
76  U.S. Department of State, ‘Definitions’ 
<https://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2016/vol2/253333.htm> accessed 19 July 2017; The 2003 re-
visions of the FATF Recommendations include instituting customer due diligence measures and im-
proving diligence measures regarding politically exposed persons (PEPs). 
77 Barry Rider, Stuart Bazley and Jeffrey Bryant, Market Abuse and Insider Dealing (3rd edn, Blooms-
bury 2016) 182, 185.  
78 Articles 14 (1)(b) and 58 of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption 2003.  
79 Articles 2, 23(2)(e), 44 of the Merida Convention. 
80 Articles 14(b) and 14(5) of the Merida Convention. 
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and responsibilities effectively and without any undue interference or impact in ac-
cordance with the national AML law.81 Furthermore, the Convention identifies that 
the FIUs and competent authorities shall have the powers and responsibilities to re-
quest mutual legal assistance and information between foreign FIUs and competent 
authorities.82 Article 52 provides the powers to the FIU, competent authorities, and 
appropriate public officials to investigate any financial accounts in a foreign country 
and maintain records of such financial accounts for prosecution.83 The next section 
explains the European Union AML Directives.  
 This Convention states that State Party shall ensure the body has the essential 
independence in order to carry out its functions effectively and free from any undue 
interference or influence, including the vital material resources and specialized offi-
cial, as well as the training that such official may require to carry out their duties in 
order to prevent the corruption.84 Furthermore, article 11 of this Convention pro-
motes the independence of the national judiciary and the prosecution service and 
their necessary roles in fighting corruption.85 In addition, article 36 states that the 
State Party also need to support the body or person specialised in fighting corruption 
via law enforcement.86 According to article 14(b) supports that this Convention re-
quires State Party to ensure the appropriate information exchange at the national and 
international levels, as well as to establish the FIU to act its functions effectively.87 
 Similar to the 2000 Convention, this Convention does not refer exactly to the 
independence of FIU, but the Merida Convention encourages the State Party to meet 
                                                 
81 Article 36 of the Merida Convention. 
82 Articles 46 and 49 of the Merida Convention. 
83 Articles 52 of the Merida Convention. 
84 Paragraph 3 of the Article 6 of the Merida Convention. 
85 Article 11 of the Merida Convention. 
86 Article 36 of the Merida Convention. 
87 Article 14(b) of the Merida Convention. 
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its fundamental principles of each national legal system by promoting the body, in-
cluding the FIU to carry out its functions efficiently and free from any influence or 
interference whether from government or industry unlikely the 1988 UN Conven-
tions.88 Next the thesis examines the United Nations Convention against Transna-
tional Corruption (2003).    
 
3.3 Implementation of the Regional Legal AML Framework 
3.3.1 European Union Anti-Money Laundering Directives 
 The EU has also adopted several legislative instruments to fight against 
money laundering.89 For example, in 1970 the Council of Europe enacted the Euro-
pean Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgements, which en-
couraged the Member States to recognise the validity of criminal sentences and judg-
ment transposed into the other Member States that have ratified this Convention.  90   
 In 1980, the EU established a Select Committee to deal with the criminal 
transfer of the proceeds of crime from one country to another, as well as the process 
of money laundering via the international and national financial markets.91 The Com-
mittee recommended the ‘Measures Against the Transfer and Safekeeping of Funds 
                                                 
88 Article 9(1). Those doing the prevention, detection and punishment must be provided with adequate 
independence. 
89 The UN Conventions, such as the Vienna Convention, Palermo Convention, and Merida Conven-
tion. 
90 European Union enacted the European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judge-
ments (1970); Mark Mackarel, ‘The European Arrest Warrant – the early years: Implementing and 
using the warrant’ (2007) 15(37) European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 37, 
39. 
91 Committee of Ministers of Council of Europe, ‘Recommendation No. R (80) 10 of the Committee 
of Ministers to Member States on Measures against the Transfer and the Safekeeping of Funds of 
Criminal Origin These Recommendations were implemented on 27 June 1980’ 
<http://www.masak.gov.tr/media/portals/masak2/files/en/Legislation/LaunderingProceed-
sofCrime/international_legislation/CE/R80(10).pdf> accessed 30 October 2018.  
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of Criminal Origins’92 to the Member States to focus on the role of their banks con-
cerning the identification of the customers (know your customer principles),93 inter-
national and national cooperation among private and public sector, and an effective 
establishment of the banking system for recognising the list of banknotes linked with 
criminal offences when such notes are used in the system.94 These measures provide 
the competent authorities in the EU with the power to investigate the suspicious 
transactions for identification, freezing, and seizure of assets regarding money laun-
dering.95  
 Thus, the competent authorities have played an important role by encourag-
ing reporting entities to verify the identity of clients, training cashiers in order to 
prevent money laundering, and reporting suspicious funds. Nevertheless, the Council 
of Europe Recommendations were not broadly transposed by Parties because of the 
character of the soft law of the Convention, which did not bind the Member States 
to implement  due to the limited constitutional competence and the lack of enforce-
ment mechanism.96  
  Therefore, the European Committee on Crime proposed to create a parallel 
stance towards the proceeds of illegal drug trafficking via the introduction of the 
Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of 
the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (1990).97 The Conven-
tion was the first to harmonise the AML policies with the practices of the tracing, 
                                                 
92 Gilmore (n 13) 10. 
93 Dionysios S Demetis, Technology and Anti-Money Laundering: A Systems Theory and Risk-Based 
Approach (Edward Elgar 2010) 9, 15, 23, 45, 64. 
94 Committee of Ministers of Council of Europe (n 91); Kern Alexander, ‘Multi-national efforts to 
combat financial crime and the Financial Action Task Force’ (2000) 2(5) Journal of International 
Financial Markets 178, 182.  
95 Committee of Ministers of Council of Europe (n 91). 
96 Gilmore (n 13) 161.  
97 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds of 
Crime (ETS 141, 1990) (hereinafter the 1990 Strasbourg Convention’); see Mo Egan, ‘Policing illicit 
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seizure, and confiscation of the proceeds of crimes in the EU member countries.98 
This Convention facilitated the sufficient international cooperation and the mutual 
assistance in criminalising the laundering of the criminal proceeds between the FIUs 
and the competent authorities, such as police and judicial authorities, in freezing of 
bank accounts, seizure of assets to prevent its removal and forfeiting instrumentali-
ties and the proceeds of drug trafficking.99   
 The 1990 Convention was extended by the Council of Europe Convention on 
Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on 
the Financing of Terrorism (2005), or Warsaw Convention.100  This Convention 
strengthened international cooperation and mutual assistance in investigating crime, 
pursuing, seizing, and confiscating the proceeds of crime.101 The Convention also 
defines the meaning of the FIU as a central, national agency dealing with financial 
information, who receives such information from reporting entities and delivers it to 
relevant competent and law enforcement authorities.102 The Convention supports the 
cooperation between the international FIUs by promoting the swift access to finan-
cial information on property committed by criminal organisations and terrorist 
                                                 
financial flows: multi-agency co-operation and legal developments’ in Monica den Boer (ed), Com-
parative Policing from a Legal Perspective (Edward Elgar 2018) 209. 
98 Eleni Tsingou, ‘Global governance and transnational crimes: Opportunities and tensions in global 
AML regimes’ (May 2005) CSGR Working Paper No 161/05 at 6 <file://nstu-nas01.uwe.ac.uk/us-
ers3$/k2-silathong/Windows/Downloads/WRAP_Tsingou_wp16105.pdf> accessed 7 November 
2018; see also Norman Mugarura, ‘The implications of Brexit for UK anti-money laundering regula-
tions: Will the fourth AML directive be implemented or be binned?’ (2018) 21(1) Journal of Money 
Laundering Control 5, 9. 
99 Council of Europe, Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds 
from Crime and Explanatory Report (Council of Europe Publishing 1995) 5; see also Council of 
Europe Portal, ‘Details of Treaty No. 141’<https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/con-
ventions/treaty/141> accessed 7 July 2019.  
100 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds 
from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (2005) was adopted in Warsaw; hereinafter the ‘2005 
Convention’. The United Kingdom ratified the 1990 Convention in 2015.   
101 Articles 3 and 46 of the 2005 Convention; see Council of Europe, ‘The 2005 Warsaw Convention 
and its additional protocol’ <https://www.coe.int/en/web/counter-terrorism/cdct/warsaw-convention-
and-additional-protocol> accessed 8 November 2018. 
102 Article 1 of the Warsaw Convention.  
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groups as the key mechanism to successful preventive and repressive instruments to 
stop such crimes.103 This Convention provides the FIUs quick access to financial 
information or information regarding assets managed by organised crime groups or 
terrorists to support the FIUs and competent authorities in operating preventive and 
repressive measures effectively.104 
 In 1999, the EU enacted the First Money Laundering Directive (1MLD), 
which required the Member States to implement a series of preventive measures, 
such as cross-border money transactions, the customer identification, the quality of 
the STR, the proper customer’s record-keeping for five years after closing the ac-
count (or the end of customer relationship), the communication and cooperation be-
tween the competent authorities, and AML training programme for staff.105 These 
measures, which required the FIUs to establish their internal procedures to monitor 
and report suspicious transactions to the FIUs based on the Vienna Convention and 
the FATF 40 Recommendations.106 Thus, the FIUs take into account suspicious 
transactions, identification records, the policy of sufficient internal procedures, in-
cluding appropriate AML training programmes for staff in line with the FATF Rec-
ommendations.107 
 The 1MLD was replaced by the Second EU Money Laundering Directive 
(2MLD) because it was considered to be ineffective.108  2MLD focused on two main 
                                                 
103 Article 46 of the 2005 Convention. 
104 Council of Europe (n 100). 
105 European Council, Directive on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System to Laundering 
Money 91/308, 1993 OJ (L 166); see Valsamis Mitsilegas and Bill Gilmore, ‘The EU legislative 
framework against money laundering and terrorist finance: A critical analysis in the light of evolving 
global standards’ (2007) 56 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 119, 120, 123. 
106 Phillippe Blaquier-Cirelli and Pierre-Yves Couturier, ‘France’ in Wouter H Muller, Christian H 
Kalin and John G Goldsworth (eds), Anti-Money Laundering: International Law and Practice (John 
Wiley & Sons 2007) 491. 
107 Mitsilegas and Gilmore (n 105) 119, 120. 
108 ibid. 
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themes.109 Firstly, the Directive extended the list of the predicate offences for the 
obliged entities to report suspicious transactions from only drug trafficking offences 
to all serious criminal offences. Secondly, the Directive expanded the extent of a 
number of professions and non-financial bodies required to report the SARs to the 
FIUs.110  
 The EU launched its Third Money Laundering Directive (3MLD) on the pre-
vention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering in 
2004,111 which required its member states to establish an independent and special-
ised national agency to counter money laundering and extend the scope of the EU 
AML regimes to include terrorism financing.112 Moreover, the Directive needed its 
Member States to increase the list of predicate offences of all serious crimes and 
issue more guidelines to enhance the client identification procedures in the relevant 
sector to fight money laundering regime effectively.113  
 In May 2015, the EU enacted the Fourth EU Money Laundering Directive 
(4MLD).114 This Directive was further developed than the FATF Recommendations 
and increased risk management under the Directive’s new requirements (such as the 
broader scope of organisations from financial institutions and banking sector to the 
                                                 
109 Directive 2001/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of the European of 4 Decem-
ber 2001, Amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC on Prevention of the Use of the Financial System 
for the Purpose of Money Laundering, 2001 O.J. (L 344) 76.  
110 The Money Laundering Regulations 2003 (SI 2003 No. 3075); The scope in this EU Second ML 
Directive included lawyers, accountants, notaries, art dealers, estate agents, casinos, jewelers, auc-
tioneers, remittance offices, as well as insurance companies. 
111 The negotiation and agreement of the Third ML Directive was achieved in June 2005, but the EU 
Member States must be fully implemented by 15 December 2007. 
112 Article 21 of the Directive 2005/06/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 Oc-
tober 2005. 
113 Jonathan Fisher, ‘Recent international developments in the fight against money laundering’ (2002) 
17(3) Journal of International Banking Law 67, 67.  
114 The Fourth EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the Prevention of the Use of 
the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering or Terrorist Financing, Amending Regu-
lation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and Repealing Directive 
2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC, 
2015 O.J. (L 141) 83, art. 1(5) (the 4th AML Directive). 
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auditors, tax advisors, including legal professionals) and expanded risk analysis.115 
The Directive improved several key changes, such as the risk-based approach 
(RBA), new regulations relating to the electronic money, the central registers of ul-
timate beneficial ownership for the company and legal entities, the same standards 
between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ politically exposed persons (PEPs), enhancement 
of the sanction regime, and the degree of cooperation between national FIUs, includ-
ing the practical operation.116 Thus, the FIUs realised the broad definition of money 
laundering, including the money laundering that occurs regardless of  the ‘predicate 
crime’, which refers to any kind of criminal involvement in the act of serious crimes 
conducted in another EU Member State or in a third country.117 The 4MLD goes 
beyond the threshold set out in the FATF standards. For example, the CDD lowers 
the cash payment with a value of over €10,000 (previous value was €15,000).118 
Furthermore, the FIU plays a crucial role to monitor the private sector in complying 
with a risk-based approach to introduce stricter transparency rules regarding the 
ownership of legal persons via cooperation among the international FIUs.119  
 Due to the increase of several risks,120 the EU published its Fifth Money 
Laundering Directive (5MLD) on the 10 June 2018, and its Member States need to 
transpose into their national law by January 2020.121 This Directive extends the 
                                                 
115 Joachim Kaetzler and Tanja Kordys, ‘Fourth Money Laundering Directive - Increased risk man-
agement requirements’ (2015) 4(5) Comp. & Risk 2, 5.  
116 ibid.  
117 Fourth AML Directive, art 1(3) includes organised crime, fraud, corruption, and tax evasion. 
118 Regulation 27(3) of the Fourth ML Directive. 
119 Leonardo Borlini and Francesco Montanaro, ‘The evolution of the EU law against criminal fi-
nance: The ‘hardening’ of FATF standards within the EU (2017) 48 Georgetown Journal of Interna-
tional Law 1009, 1037. 
120 Several risks comprise the increase in money laundering, terrorist financing, the emerging of cryp-
tocurrencies and the rise of new technologies. 
121 The Fifth EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive (EU) 2018/843 on the Prevention of the Use of 
the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering or Terrorism Financing (the Fifth ML 
Directive). 
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scope of the previous EU Directive, such as the ‘obliged entities’ to deal with such 
risks, which relate to the virtual currencies and anonymous prepaid cards, including 
the constant technological evolutions in such fields.122  The Directive also focuses 
on the enhanced customer due to diligence measures involving the context of finan-
cial transactions of high-risk third countries.123 Furthermore, the Directive increases 
transparency measures concerning enhanced access and powers for the relevant su-
pervisory authorities and the EU FIUs.124 Therefore, the 5MLD is considered as a 
stricter approach to the problem of efficiently fighting ML/CFT, e.g. than the 4MLD 
in this respect. The FIUs and competent authorities require direct access to infor-
mation on financial transactions and beneficial ownership information, including en-
couraging the FIUs to strengthen their risk assessment and policy to meet the FATF 
requirements.  
                                                 
122 The Member States should reduce the thresholds under which obliged entities (i.e. these obliged 
entities are required to register in their home Member State), are exempt from applying certain CDD 
measures to prepaid cards. The customer in a remote payment transaction exceeding EUR 50 will 
need to be identified. In addition, the use of anonymous prepaid cards issued outside the EU should 
be permitted where the cards comply with requirements equivalent to EU laws; see Barbara Jamieson, 






nalDocID=A532706548&paramdict=en-UK> accessed 4 November 2018. 
123 The application of enhanced customer due diligence for third countries that are determined by the 
European Commission to be high risk countries. The EU Member States should apply additional 
measures, where appropriate; see Arun Srivastava, ‘The Fifth EU Money Laundering Directive: Lat-
est developments’ Global Compliance News (2 January 2017) <https://globalcomplian-
cenews.com/the-fifth-money-laundering-directive-latest-developments-20170102/> accessed 4 No-
vember 2018.   
124 The Member States should enhance the powers of and cooperation between FIUs, including giving 
them access to information and the ability to exchange it without impediments. This will include 
access to information on all types of virtual currencies, not only those that are serviced by providers 
of exchange services and custodian wallet providers. The Directive requires its Member States main-
taining lists of specific functions that qualify as prominent public functions to assist in the identifica-
tion of politically exposed persons (PEPs). The Directive also enhances access to information on 
beneficial ownership across the EU and improve transparency in the ownership of companies and 
trusts; see Samantha Sheen, ‘What is the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive?’ ACAMS (5 De-
cember 2016) <https://www.acams.org/aml-resources/samantha-sheens-blog/5th-anti-money-laun-
dering-directive/> accessed 4 November 2018.  
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 In 2020 the European Union’s Sixth Anti-Money Laundering Directive 
(6MLD), replacing the 5MLD on 3 December 2020,125 defines the regulatory require-
ments introduced in the 5 MLD in greater detail, as well as provides its member 
states with clarification on emerging money laundering threats. This Directive em-
powers FIs and authorities to do more in the counter against money laundering by 
expanding the range of existing regulation, law, clarifying particular regulatory de-
tails, toughening criminal punishment across the bloc, increasing predicate offences 
(e.g. certain tax-crimes, environmental crime and cyber-crime).126  
 In summary, the EU ratified the UN AML Conventions into their Member 
States to criminalise money laundering and outline measures for the freezing and 
confiscation of criminal proceeds. The EU Member States and the FATF-Styled Re-
gional Bodies (FSRBs) have attempted to adopt the UK and EU AML measures and 
introduced such policy into the national legislation to tackle the threats posed by 
money laundering. For example, the UK has fully transposed the UN AML Conven-
tions and its requirements under the ML Directives into its national legislation. The 
UKFIU therefore improves the governance and transparency of the SARs regime, 
which the government has considered when develop the SARs regime as recom-
mended by Sir Stephen Lander in order to enhance the confidential handling of SARs 
and to promote a channel for expression of concern in certain cases.127  
                                                 
125 The financial institutions in the EU member states must implement the 6MLD by 3 June 2021. 
126 The best International practices like the 6MLD, it strengthens the preventive framework to fight 
money laundering and terrorist financing and determines the minimum rules for criminal liability for 
money laundering by extending liability to legal persons, including imposing a five-year minimum 
imprisonment for serious money laundering offences; see the European Union’s Sixth Anti-Money 
Laundering Directive (6MLD). 
127 The Institute of Chartered Accountants, ‘The confidentiality of money laundering suspicious ac-
tivity reports (SARs) in the United Kingdom’ (September 2006) p. 3; see Serious Organised Crime 
Agency (SOCA), Review of the SARs Regime – Sir Stephen Lander (SOCA March 2006). ‘Trans-
parency International UK, Combating Money Laundering and Recovering Looted Gains: Raising the 
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 Regarding the independence of the FIU, Directive 2015/849 (4MLD) pro-
motes that the FIUs shall have operational independence as well as the authority and 
capacity to take autonomous decisions to conduct their core functions, analyse, re-
quest and deliver their intelligence to relevant competent authorities.128 This was also 
consistent with the FATF Recommendations on the operational independence and 
autonomous of FIUs in order to discharge theirs functions effectively.129 
 Similar to the 5MLD, the Directive also referred to the FIUs as the operation-
ally independent units that have been established in the line with the Provisions and 
to meet the requirements of the FATF Recommendations.130 The EU member states 
therefore, implement the 5MLD to ensure effective and impartial supervision of all 
obliged entities, preferably by the public competent authorities through a separate 
and independent national regulator or supervisor.131 From reasons mentioned above, 
the EU AML Directives does not refer clearly the independence of FIU. Therefore, 
it is necessary to examine the best international practices such as FATF, Egmont 
Group and Basel in this thesis in order to explore the valuable lessons for Thailand 
to adapt such best practices into domestic AML legislation to enhance its independ-
ence to meet the standards. This thesis then focusses on the implementation of the 
international best practices and industry guidelines.  
 
                                                 
UK’s Game’ p.19 <https://star.worldbank.org/corruption-cases/sites/corruption-cases/files/docu-
ments/arw/Transparency_Intl_UK_Recovering_Looted_Gains_June_2009.pdf> accessed 13 Decem-
ber 2020.  
128 Directive 2015/849 (4MLD); see European Commission, ‘Impact assessment’ Commission staff 
working document Strasbourg, 17.4.2018 SWD(2018) 114 final (p. 6) <https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-security/20180417_directive-
proposal-facilitating-use-information-prevention-detection-investigation-prosecution-criminal-of-
fences-cswd-ia_en.pdf> accessed 13 December 2020.  
129 FATF Recommendation 29. 
130 Directive (EU) 2018/843 (the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive), Article 65(2). 
131 Directive (EU) 2018/843 (the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive) (5MLD). 
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3.4 Implementation of the International Best Practices and Industry Guidelines 
 The UN encourages its Member States to implement the international AML 
best practices and industry guidelines in terms of soft law, which does not create a 
legal obligation, such as the FATF Recommendations to fight money laundering ef-
fectively.132 However, the countries failing to comply with these AML measures 
could be subjected to financial sanctions from the international community by being 
announced as the country of the high-risk or the non-cooperative jurisdictions.133 
The next section examines the implementation of the FATF Recommendations. 
  
3.4.1 The Financial Action Task Force Recommendations 
 The global AML policy is based on reviewing the international legal instru-
ments as the soft law, namely the FATF Recommendations, or the international AML 
best practices and industry guidelines. These recommendations have been adopted 
by the EU and FSRBs,134 including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank.135 Therefore, the UN Member States are required to apply for member-
ship of the FATF; otherwise, the country could be subject to financial sanctions and 
be categorised as a non-cooperative countries and territories (NCCTs).136 It is essen-
tial to examine the FATF Recommendations in shaping the AML policy.  
                                                 
132 Michael Pucci, ‘FATF Recommendations: Becoming soft law’ <http://www.mjilonline.org/fatf-
recommendations-becoming-soft-law-2/> accessed 7 July 2019.   
133  Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘High-risk and other monitored jurisdictions’ 
<https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions/more/more-on-
high-risk-and-non-cooperative-jurisdictions.html?hf=10&b=0&s=desc(fatf_releasedate)> accessed 7 
July 2019.  
134 For example, the Asia/Pacific on Money Laundering Group (APG) is the FSRB that Thailand is a 
member of this Group. 
135 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘Thailand’ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/#Thailand> 
accessed 8 July 2019. 
136  Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘Topic: high-risk and other monitored jurisdictions’ 
<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdic-
tions/?hf=10&b=0&s=desc(fatf_releasedate)> accessed 29 November 2018; see also Financial Ac-
tion Task Force (FATF), Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering: Report on Non-co-
operative Countries and Territories (FATF 2000) 8; see also Gilmore (n 13) 154.  




3.4.1.1 Overview of the 40 FATF Recommendations 
 The FATF is an independent inter-governmental and policy-maker body that 
was established in 1989.137 It aims to set global AML standards and support the ef-
ficient implementation of its standards in order to prevent the international financial 
system from being used by money launderers and terrorism financiers.138 In order to 
achieve this objective, the FATF closely monitors typologies and trends of money 
laundering, including the legal and practical effect of the FATF Recommenda-
tions.139 Its members include the UN, the World Bank, IMF, the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision, and Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units.140 The 
FATF encourages its Member States to facilitate and implement its Recommenda-
tions which are divided into three primary instruments, including money laundering 
preventive measures; AML enforcement measures; and measures to foster transna-
tional co-operation.141 In 1996, the FATF Recommendations aimed to criminalise 
money laundering and drug trade offences, but in 2001 the terrorist attacks in the 
United States of America (US) forced the FATF revise its Recommendations to re-
spond to the threats of terrorism. 
                                                 
137 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘About’ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/> accessed 15 Au-
gust 2018.   
138 Ryder (n 4) 7.   
139 Mitsilegas and Gilmore (n 105) 119, 123. 
140  Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘FATF Members and Observers’ <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/about/membersandobservers/> accessed 15 April 2018.      
141 The pillars of money laundering preventive measures include (1) customer due diligence; (2) re-
porting obligations; (3) regulation and supervision; and (4) sanctions for non-compliance. Next, the 
pillar of AML enforcement measures consists of (1) criminalization of predicate (underlying criminal) 
acts and of money laundering; (2) investigation of predicate activities and of money laundering; (3) 
prosecution and punishment; and (4) tracing and confiscating proceeds. Finally, the pillar of measures 
to foster transactional co-operation includes (1) awareness of global trends; (2) co-operation agree-
ments and real-time transnational economic crime situation reviews; and (3) effective mutual assis-
tance processes; and (4) Transnational structures to trace and confiscate proceeds; see Pieth and Aiolfi 
(n 42) xvii; see also Stessens (n 29) 183; see also Institute for Security Studies (ISS), ‘Money laun-
dering in Zimbabwe, 2004 to 2006’ <http://www.issafrica.org/chapter-3-money-laundering-in-zim-
babwe-2004-to-2006>accessed 7 June 2015. 




3.4.1.2 FATF Special Recommendations   
 The FATF has revised its Recommendations to ensure that it remains up to 
date to respond to the evolving threat from money laundering.142 As a result of the 
al Qaeda terrorist attacks in the US in September 2001, the UN responded by issuing 
Security Council Resolution 1373 that required all member states to criminalise ille-
gal funds and prosecute safe havens for finances terrorist activities.143 In conse-
quence, the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terror-
ism (1999) defines the term ‘terrorist financing’ widely as the assets of every kind, 
whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, nevertheless obtained, and 
legal documents or instruments in any form.144  
 In 2004, the FATF added the Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist 
Financing to deal with the terrorism of finance.145 In 2005, the UN then adopted the 
UN Security Council Resolution 1617 to require all member states to implement the 
40 FATF standards.146 In 2012, the FATF revised its provision regarding Interna-
tional Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism 
and Proliferation Special Recommendations, the nine additional Special Recommen-
dations to tackle financial crime in particular.147 The FIUs play a crucial role in 
                                                 
142 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘Best Practices Paper: Sharing among Domestic Competent 
Authorities Information Related to the Financing of Proliferation’ (February 2012) <www.fatf-
gafi.org> accessed 10 May 2015; see also Financial Action Task Force (n 140).   
143 Kathryn L Gardner, ‘Fighting terrorism the FATF way’ (2007) 13(3) Global Governance 324, 342. 
144 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999), art 1 para 1. 
145 In 2001, there was eight Special Recommendations in the global fight against terrorist financing. 
146 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1617 (2005) S/RES/1617 (2005); see Cheong-Ann 
Png, ‘International legal sources III – FATF Recommendations’ in William Blair, Richard Brent and 
Tom Grant (eds), Banks and Financial Crime – The International Law of Tainted Money (2nd edn, 
Oxford University Press 2017) 61. 
147 Harrison and Ryder (n 26) 23. 
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fighting money laundering and terrorist financing. It is important to examine the role 
of FIU in line with the FATF Recommendations. 
 
3.4.1.3 FATF Recommendations Relating to the Role of FIU 
 FATF emphasises on the relevant issues of criminal law, FIU, financial su-
pervision, preventive measures (such as customer identification, and KYC), report-
ing the suspicious transactions/activities, and international cooperation. 148  The 
FATF set a working group on non-cooperative countries and territories (NCCTs) to 
identify the criteria to classify and define whether such countries practically meet the 
FATF’s criteria.149 Jurisdictions, which were identified as NCCTs, must first be ap-
proved that they have solved the deficiencies previously identified by legislating vi-
tal laws.150 However, the FATF ensures that such countries concerned are really im-
plementing the FATF’s Recommendations effectively; it still monitors to ensure 
enough efforts in implementation.151  
 Thus, the countries that fail to comply with the international AML standards 
would be announced as higher-risk countries or NCCTs.152 Consequently, it will de-
termine several NCCTs by listing these as having severe deficiencies in AML strat-
egies.153 The FATF Recommendation 19 forces the member states to comply with 
its rules as soft law or the rule of conduct154 by threatening the country to fear the 
                                                 
148 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering: Annual 
Report 2001-2002 (FATF 2002) 20. 
149 Financial Action Task Force (n 140) 8; see also Gilmore (n 13) 154.  
150 Gilmore (n 13) 155. 
151 Financial Action Task Force (n 140) 20. 
152 FATF Recommendation 19 and its Interpretive Note; see Financial Action Task Force (n 137).  
153 Brigitte Unger and Joras Ferwerda, ‘Regulating Money Laundering and Tax Havens: The Role of 
Blacklisting’ (The ECPR Conference, Utrecht University, June 2008).  
154 Oana Stefan, ‘Soft law and the enforcement of EU law’ in Andras Jakab and Dimitry Kochenov 
(eds) The Enforcement of EU Law and Values: Ensuring Member States’ Compliance (Oxford Uni-
versity Press 2017) 200. 
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economic sanctions, which endanger the states’ financial system and cause the coun-
try to lose credibility.155 The FATF Recommendations requires the regulated sector 
to submit various suspicious activity reports on transactions, including activities to 
the FIUs in order to disseminate such financial intelligence to the relevant law en-
forcement. 156  
 However, there is the amount of unnecessary information, little value, or law 
quality of the STRs/SARs (namely, defensive reporting/filing), which degrades the 
valuable files in the FIU’s database and makes the FIUs information overwhelming 
and difficult to analyse and deliver such information to other agencies effectively.157 
Such reporting behaviour occurs in many regulated sectors because they avoid po-
tential financial sanctions if they fail to report suspicious transactions pursuant to the 
FATF standards. 158  Furthermore, they likewise decrease such AML compliance 
costs by reducing internal review staff.159 Therefore, the reporting entities require 
accurate and concise guidance on the SAR/STR obligations to help their staff deeply 
understand and comply with the requirements effectively.160 
 The FATF assesses the cooperation of its Member States in order to prevent 
the usage of financial institutions by criminals. The implementation of the regulatory 
                                                 
155 FATF Recommendation 19; see Jens Steffek, ‘The legitimation of international governance: A 
discourse approach’ (2003) 9(2) European Journal of International Relations 249, 254; see Jeffrey T 
Checkel, ‘Why comply? Social learning and European identify change’ (2001) 55(3) International 
Organisation 553, 558, 568; see also Ian Hurd, ‘Legitimacy and Authority in international politics’ 
(1999) 53(2) International Organisation 379, 402. 
156 FATF Recommendations 9-23; see Miriam Goldby, ‘Anti-money laundering reporting require-
ments imposed by English law: measuring effectiveness and gauging the need for reform ’ (2013) 4 
Journal of Business Law 367, 397.  
157 Ibrahim Warde, The Price of Fear: Al-Qaeda and the Truth behind the Financial War on Terror 
(I.B. Tauris 2007) 61.  
158 Michael Levi and Peter Reuter, ‘Money Laundering’ (2006) 34(1) Crime and Justice 289, 301. 
159 ibid 289, 301. 
160 John J Byrne, ‘ Improving financial oversight: A private sector view of anti-money laundering ef-
forts ’Testimony on behalf of the American Bankers Association before the House Financial Services 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations (18 May 2004) 9; see also Rainer Hulsse, ‘Creating 
demand for global governance: The making of a global money laundering problem’ (2007) 21(2) 
Global Society 155, 167. 
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and legal system into their domestic legislation is assessed to consider their levels of 
compliance with its Recommendations.161 According to the FATF’s assessment, it 
has used the assessment methodologies based on output indicators for a long time, 
but there is still less knowledge about the effectiveness of its evaluation methods.162 
Thus, the FATF monitors its member states by periodically evaluating levels of com-
pliance.163  
 The FATF uses a specific methodology in assessing the effectiveness of the 
implementation of its Recommendations, which is also applied by the Council of 
Europe and the FATF’s Member States.164 The FATF assesses the effectiveness of 
each Member State from such criteria into four levels: largely compliant (LC), par-
tially compliant (PC), non-compliant (NC), and not-applicable (NA).165 The FATF 
Methodology 2013 presents an Immediate Outcome 7 (e.g. prosecution), as well as 
Immediate Outcome 8 (e.g. confiscation) in order to reduce criminal profits and pred-
icate crimes, including money laundering.166 
                                                 
161 Demetis (93) 21; see also Jackie Johnson, ‘Is the global financial system AML/CFT prepared’ 
(2008) 15(1) Journal of Financial Crime 7, 11. 
162 Barbara Vettori, ‘Evaluating anti-money laundering policies: Where are we?’ in Brigitte Unger 
and Daan van der Linde (eds), Research Handbook on Money Laundering (Edward Elgar 2013) 474; 
see also Economic and Legal Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering and Combat Terrorist Financ-
ing Policy (ECOLEF), Project ECOLEF: The Economic and Legal Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laun-
dering and Combat Terrorist Financing Policy Final Report (Utrecht University 2013) 12. 
163 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Annual Report 2015-2016 (FATF 2017) 14, 31. 
164 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘Methodology for Assessing Compliance with the FATF 40 
Recommendations and the FATF 9 Special Recommendations’ (February 2009) <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/methodology.pdf> accessed 12 June 2015. 
165 Largely compliant (LC) refers to ‘there are only minor shortcomings, with a large majority of the 
essential criteria being fully met’. Partially compliant (PC) means that a country has taken some sub-
stantive action and complies with some essential criteria. Non-compliant (NC) illustrates that there 
are major shortcomings, with a large majority of the essential criteria not being met. Finally, not 
applicable (NA) presents that a requirement or part of a requirement does not apply, due to the struc-
tural legal or institutional features of a country (e.g. a particular type of financial institution does not 
exist in that country); see Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘High-risk and non-cooperative ju-
risdictions’ at 6 <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions/> ac-
cessed 28 June 2015. 
166 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘Methodology for Assessing Technical Compliance with the 
FATF Recommendations and the Effectiveness of AML/CFT Systems’ (OECD 2013) at 5 
<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/methodology/FATF%20Methodol-
ogy%2022%20Feb%202013.pdf> accessed 26 March 2018.   
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 To promote the compliance with the FATF Recommendations,167 all FATF’s 
Members States must accept multilateral observation, peer review, and the public 
statement of the NCCT list by applying an annual assessment process and MER.168 
Consequently, the FATF identified that countries have AML strategic deficiencies 
by rating such countries as high risk and NCCTs in order to encourage each jurisdic-
tion to raise the quality of their AML supervision and the level of international co-
operation.169 For example, in 2012 Thailand had a low level of compliance, which 
illustrated a weak level of compliance and co-operation with the FATF Recommen-
dations.170 Such sanctions made the country’s business transaction problematic in 
the world financial market.171 Conversely, London in the UK is one of the primary 
money laundering capitals of the world (i.e. there is a large amount of money laun-
dered through the UK), but there is no blacklist or NCCTs for the UK.172  
 The FATF created specialist networks such as the Egmont Group and the 
FSRBs to improve law enforcement standards.173 The APG, an autonomous and col-
laborative international body, is the FSRB for Asia and Pacific regions in order to 
assess the degree of compliance of its member countries with the international AML 
standards through the periodic mutual evaluation exercises to understand the issues, 
gaps, and deficiencies in legal and administrative mechanisms for addressing money 
                                                 
167 Robert O Keohane, Power and Governance in a Partially Globalised World (Routledge 2002) 
214. 
168 Ryder (n 4) 16. 
169  Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘FATF Public Statement – 19 October 2012’ 
<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/s-t/turkey/documents/fatfpublicstatement-19october2012.html> 
accessed 25 March 2018; see also Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘About the Non-Cooperative 
Countries and Territories (NCCT) Initiative’ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/doc-
uments/aboutthenon-cooperativecountriesandterritoriesncctinitiative.html> accessed 10 April 2018.   
170  Financial Action Task Force (FATF), High-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions 
<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions/> accessed 28 June 2015.  
171 Jackie Johnson, ‘In pursuit of dirty money: identifying weaknesses in the global financial system’ 
(2001) 5(2) Journal of Money Laundering Control 122, 123. 
172 Demetis (n 93) 20. 
173 Harrison and Ryder (n 26) 200; see also Anja P Jakobi, ‘Governing illicit finance in transnational 
security spaces: the FATF and anti-money laundering’ (2018) 69 Crime Law Soc Change 173, 185. 
CHAPTER THREE: International, Regional and National Anti-Money Laundering Stand-
ards 
77 
laundering and terrorist financing threats.174 The APG also facilitates  international 
cooperation among the international organisations such as the FATF, IMF, the Asian 
Development Bank, the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, the World 
Bank, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the Group of 
International Finance Centre Supervisors (GIFCS), and raises AML awareness of its 
member states, including international bodies, state agencies (such as FIUs), and pri-
vate sector actors, to understand the nature of the money laundering and requirement 
of legal changes.175 Like the FATF, the APG has not got the power of the suprana-
tional ‘legislative authority’ over other jurisdictions.176 The APG works with the 
FIUs, other relevant authorities, and the private sector to train their personnel and 
ensure that they have enough knowledge foundation to detect, deter, protect, and 
counter money laundering, or even to guide national risk management practices.177  
                                                 
174 The APG was established in 1997 consisting of 41-member jurisdictions (such as, Thailand and 
Singapore), including several observer bodies. The APG has five main functions, namely the mutual 
evaluations, technical assistance and training, AML/CFT typology research, world AML/CFT en-
gagement, and private sector engagement, in order to help its member jurisdictions to set their national 
coordination mechanisms. The APG submits its report to the FATF; see Asia/Pacific Group on Money 
Laundering (APG), APG Yearly Typologies Report 2014: Methods and Trends of Money Laundering 
and Terrorism Financing (APG 2014); see also Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), 
Asia and Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), ‘About APG’ <http://www.apgml.org/about-
us/page.aspx?p=91ce25ec-db8a-424c-9018-8bd1f6869162> accessed 16 November 2018; see also 
Shahar Hameiri and Lee Jones, ‘Regulatory regionalism and anti-money laundering governance in 
Asia’ (2015) 69(2) Australian Journal of International Affairs 144, 145.  
175 The APG also publishes the paper of the national and international typologies (including red flags 
and case studies) of money laundering and terrorist financing on its website in understanding how to 
target resources to prevent such crimes and to exchange information, to support a better understanding 
of the nature of the money laundering and terrorist financing approaches, techniques and trends in 
such a region; Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), ‘APG Typology Report on Trade 
Based Money Laundering’ Adopted by APG Members at the 15th Annual Meeting at 7, 8 (20 July 
2012) <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Trade_Based_ML_APGReport.pdf> 
accessed 15 November 2018; see also Hameiri and Jones (n 174) 144, 145.  
176 ibid 144, 158. 
177 For sectoral risks, these are likely to include, but will not be limited to, the jurisdiction’s national 
risk assessments, domestic or international typologies and supervisory expertise, as well as FIU feed-
back; see Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach (FATF 2014) 
13; see also World Bank, Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism: A Compre-
hensive Training Guide (The World Bank 2009) 32.  
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 A country transposes the FATF standards to criminalise money laundering, 
oversee the FIUs, CDD, KYC, STRs/SARs, and sharing of financial information in-
ternationally and nationally. In other words, the FIUs analyse the STRs/SARs from 
a wide range of reporting entities (REs) and change them into financial intelligence 
for relevant competent authorities to investigate and prosecute money laundering or 
terrorist financing in line with the national AML legislation.178 The FATF conducts 
the evaluations and make on-site visits for considering and producing the Mutual 
Evaluation Report (MER) how each member state has implemented its Recommen-
dations, such as the assessment of FIUs in line with Recommendation 29 regarding 
the role of FIU.179  
The independence of the FIU 
 By virtue of United Nations Convention against Corruption 2003, signatories 
are required to provide the FIU with operational independence in order to carry out 
its responsibilities efficiently and free from any undue influence or interference.180 
Moreover, the UN encourages that governments should respect to the independence 
of judges and the selection, professional training and status of judges lawyers, mem-
bers of the executive and the legislature, the prosecutors, the public in general.181 As 
                                                 
178 In the UK, the SAR requirements were enacted in the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986, which 
was repealed by the Criminal Justice Act 1993 and the UK POCA 2002, respectively. Thailand is 
contained in the AMLA 1999 and Singapore is contained in the CDSA 1992. 
179 FATF Recommendation 29. 
180 The important material resources and specialised staff, including the training that such staff may 
require to carry out their functions, should be provided. The United Nations Convention against Cor-
ruption 2003, Article 6 Preventive anti-corruption body or bodies.  
181 United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, ‘Basic Principles on the Inde-
pendence of the Judiciary’ Adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of 
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held at Milan from 26 August to 6 September 1985 and en-
dorsed by General Assembly resolutions 40/ 32 of 29 November 1985 and 40 / 146 of 13 December 
1985 <https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/independencejudici-
ary.aspx#:~:text=1.,the%20law%20of%20the%20country.&text=This%20principle%20is%20with-
out%20prejudice,in%20accordance%20with%20the%20law.> accessed 30 November 2020. 
CHAPTER THREE: International, Regional and National Anti-Money Laundering Stand-
ards 
79 
a result, it is crucial that every nation state enacts legislation to guarantee the opera-
tional independence of the FIU and that it takes effective measures to strengthen the 
integrity of the FIU.182 The FIU should have a budgetary independence, which is the 
FIUs to spend independently.183 In order to meet the international standards, the gov-
ernment should guarantee the independence in the State Constitution or the law of 
the country. In order to protect the FIU’s independence, it is the responsibility of all 
governmental and other political institutions to respect and observe the independence 
of the FIU.184  
 International Monetary Fund (IMF) divides FIU into four typologies com-
prising: administrative, law enforcement, judicial and hybrid models under the in-
vestigative and institutional position responsibility of the FIUs.185 The administrative 
FIU model is considered a separate body from the LEAs, this FIU acts as a buffer in 
connecting between the REs and the LEAs when performing he FIU’s main respon-
sibilities. The administrative FIU communicates between them to reduce the pressure 
on the private and public sector agencies. This model has limited direct access to the 
information from the other public agency, such as the police force, Interpol or other 
                                                 
182 The United Nations Convention against Corruption 2003, Article 11: Measures relating to the ju-
diciary and prosecution services. 
183 Ioana Deleanu, ‘FIUs in the European Union – facts and figures, functions and facilities’ in Brigitte 
Unger, Joras Ferwerda, Melissa van den Broek and Ioana Deleanu, The Economic and Legal Effec-
tiveness of the European Union’s Anti-Money Laundering Policy (Edward Elgar 2014) p.101.  
184 United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, ‘Basic Principles on the Inde-
pendence of the Judiciary’ Adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of 
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held at Milan from 26 August to 6 September 1985 and en-
dorsed by General Assembly resolutions 40/ 32 of 29 November 1985 and 40 / 146 of 13 December 
1985 <https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/independencejudici-
ary.aspx#:~:text=1.,the%20law%20of%20the%20country.&text=This%20principle%20is%20with-
out%20prejudice,in%20accordance%20with%20the%20law.> accessed 30 November 2020.  
185International Monetary Fund (IMF), ‘Financial Intelligence Units: An Overview’ (June 2004) p. 97 
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/FIU/fiu.pdf>.  
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LEAs, including a lack of operational independence because its might subject to the 
supervision of Prime Minister, Office of Ministry, or political agencies.186  
 In summary, the FATF Recommendations are clear on international cooper-
ation and unduly restrictive regulations, for example as indicated in the Interpretive 
Note to Recommendation 29.187 FIUs should have the right to conduct a decision 
along with the FATF Recommendations without undue influence or interference.188  
Such national laws should place undue restrictions on FIU’s ability to operate its key 
functions under the international standard purposes. Any limitations restrict opera-
tional independence should be terminated. The next section explains the implemen-
tation of the Egmont Group of FIUs. 
 
3.4.2 The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units   
 The Egmont Group 189 was established in 1995 as an informal global associ-
ation to support international cooperation and help the financial intelligence ex-
change international jurisdictions through its international professional networks of 
the FIUs to reduce money laundering and terrorist financing.190 The Egmont Group's 
objectives aim to improve the system of the financial information intelligence ex-
changing domestically and internationally, encourage the abilities of relevant author-
                                                 
186 As in this case with the three countries’ FIUs (the UK, Singapore and Thailand), please see the 
analysis in chapter 4, 5 and 6 respectively. 
187 FATF Recommendation 29. 
188 The Interpretive Note to Recommendation 29 
189 Hereinafter ‘Egmont Group.’ 
190 International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, Financial Intelligence Units: An Overview 
(IMF 2004) 2; see Mohmmad Al-Rashdan, ‘An analytical of the financial intelligence units’ enforce-
ment mechanisms’ (2012) 15(4) Journal of Money Laundering Control 483, 483; see also Jakobi  
(n 173) 173, 182. 
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ities, assist the FIUs, secure operational independence, and promote mutual commu-
nication between FIUs effectively.191 Therefore, the Group forms the network in the 
AML governance.192 The Egmont Group also endorsed the UN conventions against 
crime, such as Article 7 (1)(b) of the Palermo Convention,193 as well as Article 14 
(1)(b) of the United Nations Convention against Corruption 2003 so that countries 
establish the FIUs and ensure the competent authorities to have their ability to coop-
erate and exchange intelligence amongst FIUs efficiently.194  
 The Egmont Group identifies the FIU’s powers and responsibilities as a cen-
tral, national authority accountable for receiving (including permitted requesting), 
analysing financial information concerning suspected proceeds of crime, and sharing 
financial intelligence to the relevant competent authorities in order to further inves-
tigate, convict, and prosecute money laundering offence.195 Additionally, the FATF 
authorised the Egmont Group to act as an observer body, including as a coordinator 
for affiliating an effective mutual assistance between national FIUs.196 In 2000, the 
Egmont Group published over 100 money laundering cases, which involved with all 
trends of money laundering that were investigated by the worldwide FIUs.197 The 
Egmont Group published several reports and revised its Charter (2013) in line with 
the revised 2012 FATF Recommendations to meet its objectives and international 
                                                 
191 FATF Recommendation 29; see International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (n 190) 3; 
see also Ryder (n 4) 21; see also House of Lords, Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism 
Volume I: Report of European Union Committee (19th Report of Session, The Stationery Office 2009) 
22; see also Hopton (n 5) 19-20, 192. 
192 Jakobi (n 173) 173, 184. 
193 Article 7 (1)(b) of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime 2000. 
194 FATF Recommendation 29 and Article 14 (1)(b) of the United Nations Convention Against Cor-
ruption 2003. 
195 Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, ‘Information Paper on Financial Intelligence Units 
and the Egmont Group’ (September 2004) <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/44/56/34345425.pdf> 
accessed 4 February 2018. 
196 Shehu (n 22) 221, 235. 
197 Mohammed Ahmad Naheem, ‘TBML suspicious activity reports – a financial intelligence unit 
perspective’ (2018) 25(2) Journal of Financial Crime 1, 13. 
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standards.198 Clifford stated that the Egmont Group,199 needs all FIUs to achieve the 
implementation of the FATF Standards and attempts to set an informal Global Fi-
nancial Intelligence Unit (GFIU) to make a cooperative and highly responsive global 
attack on international money laundering.200  
 The obvious advantages of international mutual sharing of financial intelli-
gence through FIUs will rely on the transnational collaboration to solve the risks and 
threats of money laundering.201 The Egmont Group assists FIUs in increasing and 
systematising the interchange of financial information that enables them to bridge 
the gaps by enhancing better legislation, operation, training, and communication 
among the international FIUs.202 However, there are several issues that the certain 
State Members of the United Nations have not established FIUs, and some have not 
joined the Egmont group.203  
                                                 
198 For instance, the Principles for Information Exchange between FIUs for Money Laundering and 
Terrorism Financing Cases; Best Practices for the Formal Exchange of Information between Compe-
tition Authorities in Hard Core Cartel Investigations; and Egmont Group of FIUs Operational Guid-
ance for FIU Activities and the Exchange of Information, see U.S. Department of State, ‘The Egmont 
Group of Financial Intelligence Units ’
<https://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2015/vol2/239473.htm> accessed 25 June 2018; see also Eg-
mont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, ‘Principles for Information Exchange between FIUs for 
Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Cases’ (13 June 2001) <http://www.apml.gov.rs/RE-
POSITORY/422_5-princ_info_exchange[1].pdf> accessed 10 October 2018; see also Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), ‘Best Practices for the Formal Exchange of 
Information between Competition Authorities in Hard Core Cartel Investigations’ (October 2005) 
<https://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/35590548.pdf> accessed 10 October 2018; see also Eg-
mont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, ‘Egmont Group of FIUs Operational Guidance for FIU 
Activities and the Exchange of Information’ (July 2013) <file://nsta-uwe03/users3$/k-silathong/Win-
dows/Downloads/Operational_Guidance%20-%20revised%20Feb%202017%20-%20final.pdf> ac-
cessed 10 October 2018.  
199 Milind Sathye and Chris Patel, ‘Developing Financial Intelligence: An Assessment of the FIUs in 
Australia and India’, (2007) 10(4) Journal of Money Laundering Control 391, 392. 
200 Clifford Williams, ‘Artificial Harmony: Why Cooperative Efforts to Create a Global Financial 
Intelligence Unit have Faltered ’(2014) 17(4) Journal of Money Laundering Control 428, 436. 
201 James H. Freis, Jr., ‘Global Market and Global Vulnerabilities: Fighting Transnational Crime 
through Financial Intelligence ’ (2008) 2 <www.fincen. gov/news_room/speeh/pdf/20080425.pdf> 
accessed 16 September 2015. 
202  Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, ‘About’ <https://www.egmontgroup.org/con-
tent/about> accessed 9 April 2018.  
203 Williams (n 200) 428, 436.  
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 The Egmont Group has supplemented the FATF efforts in increasing and 
promoting the cooperation between FIU worldwide to share information to assist 
counter money laundering in line with the UN Global Programme against Money 
Laundering.204 The FATF Recommendation 29 requires all FIU to fully apply for the 
Egmont Group member.205 The Egmont focuses on the promotion of the operational 
autonomy and independence of the FIUs in its Member States because the independ-
ent and autonomous FIU is crucial to an effective AML/CFT regime to support the 
operation of competent authorities and law enforcement authorities, AML supervi-
sors, as well as foreign counterparts.206 Therefore, the lack of autonomy or opera-
tional independence hinders the effectiveness of the national FIUs and the investiga-
tions and prosecution of money laundering.207 However, the Egmont Group did not 
identify which model of the FIUs (namely, judicial, law enforcement, administrative, 
and hybrid models) is the best FIU model for the countries to implement.208  
 
 
The independence of the FIU 
 The Egmont Group focuses on the an operational independence of an FIU 
and it categorises the features of an operationally independent and autonomous FIU 
into six groups, including FIU governance and organisational structure; the preven-
tion of information and exchanges of information; the appointment and dismissal of 
                                                 
204 Tsingou (n 98) 617, 619. 
205 FATF Recommendation 29. 
206 Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, ‘New publication: understanding FIU operational 
independence and autonomy’ (October 2018) <https://egmontgroup.org/en/content/new-publication-
understanding-fiu-operational-independence-and-autonomy> accessed 8 July 2019.  
207 ibid. 
208 Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, ‘Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs)’ <https://eg-
montgroup.org/en/content/financial-intelligence-units-fius> accessed 8 July 2019.  
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FIU senior management and staff; budget and resources; as well as characteristics 
connected to accountability, integrity, transparency and leadership.209  
Governments should provide full autonomy to the FIU to fight financial 
crimes independently by issuing the national legislation bestowing with operational 
independence.210 Furthermore, the government should ensure the independence of 
the FIU and provide it the power without any undue influence in functioning its du-
ties effectively.211  The Egmont Group has explored and discussed issues of the op-
erational independence, especially the lacking of understanding of the operational 
understanding of independence by key stakeholders, restrictive governance struc-
tures and practices, as well as undue influence by politicians and/or criminal organ-
izations are referred as the common interfere of the progress of operation of FIUs.
212
 
Every member of the Egmont Group should promote and implement operational in-
dependence in their own jurisdictions.213 A country must be asked to ensure that the 
FIU has operational independence in order to be able to independently and effec-
tively manage the incoming flow of the STRs.214 As a member states of Asia/Pacific 
Group on Money Laundering, Thailand needs to comply with the FATF Recommen-
                                                 
209 Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, Understanding FIU Operational Independence and 
Autonomy  
(The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, October 2018), p 3. 
210 M.Anwarul Azia Kanak, ‘Role of Financial Intelligence Unit in Combating Money-Laundering 
and Terrorist Financing: An Analysis on the Functioning of Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit’ 
IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science (IOSR-JHSS) (2016) 21(7) 148, 152. 
211 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendation 29. 
212 Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, Understanding FIU Operational Independence and 
Autonomy (The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, October 2018), p 5. 
213 Ibid. 
214 Ioana Deleanu, ‘FIUs in the European Union – facts and figures, functions and facilities’ in Brigitte 
Unger, Joras Ferwerda, Melissa van den Broek and Ioana Deleanu, The Economic and Legal Effec-
tiveness of the European Union’s Anti-Money Laundering Policy (Edward Elgar 2014) p.98. 
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dations, especially the Recommendation 29 to position the country effective compli-
ance of the international standards to deal with money laundering and its associated 
predicate offences and terrorist financing.215 
 Principle 13 of the Principles for Information Exchange between Financial 
Intelligence Units for Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Cases determines 
that independence enhances the trust between the REs and the justice system when 
analysing and disseminating of the intelligence.216 
 As reasons mentioned above, the FIU should carry out its independent func-
tions in the STRs/SARs regime to meet the international AML standards. Therefore, 
more independent FIU in turn tend to be more transparent, while the transparency is 
also positively correlated with AML measures of the national institutional quality.217 
 In this case, the independence links with the transparency dimension, as well 
as allows relevant authority to pursue its long-term policy objective without political 
influence or interference. 218 Therefore, the failure of the FIU could impact on the 
country’s transparency including the rule of law, trust, governance and reputation.219 
Regarding the independence of the FIU, the government shall protect the FIU from 
influence and interfere whether political or industry. For example, notwithstanding, 
FATF and Egmont Group concerned with the operational independence of the FIU 
                                                 
215 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendation 29. 
216 European Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: 
Assessing the framework for cooperation between Financial Intelligence Units’ (Brussels, 24 July 
2019) p. 5 <https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/report_assessing_the_framework_for_finan-
cial_intelligence_units_fius _cooperation_with_third_countries_and_obstacles_and_opportuni-
ties_to_enhance_cooperation_between_financial_intelligence_units_with.pdf> accessed 8 Septem-
ber 2020. 
217 International Monetary Fund (IMF), ‘Central Bank Independence and Transparency: Evolution 
and Effectiveness’ IMF Working Paper Research Department WP/08/119 
218 Kenneth N. Kuttner and Adam S.Posen, ‘Do markets care who chairs the central bank?’ Working 
Paper No. W P 07 -3 (July 2008) p. 12.  
219 Ibid.  
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in each country, but in behalf of the German Public Prosecutor, it ordered investiga-
tors and police officers raid and searched the Germany’s anti-money laundering 
agent.220 Egmont Group considered that this action would undermine and pressure 
the FIU’s independence of its key function, including the whole of FIU system. Ac-
cording to the raid, the prosecutors were probing claims that the staff of the FIU 
failed to comply with the STR regulations that three German banks submitted from 
mid-2018 to the beginning of this year flagging a dozen accounts suspected of fun-
neling around €1.7m from illicit gains to lenders across Africa. Furthermore, the 
German prosecutor noted that the FIU’s failure to forward the filings hindered in-
vestigators’ caliber to deal with the suspicious transactions within an appropriate 
time frame. As reasons above, FATF attempts to support FIU to improve value to 
the financial information which FIU receives via the STRs/SARs, not to deliver all 
reports to relevant LEAs indiscriminately operational independence along with in-
ternational standards.221 Scherschneva, former head of Austria’s financial intelli-
gence unit, said that the action could undermine and go against the principle of the 
independence of German FIUs, including increases pressure on the whole FIU pro-
cess.222  
 In summary, the FATF Standards are clear on international cooperation and 
unduly restrictive regulations should be avoided, for example as indicated in the In-
terpretive Note to Recommendation 29.223 FIUs should have the right to conduct a 
                                                 
220 Verbeek-Kusters, Chair of the Egmont Group, noted that the raid could compromise the role of 
FIU under the global standards; see Koos Couv’ee, ‘Exclusive: Egmont Group raises concern over 
raid on German FIU’ (ACAMs, 22 July 2020) <https://www.moneylaundering.com/news/exclusive-
egmont-group-raises-concern-over-raid-on-german-fiu/> accessed 19 September 2020.  
221 ibid. 
222 Koos Couv’ee, ‘Exclusive: Egmont Group raises concern over raid on German FIU’ (ACAMs, 22 
July 2020) <https://www.moneylaundering.com/news/exclusive-egmont-group-raises-concern-over-
raid-on-german-fiu/> accessed 5 October 2020. 
223 FATF Recommendation 29. 
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decision along with the FATF Recommendations without undue influence or inter-
ference.224  Such national laws should place undue restrictions on FIU’s ability to 
operate its key functions under the international standard purposes. Any limitations 
restrict operational independence should be terminated. 
  
3.4.3 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) is an international 
group of central bankers225 aiming to support the banking sector to comply with best 
practices.226 The Basel issued the best-practice guidelines to encourage vigilance 
against criminal use of the financial system.227  For example, in 1988 the Basel en-
acted its statement of principles on the ‘Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking 
System for the Purpose of Money Laundering’.228 The Basel issued the first a general 
statement of ethical principles and brought about the establishment of FATF as an 
independent inter-governmental body to fight money laundering, which FIs and non-
FIs to comply with the standards.229 Furthermore, in 1997 Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision published its Core Principles on the Prevention of Criminal Use of 
the Banking System for the Purpose of Money Laundering.230 The guidance requires 
all banks to operate the risk management process as corporate governance to dimin-
ish incidents and money laundering risks by reporting the SARs/STRs to the FIUs.231  
                                                 
224 The Interpretive Note to Recommendation 29 
225 Michael S Barr and Geoffrey P Miller, ‘Global Administrative Law: The view from Basel’ (2006) 
17(1) European Journal of International Law 15, 15.  
226 Png (n 146) 97. 
227 Lilley (n 2) 58. 
228 ibid.  
229 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was established in 1989 on the invitation of the G7 to develop 
policies to counter money laundering; see Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘History of the 
FATF’ <https://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/historyofthefatf/> accessed 26 November 2020.  
230 Mark Simpson, ‘International initiatives’ in Mark Simpson, Nicole Smith and Arun Srivastava 
(eds), International Guide to Money Laundering Law and Practice (3rd edn, Bloomsbury 2010) 238.  
231 Basel Core Principles 15, 29. 
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 Furthermore, in 2001 the Basel also published its guidance, namely ‘the cus-
tomer due diligence for banks’ that introduced the principles of the KYC to encour-
age the banking sector to protect the integrity and reputation of the banking system 
from financial crime with risk management such as money laundering.232 In 2006, 
Basel issued the Core principles for effective banking supervision and the Core Prin-
ciples methodology to help banks have appropriate AML policies and procedures to 
deal with AML risk management and meet international AML standards.233 For in-
stance, the Basel Core Principle 29 obliges all kinds of financial services to work 
closely with the FIUs of each jurisdiction to prevent banks from the abuse of finan-
cial institutions, especially money laundering and financing of terrorism for the con-
sistency and transparency of the financial system.234 Therefore, the regulatory super-
visor requires monitoring all banks to establish CDD policies and mitigate the 
AML/CFT risks consistent with such Basel Core Principles and international stand-
ards.235  
 The IMF identified that the AML preventive measures of the Basel Core Prin-
ciples and the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Prin-
ciples are consistent with the FATF Recommendations to fight money laundering 
efficiently.236 Thus, the Basel Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervisory 
Principles is an industry guideline that is consistent with the FATF Recommenda-
tions to present the approaches to protect the financial system from being used by 
                                                 
232 Ryder (n 4) 18. 
233 Bank for International Settlements (BIS), ‘Core principles for effective banking supervision’ 
<https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.htm> accessed 7 May 2018.  
234 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision 
(Bank for International Settlements 2012) 9. 
235 ibid 65. 
236 Simpson (n 230) 217, 557. 
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criminals.237 Therefore, the FIUs encourage the banking sector to implement the 
Principles as the best practices of banking governance regarding the Basel CDD, the 
Basel Risk Management the reporting STR/SAR to the FIU, as well as effective pro-
cedures and training in order to meet the FATF requirements.238  
The independence of the FIU 
 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee) issued 
guidelines on supervisory standards covering three sectors consisting of banking, in-
surance, and securities in order to fighting money laundering and its associated pred-
icate offences and terrorist financing under the IAIS and the IOSCO. The Core Basel 
Committee Principle 2 focuses on independence, accountability, resourcing, and le-
gal protection for supervisor.239 Like FATF and Egmont Group, the Basel possesses 
operational independence, transparent processes, as well as is accountable for the 
discharge of its duties and use of its resource, which support the supervisor inde-
pendently functions without undue influence. Therefore Basel encourages banks’ 
management to ensure that all customers are appropriately identified STRs and raise 
their AML policies and procedures along with the Committee’s Core Principles for 
Effective Banking Supervision, in particular on independence and transparency in 
Principle 2 of the Core Principles.240  
                                                 
237 Ibid., 238.  
238 Basel Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervisory, ‘Customer Due Diligence for Banks’ 
Consultative Document Issued for comment by 31 March 2001 (Basel Committee on Banking Super-
vision 2001) 13 <https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs77.pdf> accessed 8 July 2019. 
239 Principle 2: Independence, accountability, resourcing and legal protection for supervisors; see 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), ‘Guidance on the application of the Core Principles for 
Effective Banking Supervision to the regulations and supervision of institutions relevant to financial 
inclusion’ (BIS, September 2016) <https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d383.pdf > accessed 29 November 
2020. 
240 Principle 2: Independence, accountability, resourcing and legal protection for supervisors; see 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), ‘Guidance on the application of the Core Principles for 
Effective Banking Supervision to the regulations and supervision of institutions relevant to financial 
inclusion’ (BIS, September 2016) <https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d383.pdf > accessed 29 November 
2020.  
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 In many countries, governments have established new or have extended the 
scope of activities of existing, state-owned FIs with the objective of supporting fi-
nancial inclusion and FinTech. As above reasons, legislation should ensure that su-
pervisors have appropriate powers and operational independence to function effec-
tive supervision of such agencies without political, government or industry influence 
and interference.241 Supervisors responsible for several kinds of FIs and non-FIs also 
need sufficient resources to conduct efficient oversight and supervision. Therefore, 
they should be financed in a manner that does not impact or undermine their auton-
omy or operational independence.242 
 Article 65(2) of Directive (EU) 2018/843 determines that the European Com-
mission requires to assess the framework for FIUs’ cooperation with third jurisdic-
tions, as well as opportunities to improve cooperation between FIUs in the European, 
including the possibility of establishing a coordination and support mechanism. As 
reason mentioned above, the operational independence of FIU is mainly regulated 
by the AMLD.243 It is an essential for each government that the role of FIU should 
have sufficient operational independence.244  
3.4.4 The Wolfsberg Money Laundering Principles 
 Under the FATF 40 Recommendations, the international’s leading banks cre-
ated the Wolfsberg Money Laundering Principles245 of the global AML guidelines 
                                                 
241 Bank for International Settlements (BIS), ‘Guidance on the application of the Core Principles for 
Effective Banking Supervision to the regulations and supervision of institutions relevant to financial 
inclusion’ (BIS, September 2016) p. 8 <https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d383.pdf > accessed 29 No-
vember 2020.   
242 Bank for International Settlements (BIS), ‘Guidance on the application of the Core Principles for 
Effective Banking Supervision to the regulations and supervision of institutions relevant to financial 
inclusion’ (BIS, September 2016) p. 7 <https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d383.pdf > accessed 29 No-
vember 2020.    
243 Directive (EU) 2018/843 (the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive), Article 65(2). 
244 Kanak (n 210). 
245 Hereinafter the ‘Wolfsberg Principles’. 
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for private banking in 2000 to enhance the world banking standards in order to 
strengthen the disclosure requirements and eliminate the possible abuse of the bank-
ing system,246 including the diversities and uncertainties emerging from operating 
multi-national banks in money laundering and terrorist financing purposes.247 The 
Wolfsberg Group248 published its preventive AML guidelines focusing on the KYC 
principles, client identification, the beneficial ownership, record-keeping regula-
tions, and the STRs requirement for all private banking sector to meet the interna-
tional standards.249  
 The Basel Committee Report noted that the Wolfsberg Principles have no 
legal effect by themselves and lack a special enforcement mechanism to oblige the 
banks to comply with their voluntarily administrative guidelines.250 The Wolfsberg 
Group is just the group of private banks, i.e. not an organisation that agreed to join 
                                                 
246 Wolfsberg AML Principles on Private Banking Principle1.1; Pieth and Aiolfi presumed that the 
private banks involving more than 60% of the world financial market; see Mark Pieth and Gemma 
Aiolfi, ‘The private sector becomes active: the Wolfsberg process’ at 5 <https://www.wolfsberg-prin-
ciples.com/sites/default/files/wb/pdfs/Wolfsberg-Process.pdf> accessed 5 November 2018.   
247 The diversities and uncertainties of banking may emerge from the expansion of the worldwide 
trade and industry, which has caused criminal risks; see Kris Hinterseer, ‘The Wolfsberg anti-money 
laundering principles’ (2001) 5(1) Journal of Money Laundering Control 25, 40; see also Andrew 
Haynes, ‘The Wolfsberg Principles: An analysis’ (2004) 7(3) Journal of Money Laundering Control 
207, 208; see also Sideek Mohamed, ‘Legal instruments to combat money laundering in the EU fi-
nancial market’ (2003) 6(1) Journal of Money Laundering Control 66, 68.  
248 The Wolfsberg Group of Financial Institutions (the Wolfsberg Group) comprised 13 banks, namely 
Bank of America, Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, HSBC, Barclays, Banco Santander, Societe Generale, 
Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, MUFG Bank, Standard Chartered Bank Credit Suisse, and UBS; see 
Wolfsberg Group, ‘Global banks: Global standards’ <https://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/> ac-
cessed 5 November 2018.  
249 Wolfsberg AML Principles on Private Banking Principle 1.2, 1.2.1, 1.3 of the Wolfsberg AML 
Principles for Private Banking (published in October 2000); furthermore, the Wolfsberg Group pub-
lished a Statement on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism in January 2002, and the Wolfs-
berg AML Principles for Correspondent Banking in November 2002; see Martin Peter and Hans-Peter 
Bauer, ‘Global standards for money laundering prevention’ (2002) 10(1) Journal of Financial Crime 
69, 70; see also Angela Veng Mei Leong, ‘Chasing dirty money: domestic and international measures 
against money laundering’ (2007) 10(2) Journal of Money Laundering Control 140, 151; see also 
Louis de Koker, ‘Money laundering control and suppression of financing of terrorism: Some thoughts 
on the impact of customer due diligence measures on financial exclusion’ (2006) 13(1) Journal of 
Financial Crime 26, 29, 37. 
250 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘Consultative Document: The Standardised 
Approach to Credit Risk’ Supporting Document to the New Basel Capital Accord (Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements 2001), para 17 <https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca04.pdf> accessed 5 November 
2018; see also Pieth and Aiolfi (n 246) 7.   
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the flexible volunteer policies251 as an internal rule for the banking sector rather than 
a policy matter for formal regulators.252 As a result, Wolfsberg roles are an important 
partner in developing the FATF standards.253  
 The Wolfsberg Group takes into account the management of financial crime 
risks regarding a risk-based approach, KYC, AML/CFT policies, and the STR/SAR 
when conducting their national private banking businesses in line with the FATF 
regulations.254 For example, Principle 1.3 states that banks require the CDD to pro-
cess their customers and submit the SAR/STR to the FIUs.255 Principle 4.1–4.3 con-
cern the STRs/SARs and how to report them to the FIUs256 This Group aims to pro-
mote the effectiveness of global AML/CFT programmes by providing FIs with in-
dustry guidelines on successful crime risk management.257 The Wolfsberg Group ad-
vocates the operation of the FIU in enhancing the FIUs to identify gaps and reduce 
the money laundering risks, including improving the quality of STRs/SARs submit-
ting to the FIUs.258  
The independence of the FIU 
 The Wolfsberg Group launched its control policy, which will be in place set-
ting standard control procedures to be undertaken by the different ‘control layers’, 
such as private banker, independent operations unit, Compliance, Internal Audit). 
                                                 
251 Peter and Bauer (n 249) 69, 70; see also Federal Reserve Board, ‘Remarks by Richard Spillen-
kothen, Director, Division of Supervision and Regulation’ At the New York State Banking Depart-
ment, New York (25 October 1999); see also Zabihollah Rezaee, Financial Institutions, Valuations, 
Mergers, and Acquisitions: The Fair Value Approach (2nd edn, John Wiley & Sons 2001) 37.  
252  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (n 234); see also Mohamed (n 237) 66, 69.  
253 Effective bank supervision bases on the appropriate implementation of these strategies (namely 
the quality of internal procedures such as customer identification; risk management; and disclosure 
requirement); see Pieth and Aiolfi (n 246) 7.  
254 Haynes (n 247) 207, 207; see Wolfsberg Group (n 248).  
255 Wolfsberg Principle 1.3. 
256 Wolfsberg Principles 4.1– 4.3; see Hinterseer (n 247) 25, 36.  
257 Wolfsberg Group (n 248).  
258 Wolfsberg Group ‘Mission’ <https://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/about/mission> accessed 8 
July 2019. 
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Such control policy will cover the issues of timing, level of control, spaces to be 
controlled, duties, responsibilities and the follow-up, but the Wolfsberg Group do 
not refer to the independence of the FIU.259 To solve such issues, the next section 
thesis investigates the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. 
 
3.4.5 The World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
 Money laundering is a financial crime with economic impacts on the finan-
cial sector and the external stability of the IMF. 260  Therefore, the effective 
AML/CFT regimes are necessary to protect the integrity of world financial systems 
by mitigating the factors, which cause financial abuse.261 Fisher noted that the World 
Bank and the IMF commit a key role in fighting money laundering regime.262 
 The IMF has collaborated with the FATF by contributing to the exchange of 
information, producing a world common methodology to evaluate the degree of 
countries’ legal AML frameworks, providing technical assistance, closely surveil-
ling and assessing the economic and financial systems of its member countries, 263 
                                                 
259 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Anti-Money Laundering Unit/ Global Programme 
against Money Laundering, An overview of the UN Conventions and the international standards con-
cerning anti-money laundering legislation (February 2004) 
260 International Monetary Fund (IMF), ‘Anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism 
(AML/CFT)’ <https://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/amlcft/eng/> accessed 6 November 2018.  
261 Min Zhu, Deputy Managing Director of the IMF; see International Monetary Fund (n 260).  
262 IMF released a Statement to its members to implement the UN counter-terrorist resolutions; see 
Fisher (n 113) 67, 67; see also Hopton (n 5) 16. 
263 Article IV: Obligations Regarding Exchange Arrangements of the IMF, is part of the Articles of 
Agreement of the IMF adopted in 22 July 1944; see International Monetary Fund (IMF), ‘Surveil-
lance’ <https://www.imf.org/external/about/econsurv.htm> accessed 6 November 2018; see also 
Bruce Zagaris, International White Collar Crime: Cases and Materials (Cambridge University Press 
2010) 60-63.  
CHAPTER THREE: International, Regional and National Anti-Money Laundering Stand-
ards 
94 
gathering data, researching and promoting the best AML/CFT practices and poli-
cies264 among its member countries265 in order to counter against money laundering 
risk effectively.266 Consequently, the IMF increases international awareness of the 
issues related to money laundering and financing terrorism by conducting the re-
search to identify the risk of financial abuse.267 The IMF identifies whether or not a 
country’s AML regime complies with the FATF Standards.268As a result, the IMF 
conducts the assessments of the AML framework of the member of FATF or a par-
ticipating FSRB, including their financial sector269 to bridge their legislative and in-
stitutional AML loopholes and weaknesses.270 Similar to the Basel Committee and 
Wolfsberg Group, the IMF does not have legislative enforcement of the international 
AML instruments271 and lack the power to impose legal sanctions.272  
 The World Bank aims to support the member countries to fight corruption 
and provides member countries with instruments for growing transparency with the 
                                                 
264 IMF focuses on the promotion of the financial crime policy, both at international and national 
levels in order to prevent the integrity of the financial market from the criminal purpose, in particular 
the money laundering and terrorist financing; see Leong (n 215) 140, 151. 
265 Lauren A Dellinger, ‘From dollars to pesos: A comparison of the US and Colombian anti-money 
laundering initiatives from an international perspective’ (2008) 38 California Western International 
Law Journal 419, 433.  
266 The World Bank enhances the international compliance with the FATF Recommendation by con-
tributing the technical assistance on AML/CFT to improve the institutional capacity and financial 
sector in each country to meet the FATF requirements; see William E Holder, ‘The International 
Monetary Fund’s involvement in combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism’ (2003) 
6(4) Journal of Money Laundering Control 383, 387; see also Pierre-Laurent Chatain, ‘The World 
Bank’s role in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing’ (2004) 6 International Law 
FORUM du droit international 190,  191 <http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/jour-
nals/10.1163/1571804042341802> accessed 5 November 2018 ; see also Leong (n 215) 140, 149. 
267 Chatain (n 266). 
268 Lauren A Dellinger ‘From dollars to pesos: A comparison of the US and Colombia anti-money 
laundering initiatives from an international perspective’ (2008) 38 California Western International 
Law Journal 419, 433. 
269 Leong (n 249) 140, 149. 
270 The IMF and World Bank publish the country assessments to illustrate the level of implementation 
of the FATF Standards; see Holder (n 266) 383, 387. 
271 Alison S Bachus, ‘From drugs to terrorism: The focus shifts in the international fight against 
money laundering after September 11, 2001’ (2004) 21 Arizona Journal of International and Com-
parative Law 835, 856, 857. 
272 Holder (n 266) 383, 386.  
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integrity of the financial market.273 The World Bank also jointly works on the FATF 
40 Recommendations with the IMF by conducting the AML/CFT assessment meth-
odology and improving the institutional ability in fighting money laundering and 
terrorist financing regime. 274  Furthermore, the World Bank promotes the AML 
measures hindering or decelerating the flow of illicit money into the financial sys-
tems.275 The World Bank has improved advisory guidance for the member countries 
in conducting their national AML/CFT risk assessment.276  
 The IMF encourages its Member States to promote AML/CFT policy at na-
tional and international levels to preserve the integrity of the financial market.277 
According to the AML/CFT assessment methodology, the IMF assesses the coun-
try’s AML regime in implementing the FATF standards, including the level of com-
pliance of the Recommendation 29 concerning the role of FIU.278 The IMF, World 
Bank, the UN, EU, and FATF have developed the FATF standards for effective 
                                                 
273 World Bank also helps the developing countries achieve sustainable solutions that decrease pov-
erty and create shared prosperity; see World Bank, ‘Who we are’ 
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/who-we-are> accessed 8 November 2019; see also World Bank, ‘Fi-
nancial Integrity’ <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialmarketintegrity> accessed 8 No-
vember 2018.  
274 Macro Arnone and Pier Carlo Padoan, ‘Anti-money laundering by international institutions: A 
preliminary assessment’ (2008) 26(3) European Journal of Law and Economics 361, 363, 364; see 
also Dellinger (n 265) 419, 428.  
275 Haitham Nobanee and Nejla Ellili, ‘Anti-money laundering disclosures and banks performance’ 
(2018) 25(1) Journal of Financial Crime 95, 95.  
276 The World Bank’s Risk Assessment comprises a risk assessment tool to identify main drivers of 
ML/TF risks, and a process to let the countries enhance their own ability to deal with future risk 
assessment; see World Bank, ‘Money laundering/terrorist financing risk assessment’ (20 January 
2016) <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/infographic/2016/01/20/money-laundering-terrorist-fi-
nancing-risk-assessment> accessed 8 November 2018.   
277 Dellinger (n 265) 419, 433.  
278 Fisher (n 113) 67, 67. 
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AML/CFT policy in dealing with the threats of money laundering and terrorist fi-
nancing.279 The World Bank and IMF have assisted their members to comply with 
the FATF Recommendations effectively.280  
The independence of the FIU 
 The best practice way for a achieve central bank comprises independence 
from the political pressures, transparency beyond its actions, accountability over the 
society as well as an efficient programme of communicating with the financial mar-
ket and broad public.281 Dumiter noted that independence is the most crucial one 
because transparency, accountability and communication channels become im-
portant only after providing independence to the central bank.282 Therefore, the thesis 
explores that the FIU requires operational independence to discharge its functions 
efficiently. The thesis argues how to structure the relationships between the FIU, the 
AML legislation, the politician and the government, including how to manage the 
FIU model in order to ensure that the FIU performs its independent functions to best 
effect.283 The next section describes the role of the International Organisation of Se-
curities Commissions.  
 
3.4.6 The International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
                                                 
279 David Samuel-Strausz Vernon, ‘A partnership with evil: money laundering, terrorist financing and 
Canadian financial institutions (2004) 20 Banking & Finance Law 89, 132. 
280 Arnone and Padoan (n 274) 361, 363, 364. 
281 Florin Cornel Dumiter, ‘Central bank independence, transparency and accountability indexes: A 
survey’ (2014) 7(1) Timisoara Journal of Economics and Business 35, 39. 
282 Yoshiharu Oritani, Public Governance of Central Banks: An Approach from New Institutional 
Economics BIS Working Papers, No. 299, Bank for International Settlement (2010) 1-44. 
<https://www.bis.org/publ/work299.pdf> accessed 14 December 2020.   
283 Yoshiharu Oritani, Public Governance of Central Banks: An Approach from New Institutional 
Economics BIS Working Papers, No. 299, Bank for International Settlement (2010) p.1 
<https://www.bis.org/publ/work299.pdf> accessed 14 December 2020.   
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 The International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) (i.e. the 
international standard-setting and non-state body of transnationalisation of securi-
ties, international mobility of capital, and future markets) improves, facilitates, sup-
ports, and implements adherence to the international high standards of securities reg-
ulation to improve investor prevention and decrease financial-system risk.284 IOSCO 
and related international networks also support the global coordination and intelli-
gence exchange among relevant regulatory agencies285 and introduce the standards 
toward monitoring world investment transactions across borders and markets to im-
prove the accountability for the world financial integrity.286 For example, IOSCO 
published the ‘Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures’ in 2004 as the inter-
national set of practical standards,287 which introduced the Regulatory principles for 
corporate financial disclosure and transparency.288 Moreover, IOSCO, IMF, the Ba-
sel Committee, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, and the Fi-
nancial Stability Board (FSB) seek to identify and assess risks impacting the world 
financial system and then address them.289 In 2012, IOSCO released the ‘Principle 
                                                 
284 The member countries of IOSCO are main securities and/or futures regulators in a national juris-
diction or the primary financial regulator in each country; see Rebecca Lewis, ‘A principled approach 
to international guidance for central counterparties’ (2018) Chicago Fed Letter No. 400 
<http://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=2&sid=09c8f767-dd5e-482d-8489-
fc45cf0bc89d%40sessionmgr120> accessed 8 November 2018; see also Geoffrey RD Underhill, 
‘Keeping governments out of politics: Transnational securities markets, regulatory cooperation, and 
political legitimacy’ (1995) 21 Review of International Studies 251, 252, 253; see also Nicolas Veron, 
‘An assessment of the G20’s initial action items’ Working Paper of Bruegel policy contribution, No. 
2010/08 at 9, 10. 
285 Basel Committee, IOSCO and the FATF can also be as the regulators; see Douglas W Arner and 
Michael W Taylor, ‘The global financial crisis and the Financial Stability Board: Hardening the soft 
law of international financial regulation’ (2009) 32(2) UNSW Law Journal 488, 494. 
286 Lewis (n 246); see also Lev Bromberg, Andrew Godwin and Ian Ramsay, ‘Cross-border coopera-
tion in financial regulation: Crossing the Fintech bridge (2017) 13(1) Capital Markets Law Journal 
59, 60; see also Paul Guy, ‘Regulatory harmonisation to achieve effective international competition’ 
in Franklin R Edwards and Hugh T Patrick (eds), Regulating International Financial Markets: Issues 
and Policies (Kluwer Academic 1992) 291.   
287 Lewis (n 284).   
288 International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) ‘Principle for Ongoing Disclosure 
and Material development Reporting’ (October 2002) <http://www.iosco.org/library/pub-
docs/pdf/IOSCOPD132.pdf> accessed 8 November 2018.  
289 Lewis (n 284).   
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for Oil Price Reporting Agencies Starting’ with the LIBOR, the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) to recommend the quality of the oil benchmarks and transpar-
ency.290 IOSCO and the FATF refer to a multilateral memorandum of understanding 
(MMoU),291 which is relied on a combination of soft law and the robust membership 
obligations.292  
 As the regulators, the IOSCO produces its AML guidelines, particularly the 
CDD, namely Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation,293 which is in line 
with the FATF Recommendations, for its members to help the FIUs and competent 
authorities in money laundering investigations and prosecutions.294 According to the 
IOSCO Principles for Cooperation in Regulation, the IOSCO states that the regulator 
shall have the authority to exchange both public and private information with na-
tional and international counterparts, including the FIUs and competent authori-
ties.295 Furthermore, the Principles for Auditors, Credit Rating Agencies, and other 
information service provider determine that the auditors shall have operational inde-
pendence in issuing entity that they audit in line with the FATF Recommenda-
tions.296 The IOSCO does not refer to the independence of the FIU, but only refers 
                                                 
290 Alex Frino, Gbenga Ibikunle, Vito Mollica and Tom Steffen, ‘The impact of commodity bench-
marks on derivatives markets: The case of the dated Brent assessment and Brent futures’ (2018) Jour-
nal of Banking and Finance 95 27, 28. 
291 International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), ‘Multilateral Memorandum of 
Understanding concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information’ (May 
2002) <https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD386.pdf> accessed 8 November 2018.  
292 Arner and Taylor (n 285) 488, 498. 
293 International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), ‘Objectives and Principles of Se-
curities Regulation’ (IOSCO 2017) <https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD561.pdf> 
accessed 8 July 2019. 
294 De Koker (n 249) 26, 38.    
295 International Organisation of Securities Commissions (n 288) 7.   
296 ibid 9.  
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to the independence of the auditor. In order to find out which best international prac-
tices refer to the independence of the FIU, the next section examines the role of the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors.   
 
3.4.7 The International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
 The International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), a non-gov-
ernmental international body, is a voluntary membership agency of insurance regu-
lators and supervisors.297 The IAIS is the global standard-setting body accountable 
for improving and helping in the implementation of principles, standards, and rele-
vant supporting material for insurance supervision.298 Its mission is to promote ef-
fective and internationally consistent supervision of the insurance industry in order 
to improve the cooperation among the supervisory agencies and to support the robust 
insurance markets for the advantage and protection of insurance policyholders, to 
remain alert to merge AML risks and chances,299 and to form the global financial 
stability.300  
                                                 
297 IAIS has more than 200 member jurisdictions; see International Association of Insurance Super-
visors (IAIS), ‘ International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS)’ 
<https://www.iaisweb.org/home> accessed 9 November 2018.  
298 Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, ‘ International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
(IAIS)’  <https://www.bafin.de/EN/Internationales/GlobaleZusam-
menarbeit/IAIS/iais_artikel_en.html> accessed 9 November 2018.   
299 The IAIS’s role plays as a global standards-setter similar to the FATF, including assesses the risk-
sensitive capital evaluation (i.e. Risk-Based Global Insurance Capital Standard); see Craig Turnbull, 
‘Some notes on approaches to regulatory capital assessment for insurance firms’(2018) 23(6) British 
Actuarial Journal 1, 2; see also Ross Buckley, Emilios Avgouleas and Douglas Arner (eds), Recon-
ceptualising Global Finance and its Regulation (Cambridge University Press 2016); see also Kathryn 
L Dewenter and Leigh A Riddick, ‘What’s the value of a TBTF guaranty? Evidence from the G-SII 
designation for insurance companies’ (2018) 91 Journal of Banking and Finance 70, 71;  
see also Robert O’Connor, ‘The new secretary-general of the IAIS says the move toward a global 
capital standard and development of a common framework for the supervision of international insur-
ance groups are key priorities’ (Convergence, December 2017) Best’s Review 66, 66 
<http://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=1&sid=69f40e7e-60cd-48bd-8d6b-
4d527e9600c9%40sessionmgr104> accessed 9 November 2018.  
300 International Association of Insurance Supervisors (n 297).  
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 To protect and control the money laundering risk via the insurance sector, the 
IAIS released the ‘Insurance Core Principles and Methodology’ for all insurance 
sectors pursuant to the FATF Recommendations.301 In 2003, the IAIS then issued the 
‘Insurance Core Principles (ICP)’ by putting new measures solving supervisory 
standards into the approach to fight against AML/CFT. It includes financial crime 
consistent with the FATF requirements, the Basel Committee, IOSCO, and the EU 
initiatives,302 in particular the information sharing among insurer sector, FIUs, law 
enforcement and competent authorities, and the reporting of a case of suspicious 
transaction to the FIUs without delay.303 Furthermore, in 2016, the IAIS issued its 
new regulations on world systemically crucial insurers, which adopted industry rec-
ommendations on focusing private company risk to better judge threats to the global 
economy.304 The IAIS has worked closely with Basel and FIUs in producing its 
guidelines based on the risk-based approach, which is in relation to the incorporation 
of the KYC, CDD, and the STR/SAR.305 Nevertheless, the IAIS does not refer to the 
independence of the FIU. Therefore, the next section investigates the role of the 
Group of International Finance Centre Supervisors.      
  
3.4.8 The Group of International Finance Centre Supervisors  
                                                 
301 The Guidance Paper on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism was 
replaced the 2002 AML Guidance Notes for Insurance Supervisors and Insurance Entities’ see also 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), Guidance Paper on Anti-Money Launder-
ing and Combating the Financing of Terrorism Guidance Paper No. 5 (IAIS 2004) 16, see also Hae-
mala Thanasegaran and Bala Shanmugam, ‘Exploitation of the insurance industry for money laun-
dering: the Malaysian perspective’ (2008) 11(2) Journal of Money Laundering Control 135, 136. 
302 Richard John Herring, ‘International coordination of financial supervision: Why has it grown? Wil 
it be sustained?’ (2018) 10(2) Journal of Financial Economic Policy 213, 222. 
303 Paragraphs 18.1, 22.0.5, 22.0.8, 22.2 of the Insurance Core Principles; see International Associa-
tion of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), ‘Insurance core principles’ (Updated November 2017) at 270, 
344 <file://nstu-nas01.uwe.ac.uk/users3$/k2-silathong/Windows/Downloads/Insurance_Core_Prin-
ciples_updated_November_2017%20(1).pdf> accessed 9 November 2018. 
304 O’Connor (n 299).  
305 Ryder (n 4) 23. 
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 The money laundering, including tax havens, is a serious threat of globalisa-
tion,306 which generates mobility of fund overseas by granting no/low tax, no/low 
rule, confidentiality, and anonymity to allow money laundering, degradation of reg-
ulation, instability, and economic underdevelopment in the world.307 The IMF rec-
ognised that the offshore financial centres (OFCs) play an underlying role in money 
laundering because they offer tax and regulatory services, including confidentiality 
and secrecy to their customers by hiding money away in offshore accounts.308 Sev-
eral offshore jurisdictions, which avoid the effective national and governmental tax 
regime, are crucial characteristics of the world financial market and redistributive 
connections with the global financial flows.309  
 The Group of International Finance Centre Supervisors (GIFCS)310 is an as-
sociation of the relevant authorities in jurisdictions concerned with the supervision 
of banks and related financial services primarily engaged in cross-border activities 
in order to contribute to global financial stability through the support, the adoption 
of international AML/CFT regulatory standards, as well as the promotion of best 
practices for the supervision of financial services in fighting money laundering and 
                                                 
306 Globalisation is also at the roots of the increased capacity of criminal proceeds to successfully 
enter the legal economy; see Leila Simona Talani, ‘Globalisation, money laundering and the city of 
London’ in Colin King, Clive Walker and Jimmy Gurule (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of Criminal 
and Terrorism Financing Law (Palgrave Macmillan 2018). 
307 Criminals hide their criminal funds in offshore accounts in order to generate and facilitate money 
laundering system via tax havens; see Harrison and Ryder (n 26) 200; see also Prem Sikka, ‘The role 
of Offshore Financial Centres in Globalisation’ (2003) 27 Accounting Forum 365, 365; see also Rob-
erto Saviano, ‘Drug trafficking taught the rich how to hide money  in tax havens’ (Guardian, 18 
November 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/18/paradise-papers-tax-
havens-mafia-roberto-saviano> accessed 29 November 2018. 
308 Chizu Nakajima, ‘Politics: Offshore Centres, transparency and integrity: The Case of the UK Ter-
ritories’ in Donato Masciandaro (ed) Global Financial Crime: Terrorism, Money Laundering and Off-
shore Centres (Routledge 2004) 239.  
309 From 1/3 to half of the world fund revenue emerges via the offshore business channels, and thus, 
almost half of non-resident bank deposits are conducted in the world offshore centres; see Zoriana 
Lutsyshyn and Elnur Mekhtiiev, ‘Offshore financial centres in global capital flow’ (2017) 2(27) In-
ternational Economic Policy 59, 59. 
310 Hereinafter ‘the Group’. 
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terrorist financing as appropriate.311 The Group requires its member jurisdictions to 
implement the best practices such as the ‘Standards on the regulation of Trust and 
Company Service Providers (TCSPs)’ consistent with the international AML/CFT 
standards such as the Basel Core Principles and the FATF Recommendations.312 
 The Group also aims to apply its collective expertise to participate in the 
change, efficiently influence debate and consultation on evolving regulatory stand-
ards, and provide mutual support to each other and a forum for promoting common 
interests.313 The Group encourages cooperation between all relevant supervisors in 
order to deal directly with the private economy of offshore financial centres, as well 
as to facilitate global financial stability.314 To achieve the solution of potential risks 
in the world financial markets, in 1999 the Financial Stability Forum (FSF)315 asked 
a working group to scrutinise the adoption of the OFCs to support global financial 
stability and to make recommendations for solving any troubles identified.316 The 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) has continued to oversee the regulatory policies and 
the global financial system.317  
                                                 
311  Group of International Finance Centre Supervisors (GIFCS), ‘Structure’ <http://gifcs.org/in-
dex.php/8-about-us> accessed 10 November 2018.  
312 Group of International Finance Centre Supervisors  (GIFCS), ‘Standards on the Regulation of 
Trust and Corporate Service Providers’ <http://gifcs.org/images/GIFCSStandardonTCSPs.pdf> ac-
cessed 13 November 2018.  
313 Group of International Finance Centre Supervisors (n 311).   
314 Pierre M Picard and Patrice Pieretti, ‘Bank secrecy, illicit money and offshore financial centres’ 
(2011) 95 Journal of Public Economics 942, 942.  
315 In 1999, the G7 nations set the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), i.e. a group comprising principal 
national financial authorities, such as Finance Ministers, Central Banker Governors, and international 
financial bodies. Then in 2009, the G20 nations replaced the FSF by establishing the ‘Financial Sta-
bility Board’ (i.e. FSF successors) with an extended membership and widened authorisation; see Fi-
nancial Stability Board (FSB) , ‘Our history’ <http://www.fsb.org/> accessed 14 November 2018; see 
also Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), ‘Financial Stability Forum (FSF)’ 
<https://www.hkma.gov.hk/gdbook/eng/f/fin_stability_forum.shtml> accessed 14 November 2018. 
316 Bank for International Settlements (BIS), ‘Financial Stability Forum releases Grouping of Off-
shore Financial Centres (OFCs) to assist in setting priorities for assessment’ 
<https://www.bis.org/press/p000526.htm> accessed 13 November 2018.  
317 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA), ‘Financial Stability Board: What is it and what are its 
functions’ <https://www.bbva.com/en/financial-stability-board-functions/> accessed 14 November 
2018.  
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 To achieve the FATF requirements, the GIFCS Guidance indicates that the 
regulators should ensure that they have the legal power and effective instruments in 
place which enable them to cooperate when appropriate and coordinate with the FIU, 
LEAs, regulators, AML policy-makers, and other relevant competent authorities re-
garding the evolution and adoption of AML strategies of correspondent banking to 
fight money laundering and its associated crimes.318 As reasons mentions above, the 
GIFCS does not refer to the independence of the FIU. Then the next section explains 
the role of competent AML authorities in countering money laundering.  
  
3.5 The Establishment of the Competent Authorities  
 The Vienna Convention determined that each government must support its 
competent authorities to order the production or seizure of financial institutions, 
banks, and commercial records in order to identify, trace, freeze and finally confis-
cate the proceeds of crime.319 The FATF Recommendation 29 requires all member 
states to establish the national FIUs to receive the STRs, including other information 
in respect of money laundering, associated predicate offences, and terrorist financ-
ing, to analyse such information, and then to disseminate the financial intelligence 
to the relevant competent authorities in order to further investigate and prosecute 
money laundering offences.320 Recommendation 29 determines the FIU’s functions, 
                                                 
318 Group of International Finance Centre Supervisors (GIFCS), ‘Standard on the Regulation of Trust 
and Corporate Service Providers’  30 <https://www.gfsc.gg/sites/default/files/GIFCS%20Stand-
ard%20on%20TCSPs.pdf> accessed 8 July 2019; see also Group of International Finance Centre Su-
pervisors (GIFCS), ‘GIFCS meets in Bermuda: Focus on and cybercrime, and new member joins’ 
GIFCS Plenary Press Release on 7 November 2017 <http://www.gifcs.net/images/GIFCSmeetsinber-
muda.pdf> accessed 8 July 2019.  
319 Articles 5(1) and 5(2) of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances (1988). 
320 Financial Action Task Force Recommendation 29; Competent authorities are defined as all public 
authorities (including financial supervisors set as autonomous non-governmental authorities with reg-
ulatory powers) with authorised duties in fighting money laundering and/or terrorist financing, for 
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namely gaining additional information from reporting entities321, including available 
access on a timely principle to the other information322 relating to the FIUs’ func-
tions appropriately.323 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) needs its member states to implement such Recommendations in order 
to ensure that competent authorities are able to access and exchange essential infor-
mation on financial institutions timely.324 Additionally, the reporting entities must 
report the suspicious transactions (STRs) or activities (SARs) to the FIUs to examine 
and deliver such STRs/SARs to relevant competent authorities consistent with the 
FATF requirements.325 
 The FATF identified that competent authorities refer to all public agencies 
with designated accountabilities for tackling money laundering (including terrorist 
financing).326 Ryder divided the competent authorities into three groups, consisting 
of the primary authorities, the secondary authorities, and the tertiary authorities.327 
Thus, the AML regime requires the coordination between competent authorities, pol-
icy-makers, supervisors, regulators, law enforcement bodies, financial institutions, 
prosecutors, and the FIUs to enhance the effectiveness of the prevention of money 
laundering.328 For instance, they should cooperate to increase personal awareness of 
                                                 
example the FIU; see Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘Competent authorities’ <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/glossary/> accessed 21 November 2018.    
321 For example, financial institutions and private sector. 
322 For example, the financial information, law enforcement information, and administrative infor-
mation. 
323 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendation 29.   
324 Harrison and Ryder (n 26) 207; see also Chizu Nakajima, ‘Panama Papers conference in Madrid: 
Transparency vs confidentiality – a conflict’ (2017) 20(4) Journal of Money Laundering Control 322, 
323. 
325 Financial Action Task Force Recommendation 4, 20, 26; see Financial Action Task Force (n 6).     
326 Financial Action Task Force (n  6 ).     
327 Henry Duggan & Peter Drewry ‘UK money laundering-typological considerations’  in Arun Sri-
vastava, Mark Simpson and Nina Moffatt (eds) International Guide to Money Laundering Law and 
Practice (4th ed, Bloomsbury 2013) 25. 
328 Pierre-Laurent Chatain, John McDowell, Cedric Mousset, Paul Allan Schott and Emile van der 
Does de Willebois, Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: A Practical Guide for 
Bank Supervisors (The World Bank 2009) 10. 
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money laundering risk, as well as a deeper understanding of the most current trend 
and typologies of money laundering.329 In some legal provisions pursuant to the 
FATF Recommendations, the competent authorities have the power to impose a fi-
nancial sanction on obliged entities, which have breached or failed to comply with 
the STR/SAR regulations (such as the Fourth EU AML Directive, the UK Money 
Laundering Regulations 2017) in order to enable them to enforce and punish their 
supervisory or monitoring function properly.330 
 Ryder refers to competent authorities as the significant mechanisms to elim-
inate the proceeds of crime.331 Competent authorities accountable for the implemen-
tation of the AML system must have enough monetary, human, practical, and tech-
nical resources to ensure that the relevant staff keep highly skilled standards.332  
 The Egmont Group assists in increasing and enhancing the communication 
and cooperation between the FIUs worldwide to address money laundering in line 
with the FIU requirements.333  The FIU disseminates intelligence concerning the 
STR/SAR to the AML competent authorities for investigation and prosecution of 
money laundering.334 Therefore, the FATF Recommendation 1 requires the private 
sector complying with the risk-based policy to identify and reduce the money laun-
dering risks.335 The Recommendation also determines that the private sector shall 
                                                 
329 Chatain, McDowell, Mousset, Schott and De Willebois (n 328) 26. 
330 Under the Financial Conduct Authority Handbook or the Senior Management Arrangements, Sys-
tems and Controls (SYSC) and the Financial Services Act 2012, the FCA can issue warning notices, 
impose a fine or imprisonment and suspend or restrict a firm or individual; see Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA), ‘Financial sanctions’ (17 May 2016) <https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/financial-
crime/financial-sanctions> accessed 24 February 2018; see also  Chatain, McDowell, Mousset, Schott 
and De Willebois (n 329) 120 121; see also Mugarura (n 98) 5, 13. 
331 Nicholas Ryder, Financial Crime in the 21st Century: Law and Policy (Edward Elgar 2011) 214. 
332 Salwa Zolkaflil, Normah Omar and Sharifah Nazatul Faiza Syed Mustapha Nazri, ‘Comprehensive 
cross-border declaration system as money-laundering prevention mechanism’ (2017) 20(3) Journal 
of Money Laundering Control 292, 296. 
333 Hopton (n 5) 18. 
334 ibid. 
335 FATF Recommendation 1. 
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report information regarding the risk assessment to all relevant competent authorities 
such as the FIUs that aim to prevent or mitigate such risks.336 The understanding of 
the AML legislation, the role of competent AML authorities, money laundering risks, 
and assessment of the money laundering threats would help the country deal with the 
risk of ML/TF effectively. Thus, the next section explains the first type of competent 
authorities as to the ‘primary authorities’ in combating money laundering. 
  
3.5.1 The Primary authorities 
 To promote financial transparency and to protect the integrity of the financial 
market, the national competent authorities should improve the AML policy to meet 
the FATF requirements.337  Ryder noted that the primary authorities, such as a Fi-
nance Department, are responsible for the national AML strategy and compliance 
with such policy.338 The Justice Department superintends the enforcement of its 
AML criminal legislation; for instance, a Foreign Ministry supervises the implemen-
tation of the AML international legal instruments.339 The primary authorities collab-
orate with the secondary authorities, namely the FIUs, law enforcement bodies, and 
financial regulatory agencies.340 If the additional AML measures are insufficient, the 
primary competent authorities should consider appropriate AML policies to bridge 
and solve the gaps. For example, in 2012 the FATF categorised Thailand into the 
                                                 
336 FATF Recommendation 1. 
337 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘Public Consultation on the Draft Guidance for Private Sec-
tor Information Sharing’ at 3 <https://www.fatf-gafi.org/fr/publications/recommandationsgafi/docu-
ments/public-consultation-guidance-info-sharing.html?hf=10&b=0&s=desc(fatf_releasedate)> ac-
cessed 9 July 2019. 
338 Ryder (n 4) 25. 
339 ibid. 
340 ibid. 
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NCCT list as Thailand lacked the AML policies that are in line with the FATF stand-
ards. However, in 2013 Thailand Government enacted the AML legislation to meet 
the international requirements, and the FATF later removed Thailand from such 
list.341 
 
3.5.2 The Secondary authorities 
 The secondary authorities, particularly the FIU, support the primary bodies 
to implement the AML policies.342 To illustrate, the FIU and immigration and cus-
toms343 trace, seize, confiscate the identified proceeds of crime and arrest the other 
criminal participants via the utility of financial intelligence.344 Furthermore, in 2009 
the EU Member States created the European Public Prosecution’s Office (EPPO) as 
the secondary authorities in order to improve international AML cooperation, includ-
ing freezing and seizure assets, and action cross-border operations.345  
 
3.5.3 The Tertiary authorities 
                                                 
341 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand, ‘Press Release: FATF removes Thailand 
from Public Statement on Money Laundering/Financing of Terrorism’ (1 May 2013) 
<http://www.mfa.go.th/main/en/media-center/14/34910-FATF-removes-Thailand-from-Public-
Statement-on-Mon.html> accessed 9 July 2019.  
342 Ryder (n 4) 80. 
343 Zolkaflil, Omar, Omar and Nazatul Faiza Syed Mustapha Nazri (n 332) 292, 296. 
344 Nicholas Alan McTaggart, ‘Follow the money to achieve success: Achievable or aspirational’ 
(2017) 24(3) Journal of Financial Crime 425, 427, 431; see also Anatasia Suhartati Lukito, ‘Financial 
intelligence investigations in combating money laundering crime: An Indonesian legal perspective’ 
(2016) 19(1) Journal of Money Laundering Control 92, 97. 
345 Excluding the UK, Ireland, Denmark, Sweden, Hungary, Malta and the Netherlands. Therefore, 
the EPPO will be autonomy from each national prosecution agencies; see Aperio Intelligence, ‘UK 
publishes 2017 National Risk Assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing’ (October 




b552c9bf13-198192249> accessed 3 November 2017.  
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 The tertiary authorities include the trade associations and the professions, 
which are threatened by illicit transactions and activities concerning money launder-
ing, such as UK Finance 346 and the Law Society.347 Thus, the competent authorities 
need to understand the threats of money laundering in order to improve risk manage-
ment, especially the banking sector being abused by the criminals. Furthermore, the 
quality of information-sharing from the competent authorities would become helpful 
for the FIU and LEAs for detection, investigation, and prosecution of money laun-
dering purposes. In consequence, the thesis examines the role of competent authori-
ties in the implementation of the FATF standards. The next section explains the cre-
ation of the FIUs. 
 
3.6 The Creation of the Financial Intelligence Units 
 The threat of money laundering causes extensive damage to the integrity and 
stability of the international financial system. As mentioned above, the requirement 
for creating an independent national agency, the FIU, as the centralised, independent, 
and autonomous agency should be set up and guaranteed by the statute of each juris-
diction to deal with money laundering problems.348 The FATF Recommendation 29 
provides that the FIU should have the power and ability to operate its duties freely, 
as well as the autonomous decision to receive, analyse, request, and/or distribute 
special information to relevant competent authorities and law enforcement agen-
cies.349  
                                                 
346  British Bankers’ Association (BBA), ‘Policy’ <https://www.bba.org.uk/policy/financial-
crime/anti-money-laundering/> accessed 20 November 2018.  
347  Law Society, ‘Anti-money laundering’ <https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-services/risk-
compliance/anti-money-laundering/> accessed 20 November 2018; see also Ryder (n 4) 25. 
348 Harrison and Ryder (n 26) 21; see also International Monetary Fund and World Bank (n 190) 1; 
see Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units (n 195).  
349 Financial Action Task Force Recommendation 29. 
CHAPTER THREE: International, Regional and National Anti-Money Laundering Stand-
ards 
109 
 The FIUs have been established in the FATF’s Member States and the 
FSRBs, e.g. the APG, pursuant to the FATF Recommendation 29.350 Jurisdictions 
should establish their FIUs that roles as a national centre for receiving and analysing 
the STR and other information concerning money laundering, associated predicate 
offences, and financing of terrorism, as well as then disseminating the results of such 
analysis.351 The FIU could obtain additional information from all reporting entities 
(REs), and shall have access on an appropriate basis to the administrative, law en-
forcement, and financial information that requires to operate its responsibilities 
properly.352 The Recommendation 29 defines the FIUs as a national central body 
with a computerised database and be accessible to competent authorities for using 
financial intelligence in further investigating, prosecuting, and convicting money 
laundering cases (including financial crime).353  
 Therefore, the FIUs should be the body, which has the separated and special-
ised authority, to receive, analyse financial information from the financial sector in 
                                                 
350 FATF Recommendations 29 and its Interpretative Note. In Singapore government established its 
FIU, namely the Suspicious Transaction Reporting Office (STRO); The UK government also set the 
National Crime Agency (NCA) as its FIU; Thailand government formed the Anti-Money Laundering 
Office (AMLO) as the Thailand’s FIU; The AMLO and STRO has been the member of Asia-Pacific 
Group on Money Laundering (APG), the FATF–style regional body for the Asia/Pacific region in 
combating money laundering; see Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, ‘List of Members’ 
(at 231) <http://www.egmontgroup.org/ membership/list-of-members> accessed 1 June 2015;  
see also Egmont Group of Financial Intelligent Units, ‘FAQs’ <http://www.egmont-
group.org/about/faqs> accessed 31 May 2015; see also Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering 
(APG), ‘Overview of APG Member’ <http://www.apgml.org/members-and-observ-
ers/page.aspx?p=8c32704a-5829-4671-873c-7b5a23ced347> accessed 31 May 2015; The FSRB 
must implement the FATF Recommendations as the FATF’s Member State do; see also see Egmont 
Group of Financial Intelligence Units (n 195). 
351 Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units (n 206). 
352 ibid. 
353 The Financial Action Task Force Recommendation 29.   
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order to avoid any undue industry, governmental or political influence, and inter-
fere.354 Moreover, the Interpretive Note to Recommendation 29 determines that ju-
risdictions should ensure that the FIU applying for the Egmont Group’s membership 
properly implements the Egmont Group statement of purpose and its Principles for 
Information Exchange Between Financial Intelligence Units for Money Laundering 
and Financing of Terrorism Cases (Egmont Group Guidance relating to the role and 
responsibilities of the FIUs and important tools for interchanging intelligence be-
tween FIUs).355 However, the existence of a specialised FIU may increase more com-
pliance costs for the reporting entities, as well as causing more defensive reporting 
from such reporting entities.356 
 FIUs play a vital role as a decision-maker in allowing the other authorities to 
perform quickly, investigating assistant for police and judicial authorities, and nego-
tiators between financial institutions and law enforcement authorities.357 Using the 
administrative-FIU pattern, the FIUs have their functions as an important safeguard 
between the involving law enforcement agencies and the reporting entities in the 
SAR/STR regime,358 so the reporting entities should not be afraid to communicate 
and submit the SARs/STRs to the FIUs directly. An effective FIU enhances a signif-
icant contribution to fighting financial crimes particularly money laundering nation-
ally and internationally.359 The significant functions of the FIUs in SAR/STR regime 
are to enhance the ability of the reporting entities to deal with SARs/STRs, support 
                                                 
354 FATF Recommendation 29 and its Interpretative Note Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence 
Units, ‘Communique: Egmont Group commits to combat corruption’ (15 March 2018)  
<https://www.egmontgroup.org/en/content/communiqu%C3%A9-egmont-group-commits-combat-
corruption> accessed 19 June 2018.  
355 Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units (n 206).   
356  Donato Masciandaro, ‘Financial Supervisory Unification and Financial Intelligence Units ’(2005) 
8(4) Journal of Money Laundering Control 354, 360. 
357 Stessens (n 29) 183. 
358 Masciandaro (n 356) 354, 359. 
359 Sathye and Patel (n 199) 391, 391. 
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the investigation of relevant law enforcement authorities, exchange information be-
tween international FIUs, and implement the national AML legislation to meet the 
FATF requirements.360 The next section illustrates the models of FIUs in combating 
money laundering. 
 
3.6.1 The Models of Financial Intelligence Units 
 The FIUs leads the international and national fight against terrorist and trans-
national organised crime more practically and becomes a major apparatus in the 
hands of the government and the global community.361 The IMF and the World Bank 
have attempted to provide technical assistance to countries to strengthen interna-
tional cooperation of the FIUs to fight money laundering.362 Therefore, the IMF em-
phasised that the international cooperation and development of the implementation 
of the FATF standards and the effectiveness of FIUs is at a primary state of the 
FATF’s core function.363 Although the FIUs globally share the same core functions 
of receiving, analysing, and disseminating intelligence to relevant law enforcement 
authorities, they differ in several ways, such as the operational and policy areas of 
their operations. For example, certain FIUs are a part of the judicial, police force, 
LEA, treasury, or central bank.364 Furthermore, the specific legal and socio-political 
national reality of each country has produced the various FIU forms of reporting 
systems.365 The Egmont Group also aims to enhance information exchange between 
                                                 
360 The Financial Action Task Force (FAFT) Interpretive Note to Recommendation 29; see Egmont 
Group of Financial Intelligence Units (n 206).  
361 Masciandaro (n 356 ) 354, 354. 
362 Sathye and Patel (n 199) 391, 392. 
363 ibid. 
364 Nigel Morris-Cotterill, ‘International money laundering update’ (2007) Compliance Officer Bul-
letin 1, 3 
365 Mitsilegas and Gilmore (n 105) 119, 122. 
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the national FIUs regardless of whether they have different FIU models or financial 
and legislative systems.366 Thony identified that the architecture of FIUs is based on 
each country’s decision, namely the structure of the agency engaged in efforts to deal 
with money laundering and the responsibilities delegate the power to such agency, 
including the kind and quantity of financial information accessible to the AML agen-
cies.367 
 The IMF and World Bank divided FIUs into four models, including the ad-
ministrative-type FIU, the law-enforcement-type FIU, the judicial-or prosecutorial-
type FIU, and the mixed or hybrid FIU.368 Stessens also divided FIUs into four styles, 
namely an administrative model, the police model, the judicial model, and the mix-
ture between the judiciary and supervisory authorities.369 Whilst, Deleanu divided 
FIUs into four models, including the administrative FIU model, the Law Enforce-
ment FIU model, the judicial type of FIU, and FIU – the optimal filter model.370 Van 
den Broek categorised four models, including the FIU model, the external model, the 
internal model, and the hybrid model.371 Each of the models has both advantages and 
disadvantages.372 However, the thesis presents that the Egmont Group divided the 
FIUs into four models (namely, administrative, law enforcement, judicial, and hy-
brid-model FIUs).373 The next section explains administrative-model FIU. 
 
 
                                                 
366  Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units (n 195).  
367 Jean-Francois Thony, ‘Processing Financial Information in Money Laundering Matters: The Fi-
nancial Intelligence Units’ (1996) Eur. J. Crime Crim. L. & Crim. Just 257, 258. 
368 International Monetary Fund and World Bank (n 190) 189. 
369 ibid. 
370 Ioana Deleanu, ‘The Role of Information for Successful AML Policy’, in Brigitte Unger and Daan 
van der Linde (eds) Research Handbook on Money Laundering (Edward Elgar 2013) 465.  
371 Melissa van den Broek, ‘Designing Supervision under the Preventive Anti-Money Laundering 
Policy in the European Union’ (2014) 10(5) Utrecht Law Review 151, 154. 
372 International Monetary Fund and World Bank (n 190) 10-17. 
373 Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units (n 204).  




3.6.1.1 The Administrative-Model FIU 
 The administrative-model or independent-model FIU refers to an independ-
ent, centralised, and administrative authority, which is based within a government 
agency (e.g. the National Bank and Ministry of Finance) in order to obtain and pro-
cess financial information and the suspicious activity reports/suspicious transaction 
reports (SARs/STRs) from reporting entities to an autonomous unit, and then deliver 
disclosures to relevant law enforcement authorities, or judicial bodies for further in-
vestigation, prosecution, and conviction of money laundering offence.374 The func-
tions of the administrative-FIU model act as a significant buffer between the report-
ing entities (e.g. financial institutions), and the relevant law enforcement authorities 
(e.g. police).375 The UK, Singapore, Australia, and the US employ this model, for 
example. 376  
 According to the FIU of the UK and Singapore, the independence of FIU is 
important to the administrative-FIU type because their FIUs act as supervision like 
the independent FIUs. This type focuses on the role of buffer between the REs and 
relevant LEAs in charge of financial crime investigations and prosecutions. Further-
more, this FIU often locates in the ministry of finance, the central bank, a regulatory 
agency or as separate structure, independent of any ministry.377 It is important that 
this FIU deals with the STRs/SARs, financial information or intelligence in order to 
disseminate the intelligence to the relevant LEAs for investigating and prosecuting. 
                                                 
374 ibid.  
375 Masciandaro (n 356) 354, 359. 
376 ibid 354, 364; see also World Bank, ‘Module 2: Role of the Financial Intelligence Unit (incorpo-
rating peer reviewers comments) at 6 <http://pub-
docs.worldbank.org/en/834721427730119379/AML-Module-2.pdf> accessed 19 June 2018. 
377 International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, Financial Intelligence Units: An Overview 
(IMF 2004) 10. 
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Since the REs are required to disclose the customer’s financial information, the FIU 
shall be independent, autonomous and neutral agency rather than the LEAs. The in-
dependence of the FIU is essential to create the great cooperation between the REs 
and LEAs under the STRs/SARs regime. The next section describes the law enforce-
ment model FIU. 
 
3.6.1.2 The Law Enforcement- Model FIU  
 The law enforcement-model FIU, where the STRs/SARs are reported to an 
intelligence or police agency, supports the judicial and relevant law enforcement au-
thorities to investigate money laundering offence in line with AML legislation, but 
competes for jurisdictional authority to investigate money laundering in some 
cases.378 Germany’ FIU, Hong Kong’s FIU, Estonia’s FIU, Papua New Guinea’s 
FIU, and Japan’s FIU apply this model.379  
 The law-enforcement FIU type brings about the establishment of the FIU as 
the part of a law-enforcement body under the government (reporting to the Home 
Secretary or government) in order to have the appropriate law-enforcement powers 
such as the powers for issuing the order to the REs, in particular the order to freeze 
or seize the criminal proceedings.380 As reasons mentioned above, this FIU type does 
not focus on the independence of the FIU, but emphasises on the proper law-enforce-
                                                 
378 Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units (n 204).     
379 Masciandaro (n 356) 354, 362; see also World Bank (n 341) 7.   
380 International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, Financial Intelligence Units: An Overview 
(IMF 2004) 13. 
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ment powers to access and deal with the financial information, intelligence, investi-
gation and prosecution via the application of current international and national crim-
inal intelligence exchange networks.381 
 
3.6.1.3 The Judicial/Prosuctorial-Model FIUs 
 The judicial/Prosuctorial-Model FIUs are established within the judicial 
branch of state or the public prosecution service where the disclosures of the 
SARs/STRs are obtained by the investigative bodies from its reporting entities.382 
Because these FIU type have authority over the LEAs or investigatory agencies.383 
The authorities of these FIU type have powers to seize illegal funds, freeze bank 
accounts, conduct interrogations, detain suspects, and conduct effective searches.384 
Denmark’s FIU, Cyprus’s FIU, and Switzerland’s FIU use these models.385  
 These FIUs require the higher degree of the independence of the FIUs from 
the political interference and influence because they work with the freedom of the 
people under the Constitution law. 
 
3.6.1.4 The Hybrid-Model FIU 
 The hybrid-FIU model, as a disclosure intermediary, combines elements of 
at least two of the FIU models, such as administrative and law enforcement-FIU 
                                                 
381 International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, Financial Intelligence Units: An Overview 
(IMF 2004) 14. 
382 Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units (n 204). 
383 International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, Financial Intelligence Units: An Overview 
(IMF 2004) 16. 
384 Masciandaro (n 356) 354, 359. 
385 World Bank, ‘Module 2: Role of the Financial Intelligence Units (incorporating Peer  reviewers 
comments) at 8 <http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/834721427730119379/AML-Module-2.pdf> ac-
cessed 18 December 2020; see also Masciandaro (n 356) 354, 364. 
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models, or judicial and law enforcement-FIU models.386 Thailand’s FIU uses the 
model that combines law enforcement, judicial and administrative-FIU style.387 The 
next section describes the evaluation of the FIU Models.  
 The IMF has made an assessment of FIU in the context of jurisdiction com-
pliance with FATF recommendations, but such assessment is confined to checking 
whether an FIU has been established properly and whether it has sufficient legal 
backing effectively.388 Masciandaro supports that the political institutional environ-
ment may impact the capability of policymakers and lawmakers to implement their 
alternatives, which can also determine the model of the FIUs.389 He also argued that 
the establishment of the administrative-styles FIUs in the institutional form of finan-
cial and special agency, such as in the UK and Singapore, will be rather useful than 
other forms.390 The Egmont Group state that there are 112 FIUs in the world applying 
the administrative-type FIUs, while there are 17 hybrid-model FIUs (i.e. combining 
between administrative and law enforcement), five judicial-model FIUs, 21 law en-
forcement-model FIUs, and four hybrid-model FIUs (i.e. combining between judi-
cial and law enforcement).391 Stessens also asserted that administrative FIUs have a 
substantial level of independence because the financial institutions well link with the 
central bank or treasury ministry.392  
                                                 
386 Mitsilegas and Gilmore (n 105) 119, 122; see also Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units 
(n 204).   
387 Seehanat Prayoonrat, ‘The Need and Compliance Issue of Thailand’s Regime on Anti-Money 
Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism’ (D Juridical Science thesis, Chulalongkorn 
University, 2007).  
388 Financial Action Task Force Recommendation 29. 
389 Masciandaro (n 356) 354, 365. 
390 ibid; see also Danato Masciandaro and Alessio Volpicella, ‘Designing financial supervision: The 
puzzling case of the FIUs against money laundering ’(2016) 2(1) Journal of Financial Regulation 79, 
79.  
391 Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence units, Annual Report 2016/2017 (Egmont Group 2018) 
21.   
392 Stessens (n 29) 188, 189. 
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 Since the hybrid FIU type contains various combinations of the powers of 
arrangement, the thesis noted that the independence of the FIU shall be appropriately 
prevented a number of powers of each agency from the political influence and inter-
ference.393 
 
3.7 The Implementation of International Standards in the United Kingdom 
 London, one of the important financial centres in the world, becomes global 
money-laundering capital.394 In 2012 the Home Office approximated that domestic 
organised criminal gangs generated £20bn to £40bn a year from the sale of narcotics, 
people smuggling and trafficking, and other illicit activities.395  Furthermore, the 
NCA approximates that criminal organisations launder about £90bn of illegal money 
via the UK per year.396 The NCA estimated that the costs of money laundering to the 
UK financial system have ranged from £36bn to £90bn.397 In 2016, there were 1,435 
offenders were convicted of money laundering in the UK.398 As mentioned above, 
                                                 
393 International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, Financial Intelligence Units: An Overview 
(IMF 2004) 17. 
394 Guardian, ‘London still world’s top financial centre despite Brexit, say survey’ (Guardian, 11 
September 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/sep/11/london-financial-centre-
brexit-frankfurt-dublin-new-york-donald-trump> accessed 31 August 2018; see Dominic Kavakeb, 
‘UK remains global money-laundering capital with more work to be done’ (Transparency Interna-
tional UK, 26 October 2017) <http://www.transparency.org.uk/press-releases/uk-remains-global-
money-laundering-capital-with-more-work-to-be-done/#.W4mnnehKjct> accessed 31 August 2018.  
395 Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), ‘Anti-money laundering annual report 2012/13’ (July 2013) 
<https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/corporate/anti-money-laundering-report.pdf> accessed 4 June 
2015.  
396 Robert Barrington, ‘London, the Money laundering capital’ (World Today, April & May 2018) 
<https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/twt/london-money-laundering-capital> accessed 31 
August 2018.  
397 Matt Hopkins and Nikki Shelton, ‘Identifying money laundering risk in the United Kingdom: Ob-
servations from National risk assessments and a proposed alternative methodology’ (2019) 25 Eur J 
Crim Policy 63, 64. 
398  Home Office, ‘Economic crime factsheet’ (11 December 2017) <https://homeofficeme-
dia.blog.gov.uk/2017/12/11/economic-crime-factsheet/> accessed 10 July 2019.  
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the city of London can be scrutinised as the choice for money laundering by the 
criminals.399  
 The UN Conventions presented the international AML standards for dealing 
with drug trafficking and money laundering offences towards attacking the monetary 
incentives of the criminal organisation and activities.400 The UK government deals 
with the threats401 of money laundering by efficiently transposing international AML 
preventive measures into national AML legislation, i.e. the Proceeds of Crime Act 
2002 and the Terrorism Act 2000.402 The UK has implemented the international 
AML instruments, namely the Vienna, Palermo, and Merida Conventions, the FATF 
40 Recommendations, the EU four AML Directives, including the AML best prac-
tices and industry guidelines, into its national AML legislation.403 The UK’s AML 
legal framework, i.e. Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, goes one step beyond the require-
ments of the international standards, namely the United Nations and FATF’s AML 
                                                 
399 Liz Campbell and Nicholas Lord (eds), Corruption in Commercial Enterprise: Law, Theory and 
Practice (Routledge 2018) 95; see also JC Sharman, ‘Shopping for anonymous shell companies: An 
audit study of anonymity and crime in the international financial system’ (2010) 24(4) The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 127, 139; see also Talani (n 306). 
400 Ryder (n 4) 12. 
401 Walker argues that a world money laundering amount of $2.85bn yearly, strongly concentrated in 
North America and Europe. However, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
argues that the estimated amount of money laundered in the world yearly is 2-5 per cent of global 
GDP or $2tn in current US$; see United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), ‘Money 
Laundering and Globalisation’  <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money-
laundering/globalization.html> accessed 13 July 2017; see also John Robert Walker, ‘How Big is 
Global Money Laundering?’ (1999) 3(1) Journal of Money Laundering Control 25, 25. 
402 The preventive measures were discussed in Chapter 5 relation to the International, Regional and 
Domestic AML Standards. The international anti-money laundering preventive measures were set by 
the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
(The 1988 Vienna Convention), the Forty Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations 
and European Communities Council Directive on Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for 
the Purpose of Money Laundering; see Harrison and Ryder (n 26) 223.   
403 The UK also ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terror-
ism 1999. This thesis focuses on the money laundering legislation; see Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures-United Kingdom 
Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (FATF 2018) 177. 
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frameworks.404 For example, the UK AML framework expands the scope of obliges 
entities by including art intermediaries for transactions exceeding EUR 10,000.405  
 Furthermore, the UK government would accept evidence on the benefits to 
LEAs of the information being accessible via the register, and of the additional costs 
to firms of providing such information, over and more than the minimum needs of 
the EU Fifth AML directive.406 In the UK, the HM Treasury has organised the UK’s 
AML policy via the FCA and the CPS by the virtue of the POCA 2002.407 However, 
the NCA reports that such the phenomenon increases the number of unnecessary and 
low quality of SARs, i.e. defensive reporting, filed to the NCA and impacts the fi-
nancial intelligence disseminate to the relevant competent authorities for investiga-
tions and prosecution of money laundering because the FIUs fear the sanctions if 
they fail to comply with the SARs regime.408  
 The FATF rated that the UK has fully complied with the international AML 
obligations, showing that the UK’s AML measures go beyond its international AML 
standards.409 Furthermore, the UK has acted as the leader of the European and world 
to fight the money laundering regime.410 Nevertheless, it also impacts the role of the 
NCA in respect to the management of the SARs regime, particularly the number of 
defensive reporting that can delay the dissemination of financial intelligence to the 
                                                 
404 HM Treasury, ‘Transposition of the Fifth Money Laundering Directive: Consultation’ (Crown 
April 2019) 21, 59 <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/at-
tachment_data/file/795670/20190415_Consultation_on_the_Transposition_of_5MLD__web.pdf> 
accessed 11 July 2019. 
405 ibid. 
406 ibid. 
407 Section 327, 328 and 329 of Part 7 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002; see also R v Rollins [2010] 
UKSC 39. 
408 The NCA reported that between 2015 and 2016 there was an increase of 44 per cent in order to 
protect themselves from money laundering investigations or prosecutions; see Home Office and HM 
Treasury, Action Plan for Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Finance (Home Office 
2016) 43; see also Aperio Intelligence (n 345) 1, 11.   
409 Ryder (n 4) 252, 269.  
410 ibid. 
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competent authorities for investigating, restraining, confiscating, recovering the pro-
ceeds of crime, and prosecuting the financial crime and financing of terrorism.411  
 
 Due to the 2018 FATF MER rate the UK FIU as ‘partially compliant’, in 
particular some concerns regarding its operational independence, as well as relating 
to its ability to act its key functions because its lack of proper resources, which im-
pacts on the capacity to exercise operational and strategic analysis in SARs regime.412 
 As reasons mentioned above, the thesis wonders why the FATF rated the UK 
as best practice, but the UK gained less score for implementing the Recommendation 
29. This thesis intends to address this issue in the chapter four.  
  
3.8 The Implementation of International Standards in Singapore 
 In 2014, Singapore seized the proceeds of crime about SGD$ 71m under the 
Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) 
Act (Chapter 65A) 1992 (CDSA), i.e. the main AML legislation.413 Singapore res-
ponds to the money laundering by implementing the three main AML Conven-
tions,414 as well as the FATF Recommendations.415 To achieve such international 
standards, Singapore requires to improve its AML legal framework and strengthen 
                                                 
411 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Summary of the Third Mutual Evaluation Report Anti-Money 
Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism: United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
ern Ireland (FATF 2007) 1. 
412 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing 
Measures-United Kingdom Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (FATF 2018) 224. 
413 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Anti-
Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures - Singapore Fourth Round Mutual 
Evaluation Report (FATF and APG 2016) 68. 
414 This thesis focuses on the three main AML Conventions, namely the United Nations (UN) Con-
vention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988 (the Vienna Con-
vention), the UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime 2000 (the Palermo Convention) 
and the UN Convention Against Corruption 2003 (the Merida Convention). In consequence, this the-
sis does not study the UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
1999 (the Terrorism Financing Convention). 
415 Financial Action Task Force (n 177) 136. 
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the FIU and competent authorities by designing the robust AML regulatory and su-
pervisory framework to deal with the complicated investigation and confiscation of 
the proceeds of money laundering.416 For example, the CDSA 1992 aims to crimi-
nalise the benefits of criminal conduct and targets any person, namely legal or natural 
person concerning proceeds of the drug trade and money laundering offences.417  
 Pieth and Aiolfi stated that the architecture of Singapore AML legal frame-
work is progressive equally to the UK’s AML legal framework.418 As the reason 
mentioned above, the Singapore government has attempted to protect the integrity 
of the financial system from financial crime through compliance with preventive 
measures, such as a risk-based approach and KYC in all businesses in Singapore. 419  
The MAS produced the AML guidelines, such as the MAS Notice 626 on Prevention 
of Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (MAS Notices 
626).420 If they fail to comply with the preventive measures, they can be imposed 
sanctions.421 For example, the MAS could withdraw the license of the businesses 
because of the breach of such Notices.422 The FATF stated that Singapore is a devel-
oped country and the hub of financial service, as well as international trade in 
Asia/Pacific region which is attractive to criminals.423 Then, the World Economic 
                                                 
416 Cheong-Ann Png and Khoon-Jin Tan, ‘Singapore’ in Toby Graham (ed), Butterworths Interna-
tional Guide to Money Laundering Law and Practice (2nd edn, LexisNexis Butterworths 2003) 548. 
417 Sections 2, 43, 44 of the CDSA 1992 (2000 Rev Ed) determines ‘benefits of criminal conduct’ 
similar to the ‘proceeds derived from criminal conduct’. 
418 Pieth and Aiolfi (n 42) 420. 
419 Alvin Yeo and Joy Tan, ‘Singapore’ in Arun Srivastava, Mark Simpson and Nina Moffatt (eds) 
International Guide to Money Laundering Law and Practice (4th edn, Bloomsbury 2013) 1148.  
420 The Guidelines to Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) Notice 626 on Prevention of Money 
Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism and s 27(B) the Monetary Authority of Sin-
gapore Act in relation to the requirements for prevention of money laundering and terrorism financ-
ing; see Dennis Cox, Handbook of Anti Money Laundering (Wiley 2014) 615. 
421 Sections 27(B), 27(E) of the Monetary Authority of Singapore Act 1970.  
422 Section 28(5) of the Monetary Authority of Singapore Act 1970. 
423  International Monetary Fund (IMF), ‘Singapore’ (February 2009) <https://asean.eli-
brary.imf.org/abstract/IMF002/09958-9781451834291/09958-9781451834291/09958-
9781451834291_A001.xml?redirect=true> accessed 27 December 2018. 
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Forum announced that Singapore is the best country in preventing the business from 
criminals.424 
 By the virtue of s 27B of the Monetary Authority of Singapore Act (Chapter 
186) 1970 (MAS Act), the law provides the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) 
as a single regulator in Singapore taking into account a central bank of Singapore to 
issue the Direction, Regulations or Guidelines to prevent FIUs from being used for 
money laundering and its associated crimes.425 By the virtue of s 3A of the CDSA, 
Singapore empowers the Suspicious Transaction Reporting Office (STRO) as a na-
tional FIU to develop AML/CFT supervisory frameworks for FIUs, as well as im-
proving coordination between national and international financial regulatory author-
ities and LEAs like a buffer.426  
 The main roles of the STRO aim to the STRs regime and disseminate finan-
cial intelligence to competent authorities for investigating, criminalising, and prose-
cuting money laundering, drugs, and all serious crimes.427 For instance, the STRO 
received 34,129 STRs in 2016 that is 12 per cent higher than STRs figure in 2015.428 
These figures may include unnecessary and low quality of the STRs submitted to the 
STRO, which could impact the performance of the STRO in fighting money laun-
dering in Singapore.  
                                                 
424 Cox (n 420) 615. 
425 MAS Act 1970 (Chapter 186), s 27B. 
426  Swati R Ghosh, ‘East Asian Finance: The road to robust markets’ (World Bank 2006) 95 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/504261468026935834/pdf/372640EAP0East101OFFI-
CIAL0USE0ONLY1.pdf> accessed 10 July 2019.  
427 The CDSA 1992 (2000 Rev Ed).  
428 There were 29,082 STRs in 2014, and 30,511 STRs in 2015; see Tan Tam Mei, ‘12% increase in 
suspicious transactions reported: Commercial Affairs Department’ (The Straitstimes, 9 October 2017) 
<https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/12-increase-in-suspicious-transactions-reported-says-com-
mercial-affairs-department> accessed 11 July 2019.  
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 According to the 2016 FATF MER of Singapore, the FATF rated Singapore. 
‘Compliant’ for the implementation of the FATF Recommendation 29, which de-
serves as best international practice that Thailand should learn from Singapore.429 
Regarding the independence of FIU, it is vital to acknowledge that Singapore FIU 
has the authority and ability to operate its core function freely that encourages the 
FIU to meet international AML standards effectively.430 
 
3.9 The Implementation of International Standards in Thailand 
 The Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO), Thailand’s FIU stated that it 
has confiscated and seized assets approximately US$1.1bn over the period of four 
years from 2013 to 2016.431 In order to fight money laundering, Thailand has imple-
mented primary international AML standards into its national legislation.432 How-
ever, several military coups in Thailand have impacted the effectiveness of the im-
plementation of the international standards, particularly the FATF Recommenda-
tions.433 As a result of the military coups, the Thailand government could not enact 
                                                 
429 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Anti-
Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures - Singapore Fourth Round Mutual 
Evaluation Report (FATF and APG 2016) 182. 
430 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Anti-
Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures - Singapore Fourth Round Mutual 
Evaluation Report (FATF and APG 2016) 183. 
431 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist 
Financing Measures - Thailand Mutual Evaluation Report (APG 2017) 63. 
432 The implementation of the international AML standards and guidelines are discussed in Chapter 
3; see Seehanat Prayoonrat, An Overview of the Legal Framework of Thailand’s AML-CFT Activities 
(Anti-Money Laundering Office 2006) 9.  
433 Thailand had never been colonised, but instead had faced several military coups from 1932-1973, 
recently had on 22 May 2014; Akihiko Kawaura, ‘Generals in defense of allocation: Coups and mil-
itary budgets in Thailand ’ (2018) 58 Journal of Asian Economics 72, 73; see also Shalendra D 
Sharma, The Asian Financial Crisis New International Financial Architecture: Crisis, Reform and 
Recovery (Manchester University Press 2003) 100; see also Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering 
(n 388) 14.  
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the AML/CFT legislation to meet the FATF requirements because of the effective-
ness of the democratic process in Thailand’s Parliament in such a period.434  
 In consequence, the FATF announced the Public Statement for Thailand as 
the NCCT list in 2012.435 In 2013, the Thailand government amended the AMLA 
1999 and enacted the Counter-Terrorist Financing Act 2013436 to criminalise terror-
ist financing and implement sufficient procedures to identify and freeze such terrorist 
assets, and this action was so satisfying that the FATF removed Thailand from its 
list.437 These legislations bridged the AML strategic deficiencies and enhanced Thai-
land’s AML measures to meet international requirements.438 However, Thailand has 
closely worked with the APG and fully complied with the Standards in the full range 
of AML/CFT issues identified in the FATF 2017 Mutual Evaluation Report 
(MER).439  
 Unlike the UK and Singapore, the Thailand Government established the 
AMLO as an authorised agency to have the powers to manage the STRs regime, 
                                                 
434 Financial Action Task Force (n 167); see also Nophakhun Limsamarnphun, ‘Thailand under new 
pressure on anti-money laundering laws’ (The Nation, 18 February 2012) <http://www.nationmulti-
media.com/opinion/Thailand-under-new-pressure-on-anti-money-launderi-30176140.html> ac-
cessed 11 September 2017, see Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘FATF Public Statement – 19 
October 2012’ accessed 25 March 2018; see also Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘About the 
Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT) Initiative’ accessed 10 April 2018.    
435 Price Water House Coopers Consulting (PWC), Economic Crime in Thailand (PWC 2016) 32. 
436 Anti-Money Laundering Act 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No. 4) B.E. 2556 
(2013) and the Counter-Terrorist Financing Act B.E. 2556 (2013). 
437 Since 1999, Thai government has made five times of the amendments of the AMLA 1999 in order 
to update, strengthen, and improve such law to meet the international AML standards (namely, the 
amendments in 2003, 2008, 2009, 2013, and 2015); see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom 
of Thailand (n 341).  
438 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘ Improving global AML/CFT compliance: On-going pro-
cess – 21 June 2013 ’ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdic-
tions/documents/compliance-june-2013.html> accessed 2 March 2018.   
439 The 2007 MER relating to the implementation of the FATF Standards rated that Thailand was 
considered ‘Compliant ’ for two and ‘Largely Compliant ’ for four (i.e. it was partially compliant or 
non-compliant for all six of the Core FATF Recommendations); see International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), Thailand: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financ-
ing of Terrorism (IMF 2007). 
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investigate, and operate in all areas of enforcement, supervision/regulation, and com-
pliance.440 In other words, the AMLO exercises both supervisory/regulatory and en-
forcement agencies under the AMLA 1999 and its related Regulations, while the 
NCA and STRO only have the powers and responsibilities to involve the SARs/STRs 
regimes.441 Moreover, s. 48 of the AMLA 1999 allows the AMLO to use the law-
enforcement and prosecutorial powers to restrain or seize assets and proceeds  of 
criminals to ensure that the property cannot be in the place where there is no imme-
diate probable cause to believe that the property may be transferred, distributed, 
placed, layered, or concealed.442  
 As the above reasons, it is essential to study the experiences in implementing 
the international standards from best practices (namely, the UK and Singapore) to 
find out what the alternative FIU model may be appropriate to Thailand’s FIU, as 
well as learning the lessons from them. 
 
3.10 Conclusion 
 Money laundering continues to threaten the international financial system as 
criminals purposely conceal the true origin of funds to transform it into legitimate 
funds. The effected countries must respond to this problem with appropriate legisla-
tive and regulatory framework. This chapter has presented the information in three 
aspects.  Firstly, this thesis aims to examine the evolution of the international AML 
legislative framework by focusing on the roles of the FIUs under the international 
AML standards.443 Both international and national laws must support the operation 
                                                 
440 AMLA 1999, s. 40. 
441 AMLA 1999, s. 40. 
442 AMLA 1999, s. 48. 
443 The Vienna Convention, the Palermo Convention and the Merida Convention. 
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of the FIUs in dealing with money laundering regimes aligned with international 
standards. Secondly, this thesis determines that the international soft law norms, par-
ticularly the FATF Recommendations, have had a significant influence on the devel-
opment of the regional legislation such as the EU Member States. Thirdly, the thesis 
analyses the implementation of the international AML standards of three countries 
(i.e. the UK, Singapore, and Thailand) by focusing on the role of the FIUs. 
 The three UN Conventions and the FATF Recommendations are important 
instruments for the countries to implement the international AML standards regard-
ing the role of FIUs in domestic legislation in fighting money laundering. The EU 
was the first region transpose the international AML into their national laws. Conse-
quently, the thesis explores the implementation of the international AML standards 
into national AML legislation in the field with a particular focus on the role played 
by the FIUs in line with the FATF Recommendations such as the Thailand AMLA 
1999, the UK POCA 2002, and the Singapore CDSA 1992 that are the main legisla-
tion in each country to deal with money laundering regime. The AML laws in the 
three countries provide the criminalisation, confiscation to support the role of com-
petent authorities, and the FIUs and control the oblige entities in order to meet the 
international standards. The thesis also shows the relation between these instruments 
and the adoption of international standards to the regional and national levels. How-
ever, the differences in laws on the definition of money laundering and sanctions in 
each member state have brought about difficulties for competent authorities and FIU 
for cross-border cooperation and investigations. Then, the EU has enacted the EU 
AML Directives on the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing to 
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facilitate the implementation of the FATF soft law standards into the EU legisla-
tion.444  
 The three UN Conventions comprising the Vienna Convention, the Palermo 
Convention and the Merida Convention do not refer exactly to the independence of 
the FIU in their provisions similar to the EU Directives (1MLD, 2MLD and 3MLD) 
do not refer to the independence of the FIU in their provisions. However, the 4MLD 
and the 5MLD refer to the independence of the FIU in its provision in line with the 
FATF Recommendation 29 requirement.445 
 To address these weaknesses, the thesis therefore investigates further into the 
best international practices such as the FATF, Egmont Group and Basel to find out 
how they deal with the independence of the FIU. FATF Recommendation 29 refers 
to the independence of the FIU, in particular emphasising on the importance of the 
independent role and functions of FIU under the STRs/SARs regime. The FATF 
cover the independence of the FIU. 
 Egmont Group refers to the independence of the FIU by defining the defini-
tion of the FIU, supporting the FIU in operating freely its functions such as infor-
mation exchange with other FIUs or competent authorities. Similar to the Basel, it 
refers to the independence of the FIU, especially the Core Basel Committee Principle 
2, which emphasises on independence for supervisor.446 
                                                 
444 Borlini and Montanaro (n 119) 1009, 1060. 
445 Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of May 2015 (4MLD), 
art. 32; Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 
amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of May 2015 
(5MLD). 
446 Principle 2: Independence, accountability, resourcing and legal protection for supervisors; see 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), ‘Guidance on the application of the Core Principles for 
Effective Banking Supervision to the regulations and supervision of institutions relevant to financial 
inclusion’ (BIS, September 2016) <https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d383.pdf> accessed 29 November 
2020. 
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 This chapter has applied the best international practices to address the various 
issues of FIU, such as the independence of the FIU in order to minimise the interfer-
ence and influence from the politics, government and industry, including to 
acknowledge how to implement the appropriate FIU model for Thailand. The way 
to replace or restrict the AML legislation regarding the inappropriate powers of the 
board or government to ensure the independence of the FIU. 
  




Analysis of Competent Authorities and Financial Intelligence Unit  
in the United Kingdom 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 London is regarded as the money laundering capital of the international drug 
trade.1 It is difficult to illustrate the threat of money laundering and organised crime 
in the United Kingdom (UK), but it leads to a number of additional criminal benefits 
theoretically accessible to confiscation of criminal proceeds about £1.3bn and recov-
ery of £1bn since 2014.2 The Cabinet Office and the Home Office reported that eco-
nomic and social costs of money laundering in the UK are between £20bn and £40bn 
a year.3 Additionally, Transparency International UK found £4.4bn worth of suspi-
cious corrupt assets across the UK, which may be linked to a high money laundering 
risk.4  
                                                 
1 The National Crime Agency (NCA) stated that there are several hundreds of US$ m of criminal 
money continue to be laundered via the UK financial institutions; see James Hanning and David Con-
nett, ‘London is now the global money laundering centre for the drug trade, say crime expert’ (Inde-
pendent, 4 July 2015) <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/london-is-now-the-global-
money-laundering-centre-for-the-drug-trade-says-crime-expert-10366262.html> accessed 13 July 
2017. 
2 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing 
Measures - United Kingdom Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (FATF 2018); Estimated value 
of laundered money is 2-5 per cent of the world gross domestic product, or $800bn-$2tn per year; see 
Marijan Cingula, Douglas Rhein, and Mustapha Machrafi (eds), ‘Economic and Social Development’ 
(31st International Scientific Conference on Economic and Social Development – ‘Legal Challenges 
of Modern World, 7-8 June 2018) 465; It is estimated that cryptocurrencies in early 2018 reached a 
total value of $800bn at world level; see Ryan Browne and Arjun Kharpal, ‘Cryptocurrency market 
will hit $1 trillion valuation this year, CEO of top exchange says’ (CNBC, 13 February 2018) 
<https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/13/cryptocurrency-market-to-hit-1-trillion-valuation-in-2018-kra-
ken-ceo.html> accessed 10 July 2019; British financial institutions are estimated to spend £5bn 
fighting financial crime per year; see also Chris Stokel-Walker, ‘Why the UK is losing its costly 
against money laundering’ (Wired, 10 December 2018) <https://www.wired.co.uk/article/money-
laundering-in-the-uk-russian-banks> accessed 10 July 2019.   
3 Cabinet Office and Home Office, Extending our Reach: A Comprehensive Approach to Tackling 
Serious Organised Crime (The Stationery Office 2009) 8; see also Home Office, One Step Ahead: A 
21st Century Strategy to Defeat Organised Crime (Home Office 2004) 100. 
4 Dominic Kavakeb, ‘New police powers to target suspected corrupt wealth come into force’ (Trans-
parency International 6 February 2018) <http://www.transparency.org.uk/press-releases/new-police-




 The UK government deals with the threats5 of money laundering by effi-
ciently transposing the international anti-money laundering (AML) preventive rules 
into domestic legislation, i.e. the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and the Terrorism Act 
2000.6 As a consequence, the UK has adopted the international AML measures in 
order to work more effectively when compared to the United Nations AML provi-
sions as discussed in chapter three.  
 The UK’s AML legislation framework illustrates that it works beyond the 
particular requirements of international standards,7 including the UN AML Conven-
tions, the Recommendations of the FATF, and the European Union AML Direc-
tives.8 Moreover, the UK Criminal Finance Act 2017 provides the powers for LEAs 
                                                 
powers-to-target-suspected-corrupt-wealth-come-into-force/#.W4ARd-hKjcs> accessed 24 August 
2018; see also KYC360, ‘UK urged to crackdown on oligarchs using London as money laundering 
playground’(24 August 2018) <https://kyc360.com/news/uk-urged-to-crackdown-on-oligarchs-us-
ing-london-as-money-laundering-playground/?utm_source=ActiveCampaign&utm_me-
dium=email&utm_content=KYC360+News+Briefing&utm_campaign=KYC360_RSS_DailyN-
ews> accessed 24 August 2018.  
5 Walker argues that a world money laundering amount of $2.85bn yearly, strongly concentrated in 
North America and Europe. However, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
argues that the estimated amount of money laundered in the world yearly is 2-5 per cent of global 
GDP or $2tn in current US$; see United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), ‘Money 
Laundering and Globalisation’  <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money-laundering/globaliza-
tion.html> accessed 13 July 2017; see also John Robert Walker, ‘How Big is Global Money Laun-
dering? ’(1999) 3(1) Journal of Money Laundering Control 25, 25. 
6 The preventive measures were discussed in chapter 3 relation to the International, Regional and 
Domestic AML Standards. The international anti-money laundering preventive measures were set by 
the United Nation Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
(The 1988 Vienna Convention), the Forty Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations 
and European Communities Council Directive on Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for 
the Purpose of Money Laundering. The UK illustrates that the POCA 2002, a single codified AML 
law, criminalise money laundering with the wide scope of money laundering offence, which increases 
the number of prosecutions and convictions of such offences; see Karen Harrison and Nicholas Ryder, 
The Law Relating to Financial Crime in the United Kingdom (2nd  edn, Routledge 2017) 223.   
7 Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) ‘Examining the future of anti-money laundering regulations’ 
<https://www.fca.org.uk/news/speeches/examining-future-anti-money-laundering-regulations> ac-
cessed 28 October 2016; see also Harrison and Ryder (n 6) 223. 
8 Nicholas Ryder, Money Laundering – An Endless Cycle? A Comparative Analysis of the Anti-Money 
Laundering Policies in the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada 
(Routledge 2012) 258.  
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to identify and recover money laundering and corrupt funds while the Money Laun-
dering Regulations 2020 (MLRs) strengthen the robust AML/CFT regime in line 
with the international standards.9  
 The 2007 FATF MER of the UK considered the UKFIU to be generally ef-
fective with a high degree of independence.10 The UK was found to be compliant or 
largely compliant with 36 of the 40+9 Recommendations of the FATF. However, the 
2018 FATF MER noted that the UK’s AML/CTF regime is the strongest of the over 
sixty jurisdictions.11 The FATF stated that the UK has the vital structural elements 
needed for an efficient AML/CTF system, including institutional and political sta-
bility, governmental accountability, rule of law, and a professional and independent 
Bar and judiciary.12 Regarding the independence of the UKFIU, the 2018 MER of 
the UK rated ‘partially compliant’ on Recommendation 29 because of the lack of 
resources, which effect on the independence of the UKFIU. In addition, the FATF 
recommended that the UK should ensure that it is fully independent operationally.13 
                                                 
9 Transparency International UK, ‘Combating money laundering and recovering looted gains’: Rais-
ing the UK’s game’ p. 27 <https://star.worldbank.org/corruption-cases/sites/corruption-
cases/files/documents/arw/Transparency_Intl_UK_Recovering_Looted_Gains_June_2009.pdf> ac-
cessed 13 December 2020; see also Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Anti-Money Laundering 
and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures - United Kingdom Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Re-
port (FATF 2018) pp. 159, 224-225 <https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/re-
ports/mer4/MER-United-Kingdom-2018.pdf> accessed 13 December 2020; see House of Commons, 
‘Government response: Economic crime l Anti-money laundering supervision and sanctions imple-
mentation’ (The UK Parliament, 7 March 2019). <https://publications.parlia-
ment.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmtreasy/2187/218703.htm> accessed 13 July 2019.  
10 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing 
Measures - United Kingdom Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (FATF 2018) 204. 
11 Lord Bates, ‘The UK’s Mutual Evaluation Report by the Financial Action Task Force on its Anti-
Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing regime’ Statement UIN HLWS1131 (10 Decem-
ber 2018) <https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2018-12-
10/hlws1131> accessed 24 December 2020; see also United Kingdom Fourth Round Mutual Evalua-
tion Report (FATF 2018) pp. 159, 224-225 <https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/re-
ports/mer4/MER-United-Kingdom-2018.pdf> accessed 13 December 2020.  
12 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing 
Measures - United Kingdom Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (FATF 2018) 21. 
13 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing 
Measures - United Kingdom Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (FATF 2018) 41. 
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 The Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) Regime Committee also acts as an 
independent committee to increase the value of the SARs regime in order to contrib-
ute such SARs for reducing the harm of money laundering that encourages the 
UKFIU as an international leader in best practice.14 
 In 2012, the FATF announced that Thailand was placed on the NCCT for the 
weak levels of compliance with its Recommendations.15 Furthermore, the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) noted that Thailand needed to improve its legislative 
framework.16 In 2013 the FATF removed Thailand from the NCCT list because 
Thailand enacted AML legislation that was in line with the FATF requirements.17 
However, the IMF identified that Thailand needed to enhance AML legislative 
framework regarding financial supervisory and regulatory measures to meet interna-
tional standards.18  As mentioned above, Thailand needs to study the practice from 
the UK AML legislation. Thus, the chapter focuses on legislation relating to the UK’s 
AML policies and seeks to determine how effective the UK AML policies and the 
Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) are.19 Furthermore, this chapter explores additional 
AML strategies that Thailand should learn to implement to improve the AML poli-
cies.  
                                                 
14 Serous Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), Annual Report 2009: Suspicious Activity Reports Re-
gime (SOCA 2009) 5. 
15 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand, ‘ Press release: FATF removes Thailand 
from Public Statement on Money Laundering/Financing of Terrorism ’ (1 May 2013) 
<http://www.mfa.go.th/main/en/media-center/14/34910-FATF-removes-Thailand-from-Public-
Statement-on-Mon.html> accessed 21 July 2019 
16 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Thailand: Financial System Stability Assessment (IMF 2008) 
1. 
17 See discussion in chapter 3 and 6. 
18 International Monetary Fund (n 16) 1. 
19 This chapter includes considering the background of the anti-money laundering policy and legisla-
tion of regulating and prosecuting money laundering, plus examining the financial institutions and 
relevant competent regulatory bodies. 
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 Therefore, it is necessary to study how the UKFIU meets the requirements of 
international standards, in particular the FATF Recommendation 29 regarding the 
independence of the UKFIU.20 The Recommendation refers to the independence of 
the FIU without any unjustified interference and influence, whether it is governmen-
tal, political or industrial in order to prevent prejudicing its operational independence 
and developing the FIU’s core functions in dealing with the SARs/STRs regime.21 
As mentioned above, this thesis argues that the lack of independence of the FIU can 
cause the weakness of the FIU under the SARs regime. The study of the independ-
ence of the UKFIU could address the current issues that Thailand has faced and sug-
gest the appropriate approach for Thailand to meet the international standards. The 
next section examines the AML legal legislation regarding the role of FIU in the UK. 
 
4.2 The United Kingdom Anti-Money Laundering Legislative Framework 
 The UK’s AML policy fully complied with the international standards, best 
practices, and industry guidelines in order to fight money laundering.22 The 2018 
FATF MER of the UK reported that the UK’s AML/CTF regime was the most robust 
of the over 60 jurisdictions to date and also received the highest rating possible in 
four out of the eleven areas of the MER, gained a rating of ‘substantial’ in a further 
four areas.23 Such the report highlighted the UK’s efforts on understanding and co-
                                                 
20 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendation 29. 
21  Interpretative Note to the FATF Recommendation 29; see also Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures - United Kingdom 
Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (FATF 2018) 224. 
22 Nicholas Ryder, ‘The fight against illicit finance: A critical review of the labour government’s 
policy’ (2011) 12(3) Journal of Banking Regulation 252, 268. 
23 John Glen, ‘The UK’s Mutual Evaluation Report by the Financial Action Task Force on its Anti-
Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing regime’ Statement UIN HCWS1162 (UK Par-
liament, 10 December 2018) <https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/de-
tail/2018-12-10/HCWS1162> accessed 23 December 2020.  
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ordinating the UK’s response to the financial crime; working with international part-
ners to tackle financial crime via a robust legal AML framework; aggressively in-
vestigating and prosecuting money laundering offences; applying effective AML 
measures to deal with terrorist finance; preventing the abuse of FIs from criminals; 
as well as supporting an efficient international implementation of financial sanctions 
against CTPF.24 However, the FATF rated the UK’s implementation of the Recom-
mendation 29 ‘partially compliant’ in particular the independence of the UKFIU.25  
 The UK has attempted to enact the robust legal framework to fight money 
laundering and its associated crimes. Several statutes criminalised money laundering 
offences such as the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986, the Criminal Justice Act 
1988, and Drug Trafficking Act 1994 and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA).26 
Furthermore, the UK enacted the Money Laundering Regulations 2020 as a signifi-
cant AML system to impose obligations on reporting entities such as financial insti-
tutions (FIs) to detect and report suspicious transactions regarding money laundering 
via its money laundering reporting officer (MLRO) to the UKFIU (i.e. National 
Crime Agency or NCA) for further investigation.27 Additionally, the Fifth EU AML 
Directive (5MLD) empowers the FIUs to trace cross-border flows of illicit money at 
                                                 
24 John Glen, ‘The UK’s Mutual Evaluation Report by the Financial Action Task Force on its Anti-
Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing regime’ Statement UIN HCWS1162 (UK Par-
liament, 10 December 2018) <https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/de-
tail/2018-12-10/HCWS1162> accessed 23 December 2020. 
25 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing 
Measures - United Kingdom Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (FATF 2018) 224. 
26 Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986, s. 24(1) provided the criminalisation of money laundering, 
Part 7 of the POCA 2002. 
27 The MLRs 2017 also focuses on an internal controls in business; see Harrison and Ryder (n 6) 205; 
see also National Crime Agency (NCA), ‘Who we are’<https://nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/> ac-
cessed 14 July 2019. 
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an early stage via improving intelligence-sharing with foreign partners.28 The Finan-
cial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group 
(JMLSG)29 have issued specific AML guidance and rules as the secondary regula-
tions for the obliged entities.30   
 The UK’s money laundering policy is organised by the HM Treasury through 
the FCA 31 and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS).32 The FCA deals with the EU 
standards in terms of pre-placement AML obligations (namely, the gold standard)33 
and the FCA can impose financial penalties on any firm and/or individual who vio-
lates its AML FCA regulations.34 The UK’s AML regulations go beyond the EU 
requirements. The Fourth Directive requires the Member States to set ‘Company 
Beneficial Ownership registers parallel to own Persons with Significant Control Reg-
ister ’as well as securing exemptions for certain sectors of the gambling industry and 
e-money sector.35 Consequently, the Directive could increase the number of SARs 
submitted to the UK FIU, which handles the dissemination of such information to 
the relevant law enforcement agencies.36 The NCA reported that between 2015 and 
2016 there was an increase of 44 per cent in the number of SARs submitted which is 
                                                 
28 Mariola Marzouk, ‘Time to give the UK financial intelligence unit a stronger role’ (1 March 2019) 
<https://www.baesystems.com/en/cybersecurity/blog/time-to-give-the-uk-financial-intelligence-
unit-a-stronger-role> accessed 14 July 2019. 
29 See discussion in chapter 3. 
30 Harrison and Ryder (n 6) 205. 
31 ibid 46. 
32 Section 327, 328 and 329 of Part 7 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002; see also R v Rollins [2010] 
UKSC 39. 
33 Harrison and Ryder (n 6) 47. 
34 The POCA 2002 provides power to the FCA for imposing financial sanctions and initiating the 
money laundering offence proceedings for the financial institutions which breach the FCA’s rules.  
35 Home Treasury, ‘ Transition of the Directive on the prevention of the use of the financial system 
for money laundering or terrorist financing’  (16 February 2016) <https://www.gov.uk/govern-
ment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/564813/impact_assessment_transposi-
tion_of_4MLD.pdf> accessed 23 January 2017. 
36 Home Office and HM Treasury, Action Plan for Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist 
Finance (Home Office 2016) 43. 
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associated with firms attempting to protect themselves from money laundering in-
vestigations and/or prosecutions.37 In order to achieve its criminal intelligence func-
tion, the NCA works in cooperation with international and national counterparts 
(such as the private sector, competent authorities, and foreign FIUs) to manage nec-
essary information regarding SARs under the POCA 2002.38  
 Since its introduction in 2002, the POCA has had an impact on the UK’s 
capacity in restraining, confiscating, recovering the proceeds of crime, and prosecut-
ing the offences of money laundering.39 Therefore, the comparison study between 
the UK, Thailand and Singapore will help the thesis answer the research questions 
and achieve its research objectives. The next section examines the functions of com-
petent authorities and the national FIU in fighting money laundering.  
 
4.3 The Competent Authorities and Financial Intelligence Unit in the United 
Kingdom  
 Each country should support its competent authorities and FIUs in fighting 
money laundering and terrorist financing with appropriate and sufficient monetary, 
technical and human support.40 Although The FATF did not precisely define ‘com-
petent authorities,’ it focused on the requirement for the FIU as identified by the 
                                                 
37 Aperio Intelligence, ‘UK publishes 2017 National Risk Assessment of money laundering and ter-
rorist financing’ (October 2017) Financial Crime Digest 1, 11 <https://www.aperiointelli-
gence.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/aperio_intelligence_fcd_october2017.pdf?utm_source=Oc-
tober+2017++Financial+Crime+Digest&utm_campaign=b552c9bf13Aperio_Intelligence_FCD_Oc-
tober_2017&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1bcf699e5b-b552c9bf13-198192249> accessed 3 
November 2017. 
38 Home Office and HM Treasury (n 36) 35. 
39 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Summary of the Third Mutual Evaluation Report Anti-Money 
Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism: United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
ern Ireland (FATF 2007) 1. 
40 The Financial Action Task Force Recommendation 30. 
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Egmont Group.41 The FIU of each country has been established under the Egmont 
Group adopted Article 7 (1)(b) of the 2000 UN Convention against Transnational 
Organised Crime (Palermo Convention 2000)42 and Article 14 (1)(b) of the UN Con-
vention against Corruption 2003.43 The FIUs refer to all administrative and law en-
forcement agencies, including the FIU and related supervisors, working towards the 
fighting against money laundering and terrorist financing.44 The Egmont Group de-
termines that financial entities must submit suspicious transactions or suspicious ac-
tivities to competent authorities.45  
 The FCA and NCA also identify themselves as the competent authorities for 
monitoring the reporting obligations under the MLRs 2020, including arrangements 
to provide appropriate feedback on the SARs that they have received from the re-
porting entities.46 Ryder divided the competent authorities into three types, including 
                                                 
41 FATF Recommendations 26 - 34 concentrate upon competent authorities including transparency of 
legal persons; See also International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, Financial Intelligence 
Units: An Overview (IMF 2004) 17. 
42 Article 7 (1)(b) is as follows: (b) Shall, without prejudice to articles 18 and 27 of this Convention, 
ensure that administrative, regulatory, law enforcement and other authorities dedicate to combating 
money laundering (including, where appropriate under domestic law, judicial authorities) have the 
ability to cooperate and exchange information at the national and international levels within the con-
ditions prescribed by its domestic law and, to that end, shall consider the establishment of a financial 
intelligence unit to serve as a national centre for the collection, analysis and dissemination of infor-
mation regarding potential money laundering; see also Waleed Alhosani, Anti-Money Laundering: A 
Comparative and Critical Anaylysis of the UK and UAE’s Financial Intelligence Units (Palgrave 
MacMillan 2016) 5. 
43 Article 14 (1)(b) is as follows: (b) Without prejudice to art 46 of this Convention that administrative, 
regulatory, law enforcement and other authorities dedicated to combating money-laundering (includ-
ing, where appropriate under domestic under domestic law, judicial authorities) have the ability to 
cooperate and exchange information at the national and international levels within the conditions pre-
scribed by its domestic law and, to that ends, shall consider the establishment of a financial intelli-
gence unit to serve as a national centre for the collection, analysis and dissemination of information 
regarding potential money-laundering. 
44 FATF Recommendation 40. 
45 International Monetary Fund and World Bank (n 41) 41; see also Musonda Simwayi and Mu-
hammed Haseed, ‘The role of Financial Intelligence Units in combating money laundering: A com-
parative analysis of Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi’ (2012) 15(1) Journal of Money Laundering 
Control 112. 
46 The Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Reg-
ulation 2017; see Harrison and Ryder (n 6) 29. 
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primary authorities, secondary authorities and tertiary authorities.47 The definition of 
the competent authorities was explained in chapter three.    
 
4.3.1 The Role of Primary Authorities 
 The Egmont group aims to enhance the communication among FIUs48 inter-
nationally to assist in combating money laundering problem.49 Therefore, the UK’s 
AML policy has been implemented in line with the international standards with in-
ternational best practices and industry guidelines such as the FATF Recommenda-
tions.  
 
4.3.1.1 HM Treasury 
 HM Treasury is responsible for the UK’s AML policy and its implementation 
of international standards 50 and it acts as the UK’s representative at the FATF.51  
                                                 
47 Ryder (n 8) 25. 
48 The FIUs aim to enforce and regulate AML provisions that were designed by the Bank of Interna-
tional Settlements (BIS), the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the 
G8, G20, EU members ’finance and justice ministers, several departments in the United Nations, the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) in order 
to reduce and evaluate the  money laundering regime; see also Brigitte Unger, The Scale and Impacts 
of Money Laundering (Edwards Elgar 2007) 6.  
49 Mark Simpson, ‘International initiatives’ in Mark Simpson, Nicole Smith, and Arun Srivastava 
(eds) International Guide to Money Laundering Law and Practice (3rd edn, Bloomsbury Professional 
2010) 202.  
50 William C Gilmore, Dirty Money: The Evolution of International Measures to Counter Money 
Laundering and the Financial of Terrorism (Council of Europe 2003) 258; see also Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF), ‘About the Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT) Initia-
tive’<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdic-
tions/more/aboutthenon-cooperativecountriesandterritoriesncctinitia-
tive.html?hf=10&b=0&s=desc(fatf_releasedate)> accessed 4 February 2018.  
51 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Third Mutual Evaluation Report Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combating the Financing of Terrorism – United Kingdom (Financial Action Task Force 2007) 24.  
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HM Treasury facilitates the robust cooperation between the NCA and competent au-
thorities in line with the proportionality, engagement and effectiveness.52 For in-
stance, it co-chairs the Money Laundering Advisory Committee with Home Office53 
in order to review and improve any industry guidelines regarding AML/CTF.54 HM 
Treasury assesses the programme to create an understanding of the size of total 
money laundering in the UK via the process of the SAR regime within the responsi-
bility of the NCA.55 The next section will explain the Home Office in respect of 
competent authority to cooperate with the UKFIU. 
 
4.3.1.2 Home Office 
 The Home Office deals with the police force in the UK (England and Wales) 
and manages the NCA.56 With regard to money laundering, the NCA acts as the 
UKFIU to monitor and enforce the regulated sector and individuals to comply with 
AML regulations proficiently,57 as well as a significant role as an asset recovery 
scheme58 and the mutual legal assistance regime.59 The Home Office chairs the UK 
                                                 
52 HM Treasury, The Financial Challenge to Crime and Terrorism (HM Treasury 2007) 15. 
53 Oxford Analytical, ‘Country report: Anti-money laundering in the United Kingdom’ in Mark Pieth 
and Gemma Aiolfi, A Comparative Guide to Anti-Money Laundering a Critical Analysis of Systems 
in Singapore, Switzerland, the UK and the USA (Edward Elgar 2004) 271. 
54 The UK government is working with the European Commission to ensure that cross-European leg-
islation is strong enough to prevent the use of the financial system for money laundering; see Royal 
Institute for Chartered Surveyors, Money Laundering Guidance (Royal Institute for Chartered Sur-
veyors 2011); see also HM Treasury, ‘Policy paper: Preventing money laundering’ (Office of Finan-
cial Sanctions Implementation 5 June 2013) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-
ing-money-laundering/preventing-money-laundering> accessed 10 September 2016. 
55 HM Treasury and Home Office, The Financial Challenge to Crime and Terrorism (HM Treasury 
2007) 28. 
56  Home Office, ‘What we do’ <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/home-office> ac-
cessed 10 September 2016. 
57 Ryder (n 8) 156. 
58 ‘There are four routes for recovery of criminal assets: criminal confiscation (post-conviction); civil 
recovery (a form of non-conviction confiscation); cash seizure and forfeiture; taxation’; see also HM 
Treasury and Home Office, UK National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Fi-
nancing (HM Treasury 2015) 16. 
59 Ryder (n 8) 80. 
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Money Laundering Advisory Committee (MLAC), which is a supervisory forum for 
significant stakeholders to coordinate AML/CFT regime and review its fruitful-
ness.60 The Home Office also launched guidance for the reporting entities to comply 
with the SARs and the identity of those who make them.61 The Home Office issued 
a Circular in order to provide AML guidance, which the UK FIU and law enforce-
ment authorities must be taken into account when making a decision whether to grant 
or refuse consent to reporting entities and their clients pursuant to s 335 of POCA 
2002.62  The Home Office expected that the ‘consent policy’ ( making of an author-
ised disclosure and the obtaining of proper consent) is one of the defences to the 
money laundering offences of the ss. 327-329 of the POCA 2002.63  
 The UKFIU published a practical guidance to advise the REs regarding how 
and what to report the SARs in order to improve the quality of the SARs and also 
enhancing a better understanding of the SARs among the reporting sector.64 The 
Home Office asked the Law Commission to review limited perspectives of the AML 
                                                 
60 The Committee comprises of group of accountancy, legal, and the public sector (i.e., HMRC, FCA, 
the Gambling Commission and the Insolvency Service); see also HM Treasury and Home Office (n 
55) 18, 29; see also Joint Money Laundering Steering Group (JMLSG), Prevention of Money Laun-
dering/Combating Terrorist Financing: Guidance for the UK Financial Sector Part 1 (JMLSG 
2007)153 <www.jmlsg.org.uk/download/7092> accessed 28 February 2017. 
61 Home Office, ‘Home Office Circular 53/2005: Money laundering: the confidentiality and sensitiv-
ity of suspicious activity reports (SARs) and the identity of those who make them’ <http://nationalcri-
meagency.gov.uk/publications/suspicious-activity-reports-sars/17-home-office-circular-53-2005-
confidentiality-and-sensitivity-of-sars/file> accessed 28 February 2017. 
62 Parliament, ‘Circular 029/2008, Proceeds of Crime Act 2002: Obligations to Report Money Laun-
dering – the consent regime’ <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldeu-
com/132/9031113.htm> accessed 29 September 2017. 
63 House of Lords of European Union Committee, Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism 
Volume II: Evidence 19th Report of Session 2008-2009 (The Stationery Office Limited 2009) 72. 
64 Law Commission, ‘Anti-money laundering the SARs regime’ (18 June 2019) <https://s3-eu-west-
2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage-11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2019/06/6.5569_LC_Anti-Money-
Laundering_Report_FINAL_WEB_120619.pdf> accessed 24 December 2020.  
CHAPTER FOUR: Analysis of Competent Authorities and Financial Intelligence Unit in United 
Kingdom 
141 
regime in Part 7 of the POCA 2002 in order to reform the system of voluntary dis-
closure, namely ‘consent regime’65 The Review emphasised on the consent provi-
sions,66 the disclosure offences in order to enhance the prevention, detection , inves-
tigation, prosecution of money laundering and terrorist financing in the UK.67 The 
reduces the defensive reporting of suspicious transaction under the consent and dis-
closure legislation, including the cost of AML compliance of the business under the 
responsibilities of the SARs and the effect of the suspension of transactions under 
the consent provision on the REs.68 The UKFIU agreed that the recommendations of 
the Law Commission report on the SARs increase the independence of the UKFIU, 
improve effectiveness of the SAR regime, in particular enhancing the quality of the 
SARs, and reducing the burdens of AML compliance of the REs.69  
 The UKFIU and relevant law enforcement authorities (LEAs) consider to 
grant or refuse consent, but in 2008 there were 54.5% of requests for consent, which 
the UK FIU (SOCA) handed over to LEAs. As a result, a decision to refuse consent 
causes the legal transaction to be delayed, which can lead to financial damage.70 In 
2014, the Home Office and the NCA also campaigned the ‘Prevent ’to enhance be-
havioural change in the reported sector by educating about SARs aiming to increase 
                                                 
65  Law Commission, ‘Anti-Money Laundering’ <https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/anti-money-
laundering/> accessed 24 December 2020.  
66 The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, ss. 21 to 21ZC, 327 to 329 and 335, 336 and 338. 
67 The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, ss. 19, 21A, 21D, 330 and 333A.  
68 Money Laundering costs the UK economy $37bn annually; see HM Treasury and Home Office, 
‘National risk assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing 2020’ (HM Treasury 2020) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/945411/NRA_2020_v1.2_FOR_PUBLICATION.pdf> accessed 24 December 2020.  
69 The UKFIU sits within the NCA and is responsible for receiving, analyzing, and disseminating 
SARs; see Law Commission, ‘Anti-Money Laundering’ <https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/anti-
money-laundering/> accessed 24 December 2020; see also Law Commission, ‘Anti-money launder-
ing: the SARs regime’ Law Com No 384 <https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-stor-
age-11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2019/06/6.5569_LC_Anti-Money-Laundering_Report_FI-
NAL_WEB_120619.pdf> accessed 24 December 2020. 
70 Parliament (n 62). 
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awareness of those sectors and the quality of those submitted.71 Under the 5MLD, 
the 2017 MLRs extended the moratorium period for ensuring that the NCA and LEAs 
have sufficient time to collect more evidence.72  
 Then, the Sixth Anti-Money laundering Directive (6MLD), replaced the 
5MLD, addresses a lack of legal clarity in some individual cases and the lack of 
recognition of certain crimes and security violations by corporations.73 The directive 
also hardens the definitions of offences and punishments greater than the 5MLD by 
focusing on sanctions for both business and potential criminals in order to solve the 
previous issues. For example, the minimum imprisonment punishment for ML 
crimes increases from one to four years similar to civil sanctions rise to €5m (includ-
ing their equivalents in other currencies).74 Then the UK Money Laundering Regula-
tions 2020 (MLRs) provide that supervisors and REs have to comply their own risk 
assessments under the National Risk Assessment (NRA) in line with the 6MLD.75  
The next section focuses on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, which play roles 




                                                 
71 National Crime Agency (NCA), ‘Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) Annual Report 2014’, at 22 
<http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/464-2014-sars-annual-report/file> accessed 
28 February 2017.   
72 The UK Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) 
Regulation 2017 was implemented Anti-Money Laundering (AMLD V) – Directive (EU) 2018/842.  
73 The 2018/1673 Directive of the European Union (6MLD) sets its own deadline on 3 December 
2020, for its implementation. 
74 Electronic Identification, ‘AML6, an additional step against money laundering’ (22 November 
2020) <https://www.electronicid.eu/en/blog/post/aml6-sixth-anti-money-laundering-directive/en> 
accessed 14 December 2020.  
75 HM Treasury and Home Office, ‘National risk assessment of money laundering and terrorist fi-
nancing 2020’ Presented to Parliament pursuant to Regulation 16 of the Money Laundering, Terrorist 
Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 (Home Treasury 2020) 
6 <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/945411/NRA_2020_v1.2_FOR_PUBLICATION.pdf> accessed 24 December 2020. 
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4.3.1.3 Foreign and Commonwealth Office   
 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) supports the UK’s interest 
overseas 76 and cooperates with HM Treasury to overcome any loopholes in the leg-
islation and practices of several countries.77 The UK Government and the FCO have 
attempted to deal with money laundering by cooperating with the UK FIU and other 
governmental and law enforcement bodies through enhanced cooperation and infor-
mation-sharing. The UK is facing the cross-jurisdictional problems (e.g. tax evasion) 
as the loopholes in the laws and practices of several countries limited the implemen-
tation of International Treaties and Conventions.78  
 With regard to money laundering, the FCO has a limited role under the inter-
national agreements, Treaties, and Conventions which restrict its power to imple-
ment the AML instruments directly.79 However, international cooperation also re-
quires a consistent law in each country. For example, the Serious Fraud Office 
(SFO), which conducts investigation and prosecution under the integrated ‘Roskill 
Model,’80 concentrates on complex or serious cases of corruption, bribery and fraud. 
                                                 
76 The FCO is responsible for safeguarding the UK’s national security by countering terrorism and 
weapons proliferation, and working to reduce conflict building the UK’s property by increasing ex-
ports and investment, opening markets, ensuring access to resources, and promoting sustainable 
global growth supporting British nationals around the world through modern and efficient consular 
services; see also Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), ‘About us’ <https://www.gov.uk/gov-
ernment/organisations/foreign-commonwealth-office/about> accessed 17 September 2016.  
77 Timon Molloy, ‘Money Laundering – a view from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’ (Money 
Laundering Bulletin, 1 May 2001)  <https://www.moneylaunderingbulletin.com/risksandcon-
trols/briberyandcorruption/money-laundering--a-view-from-the-foreign-and-commonwealth-office--
1.htm> accessed 28 July 2019.  
78 ibid. 
79 For example, case of R v Secretary of State for FCO related to list of persons subject to sanction 
under the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1617; see R (on the application of Youssef) v 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2013] EWCA Civ 1302; [2014] 2 W.L.R. 
1082; see also Ryder (n 8) 80. 
80 Alison Geary and Lloyd Firth, ‘Should we worry (yet again) about the future of the UK’s Serious 
Fraud Office?’ (2017) 36(8) Of Counsel 5, 5. 
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In the case of Serious Fraud Office v Rolls-Royce Plc81 and the international coop-
eration between Thailand and the UK government, the UK withheld the information 
from Thailand in relation to the corruption accusations because of the issues con-
cerning the country’s human rights record.82  
 According to the international cooperation, the Thai Criminal Code provided 
different penalties, which include the death penalty,83 for Thai government officials 
who are convicted of bribery. However, there was no one to be executed for such 
crime.84 The military government enacted new anti-corruption legislation that ex-
tends the maximum punishment of capital penalty to non-Thais working for interna-
tional bodies and foreign governments.85 Another provision of the new anti-corrup-
tion legislation determining regulation of limitations of 20 years is no longer applied 
if the convicted person flees the country, but the previous law of limitations would 
have permitted him to return in 10 years.86 The differences between the laws in Thai-
land and the UK may help answer the question regarding the effectiveness of the 
Thailand FIU. Therefore, this conflict needs to be resolved by international organi-
sations and both governments for the purpose of better international cooperation 
among the FIUs. The differences in the current content of legislation between the 
UK and Thailand can reflect the impact of the information-sharing and international 
cooperation of Thailand’s FIU. 
                                                 
81 [2017] Lloyd’s Rep. F.C. 249.  
82 This issue was discussed in chapter 3, see Jonathan Fisher, ‘ Jonathan Fisher QC quoted in Law 
Society Gazette on Thailand Corruption Probe ’ (Bright Line Law, 15 March 2017) 
<https://www.brightlinelaw.co.uk/News/Jonathan-fisher-qc-quoted-in-law-society-gazette-on-thai-
land-corruption-probe.html> accessed 25 August 2017.  
83 Section 19 of the Thai Criminal Code. 
84 Guardian, ‘New anti-corruption law in Thailand extends death penalty to foreigners’ (Guardian, 15 
July 2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/15/new-anti-corruption-law-in-thailand-
extends-death-penalty-to-foreigners> accessed 2 October 2017. 
85 Section 13 of Organic Act on Counter Corruption (No. 3) B.E. 2558 (2015) as amended by the 
Thailand’s Organic Act on Counter Corruption B.E. 2542 (1999). 
86 Section 11 of Organic Act on Counter Corruption (No. 3) B.E. 2558 (2015) as amended by s. 83 
Organic Act on Counter Corruption (No. 3) B.E. 2558 (2015). 
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4.3.2 The Role of Secondary authorities 
 The definition of the secondary authorities was previously explained in Chap-
ter 3. This part is going to present the role of secondary competent authorities in 
fighting money laundering regime as follows: 
 
4.3.2.1 Financial Services Authority  
  As a result of financial crimes and scandals such as the breakdown of the 
Barings Bank87 and failure of Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI),88 
the Labour Government enacted the Financial Services and Market Act (FSMA) 
2000 in order to decrease financial crime, eliminate the possible risk of regulated 
companies of being misused by criminal launderers, and protect the UK financial 
market. In 1997 the Government announced its plans to create a single super-regu-
lator for the UK financial services sector, the FSA.89 The FSA had the expertise to 
deal with the complexity of risks and monitor financial institutions ’risks.90 Financial 
institutions must deal with risk management in order to prevent their business from 
money laundering and related crimes.91  
 The FSA supported consumer protection, strengthens trust in the economic 
system, public awareness, financial stability, market confidence, and encourages 
                                                 
87 Mohammed B Hemraj, ‘The regulatory failure: the saga of BCCI’ (2005) 8(4) Journal of Money 
Laundering Control 346, 350.  
88 Harrison and Ryder (n 6) 27. 
89 Ev Z Lomicka, ‘Reforming U.K. financial services regulation: the creation of a single regulator’ 
(1999) Journal Business Law 480, 482. 
90 Dalvinder Singh, Banking Regulation of UK and US Financial Markets (Ashgate 2007) 17; see 
Marianne Ojo, ‘The growing importance of risk in financial regulation’ (2010) 11(3) The Journal of 
Risk Finance 249, 257; see Marianne Ojo (ed), Uncertainties and Risk Assessment in Trade Relations 
(IGI 2018) 344; see also Grant Kirkpatrick, ‘The corporate governance lessons from the financial 
crisis’ (Financial Market Trends 2009) 1, 12 <https://www.oecd.org/finance/financial-mar-
kets/42229620.pdf> accessed 5 February 2018.  
91 Joint Money Laundering Steering Group (JMLSG), Prevention of Money Laundering/Combating 
Terrorist Financing: 2017 Consultation Version Guidance for the UK Financial Sector Part 1 
(JMLSG 2017) 22. 
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public understanding of the financial market.92 In relation to money laundering, the 
FSA is a prosecuting authority for the money laundering offences created under    
Part 7 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002,93 and it imposes financial sanctions on the 
regulated sector for breaches of its AML regulations.94 This is a ‘credible deter-
rence ’policy to deal with financial crime.95 The FSA has always applied prosecution 
under the laws relating to its memorandum and articles of association. For example, 
they have the power to prosecute offences of money laundering subject to ss 327 and 
328 of the POCA 2002.96 The FSA can also publish Decision Notices for compliance 
matters that then they have been referred to the Tribunal.97 Moreover, as part of the 
‘credible deterrence policy’, the FSA had the power to prohibit authorised persons 
and firms from operating any regulated action. Especially, the Money Laundering 
Sourcebook contained the FSA’s regulations which provide its powers to control 
money laundering.98 For example, there are a series of preventive measures through 
                                                 
92 Nicola Padfield, ‘Country Report: Anti-Money Laundering Rules in the United Kingdom’ in Mark 
Pieth and Gemma Aiolfi (eds), A Comparative Guide to Anti-Money Laundering: A Critical Analysis 
of Systems in Singapore, Switzerland, the UK and the USA (Edward Elgar 2004) 268. 
93 Financial Services and Market Act 2000, s 402. 
94 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s 206(1). 
95 For a more detailed discussion on the credible deterrence strategy see Wilson Gary and Wilson 
Sarah, ‘The FSA, “credible deterrence”, and criminal enforcement – a “haphazard pursuit”? (2014) 
21(1) Journal of Financial Crime 4, 10. 
96 The technique of statutory drafting is to be found in the provisions of POCA 2002 which are in play 
in the present case. Section 327(1) provides that a person commits an offence if he (a) conceals crim-
inal property; (b) disguises criminal property… etc. Section 328 provides that “a person commits an 
offence if he enters into or becomes concerned in an arrangement which…. A person guilty of an 
offence under s 327 or s 328 is liable to the maximum penalties specified in s 334. It follows that 
before the enactment of FSMA 2000, the FSA could have prosecuted the criminals for offences con-
trary to ss 327 and 328 of POCA 2002, if POCA 2002 has been in force at that time; see also R v 
Rollins [2010] UKSC 39; Nicholas Ryder, ‘The Financial Services Authority, the reduction of finan-
cial crime and the money launderer: a game of cat and mouse’ (2008) 67(3) Cambridge Law Journal 
635, 635.  
97 Travers Smith Regulatory Investigations Group, ‘ FSA enforcement action: themes and trends’ 
(2011) 87 Compliance Officer Bulletin 1, 2. 
98 Relating to FSA’s mission on money laundering regime in the Money Laundering Sourcebook, it 
will be similar to the powers in the Money Laundering Regulations 1993 (MLR 1993); see also Fi-
nancial Services Authority (FSA), Money Laundering Handbook (Financial Services Authority, 
2006). The FSA adopted the MLR 1993 via the FSMA 2000 Regulations (Relating to Money Laun-
dering Regulations) 2001, S.I. 2001/ 1819. 
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the Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls (SYSC) part of its 
Handbook.99 All firms must comply with Part 3 of the SYSC as the conduct of their 
businesses.100 A firm must comply with the SYSC, as mentioned in the SYSC 3.2.6 
R in relation to the compliance of the risk identification for countering the risk of 
financial crime as well as the SYSC 3.2.10 G in relation to the firm’s function for 
improving a firm responsibility to take into account the detail of risk-assessment re-
sponsibility effectively.101  
 The FSA has focused on its preventive measure, including written warnings 
as well as demanding all financial institutions to normally report its measures used 
to solve such problem.102 Nevertheless, FSA used financial sanctions when the pre-
ventive measures were unsuccessful. From 30 November 2001 to 2007 FSA had 
dealt with 167 cases concerning a pattern of financial crime, but only 18 cases had 
been involved with AML compliance. Of these, FSA had three written warnings, two 
concerned with the firm’s permissions, only one involved with skilled persons report 
under s 166 of FSMA 2000, and eight resulted in financial sanctions. But, the re-
maining cases did not find any guilty.103 The FSA had fined several cases, but the 
largest financial sanction for the AML controls failings in respect of significant de-
ficiencies of adequate oversight of the new customer relationships ’formation and 
                                                 
99 The Money Laundering Sourcebook was token place by a principles-based approach in the SYSC 
which is the part of the FSA’s Handbook. 
100 Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), FCA Handbook Senior Management Arrangements, Systems 
and Controls (FSA 2006) SYSC 3.1.1; see also Nicholas Ryder, ‘The financial crisis and financial 
crime in the UK: A critical analysis of the response by financial regulatory agencies’ (2017) 38(1) 
Company Lawyer 4, 11.  
101 SYSC 3.2.6 R and 3.2.10 G of the Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls 
(SYSC); see Law Teacher, ‘The Financial Services Authority’ <https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-
essays/finance-law/the-financial-services-authority.php> accessed 25 August 2017.  
102 Financial Action Task Force (n 39) 175. 
103 FSMA 2000, Part XI, s 166; see also Financial Action Task Force (n 39) 173. 
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the international trade book in the UK ever imposed was the Deutsche Bank AG that 
was fined £163m.104 
 Consequently, during the 2008 financial crisis, the UK faced several breaches 
of regulation. The FSA had not yet succeeded in investigating and prosecuting finan-
cial crime, but only emphasising the preventive measures and financial sanctions to 
deal with a form of financial crime, and it was able to reduce the financial crime as 
its objectives in FSMA 2000. The history of FSA showed that the UK government 
addressed the problem of money laundering by replacing with the new agency, Fi-
nancial Conduct Authority (FCA), to ensure the achievement of the UK govern-
ment’s objective to reduce financial crime effectively. The next section explains the 
role of the FCA towards fighting the money laundering regime. 
 
4.3.2.2 Financial Conduct Authority  
 Due to the 2007-08 financial crisis which resulted in the failure of Northern 
Rock, 105  the Halifax Bank of Scotland 106  and the collapse of the Bradford & 
                                                 
104 Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), ‘FCA fines Deutsche Bank 3163 m. for serious anti-money 
laundering controls failings’ (31 January 2017) <https://www.fca.org.uk/print/news/press-re-
leases/fca-fines-deutsche-bank-163-million-anti-money-laundering-controls-failure> accessed 31 
January 2018; between 2001 and 2007 FSA fined eight firms for breach of FSA regulations, i.e. Royal 
Bank of Scotland £750,000 in 2002, Northern Bank Limited £1,250,000 in 2003, Abbey National 
companies £2,320,000 in 2003, Bank of Scotland £1,250,000 in 2004, Raiffeisen Zentralbank 
Osterreich £150,000 in 2004, Bank of Ireland £375,000 in 2004, Investment Services UK Limited & 
Mr Ram Melwani £175,000 in 2005 and Langtons Limited £63,000 in 2006; see Financial Action 
Task Force (n 39) 175; In May 2010, the FSA imposed fine on Simon Eagle £2.8m for his action in 
an illegal share-ramping plan. Moreover, it imposed hefty fines to Henry Cameron, a former CEO of 
Sibir Energy Plc, and David Jones, a finance director of Northern Rock; see also Travers Smith Reg-
ulatory Investigations Group (n 97) 1, 2. 
105 The failure of Northern Rock was in mid-2007. 
106 The bankruptcy of HBOS plc (HBOS) was in October 2008. 
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Bingley,107 the UK Coalition Government 108 attempted to improve the financial reg-
ulatory system by empowering the Bank of England with more control of macro-
prudential and mircro-prudential regulations.109 The crisis illustrated that the FSA’s 
failure in dealing with the 2008 financial crisis in the UK.110 The UK government 
provided the supervisory power to the Bank of England in order to take account of 
the supervision of the financial institutions for controlling the financial entities to 
comply with the AML policies.111 Under the Financial Services Act 2012, the FCA 
replaced the FSA and became a competent agency for controlling most credit and 
financial institutions in compliance with the MLRs 2017.112 Then the UK has imple-
mented the EU 6MLD into the UK MLRs 2020, which stress on criminal offences 
and criminal activity, including the minimum term is determined for more than six 
months with serious cases calling for a penalty of a maximum term of imprisonment 
of at least four years.113 The Financial Services Act 2012 amended FSMA 2000 and 
provided the power to the FCA to issue a warning notice to all firms on their financial 
                                                 
107 The collapse of Bradford & Bingley Bank was in September 2008. 
108  HM Treasury, ‘Issue’ (8 May 2015) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/2010-to-
2015-government-policy-financial-services-regulation/2010-to-2015-government-policy-financial-
services-regulation> accessed 12 September 2016.  
109 In the banking system, the Coalition government’s agreement announced various reforms to "avoid 
a repeat of Labour's financial crisis" and stimulate the flow of credit, including the introduction of a 
banking levy, and controlling unacceptable bankers’ bonuses and regulatory reform. This system was 
managed by the ‘tripartite system of banking regulation (i.e. HM Treasury, the FSA and the Bank of 
England); see also HM Government, ‘The Coalition: Our programme for government’ (David Cam-
eron, Nick Clegg and member of the Cabinet, 20 May 2010, p. 9). 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/78977/coali-
tion_programme_for_government.pdf> accessed 12 September 2016.  
110  Chris Dyke, ‘The FCA – a more aggressive enforcer of financial crime?’ (2 April 2013) 
<https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1fb76460-7abc-4b03-89cf-84be5cbc93e4> ac-
cessed 17 October 2017. 
111 HM Government, A New Approach to Financial Regulation: Consultation on Reforming the Con-
sumer Credit Regime (HM Treasury 2010). 
112 Money Laundering Regulations 2007.  
113 Planet Compliance, ‘6MLD – The EU’s 6th Anti-Money Laundering Directive in a Nutshell’ (10 
February 2020) <https://www.planetcompliance.com/2020/02/10/6mld-the-eus-6th-anti-money-
laundering-directive-in-a-nutshell/> accessed 24 December 2020.  
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conducts.114 The FCA is an important competent authority to fight money launder-
ing, which monitors obliged entities to comply with AML regulations.  
 The FCA has continued to use the credible deterrence strategy,115 which in-
volves imposing financial sanctions on any individuals and firms when failing to 
comply with regulations. The Financial Services Act 2012 increases the FCA’s pow-
ers and authorities to police markets and regulates the approach by which companies 
handle their clients.116 This policy does not require to initiate criminal proceed-
ings.117 The policy made the long-lasting results to the individuals because the FCA 
is able to grant a prohibition order to persons who breach the pre-placement rules 
from involving with the monetary services industry for a period of years that creates 
a larger deterrent impact.118 
 The FCA requires the regulated sector to comply with the Senior Manage-
ment Arrangements, Systems and Controls (SYSC) regulations, but the POCA 2002 
applies to all persons.119 However, the FCA’s power and approach is very similar to 
that of the FSA 120 in order to mitigate the financial crime risks, protect the consumer 
and the integrity of the UK financial market.121 For example, the FCA has an AML 
website providing AML guidance,122 research reports, an AML self-assessment tool 
                                                 
114 The Financial Services Act 2012 came into force on 1 April 2013. The Act made some fundamental 
changes to the way that financial services firms like banks are regulated; see also the Financial Ser-
vices Act 2012. 
115 Arun Srivastava, Ian Mason, Mark Simpson and Marc Litt, ‘Financial Crime’ (2011) 86 Compli-
ance Officer Bulletin 1, 8. 
116 Brooke Masters, ‘Financial watchdog’s ‘credible deterrence’ (Financial Times, 24 January 2012) 
<https://www.ft.com/content/86c8ad10-4679-11e1-85e2-00144feabdc0> accessed 19 November 
2017.  
117 Harrison and Ryder (n 6) 41. 
118 ibid 42. 
119 The Part 7 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. 
120 Srivastava, Mason, Simpson and Litt (n 115) 1, 9. 
121  Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), ‘Financial Crime’ (31 July 2015) 
<https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/financial-crime> accessed 17 October 2017. 
122 Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), ‘Financial Crime: a guide for firms Part 1: A firm’s guide to 
preventing financial crime’ (April 2015) 5.  
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for financial consultants, and even the ability to ban products and details of mislead-
ing advertisements for commercial services or products.123 It also produces an annual 
AML report. The FCA receives the financial intelligence from the NCA in order to 
instigate the criminal proceedings.124 Therefore, it can impose the financial penalties 
on any firm or money laundering reporting officer (MLRO) who do not comply with 
the FCA regulations. Nevertheless, the FCA has applied such costly and complicated 
procedures for financial firms to implement, but it has tried to reduce the unnecessary 
procedures and adjust its standards such as the SYSC guidance regarding a pre-place-
ment strategy.   
 The FCA is able to determine appropriate financial penalties or combination 
of sanctions on authorised companies, including their staff who breach its rules,125 
and the FCA prosecutes the money laundering offences under s. 402 of the FSMA 
2000126 and witnessed in R v Rollins.127 The Supreme Court provided the FCA128 
                                                 
<https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/document/FC1_FCA_20150427.pdf> accessed 1 Sep-
tember 2016.  
123 HM Treasury, ‘Financial Conduct Authority’ (8 May 2015).   <https://www.gov.uk/gov-
ernment/publications/2010-to-2015-government-policy-financial-services-regulation/2010-to-2015-
government-policy-financial-services-regulation> accessed 12 September 2016.  
124 National Crime Agency (NCA), ‘Suspicious activity reports (SARs) Annual Report 2018’ (NCA 
2018) 7 https://nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/who-we-are/publications/256-2018-sars-annual-re-
port/file> accessed 14 July 2019. 
125 The fundamental objective of imposing monetary penalty is to support high standards of regulation 
by deterring persons who breached the FSMA 2000 and FCA’s rules; see also Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) ‘Decision Procedure and Penalties Manual: Chapter 6: Penalties’ (November 2016) 
DEPP 6/2 <https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/DEPP.pdf> accessed 29 November 2016.  
126 FSMA 2000 determines the definition of the financial crime as ‘any offence (e.g. fraud or dishon-
esty, misconduct in, or misuse of information relating to a financial market, or handling the proceeds 
of crime)’; see also FSMA 2000, s 6 (3)(c);  in addition, an extra-territorial perspective includes, when 
the criminal conduct was criminalised as an offence, if it had occurred in the UK; see also FSMA 
2000, s 6 (4); Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s 402 (concerning with ‘Power of the Au-
thority to institute proceedings for certain other offences’). 
127 The FSA has the power to prosecute offences of money laundering contrary to ss 327 and 328 of 
the POCA 2002; see R v Rollins [2010] UKSC 39; see also Harrison and Ryder (n 6) 47. 
128 The FCA starts proceedings of crime by receiving financial intelligence from the UK FIU; see 
National Crime Agency (NCA) ‘UK Financial Intelligence Unit’     <http://www.nationalcri-
meagency.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-do/economic-crime/UK FIU> accessed 6 March 2017. 
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power to prosecute any criminal offence as a private prosecutor.129 The UK govern-
ment expects that FCA will achieve its goals by imposing forceful punishments and 
instigating more criminal cases.130 The next section discusses the HM Revenue and 
Customs on its responsibility.  
 
4.3.2.3 HM Revenue and Customs  
 The HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) is the supervisory authority for 
money service business, high-value dealers, trust or company service providers, ac-
countancy service providers, and estate agency business. 131  In other words, the 
HMRC is the AML supervisor for money service businesses, including currency ex-
changes and money/value transmitters, whose actions are not operated by the FCA 
authorised company in order to protect the customer.132 HMRC aims to increase rev-
enues due and bear down on evasion and avoidance, transform tax and payments for 
its clients, as well as designing and distributing a professional, effective, and engaged 
organisation.133 It is responsible for monitoring firms, e.g. high-value dealers, money 
services businesses, auditors, bill payment service providers, and telecommunica-
tions firms in relation to taxes, wages, and other aspects of the financial institutions. 
                                                 
129 R v Cuthbertson [1981] AC 470 responded to stop at drugs and at confiscation provision by crim-
inalising and confiscating the proceeds of crime, especially the profits from drugs; see Peter Alldridge, 
What Went Wrong with Money Laundering Law? (Palgrave Macmillan 2016) 10; see also Paul Ozin, 
‘Financial Crime Update’ (2010) Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 
127, 127 <http://www.23es.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/JIBFL_Feb-Fin-Crim.pdf> accessed 
28 February 2017. 
130 Ryder (n 96) 4, 11.  
131 HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC), ‘Guidance: Money Laundering Regulations: who needs to 
register’ (23 October 2014) <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/money-laundering-regulations-who-
needs-to-register> accessed 29 November 2016. 
132 Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), Anti-Money Laundering Annual Report 2012/2013 (FCA 
2013) 6, 9. 
133 HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC), Annual Report and Accounts 2016-17 (Williams Lea Group 
2017) 8. 
CHAPTER FOUR: Analysis of Competent Authorities and Financial Intelligence Unit in United 
Kingdom 
153 
HMRC has the power to gain access to all documents, records and relevant infor-
mation in order to monitor compliance and investigation of tax matters, smuggling 
and money laundering proceeds, including enforcement in relation to the confisca-
tion and seizure of money at ports and other frontiers.134  
 HMRC can distribute a warning letter and then impose financial sanctions on 
all relevant persons, who fail to comply with its regulations.135 The HMRC achieves 
a significant national role in the protection of money laundering on the basis that it 
is a designated supervisory authority under the MLRs 2017.136  The 2020 MLRs re-
placed the 2017 MLRs, particularly, focusing on the clarification of the FCA in deal-
ing with a cryptoasset business, as well as requirement the Treasury to carry out a 
review in order to meet the international standards, especially the 6MLD.137 The 
2020MLRs intends to solve failures of retained EU law to conduct efficiently and 
other deficiencies arising from the Brexit.138 
 The HMRC has produced guidance notes and a training video to promote an 
awareness of the MLRs 2007.139 Its guidance covers SARs reporting requirements 
with financial institutions as well as indicators of risk.140 Furthermore, in 2016 the 
Committee of Public Accounts claimed that HMRC’s policy dealing with tax fraud 
and its method of prosecutions was unclear.141 The National Audit Office (NAO) 
                                                 
134 Financial Action Task Force (n 39) 26. 
135 Financial Conduct Authority (n 121) 9. 
136 MLRs 2017; see HM Revenue and Customs (n 131). 
137 The UK Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 
(MLRs2020) amend the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information 
on the Payer) Regulations 2017 (X.I. 2017/692).  
138  The Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 
(MLRs2020) amend the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information 
on the Payer) Regulations 2017 (X.I. 2017/692). 
139 Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) ‘HMRC training for estate agents’ (2 September 
2016) <http://www.rics.org/uk/regulation1/firm-and-individual-guidance/money-laundering1/> ac-
cessed 17 November 2016. 
140 National Crime Agency (n 71) 11. 
141 National Audit Office (NAO), HM Revenue & Customs 2015-16 Accounts (NAO 2016) 13. 
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suggests that HMRC should develop the way to collect, assess, and analyse data ef-
fectively.142 
 HMRC has its own FIU officials who obtain training in AML intelligence 
analysis in order to deal with its customers to comply with AML regulations.143 
HMRC has been working with the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors and other 
professional and law enforcement authorities to ensure the implementation of the 
AML regulations efficiently, especially business purposes that are concerned with 
the proceeds of drug dealing, prostitution and human trafficking.144  
 The AML policies are managed by HM Treasury, and also enforced by the 
HMRC.145 HMRC is one of the membership of the SARs Committee.146 HMRC and 
the SARs Regime Committee assess and develop the SARs strategy such as increas-
ing the appropriate SARs from the reporting entities, including improving the tech-
nical abilities and experience of all stakeholders.147 Therefore, HMRC works collab-
oratively with NCA by receiving the SARs in order to identify unreported and unde-
clared income and assets concealed overseas and to recover unpaid taxes, along with 
any sanctions due.148  
 The NCA has direct and indirect access to public record information and op-
erational regulatory, which is held by HMRC databases, e.g. tax details, as well.149 
                                                 
142 ibid. 
143 Financial Action Task Force (n 39) 100. 
144 National Federation of Property Professionals, ‘Money Laundering Guidance for member of Na-
tional Federation of Property Professionals, Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, Association of 
Relocation Professionals and Association of Residential Managing Agents’ (2010) 26, 54 
<http://www.arp-relocation.com/storage/downloads/Money%20Laundering%20Guidance%20fi-
nal.pdf> accessed 7 March 2017. 
145 Harrison and Ryder (n 6) 209. 
146 National Crime Agency (NCA), Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) Annual Report 2017 (NCA 
2017) 52. 
147 ibid 42. 
148 ibid 35. 
149 Financial Action Task Force (n 39) 83, see also National Crime Agency (n 71) 13. 
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However, NCA should be able to obtain such information in order to support its 
analysis of SARs and disseminate SARs timely. This is similar to the Thai FIU, 
which has this power to access to additional law enforcement and financial infor-
mation from other law enforcement agencies and financial institutions database 
timely, as critically discussed in chapter six and in chapter seven.150 SARs plays a 
crucial part in HMRC’s operation to deal with the areas of recovery, financial inves-
tigation and money laundering offences, including AML supervisory duties.151 Con-
sequently, HMRC should increases the use of SARs. It is important that HMRC 
should maintain more proactive communication to NCA and other relevant persons 
(i.e. individuals and businesses) for effective cooperation, which can reduce the com-
pliance cost and defensive reporting.152 The next section looks at the Crown Prose-
cution Service and its role in prosecution of money laundering cases.  
 
4.3.2.4 Crown Prosecution Service   
 Under the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, the Crown Prosecution Service 
(CPS) is led by the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), who is supervised by the 
Attorney General (AG).153 Under the Act, the CPS is the main independent criminal 
prosecutorial agency in England and Wales.154 It also advises the police, law enforce-
ment authorities and the NCA concerning the cases for potential prosecution. The 
CPS considers the criminal cases obtained, identifies charge for cases except minor 
cases, prepares the cases court, and applies for the restraint, receivership, including 
                                                 
150 See discussion in chapter 6; see also International Monetary Fund (IMF), Thailand: Detailed As-
sessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (IMF 2007) 
93.   
151 National Crime Agency (n 71) 24. 
152 Discussed in section 4.6 of evaluation of implementation of AML policy of the United Kingdom; 
HM Treasury and Home Office (n 55) 26; see also Financial Action Task Force (n 39) 25.  
154 Financial Action Task Force (n 39) 25. 
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the CPS confiscation orders in relation to the CPS prosecutions.155 The CPS is re-
sponsible for prosecuting money laundering and other criminal cases investigated by 
the police force, HMRC, the NCA and relevant law enforcement authorities.156 The 
CPS also prosecutes the cases investigated by the competent authorities, which re-
ceive SARs or financial intelligence from the NCA.157 Like the FCA, the CPS com-
mences criminal proceedings after obtaining financial intelligence from the NCA.158  
 The UK has worked as a pro-active approach159 to prosecute not only predi-
cate offences but also the proceeds of crime and the financial perspectives of terrorist 
cases.160 In this respect, the Proceeds of Crime Unit in the CPS cooperates with the 
NCA-led multi-agency implemented to oblige confiscation orders under the POCA 
2002.161 Like Thailand and Singapore, the two countries have powers to deal with 
the criminal cases and still work collaboratively with the FIUs in order to prosecute 
money laundering cases. The next section will explore the role of the tertiary author-
ities and their responsibilities for supporting the government to counter money laun-
dering.  
 
4.3.3 The Role of Tertiary Authorities  
 The definition of the tertiary authorities was noted in Chapter 3. This part 
illustrates the role of tertiary authorities, including UK Finance and the Joint Money 
                                                 
155 Financial Action Task Force (n 39) 25, 27; see also HM Treasury (n 52) 24. 
156 Section 327, 328 and 329 of Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. 
157 Financial Action Task Force (n 39) 25 
158 Harrison and Ryder (n 6) 32. 
159 The UK government has still designated several competent authorities, including investigation and 
prosecution agencies, e.g. NCA, HMRC, CPS and the Revenue and Customs Prosecution Office 
(RCPO); see Financial Action Task Force (n 39) 6. 
160 Financial Action Task Force (n 43) 6. 
161 Under ss 327, 328 and 329 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002; see also HM Treasury and Home 
Office (n 55) 87. 
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Laundering Steering Group (JMLSG). The next section explains the role of UK Fi-
nance in dealing with money laundering. 
 
4.3.3.1 UK Finance  
 The British Bankers ’Association and five other organisations162 merged into 
UK Finance and became the new trade association for 300 providers of finance, 
credit, markets and payments-related services, as well as the banking sector in July 
2017 in order to build and improve the financial services in line with the MLRs 
2017.163 Furthermore, the MLRs 2020 amend the 2017MLRs in line with the EU 
6MLD that the UK has to comply with the EU Directive regarding the prevention of 
the use of the financial system for the objectives of money laundering or terrorist 
financing, such as the duty to take effective measures to better understand a cus-
tomer’s ownership structure and to clarify the provision ensuring that identity can be 
verified electronically, as well as to refine the range of the responsibility to report 
discrepancies in beneficial ownership register.164 UK Finance aims to tackle money 
laundering and support partnerships by working with competent agencies and the 
banking industry to enhance the mutual exchanges of information.165 To illustrate, 
UK Finance focuses on the risk management policies and procedures such as cross-
                                                 
162 BBA is the voice of banking and financial services; see also British Bankers’ Association (BBA), 
‘About us’ <https://www.bba.org.uk/about-us/> accessed 19 September 2016.  
 The new organisation operates most of the activities previously operated by the Asset Based Finance 
Association, the Council of Mortgage Lenders, the British Bankers’ Association, Payments UK, Fi-
nancial Fraud Action UK, including the UK Cards Association; see Jackie Bennett, ‘Notes to editor’ 
(UK Finance, 3 December 2018) <https://www.ukfinance.org.uk/jackie-bennett-speech-uk-finance-
annual-mortgage-dinner> accessed 13 July 2019.  
163 ibid.   
164  Explanatory Note of the Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Amendment) (EU Exit) 
Regulations 2020 (MLRs) <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2020/991/note/made> accessed 24 
December 2020.  
165 UK Finance, ‘UK Finance Limited (formerly NewTA Limited) Annual Report and Financial State-
ments 1 January to 31 December 2018 <https://www.ukfinance.org.uk/system/files/Annual-Report-
for-the-year-ended-31-December-2018.pdf> accessed 14 July 2019.  
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border financial services. UK Finance monitors its member carrying out the risk-
based approach regarding internal control, SARs, and the identity of their customers 
or anyone who needs to open an account or buy any financial service or product from 
banks or else they may risk heavy fines or even prison sentences for failing legal 
compliance under the MLRs 2017.166 
 UK Finance coordinates with the FCA in producing AML guidelines to re-
duce the risk of money laundering and financial crime.167 UK Finance is a member 
of the SARs Regime Committee with the NCA. The membership enhances commu-
nication between banks and NCA and reduces overlapping responsibilities in order 
to develop detection and enforcement, including exchanges the financial intelli-
gence.168 The UK Finance’s guidelines assist banks in understanding the AML leg-
islation and especially reduce the cost of the AML system to the banking sector. For 
example, the sector spent approximately £5bn per year on AML compliance as well 
as developing banking systems and recruiting experts.169 The cost of AML compli-
ance increased by 60 per cent from 2003170 and increased by half in 2012.171 KPMG 
supports that the cost of AML compliance has risen since 2011.172 This is because 
AML compliance puts obligations on all firms to have more reports, more staff hired 
                                                 
166 UK Finance (n 165).  
167 ibid. 
168 Harrison and Ryder (n 6) 30.  
169 HM Treasury and Home Office, National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing 2017 (HM Treasury 2017) 35; see also Law Commission, ‘Anti-Money Laundering: the 
SARs Regime Consultation Paper’ Consultation Paper No 236 (20 July 2018) at 9 <https://s3-eu-
west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage-11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2018/07/Anti-Money-Laun-
dering-the-SARs-Regime-Consultation-paper.pdf> accessed 14 July 2019. 
170 Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG), “Anti-laundering Expenses ‘Soar’” (BBC News, 9 
July 2007) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6284106.stm> accessed 29 November 2016.             
171 British Bankers’ Association (BBA), Future Financial Crime Risks: Considering the financial 
crime challenges faced by UK banks (LexisNexis 2015) 6. 
172 KPMG surveys globally that the costs of AML compliance could be increased approximately 74 
per cent of AML investment within 2017; see Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG), ‘Cost of 
compliance continues to be underestimated’ (29 January 2014) 
<https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/insights/2014/01/cost-compliance-underestimated.html> ac-
cessed 25 July 2017.  
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in the business (e.g. AML specialist), 173 more software,174 and more suspicious re-
ports.175  
 The UK government states that a risk-based approach176 can also reduce the 
AML compliance cost.177 NCA focuses on the cooperation between banks and LEAs 
in SARs regime in order to reduce the poor quality of SARs, but increase the inves-
tigations and prosecutions of money laundering.178 The next part explores the Joint 
Money Laundering Steering Group (JMLSG). 
 
4.3.3.2 Joint Money Laundering Steering Group   
 The Joint Money Laundering Steering Group (JMLSG) aims to promote good 
practice in fighting against money laundering and to help interpret the UK money 
laundering laws.179 It has created Money Laundering Guidance notes for the finan-
cial sector which aims to facilitate all firms to interpret, understand, and obtain the 
necessary information in relation to the MLRs without undue delay.180 The FSA sug-
gested all businesses to read the 2006 JMLSG guidance notes together with the 
                                                 
173 HSBC had 24,300 experts in AML risk and compliance (i.e. ten per cent of its whole workforce) 
in 2014; see Caroline Binham, ‘Banks step up hiring of anti-money laundering specialists’ (Financial 
Times, 18 August 2014) <https://www.ft.com/content/4f20179a-2600-11e4-9bca-
00144feabdc0?mhq5j=e1> accessed 15 July 2017.  
174 Some banks paid €2m for the AML monitoring system (i.e. software and technology); see Antoi-
nette Verhage, The Anti-Money Laundering Complex and the Compliance Industry (Routledge 2011) 
136. 
175 ibid 65; see Alldridge (n 129) 29.  
176 A risk-based approach on money laundering is a necessary section of AML policy to reduce the 
level of money laundering; see S Ross and M Hannan, ‘Money Laundering Regulation and Risk-
based Decision Making’ (2007) 10 Journal of Money Laundering Control 106, 107.  
177 To decrease the AML compliance costs, certain UK banks have abolished wire transactions to 
Somalia to avoid the money laundering risk (i.e. de-risking) and compliance cost; see Financial Ser-
vices Authority (FSA), Consultation Paper 46 Money Laundering – The FSA’s New Role (FSA 2000) 
10; see also Lanier Saperstein, Geoffrey Sant and Michelle Ng, ‘The failure of anti-money laundering 
regulation: where is the Cost-Benefit analysis? (2015) 91(1) Notre Dame Law Review Online 1, 6. 
178 Law Commission (n 169). 
179  Joint Money Laundering Steering Group (JMLSG), ‘What is JMLSG ’
<http://www.jmlsg.org.uk/what-is-jmlsg> accessed 19 September 2016.  
180 JMLSG Guidance, para 8.25; see also Emmanuel Ebikake, ‘Money laundering: An assessment of 
soft law as a technique for repressive and preventive anti-money laundering control ’ (2016) 19(4) 
Journal Money Laundering Control 346, 364. 
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FSA’s regulations.181 The FSA applied this guidance when deciding whether the 
business violates the FSA’s Handbook Regulations concerning money laundering. 
However, the JMLSG Guidance, approved by the HM Treasury,182 is ‘soft law ’
without legal effects.183 On the other hand, a court applies the JMLSG Guidance 
when deciding whether a person has conducted an offence under either of the ss 330 
or 331 of POCA 2002.184 Accordingly, compliance with such guidance is a matter 
that a court must take into account when making a decision. 185  Therefore, the 
JMLSG could be an alternative mechanism supporting the hard law to fight against 
the money laundering regime effectively as it creates the guidance for the financial 
services sector.186 Additionally, the failure to follow the JMLSG Guidance leads the 
FCA to impose a financial penalty. The MLRs 2017 brought the JMLSG’s risk-based 
anti-money laundering guidance in line with the new Regulations.187 The 2020 MLRs 
introduce the provisions regarding the trust, which combines providing for additional 
                                                 
181 The HM Treasury approved this guidance for the objectives of ss 330 and 331 of the POCA 2002; 
see also Ebikake (n 180) 346, 363. 
182 The HM Treasury approved the Guidance for the aim of Regulations 42 and 45 of the Money 
Laundering Regulations 2007. 
183 For example, the JMLSG Guidance, para 8.6 determines that the records kept should embrace any 
client information, transactions, all suspicious reports, MLRO reports, training, and compliance mon-
itoring, as well as all information concerning the efficiency of training. The FSA fined the Bank of 
Ireland (BoI) £375,000 for failing to have in place systems to prevent and detect a series of money 
laundering high-risk, cash transaction worth about 2m, which were engaged in violation of their anti-
money laundering procedures and policies. That showed that the bank did not attempted to present 
appropriate processes to make sure its staff had understood the money laundering training that the 
bank distributed to them, especially the knowledge, recognition, and reporting of SARs; see Ryder    
(n 96) 635, 647; see also Financial Services Authority (FSA) ‘FSA fines Bank of Ireland £375,000 
for breaches of anti-money laundering requirement’ (2 September 2004) 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Library/Communication/PR/2004/077.shtml> accessed 26 November 
2016; see also Ebikake (n 180) 346, 363; see also Richard Brent and William Blair, ‘Regulatory re-
sponsibilities’ in William Blair and Richard Brent (eds), Banks and Crime: The International Law of 
Tainted Money (Oxford 2008) 267, 270, 275. 
184 POCA2002, ss 330, 331; As soft law definition, the JMLSG Guidance is an interesting example 
of soft law that is voluntary compliance, nonbinding nature, relying on the firms to implement; see 
also Ebikake (n 180) 346, 363; the JMLSG 2006 Guidance has also been advocated the objective of 
the similar offences under section 21A of the Terrorism Act 2000. 
185 SYSC 3.26EG; see also Brent and Blair (n 183) 267. 
186 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Mutual Evaluation Fourth Follow-up Report: United King-
dom (FATF 2009) 5. 
187 The Money Laundering Regulations 2017.  
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trusts to be included on the trust register and expanding the responsibility to report 
discrepancies in the beneficial ownership to trusts. The MLRs include amending the 
duty to enhanced due diligence measures to correspondent relationship only if they 
involve the execution of the payments, as well as increase the ‘assurance to a level 
that is necessary for efficiently managing and reducing any risk of money launder-
ing.188  
 The JMLSG, as a supervisory authority, responds to the requirements of the 
UK legislative regulations by working collaboratively with reporting entities, other 
competent authorities, law enforcement authorities and UK FIU (i.e. NCA), as well 
as producing guidance and rules in order to help report entities better understand the 
requirements of SARs, including the MLRs.189 The collaboration between the NCA, 
FCA and JMLSG strengthens the UK SARs regime to reduce the risk of reporting 
entities being abused by money launderers and other criminals. The next section 
demonstrates the model of the UKFIU.  
 
4.3.3.3. Joint Money Laundering Intelligence Taskforce (JMLIT)  
 Joint Money Laundering Intelligence Taskforce (JMLIT) plays a key role to 
encourage the UK FIU to counter money laundering in the UK.190 The NECC in-
cludes the well-established JMLIT, which is a partnership between law enforcement 
                                                 
188 Joint Money Laundering Steering Group (JMLSG), The Money Laundering and Terrorist Financ-
ing (Amendment) (Exit) Regulations 2020 <https://jmlsg.org.uk/latest-news/the-money-laundering-
and-terrorist-financing-amendment-eu-exit-regulations-2020/> accessed 24 December 2020.  
189 Harrison and Ryder (n 6) 32. 
190 JMLIT was established under the Crime and Courts Act 2013, section 7; the Provision provides a 
wide legislative gateway for the UKFIU to share information for the purpose of developing its func-
tions. As such, partnership tactical exchanging in the UK must be convened by the UKFIU, which 
contributed to the design of JMLIT as an in-person Taskforce meeting on the UKFIU premises. Since 
its establishment, JMLIT has encouraged and enhanced over 500 law enforcement investigations, 
which has directly contributed to over 130 arrests and the seizure or restraint of over £13m; see Nick 
J Maxwell, ‘Expanding the Capability of Financial Information-Sharing Partnerships’ (March 2019) 
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and the financial sector to exchange and analyse information relating to money laun-
dering and wider economic threats.191 JMLIT is an innovative model for public/pri-
vate information sharing that has generated very positive results since its inception 
in 2015, and is considered internationally to be an example of best practice vulnera-
bilities, and live tactical intelligence, is essential.    
 There has been a real willingness within in the banking sector to share infor-
mation through the JMLIT to combat economic crime. The NCA is working with 
colleagues from overseas LEAs to help inform the development of similar partner-
ships in a number of key partner jurisdictions around the world. JMLIT allows all 
sectors to work together to construct a new wider, ‘whole system’ approach, which 
will enable the private sector to act as a more effective first line of defence against 
economic crime. 
 
4.3.3.4 Joint Force Financial Analysis Centre 
 The JFAC is also hosted by the NCA, which works with four authorities, 
consisting of the NCA, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, the Financial Conduct 
Authority and the Serious Fraud Office in order to develop the independence of the 
FIU when dealing with SARs regime without undue influence and interference.192 
                                                 
<https://www.future-fis.com/uploads/3/7/9/4/3794525/pr%C3%A9cis_of_ffis_paper_-_expand-
ing_the_role_of_fisps_-_march_2019.pdf> accessed 30 December 2020; see also National Crime 
Agency (NCA), ‘National Economic Crime Centre’ <https://nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/what-we-
do/national-economic-crime-centre> accessed 30 December 2020.  
191 National Economic Crime Centre (NECC) has been created to deliver a step change in the UK’s 
response to, and impact on, economic crime. For the first time, the NECC brings together law en-
forcement and justice agencies, government departments, regulatory bodies and the private sector 
with a shared objective of driving down serious organized crime, protecting the public and safeguard 
the prosperity and reputation of the UK as a financial centre; see National Crime Agency (NCA), 
‘Money laundering and illicit finance’ <https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/what-we-do/crime-
threats/money-laundering-and-illicit-finance> accessed 23 December 2020.   
 
192 National Crime Agency (NCA), ‘Money laundering and illicit finance’ <https://www.nationalcri-
meagency.gov.uk/what-we-do/crime-threats/money-laundering-and-illicit-finance> accessed 23 De-
cember 2020.   
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4.4 The Model of the United Kingdom Financial Intelligence Unit 
 The role of the FIU is an independent agency,193 which receives financial 
intelligence from reporting entities.194 The FIU model relies on the regulatory culture 
of each country and illustrates its styles which can be classified by its nature.195 Ac-
cording to the IMF and World Bank, the administrative-type FIU forms a separate 
and autonomous government agency or is not positioned under such administration 
considered ‘independent FIUs’.196 The FIU (i.e. the NCA) should act as an independ-
ent role, which is to restore confidence for AML compliance agencies.197 The ad-
ministrative-style FIU is referred to as a filter or buffer between all reporting entities, 
who are concerned about their suspicion on customers ’activities and their relation-
ship with their customers, and relevant competent agencies or law-enforcement au-
thorities.198 An administrative-style FIU, the NCA receives SARs, analyses, and dis-
                                                 
193 Stessens explains that the FIU, which is an independent office, will inspire more confidence with 
the financial institutions rather than law enforcement-style FIUs; see Guy Stessens, Money Launder-
ing: A New International Law Enforcement Model (Cambridge University Press 2000) 187.  
194 Stessens identifies that the Belgian and the Dutch FIUs are the FIUs which have a high degree of 
independence and are transparently established in an approach that encourages a high degree of trust 
in the financial institutions which do not have to report their suspicions directly to a police, law en-
forcement or judicial authority; unlike Thailand FIU (AMLO) is a hybrid-model FIU that is a combi-
nation between an administrative and law enforcement-model FIU that the financial institutions can 
file the suspicions (STRs) to the AMLO with the fear of sanctions or  ‘defensive reporting’; see 
Stessens (n 194) 183, 190. 
195 Jean-Francois Thony, ‘Processing Financial Information in Money Laundering Matters: The Fi-
nancial Intelligence Units ’(1996) 4(3) European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Jus-
tice 257, 258. 
196 World Bank Group, ‘Module 2: Role of the Financial Intelligence Unit (incorporating peer review-
ers comments) (page 5) <http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/834721427730119379/AML-Module-
2.pdf> accessed 27 February 2017. 
197 Verhage (n 174) 88.  
198 The FIU’s role also conduct analysis to disseminate to competent authorities or law-enforcement 
officers in order to investigate and prosecute the proceeds of crime; Verhage (n 174 6. 
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seminates intelligence information to law enforcement authorities, leading to the in-
vestigation, prosecution and confiscation orders that are similar to the FIU type of 
Singapore’s FIU (Suspicious Transaction Reporting Office or the STRO).199  
 The NCA itself has a filtering and intermediary role, 200 like a hindrance be-
tween the reporting financial sectors and the public prosecutor.201 Regarding to the 
role, the financial sector is safer to file and disclose information to the NCA than 
directly submit it to the public prosecutor or the police force. The administrative-
style FIU seeks to develop a good working relationship between the banks and the 
NCA in respect of money laundering matters because the financial services sector is 
willing to provide the information to the NCA rather than the law enforcement au-
thorities.202  
 A good working relationship can promote the appropriate and qualitative in-
formation flow to the NCA. The objective of the FIU is to increase the degree of the 
flow of information from the intermediaries or the FIUs productive for fighting 
money laundering and reduce the obscurity of the reporting entities and financial 
system through the operation of each FIU.203 Stessens argues that the administrative-
style FIUs experience a high degree of budgetary autonomy and obviously estab-
lished an approach that enhances a high level of confidence and trust in reporting 
entities which are not required to submit their suspicions immediately to law enforce-
ment, judicial or police authority.204 
                                                 
199 The NCA received 404,735 SARs in 2015; see National Crime Agency (NCA) National Crime 
Agency Annual Report and Accounts 2015-16 (Williams Lea Group 2016) 23; see also Donato Mas-
ciandaro, ‘Financial supervisory unification and financial intelligence units’ (2005) 8(4) Journal of 
Money Laundering Control 354, 364. 
200 Stessens (n 119) 185.  
201 Verhage (n 174) 88.  
202 ibid. 
203 Masciandaro (n 200) 354, 357. 
204 Stessens (n 119) 188, 189. 
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 The administrative-style FIU is not given the powers of criminal investiga-
tions and prosecution. The NCA is an administrative-type FIU, which only receives, 
analyses financial information, and then disseminates to the relevant law enforce-
ment agencies.205 It also has its budget from the administration of confiscation or-
ders,206 which are the principal source via the government. The NCA also maintains 
its policies to confiscate criminal proceeds.207 Consequently, the NCA, an autono-
mous body with its budget,208 positions within the Economic Crime Command and 
deals with a large number of the SARs regime.209 Typically, the administrative-type 
FIUs function and require trained staff to supervise and inspect the reporting entities 
to comply with the anti-money laundering regulations and SARs regime, then it dis-
seminates the intelligence information to the competent authorities effectively.210  
 Nevertheless, Thailand’s model is a hybrid-style FIU that comprises admin-
istrative and law enforcement-style FIUs. In order to improve effectiveness in 
fighting money laundering, Thailand should consider to adopt the UK FIU’s style to 
deal with the STRs regime in Thailand as the adaptation may lead to the same phe-
nomenon as the UK, including generating good relations with the financial institu-
tions in money laundering matters, promoting the events of defensive reporting, and 
reducing the cost of AML compliance. The next section explains the role of the UK 
                                                 
205 Gilmore (n 50) 82. 
206 There are 6,392 confiscation orders done by courts in 2012-2012; see National Audit Office 
(NAO), ‘Confiscation orders’ (17 December 2013) <https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/up-
loads/2013/12/10318-001-Confiscation-Book.pdf> accessed 12 July 2017. 
207 ibid. 
208 The British government obtains about £150m yearly from the confiscation and forfeiture orders; 
see National Audit Office (n 141); see also 16; see also Tatsuo Ueda, ‘The Suspicious Transaction 
Reporting System and its effective use’ (2001) 411, 413 <http://www.unafei.or.jp/eng-
lish/pdf/RS_No58/No58_34PA_Ueda.pdf> accessed 28 November 2016; see also He Ping, ‘The Sus-
picious Transactions Reporting System’ (2005) 8(3) Journal of Money Laundering Control 252. 
209 Masciandaro and Balakina refer SAR is a piece of financial information that stimulates relevant 
law enforcement to possible money laundering or financing of terrorism; see also Donato 
Masciandaro and Olga Balakina, Banking Secrecy and International Financial Markets: Economics 
and Politics (Palgrave MacMillan 2015) 275. 
210 World Bank Group (n 197). 
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FIUs (i.e. the NCIS, SOCA and NCA) from the past and present to ensure their pro-
gress in fighting money laundering regime.211 
 Even though, the 2018 FATF MER of the UK rated ‘partially compliant’ on 
Recommendation 29 indicating the insufficient independence because of lack of its 
human resources.212 Regarding the independence of the UKFIU, the NCA designs to 
ensure that the UKFIU remain independent of political interference and influence in 
line with the UK government’s five year Anti-Corruption strategy with the objectives 
of preserving the UK’s status as ‘one of the safest and cleanest jurisdiction in the 
world to conduct business, and building a strong, confident international Britain’.213 
Furthermore, the government also established the National Economic Crime Centre 
(NECC) as the national competent authority, based at the Head Quarters of the NCA 
similar to the UKFIU, for the UK’s operation response to, and impact on the eco-
nomic crime, as well as improving cooperation regarding investigation and prosecu-
tion between multi-agency collaboration, but also with the public and the private 
sector.214  
 JMLSG issues the Guidance setting out what the firms and their staff should 
do to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing and how they implement the 
                                                 
211 See discussion in subsection 4.5. 
212 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing 
Measures - United Kingdom Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (FATF 2018) 224. 
213 The UK government publishes the UK five year Anti-Corruption strategy on 11 December 2017; 
see Ed Smyth, ‘The UK’s new National Economic Crime Centre’ <https://www.kings-
leynapley.co.uk/insights/blogs/criminal-law-blog/the-uks-new-national-economic-crime-centre> ac-
cessed 24 December 2020.  
214 National Crime Agency (NCA), ‘National Economic Crime Centre’ <https://www.nationalcri-
meagency.gov.uk/what-we-do/national-economic-crime-centre?view=category&id=15> accessed 24 
December 2020; see also Ed Smyth, ‘The UK’s new National Economic Crime Centre’ 
<https://www.kingsleynapley.co.uk/insights/blogs/criminal-law-blog/the-uks-new-national-eco-
nomic-crime-centre> accessed 24 December 2020. 
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requirements of the UK AML/CTF regime.215 In contrast, the Joint Money Launder-
ing Intelligence Task Force (JMLIT) is a partnership between the competent author-
ities, LEAs (e.g. the FCA, NCA, HMRC, SFO, City of London Police, and the Met-
ropolitan Police Service) and the over 40 financial institutions to share and analyse 
financial information, in particular money laundering. 216  As reasons mentioned 
above, JMLIT supports the independence of the UKFIU in effectively operating its 
functions without the political or industrial interference and influence.217  
 Moreover, the partnership of multi-agencies is cemented with establishment 
of transparent governance which are monitored by HMRC and the SARs Regime 
Committee in order to evaluate and improve the SARs strategy.218 Therefore, the 
SARs Regime Committee and the HMRC also support and work collaboratively with 
the UKFIU in line with the international standards.219 In conclusion, the Egmont 
Group aims to promote the establishment of the FIUs with the operational auton-
omy.220 The independent and transparent FIUs encourage a high degree of confi-
dence in the financial institutions than police forces, law enforcement or judicial au-
thority. The UK FIU (NCA) is an administrative-type FIU. It also has its budget to 
avoid the intervention from unduly politics. Unlike Thailand FIU (Anti-Money 
                                                 
215 Joint Money laundering Steering Group (JMLSG), ‘Current guidance’ <https://jmlsg.org.uk/guid-
ance/current-guidance/> accessed 24 December 2020. 
216 National Crime Agency (NCA), ‘National Economic Crime Centre’ <https://www.nationalcri-
meagency.gov.uk/what-we-do/national-economic-crime-centre?highlight=WyJqbWxpdCIsI-
idqbWxpdCJd> accessed 24 December 2020.  
217 National Crime Agency (NCA), ‘National Economic Crime Centre’ <https://www.nationalcri-
meagency.gov.uk/what-we-do/national-economic-crime-centre?highlight=WyJqbWxpdCIsI-
idqbWxpdCJd> accessed 24 December 2020.  
218 National Crime Agency (NCA), Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) Annual Report 2017 (NCA 
2017) 42. 
219 National Crime Agency (NCA), Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) Annual Report 2017 (NCA 
2017) 35. 
220 Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, Egmont Group: Annual Report June 2009 - July 
2010 (Egmont Group 2010) 21; see also Gilmore (n 50) 83. 
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Laundering Office or AMLO), it is a hybrid-style FIUs (i.e. a combination of admin-
istrative and law enforcement-style FIUs). In this case, the financial institutions may 
report the suspicions to the AMLO because of the fear of sanctions or ‘defensive 
reporting.’ Therefore, the FIUs should be an independent government body and 
should not be under a ministry or ministry’s equivalent (i.e. political powers).221 
Stessens identifies that judicial-style FIUs are fully independent FIUs that can deal 
with the dissemination of the information to the law enforcement for criminal inves-
tigation, but do not have access to the same international channels of information 
exchange as the same way the police forces do.222 Regarding the independence of 
the UKFIU, the partnership between the JMLIT, the SARs Regime Committee 
would enhance the independence of the UKFIU to conduct its function without the 
political and industrial influence. The next section explains the role of the UKFIU in 
countering money laundering. 
 
4.5 The United Kingdom Financial Intelligence Unit 
 Under POCA 2002, the UK FIU receives, analyses, and distributes financial 
information collected from SARs in order to investigate and fight organised crime, 
serious crime and any other kind of crime.223 Furthermore, it produces financial 
crime guidance to provide the standard approaches for risky persons.224 The FIU has 
a repository function. It holds information on money laundering, receives disclosed 
information on suspicious transactions or activities, independently analyses by add-
                                                 
221 Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO), Annual Report 2012 of Anti-Money Laundering Office 
(Chihua 2012) 25. 
222 Stessens (n 194) 188. 
223 Section 1(5) of the POCA 2002. 
224 National Crime Agency (n 109). 
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ing value to such information, and decides whether the information warrants a judi-
cial investigation.225 The FIU exchanges financial intelligence with other law en-
forcement authorities or international FIUs. The AML policies (e.g. legislation, guid-
ance and action plan) also enable the UKFIU to act swiftly for freezing assets that 
can relieve the burdens of the investigating police, law enforcement and judicial au-
thorities.226  
 Recommendation 29 states that the FATF’s members require to establish the 
FIUs, and the UK accordingly implemented the Recommendation into its national 
legislation.227 Therefore, this section concentrates on the creation of the UKFIU in 
fighting money laundering. The first UKFIU was the National Criminal Intelligence 
Service (NCIS), which was established by the Police Act 1997,228 aiming to provide 
leadership and excellence in criminal intelligence to combat serious and organised 
crime.229 The NCIS was also responsible for gathering and analysing intelligence 
data to provide and support insight and information to law enforcement agencies, 
such as the national police forces, for protection and prevention of serious crimes.230 
Its duty includes providing advice to the governments and private sector, especially 
financial institutions concerning the measures of prevention of money laundering.231 
The NCIS’s style is law enforcement-style FIUs that reserves an important role for 
                                                 
225 Stessens (n 194) 184. 
226 Stessens (n 194) 185. 
227 FATF Recommendation 29. 
228 Then it was subjected to amendments and additions in the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 
and the Police Reform Act 2002. 
229 Relative law enforcement such as the police forces, intelligence agencies, HM Revenue and Cus-
toms (HMRC), and others. The NCIS returned to direct funding by the Home Office in 2002 and was 
a non-departmental public agency; see also National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), National 
Criminal Intelligence Service Annual Report and Accounts 2005-2006 (The Stationary Office 2006) 
7. 
230 Security Service Act 1996; see Stessens (n 194) 186. 
231 Stessens (n 194) 186. 
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the police force.232 This style may not be comfortable to the financial institutions 
because they are likely to report directly to the police force, which has investigative 
powers and also extensive access to information. The law enforcement-style FIUs 
provides an advantage to the NCIS because it can access the huge information 
sources available to the police departments and international information exchange 
sources, such as Interpol and Europol.233 However, the disadvantage of this FIU style 
is a limited relationship234 between the financial institutions and the FIU that is ad-
ministrated by the police force because of the fear of customers ’reputation, civil 
liability, criminal investigation, and charges when the reporting entities are filing a 
suspicion to them. Stessens assumes that financial institutions will be more reluctant 
or afraid of reporting their suspicions to the police forces, law enforcement and ju-
dicial authorities than to special administrative FIUs. But they will do merely when 
their suspicion is obviously strong.235     
 Between 2005 and 2006, NCIS supported the government’s harm reduction 
strategy on money laundering and criminal finance and disseminated 3,501 intelli-
gence reports to the relevant law enforcement agencies.236 NCIS received just only 
154,000 SARs in 2004-2005237  and 196,000 SARs in 2005-2006. 238  NCIS was 
merged into a part of the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) on 1 April 2006.  
According to Article 29 of the Third Money Laundering Directive, each national FIU 
should be responsible for gathering, analysing, and disseminating SARs. Thus, the 
                                                 
232 ibid; however, Masciandaro argues that the NCIS is an administrative-style FIUs; see also Masci-
andaro (n 200) 354, 364. 
233 Stessens (n 194) 186. 
234 ibid. 
235 Stessens (n 194) 187. 
236 National Criminal Intelligence Service (n 230) 7. 
237 ibid 6. 
238 ibid 10. 
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Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), the UKFIU between 2006 and 2013, also 
managed the assets recovering provision by the POCA 2002.239 The Serious Organ-
ised Crime and Police Act 2005 empowered the SOCA (i.e. the UK FIU) and re-
placed the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS).240 SOCA had three objec-
tives - tackling serious organised crime; gathering information relating to crime; and 
other general considerations. Its primary functions are preventing and detecting se-
rious crime, including contributing to the reduction of such crime and mitigating its 
consequences.241  
 Regarding money laundering and serious crime, s. 3 determines the function 
of SOCA that is to gather, store, analyse, and disseminate information relevant to the 
prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences or the reduction of 
crime in other ways or the mitigation of its consequences.242 It was a hybrid agency 
which contained the National Crime Squad, the NCIS, Her Majesty’s Revenue and 
Customs (HMRC) concerning with drug trafficking, Her Majesty’s Immigration Ser-
vice (HMIS) involving in human trafficking.243 SOCA also published the UK Threat 
Assessment of Organised Crime, which highlighted the relationship between money 
laundering and organised crime.244 Like the NCIS, the SOCA illustrated the disclo-
sure-receiving bodies as an FIU of the police model (i.e., law enforcement-model 
                                                 
239 However, the role of FIU, SOCA, transferred to the National Crime Agency (NCA) in 2013 fol-
lowing the Crime and Courts Act 2013.  
240 Section 2 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (SOCPA 2005) determined the 
SOCA’s duties and responsibilities including the prevention and detection of serious organised crime 
and contribution to its reduction and the mitigation of its consequences.  
241 Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, ss 2(1)(a) and (b). 
242 Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, ss 3(1)(a) and (b). 
243 Clive Hartfield, ‘SOCA: A paradigm shift in British policing’ (2006) 46(4) British Journal of 
Criminology 743, 743. 
244 Then it was replaced by the National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime, which 
has been produced by the National Crime Agency (NCA); see National Crime Agency (NCA) ‘Na-
tional Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime’ (1 May 2014) <http://www.nationalcri-
meagency.gov.uk/publications/207-nca-strategic-assessment-of-serious-and-organised-crime/file>  
accessed 11 October 2016; see also Mo Egan, ‘The role of the regulated sector in the UK anti-money 
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FIUs). Therefore, the reporting entities must directly report to the SOCA for inves-
tigations that may impact the increase of defensive reporting.245 Although SOCA had 
a legislative power to initiate an investigation of proceedings in relation to asset re-
covery,246 in the case of R (UMBS Online Ltd) v Serious Organised Crime Agency247 
the Court of Appeal in England determined that SOCA must withhold consent based 
on a good reason.248  In the case of UMBS, SOCA had erred in refusing to revisit its 
decision on refusing to grant consent to a bank to continue a client’s banking mandate 
on the ground that the bank itself had not made the further request for the consent. 
Nothing in s. 335 of the POCA 2002 needed the request to revisit the matter to be 
made by the bank.249  
 However, the SOCA has still missed the government’s objectives to reduce 
serious and organised crimes effectively.250 For instance, the SOCA was criticised 
for poor management information of SARs regime (such as ineffective SARs data-
base), weak monitoring of enforcement outcome, insufficient training, the lack of 
government support for the strategy,251 poor investigation skilled, and not seizing 
                                                 
laundering framework: pushing the boundaries of the private police’ (2010) 6(2) Journal of Contem-
porary European Research 272, 276. 
245 Discussed in section 8.9.3 in this chapter; see Gilmore (n 50) 82. 
246 Liz Campbell, Organised Crime and the Law: A Comparative Analysis (Hart 2013) 224. 
247 R (UMBS Online Ltd) v Serious Organised Crime Agency [2007] EWCA Civ 406. 
248 Konyin Ajayi and Hamid Abdulkareem, ‘Insulating the vaults from the tide of dirty money: are 
the floodgates secure?’ (2010) 13(1) Journal of Money Launderign Control 33, 40. 
249 R (UMBS Online Ltd) v Serious Organised Crime Agency [2007] EWCA Civ 406. 
250 Tom Warren, ‘National Crime Agency warned over serious flaws in money-laundering system’ 
(BuzzFeedNews , 8 December 2015) <https://www.buzzfeed.com/tomwarren/national-crime-agency-
warned-over-serious-flaws-in-money-lau> accessed 18 July 2019. 
251 Ryder (n 8) 93.  
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enough assets.252 By the virtue of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 it was replaced by 
the NCA in 2013 in order to prevent and detect serious and organised crime.253  
 The European Union launched the Third Money Laundering Directive 
(3MLD),'254 it’s objective was  to criminalise a person’s relation with criminals and 
their criminal proceeds, and criminalising performance, which may help launders or 
criminals to retain, utilise or otherwise advantage from such criminal proceeds to 
prevent the use of the financial system from the purpose of money laundering and 
terrorist financing. The UK transposed this Directive to the Money Laundering Reg-
ulations 2007 (MLRs).255 Therefore, the UK legislation concerning the anti-money 
laundering scheme comprises the POCA 2002 and the MLRs 2007.256 Part 7 of 
POCA 2002 deals with the offences of money laundering.257 The MLRs 2007 acted 
as a significant role because it requires reporting entities (e.g. bank sector and other 
                                                 
252 SOCA had seized £14.9m assets in 2013 (the last year of operation), but NCA had seized £22.5m 
with 3,329 arrests and 400 convictions in its first year; see Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), 
Annual Report and Accounts 2013/14 (1 April 2013 to 6 October 2013) (Williams Lea Group 2014) 
31; see also Alan Travis, ‘National Crime Agency must claw back more criminal assets, MPs say’ 
(Guardian, 17 February 2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/feb/17/national-crime-
agency-criminal-assets-commons-home-affairs-select-committee-nca> accessed 17 July 2019; see 
also Ozlem Ulgen, ‘The UK’s new Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA): combining intelligence 
and law enforcement’ (2007) 77 International Review of Penal Law 153, 179. 
253 The Crime and Courts Act 2013, Sch.8(2) para 158; the 2013 Act provides that the NCA is to have 
the functions conferred by the POCA 2002, ss 1(3)(b), 1(5); see Government Digital Service, ‘Serious 
Organised Crime Agency has closed’ <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/serious-organ-
ised-crime-agency> accessed 18 July 2019. 
254 The Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on 
the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist 
financing [2005]. 
OJ L309/15. 
255 The Money Laundering Regulations 2007 SI 1992/1771 came into force on 15 December 2007; 
see also Statutory Instruments, ‘The Money Laundering Regulations 2007’ <http://www.legisla-
tion.gov.uk/uksi/2007/2157/pdfs/uksi_20072157_en.pdf> accessed 23 February 2017; see also Peter 
Snowdon and Simon Lovegrove, ‘Money Laundering Regulations 2007’ (March 2008) 54 Compli-
ance Officer Bulletin, 1.  
256 The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and the Money Laundering Regulations 2007. 
257 Part 7 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. 
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financial institutions) to implement preventive measures, especially internal proce-
dures to detect and report suspicious activities of their customers in fighting the 
money laundering regime.258 
 The laws that include several secondary regulations such as certain guidelines 
and standards provided by the FCA and the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group 
(JMLSG) are significant tools for fighting money laundering in the UK.259  The 
MLRs 2007 are secondary to the POCA,260  providing the ‘risk-based approach 
(RBA)’261 and the use of ‘customer due diligence’262 approach (i.e. Know Your Cus-
tomer) to ensure that funds are derived and transacted from legal sources to prevent 
money laundering and terrorist financing risks.263 The Regulations aim to impose 
                                                 
258 Money Laundering Regulations 2007. 
259 The criminalisation of money laundering can be studied from the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 
1986, then it was replaced by the POCA 2002 (Punitive measures). In addition, the Money Laundering 
Regulations 2007 (MLRs 2007) (or Preventive measures) and the Systems and Controls or SYSC 
Handbook of the FCA oblige all reporting entities to comply; see Harrison and Ryder (n 6) 224; see 
also Alhosani (n 42) 205. 
260 Part 7 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 rules the money laundering offences and needs the cre-
ating SARs to the NCA; see Sabrina Fiona Preller, ‘Comparing AML Legislation of the UK, Swit-
zerland and Germany’ (2008) 11(3) Journal of Money Laundering Control 245; see also Stephen 
Lander, ‘Review of the suspicious activity reports regime (The SARs Review)’ (March 2006) 11                                                        
<http://hb.betterregulation.com/external/SOCAtheSARsReview_FINAL_Web.pdf> accessed 30 
July 2016. 
261 A Risk-Based Approach (RBA) to anti-money laundering and countering financing terrorism re-
quires all jurisdictions, financial institutions and competent authorities identify, assess and understand 
the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing by exposing and taking anti-money laundering 
and countering financing terrorism measures respond to such risks to reduce them efficiently such as 
applying Customer due diligence (CDD) i.e., identifying the customer, the customer’s beneficial 
owner; see also Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach: the 
Banking Sector (FATF 2014) 6. 
262 Part 2: Customer due diligence of the Money Laundering Regulations 2007. 
263  Law Society, ‘Money laundering warnings signs’ (22 October 2014) <http://www.lawsoci-
ety.org.uk/support-services/advice/practice-notes/aml/money-laundering-warning-signs/> accessed 
10 August 2016. 
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compliance with firms,264 which distribute access to financial services and other sim-
ilar services that possibly attract money launderers.265  
 The 2007 Regulations determine the institutions and professionals266 to ap-
point a nominated officer who will report the SARs to the NCA267 unless an officer 
would be in violation of this rule.268 Furthermore, the FCA can impose high fines on 
both financial institutions and such officers who breach the money laundering pro-
vision in order to enhance better conduct across the obliged entities.269 All desig-
nated authorities270 have the power to impose civil penalties on any person who vio-
lates the rules.271 All breaches must be liable to civil penalties under Regulation 42 
and also criminal offences under Regulation 45, with the minor exception of Regu-
lation 11(1d), which requires “a relevant person to consider whether he is bound to 
disclose under Part 7 of the POCA 2002 or Part 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000 to keep 
appropriate procedures.” 272  However, the FCA’s pre-placement policy and the 
                                                 
264 The MLRs 2007 force only to firms in the regulated sector and financial institutions which are 
obliged by rule by the FSA must be subject to the FSA’s foundations on money laundering Paragraphs 
3.2.6A-3.2.6J of the FSA’s Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls Sourcebook 
(SYSC).  
265 Slaughter and May, ‘An introduction to the UK Anti-Money Laundering regime’ (March 2008) 3 
<https://www.slaughterandmay.com/media/559043/an_introduction_to_the_uk_anti__money_laun-
dering_regime.pdf > accessed 5 October 2016.  
266 The Act intends to prevent the professionals, who involve in financial transaction (e.g. accountants 
or lawyers), from failing to report SARs of their clients; Janet Ulph and Ian Smith, The Illicit Trade 
in Art and Antiquities: International Recovery and Criminal and Civil Liability (Hart 2012) 113. 
267 Under the POCA 2002, nominated officers are persons who the financial institutions have posi-
tioned to receive internal disclosure or report from other members of staff of suspected money laun-
dering now was referred to as Money Laundering Reporting Officers (MLROs). Some staff of finan-
cial institutions e.g. the individual trader or cashier at banking counter were required to report to the 
MLROs when they suspect their customer in relation to money laundering; see also R C H Alexander, 
Insider Dealing and Money Laundering in the EU: Law and Regulation (Ashgate 2007) 167; Failure 
to disclosure to the NCA by nominated officer in the regulated sector;      s 332 of the Proceeds of 
Crime Act 2002. 
268 Alexander (n 268) 167; POCA 2001 s 330 (4); see also HM Treasury, ‘Bills and Legislation’ (5 
June 2013) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/preventing-money-laundering/prevent-
ing-money-laundering> accessed 25 February 2017. 
269 HM Treasury, A New Approach to Financial Regulation: Building a Stronger System (HM Treas-
ury 2011) 72. 
270 The Regulation 36 of Money Laundering Regulations 2007. 
271 The Regulation 42 of Money Laundering Regulations 2007. 
272 Part 7 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002: Money Laundering Offences; Part 3 of the Terrorism 
Act 2000: Terrorist Property.  
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MLRs 2007’s requirements were claimed by the obliged entities that they are costly, 
unnecessary, and complicated processes.273 Consequently, the British Bankers ’As-
sociation paid £5bn annually to comply with such anti-money laundering legisla-
tion.274  
 The Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Infor-
mation on the Payer) Regulations 2017 (MLRs 2017)275 replaced the Money Laun-
dering Regulations 2007, including the Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) 
Regulations 2007 and force on 26 June 2017. Kirby states that the UK Government 
require to enhance data sharing between FIUs effectively.276 Therefore, the UK Gov-
ernment transposed the European Union’s fourth Directive on Money Laundering 
into its domestic regulations to enhance and bridge the 2007 MLRs ’gaps. The trans-
position increased more prescriptive policy of AML risk assessment, strengthened 
risk mitigation policies (e.g. positioning an official board member into account of 
MLRs 2017, and enhanced customer due diligence (CDD) procedures and recording 
keeping system, and screening agents and training staff more effectively).277 In ad-
dition, the level of due diligence would be required to be more restrictive rather than 
MLRs 2007. The relevant persons278 must consider their customer and geographical 
                                                 
273 Harrison and Ryder (n 6) 224. 
274 Based on consultation with major banks; see also British Bankers’ Association (BBA), ‘Response 
to cutting red tape review the effectiveness of the UK’s AML regime’ (10 November 2015, page 2) 
<https://www.bba.org.uk/policy/bba-consultation-responses/bba-response-to-cutting-red-tape-re-
view-effectiveness-of-the-uks-aml-regime/> accessed 4 March 2017; see also Home Office and HM 
Treasury (n 36) 12. 
275 The Money Laundering, Terrorist financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) 
Regulations 2017 (2017 No. 692). 
276 Simon Kirby, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, commented in the House of Common on 
28 March 2017; see HC Deb 28 March 2017, vol 624, col 567W. 
277 Thomas Webb, ‘Money Laundering Regulations 2017 now in force: what you need to know’ 
(Burges Salmon, 29 June 2017)<https://www.burges-salmon.com/news-and-insight/legal-up-
dates/money-laundering-regulations-2017/?utm_source=mailout&utm_medium=email&utm_con-
tent=BS_logo&utm_campaign=New_MLR_2017> accessed 30 June 2017. 
278 ‘Relevant persons’ remain the same as under the MLRs 2007, but the MLRs 2017 includes ‘all 
gambling providers’ rather than simply holders of a casino operating licence, as under the previous 
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risk issues when making a decision of providing simplified due diligence because 
the MLRs 2017 will create of a ‘blacklist’279 of high-risk countries, which related to 
transaction activities. The 2017 Regulations also add the local PEPs who have 
worked for the public both in the UK and overseas, but the MLRs 2007 merely iden-
tified the foreign PEPs.280 It illustrates quite a wider scope than the previous Regu-
lations. The CDD plays a significant role in these Regulations; therefore, the third 
party must provide such received CDD information, which includes the customer 
and/or its beneficial owner in two working days. Finally, the Regulations create a 
new criminal offence for any person who makes a statement in respect of money 
laundering, which can be a fine or up to two years ’imprisonment or both. 
 The businesses in control of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, 
POCA 2002, MLRs 2017, and the new JMLSG and FCA guidance281 were impacted 
and pressured by such regulations to deal with risk-assessments of money launder-
ing. For example, the businesses must adapt their business procedures, functions, 
roles and control to comply with the requirements. The UK Government believes 
that the ability of all supervisors to impose civil, administrative and criminal sanc-
tions is a significant hindrance and encourages regulated sectors to comply with the 
regulations.282 
                                                 
regulations. The new Regulations also provide the greater rules in relation to the transparency of 
beneficiaries in their trusts.   
279 ‘Blacklist’ under the Money Laundering Regulations 2017 is created for high risk jurisdictions 
which, if involved in an activity or transaction, conducts improved the level of due diligence and 
further risk assessment compliance. The Regulations cover for both foreign and UK Politically ex-
posed persons (PEPs) i.e. those with well-known or famous public functions. 
280 Money Laundering Regulation 2007. 
281 The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and JMLSG aim to improve the understanding of the 
SARs; the FCA also has a power to impose financial sanctions on all reporting entities which fail to 
comply with the SARs requirements. 
282 HM Treasury, ‘Consultation outcome: Money Laundering Regulations 2017: consultation’ (26 
June 2017) <https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/money-laundering-regulations-
2017/money-laundering-regulations-2017> accessed 2 July 2017. 
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 The legislation affects the relevant person, not only just business firms in 
relation to their due diligence and suspicious activity reports (SARs) because the 
firms have to create an autonomous audit function and a board member to take into 
account in compliance with the MLRs 2017. There are a lot of burdens and liabilities 
for all firms that can cause the defensive reporting, level of compliance cost in the 
SAR regime, including the improvement of the sufficient knowledge of the firm’s 
money laundering and terrorism financing risk exposure. However, the UK has trans-
pose the 6MLD into the MLRs 2020, which focus on criminal offences and criminal 
activity, including the minimum term is determined for more than six months with 
graver cases calling for a punishment of a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 
four years.283 
 Sections 330 to 332 of the POCA 2002 constitute the regulated sector of-
fences284 that are enabled to punish any person or organisation falling within such 
regulated sector on conviction by a maximum of five years’ imprisonment and/or a 
fine if they fail to disclose to the NCA.285 Such legislation determines that if anyone 
in the regulated sector knows (subjective or constructive knowledge)286 or suspects, 
or there are reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting from any information 
gained in their business, identifying another person involved in any money launder-
ing (including attempted actions), they must as soon as possible make a disclosure 
or report to the NCA. 
                                                 
283 Planet Compliance, ‘6MLD – The EU’s 6th Anti-Money Laundering Directive in a Nutshell’ (10 
February 2020) <https://www.planetcompliance.com/2020/02/10/6mld-the-eus-6th-anti-money-
laundering-directive-in-a-nutshell/> accessed 24 December 2020.  
284 The regulated sector includes banks, insurance companies and other financial institutions (FIs). 
285 Sections 327 to 329 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. 
286 Doug Hopton, Money Laundering: A Concise Guide for All Business (Gower 2006) 55, 56. 
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 In consequence, the FIUs tend to adopt a defensive method of reporting the 
suspicion rather than the real suspicions.287 Nevertheless, the suspicion is a signifi-
cant factor for money laundering offence, and the reporters of SARs must understand 
its meaning to make a quality of SARs submitting to the NCA.288 Therefore, the re-
porters should submit the SARs with the independent decision and understand the 
meaning of suspicion. Levi and Reuter comment that it is difficult to evaluate the 
reason for the suspicion without inquiring or interviewing and sometimes the inter-
viewer (i.e. bank staff) may be charged with tipping off offence. Therefore, the ex-
pectations of high prosecution, conviction and/or criminal asset output from SARs 
can be unavailable, even without defensive reporting.289 
 The relevant person should realise the terms suspect, suspicion, reasonable 
grounds to suspect, and reasonable cause to suspect.290  The Joint Money Laundering 
Steering Group (JMLSG) explains that suspicion becomes more subjective and 
inadequate proof relied on substantial evidence.291 Furthermore, the JMLSG also 
                                                 
287 Michael Levi and Peter Reuter ‘Money Laundering ’(2006) 34(1) Crime and Justice 289, 301. 
288 According to the 1995 Walker report determined the suspicious transactions in Australia with a 
face worth of Australian $51m, but it was considerably lower than the amount of money laundering 
which was Australian $3.5bn; see John Robert Walker, ‘The Extent of Money Laundering in and 
through Australia in 2004’ John Rebert Walker Crime Trends Analysis, Report for AUSTRAC, at 78 
<www.criminologyresearchcouncil.gov.au/reports/200304-33.pdf> accessed 13 July 2017; see also 
Jonathan Fisher, ‘The anti-money laundering disclosure regime and the collection of revenue in the 
United Kingdom’ (2010) 3 British Tax Review 235, 237. 
289 Levi and Reuter (n 28) 289, 335. 
290 Section 340(3) defines term ‘criminal property’ as the property, which represents an advantage 
from criminal conduct. The money launderer committed the illegal activity (such as transferring, con-
cealing) knowing or suspecting that such a property obtained from illegal conduct. For example, in R 
v IK [2007] EWCA Crim 491 the Court considered the proceeds of cheating the revenue could be the 
‘criminal property’. In R v Anwoir [2008] 2 Cr. App. R 36, the Court identified that criminal property 
could be obtain from criminal conduct, such as fraud, drug-trafficking; see Rudi Fortson, ‘ Money 
laundering offences under POCA 2002’ in William Blair and Richard Brent (eds), Banks and Finan-
cial Crime: The International Law of Tainted Money (Oxford 2008) 167. 
291 Chapter 6 of the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group (JMLSG), Guidance for the UK Finan-
cial Sector: Part 1 (JMLSG 2017) 160. 
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cited that the term suspicion was determined by the court in the context of the Crim-
inal Justice Act 1988292 because there is no definition for this term ‘suspicion ’in the 
POCA 2002 or MLRs 2017.293 In R v Da Silva, Longmore LJ, the Judge of the Court 
of Appeal described that it is a possibility294 which is more than imaginative or fan-
ciful with concerning facts exist while an unclear feeling of anxiety or discontent 
would not be enough.295 Then the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) also implemented 
the interpretation of such ‘suspicion ’in the case of Da Silva to POCA 2002 in the 
case of K Ltd v National Westminster Bank, HMRC, SOCA.296 The financial institu-
tions are able to apply to the Court of Appeal’s decision in K Ltd to defend them-
selves from a breach of their contractual obligations to their clients.297 
 In addition, this concept was confirmed by the Court of Appeal decision in 
the case of the Shah and another v HSBC Private Bank (UK) Ltd.298 Therefore, the 
relevant persons must realise that it is not crucial for the term ‘suspicion ’to be clear 
or definitely grounded on particular truths or facts. The term ‘suspicion ’should be 
consistent with a degree of content, not essentially whole belief, but it should be 
beyond a guess.299 The members of staff of the reporting entities should report to the 
                                                 
292 In R v Da Silva [2007] 1 WLR 303, the Court of Appeal had a decision to convict under section 
93A(1)(a) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (CJA) that there was a possibility, which was more than 
imaginary or fanciful, when the other person was engaged or had been involved in or had advantaged 
from proceeds of criminal conduct. 
293 There is no statutory definition of the term suspicion, only guidance from the case law (i.e. R v Da 
Silva [2006] EWCA Crim 1654); Chambers Dictionary defines suspicion as the ‘act of suspecting; 
the state of being suspected; the imagining of something without evidence or on slender evidence; an 
inkling; mistrust; see also CM Schwarz, ‘The Chambers Dictionary’ (Chambers 2015)  
<http://search.credoreference.com/content/title/chambdict?alpha=S&page=384> accessed 21 August 
2017.  
294 [2006] EWCA Crim 1654; see also R v Gillard (1988) 87 Cr App R 189; R v Hall (1985) 81 Cr 
App R 260.  
295 [2006] EWCA Crim 1654. 
296 [2006] EWCA Civ 1039, para 16; see also Fortson (n 291) 171. 
297 ibid 183. 
298 [2010] EWCA Civ 31. 
299 Jon Gale, ‘Reporting obligations under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002: guide for financial insti-
tutions’ (Practical Law) <https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/Docu-
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nominated officer if they have a suspicion of whether a customer’s conduct is rea-
sonable. Consequently, there are a great number of inappropriate SARs on the NCA 
because of the fear of the financial sanctions.300  
 Similar to Thailand Anti-Money Laundering Act B.E. 2542 (AMLA 1999), 
the term suspicious transaction refers to a transaction with reasonable grounds to 
believe that it is committed to refrain from compliance with the AMLA 1999 or even 
committed by only single transaction or series of transactions, including attempts to 
transfer.301 Under the AMLA 1999, the commission of any actions that concern or 
may concern with the action of predicate offences of money laundering or financing 
terrorism.302 The next section represents discussion on the UK FIU model. 
 
4.5.1 National Crime Agency   
 The NCA has the power to lead UK police forces and law enforcement agen-
cies to undertake specific operational tasks to combat and eliminate organised 
crime.303 NCA officers may be entitled to ‘one or more of the powers and privileges 
of a constable, powers of a customs officer, and powers of an immigration officer 










cessed 3 July 2017. 
300 Ryder (n 96) 635, 649. 
301 Section 3 (21) para 4 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act B.E. 2542 (1999). 
302 Section 3 (21) para 4 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act B.E. 2542 (1999). 
303 National Crime Agency (NCA) ‘About the NCA’ <http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/> ac-
cessed 19 August 2016. 
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(triple warranted).’304 The NCA is not related to the role of a government (a non-
ministerial government department).305  
 The NCA’s roles and responsibilities relate to the submission of SARs. The 
NCA disseminates intelligence to relevant LEAs for money laundering investiga-
tions, monetary fines, conviction, custodial sentence, and confiscation order.306 The 
NCA deals with monitoring compliance with anti-money laundering regulations and 
the SARs regime. The NCA receives, analyses, changes the SARs into intelligence 
information, and then delivers to the involved law enforcement agencies, excluding 
criminal investigation and prosecutorial powers.307 The NCA plays an important in-
dependent role with its budget, and acts as a bridge and mediator between the SARs 
entities and relevant law enforcement authorities.308 
 The NCA receives, analyses and evaluates suspicious activity reports 
(SARs),309  including other information relating to money laundering, associated 
                                                 
304 National Crime Agency (NCA) ‘how we are run’ http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/about-
us/how-we-are-run accessed 19 August 2016. 
305 ibid. 
306 The NCA receives 404,735 SARs in 2015; National Crime Agency (NCA), National Crime 
Agency Annual Report and Accounts 2015-16 (Williams Lea Group 2016) 23. 
307 International Monetary Fund and World Bank (n 41) 10. 
308 Ueda (n 209); see also Ping (n 209) 252, 252. 
309 The SARs information presents the awareness of law enforcement internally and globally to pos-
sible money laundering (or terrorist financing) as well as construct a better apprehending of criminal 
risks to the country; see National Crime Agency (NCA) ‘Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) Annual 
Report 2015 ’ (page 5) <http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/677-sars-annual-re-
port-2015/file> accessed 21 November 2016; The UK Drug Trafficking Offences Act of 1986, which 
initially set the laundering of proceeds of drug trafficking as a criminal offence SARs regime, has 
been obliged to present the SARs as  soon as is practical; Persons and all firms in the regulated sector 
are obliged under Part 7 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) and the Terrorism Act 2000 
(TACT) regarding to SARs regulation; see also Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) ‘Submit-
ting a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) within the Regulated Sector’ (November 2012) page 2 
<http://www.aat-interactive.org.uk/cpdmp3/The%20Professional/Submit-
ting_a_SAR_Within_the_Regulated_Sector_November_2012_1_1.pdf> accessed 20 November 
2016; the Criminal Justice Act 1993 (CJA) implemented the 1991 EC Directive on the Prevention of 
the use of the Financial System for Purpose of Money Laundering (the First Money Laundering Di-
rective 1991). Under s 18 of this 1993 Act, also determines the individual and entity to report the 
SARs perspective of drug money laundering to UK FIU; see the Criminal Justice Act 1993, s 18; see 
also Money Laundering Regulations 2007, Regulation 14 and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, s 7.  
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predicate offences and financing of terrorism that were submitted by reporting enti-
ties, i.e., firms, individuals, designated professionals across the financial sector,310 
then disseminating valuable intelligence information to the anti-money laundering 
competent authorities.311 The NCA works as the intermediary or administrative-
model FIUs similar to the USA FIU (FinCEN) and Australia FIU (AUSTRAC) that 
demonstrate itself as a buffer between the reporting entities (i.e. private sector) and 
relevant law authorities (e.g. police forces and public prosecutor).312 SARs also de-
tect and disrupt money laundering and predicate offences as well.313 The fourth Eu-
ropean Union Anti-Money Laundering Directive (EU Directive), the Financial Ac-
tion Task Force (FATF), the 2012 Recommendations, as well as the new FATF eval-
uation methodology require a re-examination of the model and the effectiveness of 
the UK SAR Regime through the operation of the NCA under its Economic Crime 
Command for increasing the enhancement for the Home Office efficiently.314  
 The regulated sector is subjected to the AML regulations to report any suspi-
cious activities to the UK FIU, the NCA, but such reports may often not be acted 
upon because the NCA receives an excessive amount of inappropriate infor-
mation.315 Also, the legislation does not identify the minimum worth of suspicious 
transactions to report to the NCA.316 This may cause banks to apply improper criteria 
                                                 
310 HM Treasury and Home Office (n 55) 6. 
311  Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, ‘Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs)’ 
<http://www.egmontgroup.org/about/financial-intelligence-units-fius > accessed 19 November 2016. 
312 The US’s FIU is Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN); see Gilmore (n 50) 82. 
313 National Crime Agency (NCA), ‘ UK Financial Intelligence Unit: How SARs are used to detect 
crime ’ <http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-do/economic-crime/UK FIU> 
accessed 20 November 2016. 
314 National Crime Agency (n 245). 
315 Unger (n 48) 35. 
316 Mary Munford, ‘Reporting suspicions of money laundering and terrorist financing: spotlight on 
France ’International Compliance Association (ICA) (9 March 2016) <https://www.int-comp.org/in-
sight/2016/march/09/reporting-suspicions-of-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-spotlight-
on-france/> accessed 6 January 2017. 
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for reporting the SARs (i.e. defensive reporting).317 In addition, the regulated sector 
deals with the customers and the AML compliance,318 which can cause a high cost 
of the reporting entities.319 In consequence, all firms submit the SARs with defensive 
reporting because of the fear of unlimited financial sanctions if they fail to comply 
with the POCA 2002.320 They have submitted inappropriate transaction reports to the 
NCA321 which may make the NCA’s competence in fighting money laundering un-
successful.322  
 This thesis illustrates that the 2017 MLRs, POCA 2002 and Terrorism Act 
2000 goes beyond the FATF requirements.323  The FCA Handbook and JMLSG 
Guidance are the main instruments to help the relevant persons (e.g. reporting enti-
ties) understand implementing such legislation effectively. Furthermore, Regulation 
104 of the MLRs 2017 determines that the NCA must also provide proper feedback 
on the disclosure of suspicious activity at least once a year. Similarly, Thailand im-
plements the FATF standards, but still lacks the effective AML legislation and led 
to the FATF punishment in 2012. 
                                                 
317 ibid 97. 
318 John Broome, Anti-Money Laundering, International Practice and Policies (Sweet and Maxwell 
2005). 
319 Kathleen A Lacey and Barbara Crutchfield George, ‘Crackdown on money laundering: a compar-
ative analysis of the feasibility and effectiveness of domestic and multilateral policy reforms’, (2003) 
23(2) (Winter)  Northwestern Journal of Law and Business 263, 304; see Lloyds Bank v The Chartered 
Bank of India, Australia and China [1992] 1 KB 40, 73 per Sankey LJ; see also Fred Hobson, ‘Intro-
duction: Banks and Money Laundering’ in William Blair and Richard Brent (eds) Banks and Finan-
cial Crime: The International Law Tainted Money (Oxford University Press 2008) 8.  
320 Ryder (n 8) 63. 
321 Jun Tang Lishan Ai, ‘Combating money laundering in transition countries: the inherent limitations 
and practical issues ’(2010) 13(3) Journal of Money Laundering Control 215, 222. 
322 Mohammed Ahmad Naheem, ‘HSBC Swiss bank accounts-AML compliance and money launder-
ing implications ’(2015) 23(3) Journal of Money Laundering Control 285, 294. 
323 Ryder (n 8) 258; see also Financial Conduct Authority (n 7). 
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 The SARs is a regulated sector’s disclosure, which is submitted by their 
money laundering reporting officer (MLRO)324 after collecting and deeming an in-
ternal disclosure, then applying to the NCA.325 The POCA 2002 does not indicate 
the term of SAR, but it instead indicates the term of the disclosure.326 The MLRO 
has a right with an independent decision under s 331 or s 332 of POCA 2002 to 
consider and submit their internal disclosure to the NCA.327 The POCA 2002 does 
not impose the penalty to the regulated sector who submits poor reporting quality or 
too many suspicious transaction reports (SARs) to the NCA.  
 The SARs can assist in detecting and preventing a money laundering regime, 
but it can cause problems to all involved. For example, all reporting entities impact 
the unnecessary financial burden of SARs reporting and AML compliance costs. 
They may submit poor reporting quality to the NCA because of the fear of financial 
sanctions,328 which also causes the delayed feedback on the SARs from the NCA 
(more than eight working days from the day after submission of the SAR).329 Fur-
thermore, where the NCA gives consent but there is not any response for 31 calendar 
                                                 
324 Regulated Sector appoints an MLRO under s 331 (failure to disclosure: nominated officers in the 
regulated sector) or 332 (failure to disclose: other nominated officers) of Part 7 of the POCA 2002. 
325 Robin Booth, Simon Farrell, Guy Bastable and Nicholas Yeo, Money Laundering Law and Regu-
lation: A Practical Guide (Oxford University Press 2011) 104. 
326 Part 7 of POCA 2002; see also Alhosani (n 42) 264. 
327 Booth, Farrell, Bastable and Yeo (n 288) 104. 
328 The poor quality of SARs illustrates a lack of understanding or obligation with the rules and POCA 
2002 by the submitter. For example, the SARs from the estate agency sector, the NCA indicate that 
SARs lacked clarity in their reason for reporting and a lack of general understanding of the need and 
objective of SARs reporting; see also HM Treasury and Home Office (n 55) 45, 55;  From October 
2014-September 2015, the NCA received the 381,882 SARs (increasing by 7.82% on the previous 
year from 354,186 in 2013/14; by 83.39% SARs submitted from the banking sector); see National 
Crime Agency (n 245); see National Crime Agency (NCA),‘  Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) 
Annual Report 2014 ’(December 2014) <http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/464-
2014-sars-annual-report/file> accessed 21 November 2016. 
329 The NCA identified that the average returned time for response to reporters for all consent requests 
was 4.7 day (increasing o the last year’s reported turnaround of 4.3 days; see National Crime Agency 
(n 245); The SOCA produced its bulletin to communicate its commitment to sharing perspectives on 
the SARs Regime; see also Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) ‘ Suspicious Activity Reports 
(SARs) – Top Ten Tips for the Accountancy Sector ’(Financial Intelligence Unit (UK FIU) Bulletin, 
2011) 6 <https://www.icaew.com/-/media/corporate/files/technical/legal-and-regulatory/money-
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days from the NCA’s refusal (i.e. the ‘moratorium period’) in order to permit rele-
vant law authorities time to analyse and collect related evidence to resolve whether 
additional action, e.g. restraint of the funds, is suitable.330  
 Stessens argues that the NCA’s feedback is highly advantageous to the mu-
tual collaboration among the reporting entities, relevant authorities, including the 
NCA itself in that they grant the reporting entities information on the consequence 
of their action.331 Furthermore, the feedback can be useful for allowing reporting en-
tities to better train their staff as to which activities and transactions are suspicious, 
especially producing compliance officers of reporting entities with information and 
results that create the potential for them to clarify reports compiled by staff that are 
not meaningful and significant.332 The feedback brings about more efficiency and 
effectiveness of the FIUs and the reporting entities.  
 The NCA received over 380,000 SARs in 2016, and 463,938 SARs between 
2017 and 2018,333 but the NCA does not have the essential resources to make suffi-
cient intelligence information to investigate all the suspicions appropriately.334 For 
example, now the NCA cannot withhold consent to proceed with a transaction be-
yond 31 days after the initial day of the refusal of the consent.335 To fulfil the prin-
cipal role of the NCA in the operation of the consent regime and the quality of SARs, 
the lack of feedback from the NCA and the law enforcement agencies should be 
                                                 
laundering/20110419-f1a420n-top-10-tips-for-accountancy-sector-v10.ashx?la=en> accessed 20 No-
vember 2016. 
330 National Crime Agency (n 245). 
331 Stessens (n 194) 192. 
332 ibid. 
333 National Crime Agency (NCA), Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) Annual Report 2018 (NCA 
2018) 3.  
334 Jonathan Fisher, ‘Criminal finances’ (Counsel, 2017) <https://www.counselmagazine.co.uk/arti-
cles/criminal-finances> accessed 19 August 2017.  
335 Section 335(6) of Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. 
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resolved and improved.336 The NCA, which is responsible for SARs, provides ‘very 
limited feedback ’to all reporting sectors in respect of particular SARs that are filed. 
They are required to submit a disclosure to the NCA when the information arrives, 
or when sometimes the workload of the NCA to analyse the SARs can delay their 
feedback to the reporters.337  
 The UK government determined several competent authorities to deal with 
financial crime, in particular in relation to money laundering. Then in 2013, due to 
the less criminal conviction of serious organised crime,338 the NCA replaced the 
SOCA to control the money laundering regime.339 The NCA’s analysis and evalua-
tion of the SARs can identify the money laundering of typologies, techniques and 
trends, which can assist the entities to prevent them from being fine and improve 
their reputation from the money laundering regime.340 The NCA received a total of 
                                                 
336 Booth, Farrell, Bastable and Yeo (n 326) 22. 
337 POCA 2002, s 331(4); see Hobson (n 320) 12. 
338 The SOCA seized £8m in 2011, but in 2012 it seized only £4.2m; and then in 2013, it confiscated 
only £1.5m of cash seizures; see also Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), Annual Report and 
Accounts 2011/12 (HM’s stationary Office 2012); Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), Annual 
Report and Accounts 2012/13 (HM’s Stationary Office 2013); see also Serious Organised Crime 
Agency (n 253) 9; The SOCA was also accused of delaying its feedback to the regulated institutions 
that may cause a barrier to all firms; see also Christopher Recker, ‘The National Crime Agency: A 
critical analysis of its potential impact on the UK’s financial crime policy’ in Nicholas Ryder, Jon 
Tucker and Umut Turksen (eds), The Financial Crisis and White Collar Crime – Legislative and 
Policy Response: A Critical Assessment (Routledge 2017) 309; SOCA paid £15 for every £1 confis-
cated, an extraordinarily less response, but indicative of the ease with which gangs can hide the crim-
inal proceeds; see also Philip Johnston, ‘The National Crime Agency: does Britain need an FBI?’ 
(Telegraph, 7 October 2013) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-or-
der/10361009/The-National-Crime-Agency-Does-Britain-need-an-FBI.html> accessed 6 March 
2017. 
339 On 7 October 2013 the NCA, as non-ministerial government department, replaced the SOCA to 
lead the UKs fight to cut serious and organised crime. Because the failures of SOCA included the 
poor management and its staff had low investigation skills; see also Serious Organised Crime Agency 
(SOCA) ‘United Kingdom Financial Intelligence Unit (UK FIU) ’<https://www.lawscot.org.uk/me-
dia/228174/Overview_of_UK_Financial_Intelligence_Unit.pdf> accessed 20 November 2016; see 
National Crime Agency (NCA) ‘ How are we run ’ (November 2016)  <http://nationalcri-
meagency.gov.uk/about-us/how-we-are-run>  accessed 21 November 2016. 
340 Valsamis Mitsilegas, ‘Book Review: A Comparative Guide to Anti-Money Laundering: A Critical 
Analysis of Systems in Singapore, Switzerland, the UK and the USA’ (2007) 17(3) International 
Criminal Justice Review 253, 254. 
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381,882 SARs between October 2014 and September 2015.341 The ELMER, the da-
tabase for SARs, becomes a weak calibre to fight against money laundering, which 
may cause high risks to the efficiency of the NCA.342  
 Furthermore, a large number of SARs submitting to the NCA does not 
indicate a higher quality of the SARs or the proportions of prosecutions or 
convictions of money laundering. For example, in the UK in 2015, there were 
381,882 increasing from 354,186 in 2014. There were convictions per SAR 
presented at 0.13 per cent in 2004.343 Similar to Thailand, there were 13,963 suspi-
cious transaction reports (STRs), but there were only 139 prosecutions and 90 con-
victions in 2013-2014.344  
 The NCA grants consent in 90% of the cases. However, it is significant to 
note that more than 50 per cent of the requests of case consents were adverted and 
referred to other authorities or law enforcement authorities such as the HMRC, which 
often cause delays in the SAR consent procedure of about 42 days.345 The SARs 
regime would work more effectively and productively if the public and private sector 
bodies were to work and communicate together constructively.346 For example, the 
establishment of the Money Laundering Advisory Committee (MLAC), a high-level 
advisory group consisting of the representative of the various public and private sec-
tor organisations (e.g. the Home Office, HM Treasury, UK FIU, police, HMRC, 
                                                 
341 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Annual Report 2015-2016 (FATF/OECD) 2017. 
342 HM Treasury and Home Office (n 55) 6. 
343 Verhage (n 174) 150; see also Jackie Harvey, ‘Just how effective is money laundering legislation?’ 
(2008) 21(3) Security Journal 189, 198. 
344  Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO), Annual Report 2014 of Anti-Money Laundering Office 
(AMLO 2015) 36. 
345 In respect of the disclosure under the Terrorism Act 2000, the Act does not determine the deadlines 
for the FIU to respond to a request for consent; see Brent and Blair (n 183) 274; see also Andrew 
Campbell and Elise Campbell, ‘Money laundering and consent regime in the United Kingdom – time 
for change?’ in Barry Rider (ed) Research Handbook on International Financial Crime (Edward El-
gar 2015) 492. 
346 Booth, Farrell, Bastable and Yeo (n 326) 24. 
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NCA, CPS, the Law Society, BBA, JMLSG and RICS), could improve the UKs 
AML policy by publishing a money laundering strategy document named the ‘Fi-
nancial Challenge to Crime and Terrorism’.347 Furthermore, the HMRC launched its 
guidance on its website in 2010 to assist money service businesses, high-value deal-
ers and the trusts or firms service providers. The JMLSG also published money laun-
dering guidance to help the financial sector to interpret the UK money laundering 
regulations since 1990.  
 The NCA revised the SAR glossary codes,348 guidance booklet details for 
enhancement of the quality of SAR.349 In September and October 2015, the Home 
Office and the NCA set the principle for consultation with relevant stakeholders350 
in order to enhance SARs regime that could promote the protection of money laun-
dering.351 Moreover, the UK government established the Joint Financial Analysis 
Centre (JFAC) consisting of the NCA, HMRC, SFO, and FCA purposely to respond 
to the leaked Panama Papers data via criminal intelligence for investigations.352 In 
consequence, the Criminal Finances Act 2017 (CFA) extends the moratorium period 
                                                 
347 The MLAC’s objectives are to oversee the implementation of the 2007 Financial Crime Strategy, 
reconsider the UK’s AML policies and enable better cooperation of the UK’s AML regime; see Booth, 
Farrell, Bastable and Yeo (n 326) 25. 
348 National Crime Agency (NCA) ‘Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) Glossary Codes and Reporting 
Routes (1 October 2016) <http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/725-sar-glossary-
code-and-reporting-routes/file> accessed 21 November 2016. 
349 National Crime Agency (NCA), ‘UK Financial Intelligence Unit: Revised SAR Glossary Codes ’
<http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-do/economic-crime/UK FIU> accessed 
20 November 2016. 
350 Now the stakeholders who use the SARs are a law enforcement authority and relevant government 
agency (e.g. Her Majesty’ s Revenue & Customs (HMRC) or local police; see also National Crime 
Agency (NCA) ‘ The SARs regime ’ <www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-do/eco-
nomic-crime/UK FIU/the-sars-regime> accessed 21 November 2016. 
351 The Royal United Services Institute Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies, which is the 
world’s oldest independent think tank on the international defence and security (i.e., founded in 1831), 
organised this event; see also National Crime Agency (n 245); see also Royal United Services Institute 
(RUSI), ‘About RUSI’ <https://rusi.org/about-rusi>  accessed 26 September 2017. 
352 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 57. 
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from 31 days up to a total of 186 days (i.e. from the end of the initial 31 day mora-
torium period) to allow relevant authorities more time for investigative proce-
dures.353 The UK Court has to take into account its decision to this Act. The exten-
sion of the SAR moratorium period for further than 31 days can increase a more 
effective law enforcement response as fundamental to handling money laundering. 
According to the Criminal Finances Act 2017, the reporting entities face the regu-
lated burdens in dealing with customer expectations and the risk of tipping off of-
fences.  
 To assure the operational independence of the UKFIU, the UK has the ‘NCA 
Remuneration Review Body ’(NCARRB), which was founded to review and suggest 
the UK government regarding the pay, salary, and allowances of NCA officers des-
ignated with autonomous operational powers.354 Consequently, this department il-
lustrates that the UK firmly supports the operational independence of the NCA in 
fighting money laundering efficiently.  
 
 4.6 Evaluation of NCA’s Implementation of AML policy of the United King-
dom  
 The NCA plays an effective role as the FIU role aiming to lead and coordinate 
the response to ML/TF through the SARs regime (i.e. receiving, analysing and dis-
seminating information) in line with national statutory mandate.355 As mentioned 
                                                 
353 However the moratorium period cannot total more than 186 days beginning after the end of the 
starting 31 day period; see Neil Gerrard, Caroline Black, Sam Aldous and Timothy Bowden, ‘The 
UK’s New Suspicious Activity Reporting Regime: Part 1’ (Law360, 22 June 2017) 
<https://www.law360.com/articles/937558/the-uk-s-new-suspicious-activity-reporting-regime-part-
1> accessed 19 August 2017. 
354   National Crime Agency (NCA), Annual Report and Account 2014-15 (Williams Lea Group 2015) 
34 <http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/about-us> accessed 18 February 2016. 
355 Furthermore, the REs also report SARs under the TA 2000, ss.19(2), 19(7B), 21A(4); see Finan-
cial Action Task Force (n 2) 23, 222. 
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above, the NCA adopts an administrative-FIU model to operate its powers and re-
sponsibilities in dealing with SARs regime.356 The NCA is a non-ministerial govern-
ment body with operational independence, free from undue influence or interfer-
ence.357 Nevertheless, the FATF Recommendation 29 was rated ‘partially compli-
ant’. The NCA has a limited capacity to conduct operational analysis because of the 
large number of SARs, limited human and IT resources, as well as a lack of effective 
management of information from REs in order to obtain further information to ana-
lyse into intelligence.358  Furthermore, the UK also enacted Criminal Finances Act 
2017 imposing a new offence of failure to deal with the facilitation of tax evasion 
and empowers NCA to receive a further information order to oblige information re-
garding SARs from REs in order to alert reporting entities to take a proactive role in 
the protection of possible money laundering.359  
 The FATF does not determine the minimum amount of transactions to report 
to the FIUs.360 However, the SARs regime has caused the conflicts of interest be-
tween the regulators, clients, and financial firms in the SAR regime such as the var-
ious regulatory typologies, the standard level of financial firms ’compliance, and im-
plementation of concerns.361 For example, the financial institutions are stuck in the 
conflicts of interest between their legal regulations towards the AML agencies and 
responsibilities towards their customers.362 The anti-money laundering legislation 
requires financial institutions such as banks to investigate their customers, and this 
                                                 
356 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 23. 
357 ibid 224.  
358 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 225. 
359 ibid 52. 
360 Munford (n 317). 
361 Broome (n 319). 
362 Verhage (n 174) 5. 
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requirement causes an expensive managerial burden on the entities.363 In conse-
quence, the SARs regime has generated a cost of AML compliance and a rise in the 
number of unnecessary reports submitted to the NCA (i.e. ‘defensive reporting’),364 
while FIUs have attempted to reduce internal review staff expenses.365 Therefore, 
the AML laws can cause an impact assessment of the effect that such legislation 
could have on the costs of any obliged entities or business.366 The financial institu-
tions increase the defensive reporting and flaws in the interpretation of the term sus-
picion and the level of compliance cost to avoid punishment (e.g. financial sanction) 
from the NCA.367  
 The defensive reporting is a significant failure, which impacts the achieve-
ment of implementation of POCA 2002.368 In 2014, banks submitted 82.18 per cent 
of the total number of SARs filed,369 largely because they feared potential financial 
sanctions from the FCA for non-compliance.370 Therefore, some financial institu-
                                                 
363 Lacey and Crutchfield George (n 320) 263, 304; see also Lloyds Bank v The Chartered Bank of 
India, Australia and China [1992] 1 KB 40, 73 per Sankey LJ; see also Hobson (282) 8.  
364 Ryder (n 8) 164. 
365 Levi and Reuter (n 288) 289, 301. 
366 Explanatory Note of the Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Amendment) Regulations 
2019 <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2019/1511/made/data.pdf> accessed 3 December 2020.  
367 Criminal property means the alleged offender knows or suspects that the asset or property com-
poses or forms the benefits of a person’s illicit conduct. The knowledge must be a higher stage of 
certainty in the position of mental condition than belief and suspicion. Therefore, the knowledge is 
different from belief and suspicion); see Booth, Farrell, Bastable and Yeo (n 326) 45; see also Ryder 
(n 8) 63. 
368 Home Office and HM Treasury (n 36) 39. 
369 In 2014, the suspicious reporting in the UK increased by 7.8% to 381,882; see Munford (n 317); 
see also National Crime Agency (n 304). 
370 The firms ’attitudes towards AML legislation identified that the large majority of them complied 
with the AML regulations not because they accept or obtain it from the best practice, but only because 
of the fear of financial penalties; see also Ryder (n 96) 635, 647.  See for example Financial Conduct 
Authority ‘FCA fines Deutsche Bank £163 million for serious anti-money laundering controls fail-
ings’, January 31 2017, available from https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-fines-
deutsche-bank-163-million-anti-money-laundering-controls-failure, accessed November 11 2020. 
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tions submit an invaluable report to the NCA by impunity motivation (i.e., the pen-
alties for failure to submit the suspicious report).371 Some entities are tending to im-
plement the defensive reporting policy.372 Thus, focusing on AML regulations can 
bring about to maximise the defensive reporting, which may overwhelm the NCA 
and finally diminish their competence.373 For addressing defensive reporting, the 
government agencies and financial institutions must acknowledge their stakeholders 
concerning with AML risk and the compliance of the AML regulations to report the 
genuine suspicion rather than concerns regarding a failure to comply with POCA 
2002.374 As the reason mentioned above, this Act also encourages the regulated sec-
tor to raise a more acknowledged way to analyse only a genuine SAR rather than 
defensive reporting as ‘a belt and braces ’measure.375  
 Therefore, all firms are required to prove that their customers have the 
knowledge and understand the risks concerned when making transaction in the fi-
nancial system.376 Finally, the AML compliance costs should be reduced.377 The 
NCA had better realise and address these issues. Accordingly, the government 
should solve such issues, including the unnecessary financial burden problems to the 
relevant private sectors by managing and reducing unnecessary bureaucracy under 
Part 7 of the POCA 2002,378 increasing in cooperating and sharing international FIUs 
                                                 
371 Tang Lishan Ai (n 322) 215, 222. 
372 Barry Rider, ‘Don’t panic ’(2016) Company Lawyer 1, 2. 
373 Ahmad Naheem (n323) 285, 294. 
374 Jonathan R Macey, ‘ Agency theory and the criminal liability of corporations ’ Yale Law School, 
Faculty Scholarship Series Paper 1716 (1991) 315, 339 <http://digitalcom-
mons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2726&context=fss_papers> accessed 9 January 
2017. 
375 Gerrard, Black, Aldous and Bowden (n 354).  
376 Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), FCA Risk Outlook 2014 (FCA 2014) 46. 
377 Ryder (n 96) 635, 645.  
378 Consent regime means the process that the POCA 2002 permits individuals and private sector to 
use themselves of a defence against money laundering charges by finding the consent of the compe-
tent authorities (e.g., the FIU or the NCA) to commit a transaction or conduct other action about which 
they have concerns. The NCA make its decision to deny or allow consent in consultation with the 
relevant law enforcement authority; see also National Crime Agency (n 245) 42. 
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network intelligence (e.g. the European FIU system),379 developing fast-tracking ap-
proach to disseminate intelligence information to relevant law enforcement bodies 
to protect and prosecute potential launderer, as well as reviewing the SARs database 
(ELMER)380 and statistic system for identifying the typologies of money laundering 
accurately to assist the private sector when analysing their transactions.381 The im-
provement of an Anti-Money Laundering Action Plan is vital to enhance the SARs 
regime and the ability of the NCA.382 The UK Serious Crime Act 2015 now provides 
all reporters with legal immunity from civil liability when filing SARs in good faith 
in order to protect the regulated sector.383    
 In relation to operational independence, the UK’s MER stated that the 
UKFIU, structured in the NCA, is a non-ministerial government department and is 
operationally independent.384 The designation by the Director General of the NCA 
grants the authority for the UKFIU to operate its functions independent from any 
undue influence.385 However, the Head of the UKFIU is still appointed by the NCA 
Director Prosperity.386 The Head of the UKFIU is a senior manager within the NCA 
                                                 
379 National Crime Agency (n 245) 5. 
380 The UK FIU internal SARs database has been known as ELMER that there are approximately two 
million SARs on ELMER. The NCA will kept on ELMER for six years or until proven not to be 
connected with any crime; see National Crime Agency (NCA), ‘ the SARs regime ’<http://www.na-
tionalcrimeagency.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-do/economic-crime/UK FIU/the-sars-regime> accessed 
21 November 2016. 
381 National Crime Agency (NCA) ‘The value of SARs ’<www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/about-
us/what-we-do/economic-crime/UK FIU/the-sars-regime> accessed 21 November 2016. 
382 National Crime Agency (NCA) ‘NCA Annual Plan 2016-2017 ’ 
<http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/683-nca-annual-plan-2016-17> accessed 21 
November 2016. 
383 The Serious Crime Act 2015 received Royal Assent on the 3rd of March 2015, which modified the 
POCA 2002 in several ways as well as protection from civil liability for reporting entities conducting 
authorised internal disclosures in relation to money laundering; see also HM Treasury and Home 
Office (n 55) 6. 
384 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing 
Measures - United Kingdom Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report 224. 
 
385 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing 
Measures - United Kingdom Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report 224. 
386 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing 
Measures - United Kingdom Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report 224. 
CHAPTER FOUR: Analysis of Competent Authorities and Financial Intelligence Unit in United 
Kingdom 
195 
and makes decisions to analyse, request and/or disseminate information.387 When 
dealing with case that involves political sensitivities, high values, impact on the 
NCA’s reputation or carry a risk of legal challenge, the Head of the UKFIU can, but 
is not obliged to, refer the case NCA senior management. The FATF MER noted that 
the UKFIU has not sufficient independence from the NCA in determining its role or 
its priorities.388 Head of the UKFIU is able to sign, on his authority, non-binding 
MOUs with domestic competent authorities and its foreign counterparts.389  
 According to the 2018 FATF MER of the UK, it showed the assessment of the UK regarding 
the Recommendation 29 that was rated ‘partially compliant’ as the lack of appropriate independence 
of the UKFIU’s functions.390 As reasons mentioned above, the thesis noted that the insufficient re-
sources may impact on the UKFIU’ s independence, but it was not the big problem because the 
UKFIU has several best practice to support the independence of the UKFIU such as the JMLIT, 391 
and the SARs Regime Committee392 in line with the robust legal AML framework. Beside the respon-
sibility of development of the SARs regime, the SAR Regime Committee brings together representa-
tives from government agencies, law enforcement, AML supervisors, the Gambling AML Group, and 
the regulated sector in order to ensure that all decisions about the UKFIU (i.e. NCA), which could 
enhance the independence of the UKFIU.393 Unlike the Thailand AMLB, the JMLIT set as 
a taskforce located at the NECC, not similar to the Anti-Money Laundering Board 
(AMLB) in Thailand. The JMLIT has the powers to support the UKFIU in line with 
                                                 
387 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing 
Measures - United Kingdom Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report 224. 
388 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing 
Measures - United Kingdom Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report 224. 
389 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing 
Measures - United Kingdom Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report 224. 
390 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing 
Measures - United Kingdom Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (FATF 2018) 224. 
391 National Crime Agency (NCA), ‘National Economic Crime Centre’ <https://www.nationalcri-
meagency.gov.uk/what-we-do/national-economic-crime-centre?highlight=WyJqbWxpdCIsI-
idqbWxpdCJd> accessed 24 December 2020.  
392 National Crime Agency (NCA), Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) Annual Report 2017 (NCA 
2017) 42. 
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the UK POCA 2002, but the AMLB becomes the obstacle of the independence of 
the Thailand FIU under the s25(3) of the AMLA 1999.394  
4.7 Conclusion 
 This chapter has examined the AML policy, the AML competent authorities 
and the FIU in the UK in the implementation of the international requirements, such 
as the 1988 Vienna, 2000 Palermo Conventions, FATF Recommendations and EU 
AML Directive. Since money launderers and its associated criminals continue to 
benefit from their illicit proceeds, their requirements to launder illegal money will 
continue especially in the world financial centre countries like the UK. Such a threat 
pushes the UK government to respond to safeguard its reputation and credibility of 
the financial function by mainly focusing on the efficiency of the AML policy and 
competent authorities as the crucial instruments to fight against money laundering 
regime. The AML policy in the UK, which is managed by HM Treasury and assisted 
by the FCA. Although the UK AML policies exceed the global AML standards by 
imposing stricter obligations requiring the private sector to report a number of trans-
actions in the SARs regime. The UK government and relevant agencies have faced 
several difficult issues to manage such as the delayed feedback from the NCA and 
the relevant law enforcement authorities to the reporters, defensive reporting and 
high AML compliance cost, which have impacted the effectiveness of financial in-
formation flow. The UK government must act to reduce the burdens under the POCA 
2002 for the reported sector by improving the fast-tracking channel to transport the 
SARs to the law enforcement agencies including the feedback to the reporters in 
order to reduce the compliance cost. Also, it is important to enhance the guidance to 
                                                 
394 Section 25(3) of the AMLA 1999 as additionally amended by the Order of the Head of the National 
Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) No. 38/2560 (2017) Re: The Revision of the Powers and Duties 
of the Anti-Money Laundering Board. 
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promote a better understanding of the interpretation of the term suspicion to the pri-
vate sector to reduce defensive reporting.  
 The UK Parliament enacted the UK Serious Crime Act 2015 to provide legal 
immunity to all reporters who submit the SARs from civil liability. In June 2017, the 
UK government has transposed the Fourth Money Laundering Directive into the 
MLRs 2017, which strengthen the ability of the NCA and competent authorities ef-
fectively. The 2017 Regulations extend the moratorium to 186 days to provide fur-
ther time for the relevant law enforcement agencies to collect essential evidence. 
However, the NCA’s power is similar to the SOCA’s in that they cannot expect its 
consequences. Thus, the UK’s government, HM Treasury and the NCA should sup-
port the co-operation between the NCA and the FCA in order to use its credible de-
terrence policy and its power to impose financial sanctions on relevant persons or 
firms that have violated their gold standards (i.e. pre-placement rules). Moreover, 
the HM Treasury should hold up the FCA to prosecute the money laundering pursu-
ant to the decision of the Supreme Court in R v Rollins. The collaboration between 
the competent authorities, such as the FCA and the UK FIU (i.e. the NCA), assists 
in overcoming the money laundering regime effectively.  
 The FATF rated the UK’s AML legal framework applied in conducting the 
CDD very comprehensively. The UK regulatory and supervisory bodies apply such 
regulations to all regulated entities in line with the FATF standards. Furthermore, the 
UK achieves several investigations (7,900 cases), prosecutions (2,000 cases), and 
convictions (1,400 cases) for money laundering offences, or where money launder-
ing is the principal offence.395 Therefore, more technological and human resources 
                                                 
395  Law Society, ‘UK performs well in its 2018 FATF assessment’ (16 January 2019) 
<https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-services/risk-compliance/anti-money-laundering/uk-per-
forms-well-2018-fatf-assessment/> accessed 25 January 2019.  
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are needed for the NCA to deal with the growing number of SARs around 463,938 
SARs from all reporting entities between 2017-2018.396 Additionally, to deal with 
the money laundering risk, the UKFIU requires more power to acquire further infor-
mation regarding the SARs and financial information from obliged entities.397 There-
fore, the reporting entities need to develop their risk management and risk analysis 
in order to obtain a good quality of SARs.  
 Regarding the independence of the UKFIU, the UKFIU was rated ‘partially 
compliant’ by the FATF for the implementation of the Recommendation 29, however 
the FATF raised the UK as best practice.398 Beside the JFAC, the JMLIT and the 
SARs Regime Committee are deemed globally to act as best practice, in particular 
the independence of the UKFIU.399 As mentioned above, the JFAC and FMLIT, the 
jointing Committee between the LEAs and private sector, would be the important 
elements of the UK to improve the independence of the UKFIU by developing trans-
parent processes under the SARs regime in fighting money laundering and its asso-
ciated crime. Therefore, Thailand government should learn to adapt the Thailand FIU 
from the UK in dealing with the issue of insufficient independence of the Thailand 
from the military coup regime. The next chapter relates to the AML policy, compe-
tent authorities and FIU in Singapore, which demonstrate the implementation of in-
ternational standards to fight money laundering issues effectively. 
                                                 
396 National Crime Agency (n 296) 3. 
397 Home Office and HM Treasury (n 26) 35. 
398 FATF Recommendation 29; see Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Anti-Money Laundering 
and Counter-Terrorist financing measures – United Kingdom Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Re-
port (FATF 2018) 224. 
399 National Crime Agency (NCA), ‘Money laundering and illicit finance’ <https://www.nationalcri-
meagency.gov.uk/what-we-do/crime-threats/money-laundering-and-illicit-finance> accessed 23 De-
cember 2020.   
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 Singapore has succeeded not only as a significant international financial hub1 
and as a major offshore financial centre2 but also as a worldwide transportation hub.3 
However, these successes contribute towards the increasing money laundering risk4 
of becoming a transfer location for illegal funds from abroad.5 Singapore has devel-
oped accessible financial services that may be abused by organised crime to launder 
illegal funds across the region.6 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) estimated 
                                                 
1 Singapore is a developed nation. In 2011, Singapore ranked the 8th of the Transparency International 
Bribe Payers’ Index; Lu Wang, ‘Study on the cooperation mechanism of Nansha area and national 
free trade areas along - The Belt and Road’ (2018) 6 Open Journal of Social Sciences 98, 103; The 
UK ranked the ninth, but the same score (8.3 of 10). There is no Thai information in this Index; see 
Jack Kerr, ‘How can legislators protect sport from the integrity threat posed by cryptocurrencies?’ 
(2018) 18 the International Sports Law Journal 79, 81. 
2 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Anti-
Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures – Singapore Fourth Round Mutual 
Evaluation Report (FATF and APG 2016) 123. 
3 The enormous financial resources and new information technology cause transfer of money laun-
dering across border easily; see Sinisa Franjic, ‘Money laundering phenomenology’ 31st International 
Scientific Conference on Economic and Social Development – “Legal Challenges of Modern World” 
– Split, 7-8 June 2018, at 422 <https://air.uniud.it/retrieve/han-
dle/11390/1134725/251756/Book_of_Proceedings_esdSplit2018_Online.pdf#page=76> accessed 4 
December 2018.  
4 In consequence, Singapore attracts enormous funds flow from abroad that make the country vulner-
able to changing into a transit point for illegal funds; see Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), ‘Singa-
pore’s anti-money laundering and counter financing of terrorism regime assessed to be robust; con-
trols to be strengthened in certain sectors’ (10 January 2014) 
<https://www.mha.gov.sg/Newsroom/press-releases/Pages/Singapores-AntiMoney-Laundering-and-
Counter-Financing-of-Terrorism-Regime-Assessed-to-be-Robust-Controls-to-be-Strength.aspx> ac-
cessed 27 January 2018.  
5 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 5; see also Banker’s Academy, ‘Anti-money laundering (AML) 
in Singapore’ <http://bankersacademy.com/resources/free-tutorials/57-ba-free-tutorials/611-aml-sin-
gapore-sp-450> accessed 4 September 2017. 
6 Chat Le Nguyen, ‘Towards the Effective ASEAN Mutual Legal Assistance in Combating Money 
Laundering’ (2012) 15(4) Journal of Money Laundering Control 383, 385. 
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that 77 per cent of the funds that flow into Singapore are from foreign sources with 
the main assets under the management flowing from the Asia-Pacific region.7  
 The anti-money laundering/countering financing terrorism (AML/CFT) risks 
in Singapore have increased because of Singapore’s position as international trade 
and the transportation hub in the Asia-Pacific.8 Furthermore, the banking sub-sector 
usually offered a complex and large volume of financing services trade, which 
caused a higher level of money laundering and terrorist financing risk in Singapore.9 
Consequently, the Singapore government has attempted to respond to the money 
laundering threat with an efficient system.10 While most of the Association of South-
east Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states and Singapore have been members of 
the Asia/Pacific Group of Financial Intelligence Units (APG),11 of the ASEAN coun-
tries, Singapore is the only member of the FATF since 1992.12  
 Since then Singapore has implemented international AML standards, includ-
ing the UN AML conventions, FATF Recommendations, as well as best practices 
and industry guidelines into its national legal framework.13 Singapore enacted the 
Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) 
                                                 
7 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 5. 
8 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 5. 
9 ibid. 
10 Dennis Cox, Handbook of Anti Money Laundering (Wiley 2014) 396. 
11 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), established on 8 August 1967, consists of 
ten-member states as follows: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myan-
mar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, see also Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions (ASEAN), ‘ASEAN Member States’ <http://asean.org/asean/asean-member-states/> accessed 4 
September 2017.      
12  Le Nguyen (n 6) 383, 387; see also Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘Singapore’ 
<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/#Singapore> accessed 10 July 2019; Francisco Ed Lim, ‘Anti-
money laundering initiatives: Ramifications on the legal profession’ <https://www.aseanlawassocia-
tion.org/Francis_Lim.pdf> accessed 16 July 2019. 
13 The last MER regarding the implementation of AML/CTF standards in Singapore, Singapore was 
considered Compliant for 18, Largely for 16 and Partially for 6 of the FATF 40 Recommendations; 
see Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Anti-
Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures – Singapore Fourth Round Mutual 
Evaluation Report (FATF and APG 2016) 12. 
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Act (Cap. 65A) 1992 (CDSA) in line with the Standards to criminalise the laundering 
of proceeds involving drug dealing and criminal conduct.14 The 1992 Act is the key 
legislation to require all persons to report suspicious transactions to Singapore’s FIU, 
Suspicious Transaction Reporting Office (STRO).15 
 In Singapore, there are several government agencies, competent authorities, 
and FIU taking responsibility for examination for AML compliance and enforcement 
of AML requirement. Particularly, the role of Singapore’s FIU under the AML 
framework is able to meet international AML regulations.16 Financial institutions 
(FIs), other businesses and individuals are subject to AML requirements,17 such as 
risk policy, a risk-based approach, customer identification,18 customer due diligence 
(CDD), enhanced CDD, recordkeeping, STRs, and internal controls pursuant to Sin-
gapore’s international obligations.  
 The FATF and APG assessed that Singapore has a moderate or substantial 
rating for the effectiveness of STRO with a well-functioning system in disseminating 
intelligence to LEAs.19 The efficient management of STRs regime makes a signifi-
                                                 
14 Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act (Cap. 65A) 
1992, ss 43(1), 44(1), 46(1), 46(2), 46(3), 47(1), 47(2), 47(3) and 47AA(1). 
15 CDSA 1992, ss 3A, 39(1). 
16 See definition of the Competent authorities, FIUs in chapter 3. 
17 FIs include banks, merchant banks, finance companies, money changers, remittance agents, insur-
ers, insurance brokers, capital markets intermediaries, trust companies, financial advisers, stored 
value facility holders; designated businesses include casino operators, corporate service providers, 
dealers in precious stones and/or precious metals, estate agents and salespersons, legal practitioners 
and law practices, moneylenders, pawnbrokers, and professional accountants and professional ac-
counting firms under s 39 of the CDSA 1992.  
18 The AML requirements include a risk-based approach, identifying and verifying the identity of the 
client or any beneficial owner regarding the client, understanding the purpose and intended nature of 
the business relationship with the client, as well as ongoing monitoring of the business relationship 
with the client. 
19 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 3. 
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cant use of financial information from the reporting entities (REs) to support inves-
tigations and prosecutions.20 Therefore, this chapter aims to examine the AML leg-
islation relating to the role of FIU in Singapore and evaluate its implementation of 
the international standards, especially the FATF Recommendations.  
 It is essential to study how the Singapore FIU comply with the international 
standards, particularly the independence of the FIU in line with FATF Recommen-
dation 29. Such Recommendation focuses on the independence of each of the FIUs 
without any undue influence and interference in order to protect such prejudicing its 
independence and enhancing the FIU’s core functions in dealing with the 
SARs/STRs regime. The next section explains the Singapore’s AML framework.  
 
5.2 Singapore’s Anti-Money Laundering Framework 
 In order to fight money laundering effectively, Singapore has signed for 
members of the United Nations (UN) Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988 (the Vienna Convention), the UN Conven-
tion Against Transnational Organised Crime 2000 (the Palermo Convention) and the 
UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999 
(the Terrorism Financing Convention), the UN Convention Against Corruption 
2003, and the FATF Recommendations.21 As a result of these international Conven-
tions and membership of the FATF, the Singapore government strengthens its AML 
                                                 
20 CDSA 1992, ss 2, 45(4)(a). 
21 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 136. 
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legislation framework to combat illegal fund flows, including designing the proac-
tive legal and supervisory framework22 in order to investigate complex money laun-
dering cases to produce confiscation orders of criminal proceeds and the prosecu-
tions. Singapore has also enacted a strong domestic legislation to meet FATF re-
quirements, which Singapore joined in 1991.23 Consequently, the World Economic 
Forum rated Singapore as the best country for protecting the business from criminals 
and the FATF also raised that Singapore meets the requirement of FATF Recom-
mendations effectively.24 Similar to the UK, Singapore has the essentially key ele-
ments for an economic centre, including a fully open capital account, a common-law 
based legislative system, an independent and efficient judiciary in commercial af-
fairs.25 
 Money launderers have kept using private banking and asset management in 
Singapore to fund disguise their proceeds of crime.26 Therefore, the risk management 
of FIs is significant to prevent the economic stability, integrity27 and competitiveness 
                                                 
22 Cheong-Ann Png and Khoon-Jin Tan, ‘Singapore’ in Toby Graham (ed), Butterworths International 
Guide to Money Laundering Law and Practice (2nd edn, LexisNexis Butterworths 2003) 548. 
23 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, Vol 70, Col 1733, 6 July 1999. 
24 Cox (n 10) 615; see Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘Singapore’s progress in strengthening 
measures to tackle money laundering and terrorist financing’ (2019) < https://www.fatf-gafi.org/pub-
lications/mutualevaluations/documents/fur-singapore-2019.html>.    
25 The Economist, ‘Advantage Singapore?’ (22 July 2020) <https://www.eiu.com/n/advantage-singa-
pore/> accessed 25 December 2020.  
26 Sir James Sassoon, Keynote Address at the Countering the Financing of Terrorism Seminar, 12 
February 2008, Singapore (as cited in Public Prosecutor v Ong Tian Soon [2008] SGDC 35 at [28]. 
27 Paramjit Signh, ‘Confronting economic crime – Singapore’s experience’, Paper presented at the 
24th Cambridge International Symposium on Economic Crime, Jesus College, Cambridge, September 
2006.  
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of Singapore.28 Consequently, the Singapore government has designed a robust leg-
islation, policy and supervisory framework29 in order to prevent Singapore’s integ-
rity of the economic system from illicit fund flows and activities.30 Singapore’s AML 
policy aims to deter and prevent money laundering and its associated predicate of-
fences.31 To protect the integrity of the financial system, Singapore has used proac-
tive prevention such as a risk-based approach across multi sectors through a strong 
regulatory regime and effective enforcement action with severe punitive measures 
for deterrence.32  
 Singapore’s AML regime is posited the FATF Recommendations and ratified 
Convention and UN Security Council Resolutions.33 In Singapore, the main AML 
legislation is the CDSA 1992,34 which targets the ‘benefits of criminal conduct’ and 
applies to any person such as an individual or corporation.35 Pieth and Aiolfi asserted 
                                                 
28 Lee Seiu Kin, SC, Cross-Border Status and other Measures to Curb Money Laundering in Singa-
pore (25th Anniversary, 2005) Asian Law Association; see also Alvin Yeo and Joy Tan, ‘Singapore’ 
in Arun Srivastava, Mark Simpson and Nina Moffat (eds), International Guide to Money Laundering 
Law and Practice (4th edn, Bloomsbury 2013) 1147. 
29  Ministry of Finance (MOF), ‘Singapore’s AML/CFT Policy Statement’ (4 December 2017)  
<http://www.mof.gov.sg/Policies/Anti-Money-Laundering-Countering-the-Financing-of-Terrorism-
AML-CFT/Singapores-AML-CFT-Policy-Statement> accessed 6 December 2017. 
30 Yeo and Tan (n 28) 1148. 
31 Predicate offences are listed in the First Schedule (i.e. drug dealing offence) and Second Schedules 
(i.e. serious offence) of the CDSA 1992, as well as include the conspiracy, attempt, abetment, or 
incitement of another to conduct such offences. Tax evasion is a predicate offence listed in Second 
Schedule. 
32 Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), ‘Speech by Kasiviswanathan Shanmugan SC, Minister 
of Law’ at the Opening Ceremony of the 13th Annual Meeting of Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laun-
dering, 13 July 2010 <http://www.mas.gov.sg/news-and-publications/speeches-and-monetary-pol-
icy-statements/speeches/2010/speech-by-mr-k-shanmugam-at-the-13th-annual-meeting-of-asia-pa-
cific-group-on-money-laundering.aspx>  accessed 5 September 2017. 
33 The detail of the FATF Recommendations, the three conventions, and the UN Security Council 
Resolutions was discussed in chapter 3. 
34 The Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act (Chap-
ter 65A) 1992 (2000 Rev Ed). 
35 Sections 2, 43, 44 of the CDSA 1992 (2000 Rev Ed) determines ‘benefits of criminal conduct’ 
similar to the ‘proceeds derived from criminal conduct’. 
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that the structure of the Singapore AML regime regarding the financial sector is pro-
gressive, which is similar to the UK’s model.36 Furthermore, it is similar to Thai-
land’s because all of them divided the AML regime into two main measures, i.e. the 
deterrent anti-money laundering measure and the preventive anti-money laundering 
measure.37  
 Under the Singapore’s AML legislation on the part of individuals and corpo-
ration constitute breaches of the criminal law, which competent authorities criminal-
ise the criminal proceeds. For example, the deterrent AML legislation includes the 
CDSA 1992 and the Monetary Authority of Singapore Act (Chapter 186) 1970 (MAS 
Act), which are applied to relevant persons and private sectors to criminalise the 
laundering of criminal proceeds.38 In terms of deterrent AML measure, the Singa-
pore primary legislation enacted to fight money laundering is the CDSA 1992.39 It 
has been developed from the Corruption (Confiscation of Benefits) Act 1989.40 Con-
sequently, in Singapore, the CDSA 1992 criminalises money laundering, which are 
also consistent with the Palermo Convention 2000 and the terrorism (Suppression of 
Financing) Act, Chapter 325 in order to confiscate and seize any property involving 
in the money laundering and the financing of terrorism.41 
                                                 
36 Mark Pieth and Gemma Aiolfi, ‘Synthesis: Comparing international standards and their implemen-
tation’ in Mark Pieth and Gemma Aiolfi (eds), A Comparative Guide to Anti-Money Laundering - A 
Critical Analysis of Systems in Singapore, Switzerland, the UK and the USA (Edward Elgar 2004) 
420. 
37 Guy Stessens, Money Laundering – A New International Law Enforcement Model (Cambridge Uni-
versity Press 2000) 133.  
38 Sections 43(1), 44(1), 46(1), (2), (3), 47(1), (2), (3) of the CDSA 1992 (2000 Rev Ed) and the 
Monetary Authority of Singapore Act, including the Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act (Cap 
325). 
39 The CDSA 1992 (2000 Rev Ed).  
40 The CDSA 1992 was token over it with the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes 
(Confiscation of Benefits) Act 1999; see Nigel Morris-Cotterill, ‘International money laundering up-
date’ (2007) Compliance Officer Bulletin 1, 3. 
41 Cox (n 10) 615; see Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, ‘Money laundering and terrorism financing risks 
of prepaid cards instruments?’ (2009) 4(1) Asian Criminology 11, 22; see also AML-CFT, ‘List of 
ML Offences in Singapore’ (2 May 2017) <https://aml-cft.net/library/list-money-laundering-predi-
cate-offences-singapore/> accessed 5 September 2017. 
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 To deal with the money laundering regime effectively, Singapore has intro-
duced the CDSA 1992, which forces all non-financial and FIs, especially in relation 
to the suspicious transaction reporting (SAR) regulatory requirements under the 
CDSA 1992, including the identification and record keeping regulations.42 The Sin-
gapore government strongly implements the FATF Recommendations to improve 
the availabilities and transparency of information on beneficial ownership of legal 
persons, limited liability partnerships and trusts, the risk assessment for all types of 
legal persons and non-profit sector.43  
 As mentioned above, Singapore creates an efficient anti-money laundering 
policy to maintain a competitive financial hub in Asia by assessing and deepening 
the understanding of money laundering risks led by the Ministry of Finance (MOF), 
the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and the Monetary Authority of Singapore 
(MAS).44 The whole financial sector in Singapore provides 11.9 per cent of its GDP 
in 2014.45 The Singapore government has emphasised the response to its role as a 
financial market centre in Asia/Pacific region that there is extensive scope not only 
for cross-border crimes but also global money laundering, which currently is no 
longer limited to drug trafficking crimes. 46  For example, the CDSA 1992 was 
amended to extend the asset confiscation and AML provisions of the former Drug 
                                                 
42 The CDSA 1992 (2000 Rev Ed).  
43 Chanyaporn Chanjarorn, ‘Singapore has gaps to fill in money-laundering fight’ (Bloomberg, 27  
September 2016) <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-27/singapore-has-gaps-to-
fill-in-money-laundering-fight-fatf-says> accessed 4 September 2017.         
44 Madeline Lee, ‘Country report: Anti-money laundering laws and regulations in Singapore’ in Mark 
Pieth and Gemma Aiolfi (eds), A Comparative Guide to Anti-Money Laundering: A Critical Analysis 
of Systems in Singapore, Switzerland, the UK and the USA (Edward Elgar 2004) 64. 
45 Financial Stability Board (FSB), Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2015 (FSB 2015); see 
Christian Hofmann, ‘Shadow Banking in Singapore’ (2017) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 18, 
26. 
46 Lee (n 44) 64, 99; see also International Monetary Fund (IMF), ‘Singapore’ (February 2009) 
<https://asean.elibrary.imf.org/abstract/IMF002/09958-9781451834291/09958-
9781451834291/09958-9781451834291_A001.xml?redirect=true> accessed 27 December 2018. 
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Trafficking (Confiscation of Benefits) Act beyond drug laundering provisions to 
cover all serious crimes that are illustrated under the First and Second Schedules to 
the CDSA 1992 as predicate offences.47 Consequently, Singapore’s main legislation 
for countering money laundering, the CDSA 1992, criminalise the laundering of 
criminal conducts obtained from drug trafficking and other serious offences, which 
provide the power to confiscate the laundering and corruption.48  
 To deal with the offences of helping another to hold possession of the illegal 
benefits of drug trading or from criminal activity, the CDSA 1992 imposes to fine 
and imprison a person that knowingly assists in keeping such criminal proceeds of 
drug dealing and the benefits of other criminal conduct might be sentenced to a fi-
nancial sanction not exceeding SG$500, 000 or to imprisonment for a term not ex-
ceeding seven years, or to both for the individual offender or a fine not exceeding 
SG$1m for the non-individual offender.49 To criminalise the offences of receiving, 
possessing, using, hiding or conveying the benefits of drug trafficking, or criminal 
activity, the CDSA 1992 determines that any person that knowingly helps hide or 
transact the advantages of drug dealing and criminal conduct might be punished with 
a fine not exceeding SG$500, 000 or with imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
seven years or to both for the individual offender or a fine not exceeding SG$1m for 
                                                 
47 The Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act was 
amended in 2006 to expand the list of money laundering predicate offences from 189 to 297 offences, 
but now there are more than 400 money laundering predicate offences; see Second Schedule (Serious 
Offences) of the CDSA 1992; the First and Second Schedules of the Corruption, Drug Trafficking 
and Other Serious Crimes (Confication of Benefits) Act (CDSA) were amended with effect from 
June3, 2015 to include different new predicate offences as ‘serious offences’; Conventus Law, ‘Sin-
gapore – Recent developments in AML/CFT Regulation’ (6 July 2015) <https://www.conven-
tuslaw.com/report/singapore-recent-developments-in-aml-cft/> accessed 25 December 2020. 
48 Raymond Choo (n 41) 11, 22. 
49 The Singapore dollar is the official currency of Singapore. In this thesis, Singapore dollar herein-
after ‘SG$’; ss 43 and 44 of the CDSA 1992 (2000 Rev Ed), involving with entering into, or otherwise 
being concerned in an arrangement. 
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non-individual offender.50 The CDSA 1992 criminalises the processes of laundering 
of drugs and other types of serious offences, including any offences committed out-
side the jurisdiction that can be imposed and prosecuted as if the offences had been 
engaged in Singapore.51 Under the standard for criminalization, the 1988 Vienna 
Convention includes drug-related offences as predicate offence.52 Furthermore, the 
2000 Palermo Convention determines that its predicate offences should include all 
serious crimes (i.e. act constituting an offences punishable by imprisonment for a 
period of at least four years.53   
 Despite Singapore has the robust AML regulations, it has also suffered from 
several money laundering cases and delisting that has weakened its reputation as an 
international financial centre. The CDSA requirements apply to all business, even a 
small to big ones, such as in the case of Ang Jeannette v Public Prosecutor, a small 
individual business owner was convicted of money laundering offences for obtaining 
over SG$2m and remitting it overseas from a third-party on the instructions of her 
brother, who had claimed to be in criminal problem.54 Furthermore, in 2000, the case 
                                                 
50 The CDSA 1992 (2000 Rev Ed), ss 46(1) and 47(1) determine that concealing, disguising, concert-
ing, transferring, removing from the jurisdiction, acquiring possessing, or using any property which 
is, or in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, representing, his benefits of drug dealing/from criminal 
conduct. Sections 46(2) and 47(2) involving with concealing, disguising, converting, transferring, or 
removing from the jurisdiction any such property described in the right column. 
51 Sections 43(a), 60 of the CDSA 1992 (2000 Rev Ed); see also Koh Teck Hin, ‘Corruption control 
in Singapore’ 122, 125 <http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/RS_No83/No83_17VE_Koh1.pdf> ac-
cessed 23 January 2018.  
52 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Financial Intelligence Units: An Overview (IMF 2004) p. 47 
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/FIU/fiu.pdf> accessed 12 December 2020.  
53 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Financial Intelligence Units: An Overview (IMF 2004) p. 47 
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/FIU/fiu.pdf> accessed 12 December 2020. 
54 The accused was convicted for assisting retain criminal monies and sentenced to 9-month impris-
onment; Ang Jeanette v Public Prosecutors [2011] SGHC 100; see Singapore Legal Advice, ‘Anti-
Money Laundering Regulations and your business: What you need to know’ (11 December 2020) 
<https://singaporelegaladvice.com/law-articles/anti-money-laundering-regulations-business/> ac-
cessed 25 December 2020. . 
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of Public Prosecutor v Teo Cheng Kiat was the first money laundering case in Sin-
gapore was investigated and prosecuted.55 Teo Cheng Kiat, a former crew of the Sin-
gapore Airlines (SIA), was convicted of money laundering and fraud offences of $35 
million from the SIA.56 Kiat was jailed for 24 years for his crime.57 This case was 
the worst money laundering was committed in Singapore. According to money laun-
dering offence, these cases were also illustrated that Singapore’s effort in implement-
ing the AML international standards effectively.58 In addition, the MER noted that 
Singapore has a strong institutional and legal framework and effective AML/CFT 
coordination of the competent authorities. The thesis found that the corporations in 
Singapore cite transparency and lack of corruption as leading attractive features of 
Singapore’s investment atmosphere.59  
 The STRO received 30,511 STRs in 2015.60 In 2017, the number of STRs 
has increased to 35,471 STRs, which was risen 4 per cent from 2016.61 However, the 
STRO disseminated 25 per cent less intelligence to relevant competent authorities as 
compared to 2016.62 Singapore convicted 56 money laundering cases in 2016 and 73 
                                                 
55 Public Prosecutor v Teo Cheng Kiat [2000] SGHC 129; term ‘public prosecutor’ hereinafter ‘PP’. 
56 Public Prosecutor v Teo Cheng Kiat [2000] SGHC 129. 
57 Public Prosecutor v Teo Cheng Kiat [2000] SGHC 129; see Nureza Ahmad, ‘Longest jail term for 
the worst case of commercial fraud’ (Singapore Infopedia 2016) <https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/info-
pedia/articles/SIP_422_2005-01-25.html> accessed 11 December 2020. 
58 Singapore ranked among the least corrupt jurisdictions in the world in 2016. Furthermore, it scored 
at 85 out of 100 of the Transparency International Corruption Index KnowYourCountry Limited, 
‘Singapore’ <https://www.knowyourcountry.com/singapore1111> accessed 11 December 2020; see 
also Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘Singapore’s measures to combat money laundering and 
terrorist financing’ (2019) <https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/mutualevaluations/docu-
ments/mer-singapore-2016.html> . 
59  KnowYourCountry Limited, ‘Singapore’ <https://www.knowyourcountry.com/singapore1111> 
accessed 11 December 2020. 
60 Commercial Affairs Department (CAD), Annual Report 2017 (CAD 2017) 29. 
61 Commercial Affairs Department (n 60) 29. 
62 ibid 30. 
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cases in 2017.63 Furthermore, it seized SG$ 32m of suspected tainted money in the 
money laundering investigations in 2017.64 
 The preventive measures involve the compliance with the regulatory and le-
gal requirements, and Singapore was rated by the FATF as the country that has an 
effective AML regime.65 For example, Singapore issued the Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters Act (Chapter 190A) 1992 in order to permit the Singapore govern-
ment agencies to deliver and obtain international mutual assistance regarding money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism.66 
 Additionally, MAS Act 1970, which was issued in 1970 and revised in 1999, 
aimed to provide the exercise of control over financial sectors and their related enti-
ties by the MAS.67 This MAS Act 1970 empowers the MAS supervisory powers re-
garding Singapore AML regime to regulate the financial services sector in Singapore 
to promote financial stability conducive to the economic growth.68  
 In order to complete the AML provisions in the CDSA 1992, 69 the MAS 
issued the Guidelines, namely MAS Notice 626 on Prevention of Money Laundering 
and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (MAS Notice 626), which are pursuant 
to s. 27(B) the MAS Act 1970.70 The MAS Act contains the main requirements for 
                                                 
63 ibid 45.  
64 ibid 45. 
65  Pieth and Aiolfi (n 36) 416; see also Cox (n 10) 615. 
66 Cox (n 10) 615. 
67 Monetary Authority of Singapore Act (Chapter 186) 1970. 
68 MAS Act 1970; see Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), ‘MAS Act and Regulations’ (26 
November 2016) <http://www.mas.gov.sg/regulations-and-financial-stability/regulatory-and-super-
visory-framework/mas-act.aspx> accessed 18 January 2018.  
69 Cox (n 10) 615. 
70 The Guidelines to Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) Notice 626 on Prevention of Money 
Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism and s 27(B) the Monetary Authority of Sin-
gapore Act in relation to the requirements for prevention of money laundering and terrorism financ-
ing. 
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the FIs such as the KYC, CDD, and record procedures, while the MAS Notice pre-
sents itself as a ‘soft law’ directive from the MAS to ensure the relevant private sec-
tor to comply with the applicable regulations such as the detailed requirement.71 
MAS Notice 626 has supplemented the encouragement of the FIs to implement the 
MAS Act’s requirements.72 Furthermore, the MAS Notice 626 also clearly demon-
strates the list of useful examples of transactions that could induce suspicious about 
a customer’s connection with money laundering activities.73 For example, the Guide-
lines to MAS Notice 626 defines ‘money laundering’ as a derivative offence relating 
to the processing of proceeds gained from illegal conduct, with the final consequence 
of concealing its origins by presenting it originated from a legal source.74  
 The MAS Notice 626 involves a bank licensed under the Banking Act (Cap. 
19), which the MAS uses for the preventive AML measures for the FIs.75 Therefore, 
all financial sectors must comply with the MAS Guidelines because the MAS Act 
1970 provides the power to the MAS to issue such direction, requirements or regu-
lations concerning all FIs. The MAS considers that the guideline is essential to pre-
vent money laundering because if FIs fail to comply with such measures, they can 
be imposed of financial sanction or imprisonment.76 Moreover, the MAS may also 
withdraw the license of the FIs if they fail to comply with such Notice.77  
 Thus, the FIs are required to identify the Notice and Guideline appropriately 
to their business and affirm that their AML policies, including the procedures, are 
                                                 
71 MAS Act 1970. 
72 MAS Notice 626 on Prevention of Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism. 
73 See the list of examples of Suspicious Transactions of the Notices and Guidelines on Prevention of 
Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism. 
74 Guidelines to Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) Notice 626 on Prevention of Money Laun-
dering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism, para 10.  
75 Section 2 of the Monetary Authority of Singapore Act 1970 and the Banking Act (Cap. 19), 2008 
Rev. Ed. 
76 Sections 27(B), 27(E) of the Monetary Authority of Singapore Act 1970.  
77 Section 28(5) of the Monetary Authority of Singapore Act 1970. 
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consistent with the AML requirements to identify STRs regarding money mules.78 
Therefore, the MAS has issued its guidance of the replacement of individual account-
ability system, like the UK’s Senior Managers and Certification Regime 
(SM&CR),79 in order to ensure to identify and define who in senior management 
with true decision-making authority within the relevant body is accountable for the 
FI’s core management duties.80 Additionally, the MAS also issued the Guidelines to 
MAS Notice 1014 on Prevent of Money Laundering and Countering the Financing 
of Terrorism in 2007.81  
 Furthermore, the Association of Banks in Singapore (ABS) issued the Guide-
lines on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism.82 For 
example, the first ABS Guidelines, which is the Prevention of the Misuse of the Sin-
gapore Banking System for Drug Trafficking and Money Laundering Purpose, were 
issued in 1990 and lately revised in 2009.83 The ABS Guidelines are actually pre-
ventive AML measures and best practice for the financial sector (e.g. the investment 
and commercial banking, private banking, retail banking, and trade finance),84 but 
the ABS Guidelines do not have the force of law per se. The ABS Guidelines support 
                                                 
78 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 40. 
79 Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), ‘Senior Managers and Certification Regime’ (7 February 
2019) <https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/senior-managers-certification-regime> accessed 3 April 2019.  
80 The Senior Managers and Certification Regime (SM&CR) came to affect for banking sector in 
March 2016; see Allen & Overy, A Comparative Look at Singapore’s Proposed Accountability Re-
gime for Senior Managers and Employees in Material Risk Functions (June 2018) 3 <http://www.al-
lenovery.com/publications/en-gb/Pages/A-Comparative-Look-at-Singapores-Proposed-Accountabil-
ity-Regime-for-Senior-Managers-and-Employees-in-Material-Risk-Functio.aspx> accessed 5 Janu-
ary 2019.   
81 Notice to Merchant Bank: Guidelines to MAS Notice 1014 on Prevent of Money Laundering and 
Countering the Financing of Terrorism - Merchant Banks (24 April 2015).   
82 ABS Guidelines on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (13 No-
vember 2015). 
83  Association of Banks in Singapore (ABS), Guidelines on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering 
the Financing of Terrorism (13 November 2015) 1. 
84 Association of Banks in Singapore (n 83) 1. 
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the MAS Notice to prevent FIs from abusing by the money launderers.85 Conse-
quently, the preventive anti-money laundering measures empower all financial enti-
ties to act as the civil police role to monitor the suspicious transactions and report 
them to the financial intelligence unit (FIU).86   
 The key role of the STRO under the CDSA 1992 is to ensure that useful in-
telligence is effectively and properly disseminated and provided to relevant LEAs in 
order to increase the number of investigations and prosecution of money laundering 
via the well-functioning systems and coordination mechanism.87 MAS and STRO 
have reminded FIs of their responsibility to comply with STR requirements, AML 
guidelines and a risk-based approach in particular. The next section examines the 
Singapore competent authorities and the FIU in implementing international stand-
ards, including the domestic legislation (i.e. Deterrent and preventive AML 
measures) in combating money laundering.  
 
5.3 The Competent Authorities and Financial Intelligence Unit in Singapore 
 There are three kinds of competent authorities in Singapore,88 including pri-
mary, secondary, and tertiary authority. Each contains different divisions that will be 
described below.  
 
5.3.1 The Role of Primary Authorities 
 Singapore Government has played a proactive role in supporting the country 
to be an international financial hub by creating MAS, which chaired by the Ministry 
                                                 
85 ibid. 
86 Stessens (n 37) 134. 
87 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 45. 
88 See discussion of competent authorities in chapter 3. 
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of Finance and the Central Bank, to be the primary regulatory agency89 for handling 
the financial services industry and governing the financial sector.90 The next section 
displays the Ministry of Finance. 
 
5.3.1.1 Ministry of Finance 
 The Ministry of Finance (MOF) is the main ministry, which is responsible 
for formulating and implementing the AML/CFT policies in Singapore, which led 
by the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Steering 
Committee (AML/CFT Steering Committee).91 The MOF is also one of the members 
of the Singapore AML/CFT Steering Committee that works together with the Inter-
Agency Committee in order to implement the national AML/CFT policy.92 MOF has 
formulated and implemented the government’s AML policy relating to the currency 
and foreign exchange businesses in accordance with STRO’s commitments to inter-
national standards by reminding FIs to report any suspicious transactions they come 
across to the STRO. The next section examines MAS in fighting money laundering. 
 
5.3.1.2 Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) 
 By the virtue of the Monetary Authority of Singapore Act (CHAPTER 186) 
1970 (MAS Act), the MAS roles as the central bank of Singapore and a financial 
regulator who regulates, monitors, and supervises the financial services sector, in-
                                                 
89 See the definition of primary authorities in chapter 3. 
90 Pieth and Aiolfi (n 36) 418. 
91 Ministry of Finance (n 29). 
92 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 37. 
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surance sector, and individuals in order to deal with a risk of financial crime, espe-
cially money laundering.93 The MAS is responsible for the anti-money laundering 
and countering financing terrorism supervision.94 The duty of AML/CFT supervi-
sion is a broad scope of sanctioning instruments accessible to the FIs, extending from 
warnings/reprimands to criminal prosecution/removal of licenses.95  
 The FATF commented that all of the tools have been used, except direct sanc-
tion regarding the senior management of FIs.96 However, in the case of Abdul Ghani 
bin Tahir v Public Prosecutor97 the Singapore High Court jailed the director for 
charges regarding money laundering activities conducting by the company pursuant 
to the CDSA 1992.98 This case illustrates that Singapore government realises that the 
officers, directors, and non-executive directors are the gatekeepers of organisations 
that must be alert for deterring and preventing the money laundering risk and illegal 
activities within their administrative firms regardless of whether they actually con-
ducted the crime. 99  Therefore, the AML compliance policies, internal controls, 
measures, and procedures should be properly approved by the senior management.100 
                                                 
93 Jason Chan, Vincent Leow and Daren Shiau, ‘Singapore’ in Nicolas Bourtin (ed), The International 
Investigations Review (7th edn, Law Business Research 2017) 228; see also KYC360, ‘Singapore reg-
ulator directs banks to tighten customer verification process’ (25 July 2018) 
<https://kyc360.com/news/singapore-regulator-directs-banks-to-tighten-customer-verification-pro-
cess/> accessed 29 July 2018. 
94 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 8. 
95 ibid. 
96 ibid. 
97 [2017] SGHC 125. 
98 The CDSA 1992, ss 47(1)(b), 59(1). 
99 Wendy Wysong, ‘First prosecution in Singapore of a director for company money laundering’ 
<https://www.cliffordchance.com/briefings/2017/07/first_prosecutioninsingaporeofadirec-
torfo.html> accessed 1 May 2018.  
100 Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), Consultation Paper on Designation of Tax Crimes as 
Money Laundering Predicate Offences in Singapore (October 2012) 4. 
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 According to the MAS’s responsibilities, it attempts to prevent reputation 
damage, which is caused by AML lapse at banks in the nation linked to money laun-
dering.101 Under s 27B of the Monetary of Singapore Act 1970 (Cap. 186), the MAS 
has the power to launch the regulations, guidelines and codes, as well as imposing 
conditions of operation on FIs and the DNFBPs to prevent the money laundering.102 
Furthermore, it also ensures them to maximise the compliance with the FATF Rec-
ommendations and the AML preventive measures. The MAS can instigate investi-
gations, overrule the operating licence of regulated proceedings, and impose civil 
penalties. All the actions of Singapore’s MAS are similar to the UK Financial Con-
duct Authority (FCA) and the Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO) adopt – the 
imposition of financial sections.103 Consequently, such regulatory notices and guide-
lines are applied to all obliged entities.104  
 In April 2015, the MAS issued the notice to the holders of stored facilities to 
guide the crucial principles for all relevant holders105 when operating their business 
activities.106 For example, they are required to comply with the highest standard of 
due diligence, customer identification, including the identity of each beneficial 
                                                 
101 Chanjarorn (n 43). 
102 The Guidelines on MAS Notice 626 on Prevention of Money Laundering and Countering the Fi-
nancing of Terrorism; see also Dora Neo, ‘Inside the Singapore Financial Centre’ in Jiaxiang Hu, 
Matthias Vanhullebusch and Andrew Harding, Finance, Rule of Law and Development in Asia: Per-
spectives from Singapore (Koninklijke Brill NV 2016) 18, 33. 
103 Lev Bromberg, George Gilligan and Ian Ramsay, ‘Financial market manipulation and insider trad-
ing: an international study of enforcement approaches ’(2017) 8 Journal of Business Law 652, 668. 
104 Neo (n 102) 18, 33. 
105 The Payment Systems (Oversight) Act (Cap. 222A) (PSOA) defines ‘Relevant holder’ as a holder 
of a relevant stored value facility. 
106 The MAS’ Notices on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Ter-
rorism (AML/CFT Notices) are launched pursuant to the s 27B of the Monetary Authority of Singa-
pore Act (Cap. 186) (MAS Act 1970); see Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), Prevention of 
Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism – Holders of Stored Value Facilities. 
MAS Notice PSOA-NO2 Notices and Guidelines (24 April 2015) 5. 
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owner when dealing with all clients to cooperate with the relevant authorities to pre-
vent, detect and deter money laundering.107 Additionally, the MAS Notice 626 em-
phasises the suspicious transaction reports (STRs) towards relevant obliged entities, 
especially s 48 of the CDSA 1992 on tipping-off offence.108 Such entities must report 
suspicious transactions or attempted transactions to the STRO, as well as expanding 
a copy to the Authority for Information.109  
 In the 2016 Mutual Evaluation Report (MER), the FATF determined that the 
FIs and the DNFBPs illustrated a good understanding of the money laundering risks 
affecting Singapore and concluded that they were largely compliant with the FATF 
recommendations. However, they were criticised that they had a less improved un-
derstanding of the risk of illegal fund flows into and out of the jurisdiction.110 Con-
sequently, in December 2016 the MAS fined the Singapore branches of the Standard 
Chartered Bank, Singapore Branch (SCB) around SG$ 5.2m and the Coutts & Co 
Ltd, Singapore Branch (Coutts) about SG$ 2.4m for violations of the MAS’s anti-
money laundering regulations with an account of fund flows connecting with the 
Malaysian governmental development fund, i.e. One Malaysia Development Berhad 
(1MDB) via these banks.111   
                                                 
107 Monetary Authority of Singapore (n 100) 5; see also Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, ‘Cyptocurrency 
and virtual currency: Corruption and money laundering/terrorism financing risks?’ in David Lee Kuo 
Chuen (ed), Handbook of Digital Currency: Bitcoin, Innovation, Financial Instruments, and Big Data 
(Academic Press 2015) 303.    
108 Section 48 of the CDSA 1992 (2000 Rev Ed). 
109 Paragraph 13.2 of the Notice to Holders of Stored Value Facilities, MAS Act 1970, CAP. 186; see 
also Monetary Authority of Singapore (n 100) 26.  
110 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 91. 
111 Berhad, Malaysian word, means ‘private’; see Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), ‘MAS 
imposes penalties on Standard Chartered Bank and Coutts for 1MDB-related AML breaches’ (2 De-
cember 2016) <http://www.mas.gov.sg/news-and-publications/media-releases/2016/mas-imposes-
penalties-on-standard-chartered-bank-and-coutts-for-1mdb-related-aml-breaches.aspx> accessed 5 
December 2017; see also Stanley Lai, Francis Mok and Tham Kokleong, ‘Singapore: payment sys-
tems – proposed payments framework’ (2017) 32(1) Journal of International Banking Law and Reg-
ulation 1, 1. 
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 The MAS and the Commercial Affairs Department of Singapore (CAD), the 
branch in the Singapore Police Force (SPF), cooperate a government-industry part-
nership, the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism In-
dustry Partnership (ACIP).112 The ACIP leads to the partnership between the indus-
try and the government agencies, including regulators and law enforcement authori-
ties, to deal with the international risks of money laundering and terrorist financing, 
which Singapore has been dealing with by identifying, assessing, deterring, detecting 
and mitigating such risks.113   
 In January 2018 the MAS launched its guidance on the use of innovative 
technology solutions to facilitate non-face-to-face client onboarding. The guidance 
includes the measures on biometric identification and digital signatures in order to 
improve the security of customer verification and banking transactions effectively.114 
Apparently, Singapore, the UK and Thailand have issued substantial updates to their 
internal guidelines for their financial sector, including foreign FIUs.115 The MAS has 
issued industry-specific guidance, which is standardised with minor amendments for 
each relevant sector.116  
 Interestingly, Singapore’s guidelines are not so authoritarian but are more 
flexible to the regulated agencies in the way that the legislation and regulative regime 
                                                 
112 Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), ‘CAD and MAS Partner Industry Stakeholders to Fight 
Financial Crimes’ (24 April 2017) <http://www.mas.gov.sg/News-and-Publications/Media-Re-
leases/2017/CAD-and-MAS-Partner-Industry-Stakeholders-to-Fight-Financial-Crimes.aspx> ac-
cessed 6 September 2017. 
113 Monetary Authority of Singapore (n 106). 




10 December 2018.  
115 Morris-Cotterill (n 40) 1, 2. 
116 ibid. 
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are used, and this practice is similar to the UK’s guidance.117 On the contrary, Thai-
land’s guidelines adopt the authoritarian approach and put certain views of primary 
law, which allows interpretation, beyond uncertainty.118 On the whole, the Singa-
pore’s MAS has implemented a similar method to its counterparts in the UK and 
Thailand by cooperating with other authorities such as the Singapore Exchange Lim-
ited (SGX), and the CAD of the SPF, which were categorised in the secondary com-
petent authorities as to the UK’s and Thailand’s.119 
 For the purpose of an investigation, the CDSA 1992 empowers the MAS as 
an authorised officer to apply to a court for an order to search, restrain, confiscate 
material and information in order to find any evidence relating to drug dealing or 
criminal conduct.120  Similar to Thailand, the Anti-Money Laundering Act 1999 
(AMLA) provides these powers to the Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO), 
Thailand’s FIU, to issue an order or file a petition to the Civil Court in line with the 
AMLA 1999.121 Although the role of Singapore’s MAS is similar to the AMLO of 
Thailand, the STRO applying the administrative-FIU model does not have the judi-
cial and law-enforcement power like the Thai AMLO, which uses the hybrid-FIU 
model.  
 In summary, Singapore’s MAS roles as the primary regulator is a crucial role 
in monitoring the variety of FIs to comply with the AML/CFT regime by providing 
the necessary guidance and creating the trust of the financial entities. The MAS also 
                                                 
117 ibid. 
118 ibid 1, 3. 
119 Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), ‘MAS and CAD to jointly investigate market miscon-
duct offences’ (17 March 2015) <http://www.mas.gov.sg/News-and-Publications/Media-Re-
leases/2015/MAS-and-CAD-to-Jointly-Investigate-Market-Misconduct-Offences.aspx> accessed 21 
May 2019.  
120 The CDSA 1992, s 30(1); see Veltrice Tan, ‘The art of deterrence: Singapore’s anti-money laun-
dering regimes’ (2018) 25(2) Journal of Financial Crime 467, 474. 
121 The AMLA 1999, ss 34, 35, 36, 38, 40, 46, 48, 49, 55. 
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develops its AML/CFT policy of active enforcement to ensure that all obliged enti-
ties build a strong culture of compliance and then comply with the AML/CFT regu-
lations and guidelines strictly.  
 MAS has issued AML directions, guidelines and regulations that have the 
obligation of law, particularly the STRs requirements that FIs comply with its 
rules.122 The MAS and STRO have encouraged FIs and other REs of their duty to 
periodically review their client relationships, especially the STRs procedures, a risk-
based policy, KYC/CDD, internal control in their businesses.123 The STRO works in 
partnership with the MAS to review and check for ensuring that any professional 
intermediaries under their supervision have complied with their AML legislation to 
prevent money laundering and its associated crimes.124  
 In summary, the MAS is not a part of the Singapore Government (comprising 
the President and Cabinet Members), while the MAS is a statutory board that acts as 
the national central bank, and serves as banker to and monetary agent of the Govern-
ment.125 Therefore, it has been suggested that since the MAS is not the part of the 
Singapore Government, it has greater operational independence and flexibility in its 
functions and operations.126  
 The next section focuses on the AML/CFT Steering Committee in Singapore 
that has been established by various agencies in fighting the money laundering re-
gime.  
                                                 
122 The MAS Act 1972 (Cap 186, 1999 Rev Ed), s 27B and the Banking Act (Cap 19, 2008 Rev Ed), 
s 55 empowers MAS to issue AML notices (containing binding directions).  
123 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 178. 
124 ibid 191. 
125 Veltrice Tan, ‘the art of deterrence: Singapore’s anti-money laundering regimes’ (2018) 25(2) 
Journal of Financial Crime 1, 7; see Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), ‘about us’ <About Us 
(mas.gov.sg)> accessed 13 December 2020. 
126 Veltrice Tan, ‘the art of deterrence: Singapore’s anti-money laundering regimes’ (2018) 25(2) 
Journal of Financial Crime 1, 7; see Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), ‘about us’ <About Us 
(mas.gov.sg)> accessed 13 December 2020. 
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5.3.1.3 The Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terror-
ism Steering Committee 
 The Singapore’s Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing Terror-
ism Steering Committee (AML/CFT Steering Committee) comprises the Permanent 
Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of 
Finance, and Managing Director of the MAS. 127  In June 2015, the Singapore 
AML/CFT Steering Committee published a national AML/CFT Policy Statement128 
that aims to detect, deter, including prevent money laundering, associated predicate 
offences and terrorism financing, and to protect the integrity of the Singapore finan-
cial system from money laundering and other criminal activities.129  
 Additionally, in 2013 the AML/CFT Steering Committee produced a Na-
tional Risk Assessment (NRA), which identified the risks of money laundering and 
terrorist financing regarding the Financial Sector.130 The Singapore NRA process has 
promoted background knowledge for the private sector and government authorities 
to deeply understand money laundering and terrorist financing risks in Singapore.131 
Such assessment assists relevant authorities in keeping an effective risk-based re-
gime to fight money laundering, as well as allocating financial sector and individuals 
to better understand the money laundering risk in their own business and a cus-
tomer’s risk profile.132 If the assessment report is publicised, it will increase greater 
                                                 
127 Ministry of Finance (n 29).  
128 ibid.  
129 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 65.  
130 Ministry of Home Office, Ministry of Finance (MOF) and Monetary Authority of Singapore 
(MAS), Singapore National Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment Report 
2013 (Ministry of Home Office, MOF and MAS 2014). 
131 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 6. 
132 Monetary Authority of Singapore (n 100) 1. 
CHAPTER FIVE: Analysis of Competent Authorities and Financial Intelli-
gence Unit in Singapore  
222 
awareness of the money laundering and other serious crime risks in Singapore, as 
well as the approaches to detect, deter, reduce and prevent the crimes.133 Addition-
ally, the money laundering risk that was identified in the NRA will establish a robust 
culture of STR to detect and follow all cases of money laundering and other crimes 
in Singapore and overseas.134 
 The Singapore government requires FIs to take the NRA Report findings into 
account when they create their risk assessments, and this practice is similar to the 
UK.135 However, Thailand briefly demonstrates its NRA on the Anti-Money Laun-
dering Office (AMLO) website only because the full version is confidential. Thus, 
when lacking sufficient background knowledge, it is of course not efficient enough 
to support the financial sector and individuals to recognise and understand Thai-
land’s current AML/CFT risks and trends.136  
 According to national AML/CFT Policy Statement, the Committee, as a pri-
mary national government AML/CFT policy, has coordinated with STRO and all 
relevant competent authorities, which act as a valuable tool in AML policy develop-
ment, in order to mitigate money laundering and terrorist financing risks.137 To illus-
                                                 
133 Ministry of Home Affairs (n 4). 
134 Ministry of Home Office, Ministry of Finance and Monetary Authority of Singapore (n 130) 23. 
135 Kyle Wombolt, William Hallatt, Siddhartha Sivaramakrishnan and Pamela Kiesselbach, ‘En-
hanced anti-money laundering regime in Singapore: an update’  (Lexology, July 31 July 2015) 
<https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b5294fb8-c631-4c48-b015-64f27decb3ce> ac-
cessed 17 January 2018.  
136 Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO), ‘National Risk Assessment Report 2016’ (2 October 
2017)  <http://www.amlo.go.th/index.php/en/national-risk-assessment/2016-national-assessment-re-
port> accessed 1 February 2018; see Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), ‘National Risk As-
sessment’ (26 November 2016) <http://www.mas.gov.sg/regulations-and-financial-stability/anti-
money-laundering-countering-the-financing-of-terrorism-and-targeted-financial-sanctions/anti-
money-laundering-and-countering-the-financing-of-terrorism/national-risk-assessment.aspx> ac-
cessed 1 February 2018; see also HM Treasury and Home Office, ‘UK national risk assessment of 
money laundering and terrorist financing’ (15 October 2015)  <https://www.gov.uk/government/pub-
lications/uk-national-risk-assessment-of-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing> accessed 1 Feb-
ruary 2018.    
137 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 3. 
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trate, they are able to disseminate AML/CFT policies, guidance, and recommenda-
tions across the competent authorities. The next section examines the role of second-
ary authorities. 
 
5.3.2 The Role of Secondary Authorities 
 The risks of money laundering through a financial sector and individual can 
impact the reputation of Singapore’s financial centre.138 Therefore, secondary au-
thorities139 such as regulatory and supervisory agencies have played an important 
role to combat this threat. The next section discusses the role of the Commercial 
Affairs Department. 
 
5.3.2.1 The Commercial Affairs Department 
 To achieve the international requirements, in particular, the FATF Recom-
mendations Singapore government established the Commercial Affairs Department 
(CAD) in 1984 under the control of the Revenue Division of the Ministry of Finance 
to fight financial crime, including money laundering in Singapore.140   Due to the 
lack of an enforcement agency with the essential specialist and professional 
knowledge in fighting against the complex economic crimes, the CAD was trans-
ferred to be controlled by the Singapore Police Force (SPF).141  
 The CAD is the main investigation department, which has the responsibility 
for investigating in respect of money laundering, and other white-collar offences, 
                                                 
138 Ministry of Home Office, Ministry of Finance and Monetary Authority of Singapore (n 130) 34. 
139 See definition of secondary authorities in chapter 3. 
140 FATF Recommendations 27, 28; see Lee (n 44) 91. 
141 On 10th January 2000; see Lee (n 44) 91. 
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and has its intelligence and investigative resource in the SPF.142 Thus, the CAD 
works together with other SPF units and relevant law enforcement authorities such 
as the Corruption Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) and the Central Narcotics 
Bureau (CNB) concerning money laundering. Furthermore, the CAD also issues the 
AML Compliance Handbook, which contributes the additional AML information to 
relevant sectors.143  
 The CAD significantly uses the STRs at the processes of money laundering 
and predicates investigations in order to seize the criminal assets.144 The CAD can 
enter into a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the foreign jurisdiction in 
agreeing to the sharing of any information under the CDSA.145 Therefore, CAD 
would analyse requests from foreign authorities and help them gains information via 
formal and informal ways to confirm if there is adequate evidence to commence a 
domestic money-laundering investigation effectively.146 Unlike the UK and Thai-
land, the CAD in Singapore sets a single law enforcement agency for all types of 
financial crime.147 It is a focal point in collecting and exchanging financial intelli-
gence to disseminate to the relevant enforcement agencies to further investigate and 
prosecute against money laundering. The next section examines the Singapore Police 
Force. 
 
5.3.2.2 The Singapore Police Force  
                                                 
142 The Financial Investigation Group of the CAD is accountable for investigating criminal activities, 
such as money laundering, terrorist financing and other financial crimes; see also Cox (n 10)  616; see 
Samuel Sharpe, Duane Morris and Selvam, ‘Financial crime in Singapore : overview’ Practical Law 
Country Q&A 3-618-7957 (1 March 2017) 19, 19.  
143 Cox (n 10) 616. 
144 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 7. 
145 Sections 39(1), 41 of the CDSA 1992.  
146 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 56. 
147 Lee (n 44) 91. 
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 Singapore Police Force (SPF), a member of International Criminal Police Or-
ganisation (INTERPOL), is an investigative agency pursuant to Part IV of the Crim-
inal Procedure Code (CPC).148 It has the power to summon any person within a ju-
risdiction to attend and help its ML/TF investigations,149 as well as ordering the ac-
cess, or the production of documents and relevant evidence essential in its investiga-
tions. Furthermore, it might search or apply for searching relevant evidence that is 
essential to such investigations. Under the CDSA 1992, the SPF has closely coordi-
nated with STRO and Commercial Affairs Department (CAD)150 and other compe-
tent authorities, particularly information-sharing between national and international 
counterpart authorities for further comprehensive statistics database, investigations 
and prosecutions.151 The next section examines the Financial Investigation Division. 
 
5.3.2.3 The Financial Investigation Division 
 The Financial Investigation Division (FID), a section within the Commercial 
Affairs Department (CAD) of the Singapore Police Force (SPF), is the main agency 
for fighting white-collar crime by prosecuting the financial crime, authorising to 
search and seizure, and ordering FIs to monitor customer accounts carefully.152 The 
FID is divided into three branches to combat money laundering, including the Finan-
cial Investigation Branch (FIB), the Proceeds of Crime Unit (PCU) and STRO.153 
                                                 
148 Part IV of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC). 
149 Money laundering and terrorist financing investigations. 
150 The CAD is a department within the SPF that has the principal responsibility for investigating and 
taking enforcement operation regarding money laundering and other financial crimes; see Eric Chan 
and Agnes Lim, ‘Singapore’ in Lamia R Matta and Ann Sultan (eds), Anti-Money Laundering (Law 
Business Research 2017) 3 <http://shooklin.com/~slbadm/images/publications/2017/July/Anti-
Money-Laundering-2017-Singapore.pdf> accessed 18 July 2019. 
151 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 189, 200. 
152 Under the s 21 of Part IV of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) and the CDSA 1992 (2000 Rev 
Ed); see Chan, Leow and Shiau (n 93).  
153 The STRO is the Singapore Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU); see Anti-Money Laundering Forum, 
‘Singapore’ (27 January 2012) <https://www.anti-moneylaundering.org/asiapacific/Singapore.aspx> 
accessed 4 September 2017.  
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The FID receives intelligence from STRO to prosecute and convict various offences 
arising from these investigations. For example, the FID worked closely with the 
STRO, MAS and the Attorney-General’s Chambers (AGC) in the 1Malaysian De-
velopment Berhad (1MDB) in 2015 and withdrew the merchant bank status of BSI 
Bank and Falcon Bank resulting in the investigations prosecutions, and convictions 
of money laundering and its associated crimes.154 The next section examines the Fi-
nancial Investigation Branch. 
 
5.3.2.4 The Financial Investigation Branch 
 The Financial Investigation Branch (FIB), the branch of the CAD, is account-
able for investigating various money laundering attendants from bribery offences 
and/or other predicate offences pursuant to the CDSA 1992, including alleged crimes 
under the Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act 2002 (Cap. 325) (TSOFA).155 
The FIB manages requests for mutual legal assistance (MLA) from other foreign 
authorities with regard to bribery and money laundering offences.156 Furthermore, 
the FIB has worked with STRO REs to identify financial crime by using big data 
analysis from REs.157 The FIB receives intelligence from STRO for investigating 
money laundering and bribery-related predicate offences under the CDSA 1992.158 
The next section examines the Proceeds of Crime Unit. 
 
                                                 
154 Commercial Affairs Department (n 60) 47. 
155 Lee (n 44) 92; see Anti-Money Laundering Forum (n 153); see Cox (n 10) 616.  
156  Loh Yoon Min, ‘Contemporary measures for effective international cooperation’ 
<https://www.unafei.or.jp/publications/pdf/GG10/23_CP_Singapore.pdf> accessed 13 December 
2018.  
157  Commercial Crime Services, Financial institutions embrace AI to tackle money laundering’ 
<https://icc-ccs.org/index.php/1245-financial-institutions-embrace-ai-to-tackle-money-laundering> 
accessed 18 July 2019. 
158 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 184. 
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5.3.2.5 The Proceeds of Crime Unit 
 The Proceeds of Crime Unit (PCU), which is the branch of the CAD, is 
mainly responsible for investigating the criminal proceeds and services asset recov-
ering in an illegal investigation.159  This Unit also identifies, assesses, restraints, 
seizes and forfeits criminal assets or the proceeds of crime derived property from the 
illicit activities, and then operates them until there are further managements, such as 
the relevant confiscation or restitution orders under the CDSA 1992.160                  Sin-
gapore enforcement authorities can refer the criminal case to the PCU for a joint 
operation, investigation and subsequent prosecution, when they come across a po-
tential incidence of money laundering while investigating any money laundering of-
fence.161 STRO delivers intelligence to PCU for further investigations and prosecu-
tions of money laundering and associated predicate offences. The next section ex-
amines the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau.   
 
5.3.2.6 The Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau   
 Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) is an independent law en-
forcement agency and as a primary investigative agency in Singapore that aims to 
investigate the corruption offences and other involving offences such as money laun-
dering pursuant to the Prevention of Corruption Act (Chapter 241) 1960 (PCA), in-
cluding the Criminal Code.162 Like the CAD and the CPIB, they use the STRs at the 
                                                 
159 Anti-Money Laundering Forum (n 153).  
160 Anti-Money Laundering Forum (n 153).  
161 Cox (n 10) 616. 
162 The Prevention of Corruption Act (Chapter 241) 1960 (PCA) and the Criminal Code; see Financial 
Action Task Force (n 2) 7. 
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earlier stages of money laundering and predicate investigations to criminalise the 
benefits of the proceeds of crime.163 
 The PCA 1960 and the CDSA 1992 empower the CPIB to deal with the in-
vestigation of the corruption in Singapore, including in relation to the money laun-
dering offence.164 Section 37(1) of the PCA provides the extra-territorial powers over 
a Singapore citizen to deal with proceeds of corruption committed any place outside 
Singapore jurisdiction; for example, a person may dealt with money laundering of-
fence as if it had been conducted within Singapore.165 Consequently, non-citizens 
could be investigated, prosecuted, and convicted in Singapore in case that the involve 
or support the procedure of corruption concerned Singapore pursuant to the CDSA 
1992, 166  which covers and applies to any predicate offences and any property 
whether it is located in Singapore or elsewhere, including any criminal conduct and 
drug trafficking whether committing of such activities in Singapore or elsewhere.167 
 Under the CDSA 1992, the CPIB has continued to monitor Singapore’s rep-
utation with non-tolerance for corruption such as the punishment for corruption up 
to five years’ imprisonment and/ or a fine of SG$10,000.168 The CDSA 1992 applies 
to all persons that commit the predicate offence and for drug dealing and criminal 
conduct respectively.169 There are several jail sentences being distributed to some 
                                                 
163 ibid 7. 
164 Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB), ‘Prevention of Corruption Act’ (29 May 2017) 
<https://www.cpib.gov.sg/about-corruption/prevention-of-corruption-act> accessed 8 September 
2017; see also Chan, Leow and Shiau (n 93) 237.  
165 Section 37(1) of the PCA. 
166 Sections 3(3) and (5) of the CDSA 1992 (2000 Rev Ed), including s 34 of the Terrorism (Suppres-
sion of Financing) Act (Chapter 325) 2002 (2003 Rev Ed).  
167 Section 2(1) of the CDSA 1992 (2000 Rev Ed). 
168 Section 5 of the PCA 1960. 
169 Sections 46(1) and 47(1) of the CDSA 1992 (2000 Rev Ed). 
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private sector employees, who were convicted of corruption offences.170 For exam-
ple, Koh Seah Wee was accused in 2010 of money laundering and cheating offences 
amounting to S$12.5m and pleaded guilty with 22 years’ imprisonment in 2011.171 
The case showed that the accused persons, Koh Seah Wee, was former deputy direc-
tor of the in the Singapore Land Authority (SLA)’s Technology and Infrastructure 
(TI) department. The strong commitment of the CPIB illustrates good practice, 
which supports the STRO to fight money laundering regime effectively.172 In 2016, 
Singapore ranked the third least corrupt nation while Thailand ranked the 99th least 
corrupt nation out of 175 jurisdictions.173 Still, Singapore ranked the third out of 180 
countries in 2018, and Thailand remained in rank of the 99th out of 180 countries.174 
The CPIB strongly cooperate with the Attorney-General’s Chambers to deal with 
corrupt offenders, and such corporation produces the highest conviction rate at 100 
per cent in 2016.175 The next section explains the role of Attorney-General’s Cham-
bers. STRO supports CPIB through intelligence regarding money laundering and 
bribery offences.176 Furthermore, the STRO monitors the quality of STRs from the 
REs.177 The next section examines the Attorney-General’s Chambers. 
 
                                                 
170 Koh Seah Wee, Deputy Director of Technology and Infrastructure Department, Singapore Land 
Authority; see Corruption Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB), The Corruption Practices Investi-
gation Bureau Annual Report 2016 (CPIB 2016) 81. 
171 Koh Seah Wee, Deputy Director of Technology and Infrastructure Department, Singapore Land 
Authority; see Corruption Practices Investigation Bureau (n 164) 81. 
172 ibid 7. 
173 Trading Economics, ‘Singapore Corruption Rank’ <https://tradingeconomics.com/singapore/cor-
ruption-rank> accessed 2 February 2019; see also Trading Economics, ‘Thailand Corruption Rank’ 
<https://tradingeconomics.com/thailand/corruption-rank> accessed 2 February 2019. 
174 Transparency International, ‘Singapore’ <https://www.transparency.org/country/SGP> accessed 2 
February 2019; see also Transparency International, ‘Thailand’ <https://www.transparency.org/coun-
try/THA> accessed 2 February 2019.  
175 Corruption Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB), ‘Corruption in Singapore at low levels’ Press 
release by CPIB (20 November 2017) <https://www.cpib.gov.sg/press-room/press-releases/corrup-
tion-singapore-low-levels> accessed 2 February 2019.  
176 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 30. 
177 ibid 173. 
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5.3.2.7 Attorney-General’s Chambers 
 The Singapore Attorney-General’s Chambers (AGC) is an independent state 
body accountable for the prosecution of offenders, including money laundering that 
is investigated by the law enforcement authorities such as CPIB and CAD.178 It ad-
vises the Singapore Government in relation to domestic and international legislative 
matters, as well as supporting mutual legal assistance in criminal matters.179 Addi-
tionally, the AGC is a member of the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC), which sup-
ports the AML/CFT Steering Committee to develop and adapt the application of the 
national AML/CFT strategy.180 For example, the Attorney General (AG) is able to 
request the evidence from foreign authority regarding criminal proceeding in Singa-
pore.181  
 Furthermore, the AGC also issued the Practitioner’s Guide for Asset Recov-
ery for relevant competent authorities.182 Similar to Thailand’s Office of Attorney 
General (OAG), it coordinates between the LEAs’ investigation in money laundering 
investigations, particularly the asset recovery and restraint, which requests from 
Thailand’s FIU.183 The STRO acts as a buffer between FIs and LEAs, in particular, 
                                                 
178 Furthermore, the FTCD also provides legal advice to the relevant agencies; see  Attorney-Gen-
eral’s Chambers, ‘Financial and Technology Crimes Prosecutions’ (31 July 2017) 
<https://www.agc.gov.sg/our-roles/public-prosecutor/financial-and-technological-crime-prosecu-
tions> accessed 3 January 2019; see also Chan, Leow and Shiau (n 93) 229. 
179 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 22. 
180 ibid 21. 
181 Section 8 of the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (MACMA), Chapter 190A. 
182 Dennis Tan Chuin Wei, ‘The Practitioner’s Guide for Asset Recovery in Singapore’ (Attorney-
General’s Chambers 2016) <https://www.agc.gov.sg/docs/default-source/our-roles-documents/inter-
national-law-adviser/practitioner's-guide-for-asset-recovery-in-singapore---13-september-2016.pdf> 
accessed 3 January 2019.  
183 The Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO) is a Thailand’s FIU; see Asia/Pacific Group on 
Money Laundering (APG), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures – 
Thailand Fourth Mutual Evaluation Report (APG September 2017) 7. 
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the AGC by disseminating intelligence to the AGC, which leads to the AGC prose-
cution of money laundering and associated predicate offences. The next section ex-
amines the Casino Regulatory Authority. 
 
5.3.2.8 The Casino Regulatory Authority of Singapore  
 The Casino Regulatory Authority of Singapore (CRA) supervises the poli-
cies, procedures, and measures of the casinos for the detection of the risk of money 
laundering, the submitting of STRs and the conducting of disclosures to the STRO 
in order to prevent the casinos from the purpose of misuse by the criminals, and to 
assure that gaming in a casino is operated honestly.184 For example,        s 139(1) of 
the Casino Control Act 2006 determines that the casino shall conduct the CDD meas-
ure by filing the cash transactions regarding a total amount of SG$10,000 or more in 
such transaction.185 The CRA has engaged with the CAD and MAS to understand 
the emerging money laundering typologies and trends, then developed proper AML 
measures by learning and sharing best practices to all casinos.186 The STRO assists 
the CRA in examining a casino licence through the useful intelligence or STRs to 
protect the criminal organization or their associates from being the casino opera-
tor.187 The next section examines the Central Narcotics Bureau. 
5.3.2.9 The Central Narcotics Bureau 
                                                 
184 Under s 39 of the CDSA 1992 (2000 Rev Ed); the Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act (Cap. 
325) 2002 (2003 Rev Ed); the Casino Control Act (Chapter 33A) 2006 (2007 Rev Ed); and the Pre-
vention of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Regulation 2009. 
185 Section 139 of the Casino Control Act (Chapter 33A) 2006 (2007 Rev Ed) identifies the CDD 
measures for all casinos to conduct to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. 
186 Casino Regulatory Authority (CRA), Annual Report 2017/2018 <https://www.cra.gov.sg/docs/de-
fault-source/default-document-library/cra_annual_report_2017_2018.pdf> accessed 28 January 
2019.  
187 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 180. 
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 The Central Narcotics Bureau (CNB) works closely with the CAD, other SPF 
units, and relevant law enforcement authorities such as the Corrupt Practices Inves-
tigation Bureau (CPIB) in order to investigate money laundering offences that are 
involved with drug trade under the CDSA 1992, including, the Criminal Procedure 
Code 2010 (CPC) and the Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act 2002 
(TSOFA).188 STRO has closely worked with the CNB via disseminating intelligence 
regarding money laundering, terrorist financing, corruption and bribery-related pred-
icate offences to the CNB for further investigations.189 The next section examines 
the Inter-Agency Committee. 
 
 
5.3.2.10 Inter-Agency Committee  
 The Inter-Agency Committee (IAC), a key operational body that supports the 
implementation of the Singapore AML/CFT policy launched by the Singapore’s 
AML/CFT Steering Committee, comprises the Singapore’s principal AML/CFT au-
thorities such as the STRO, policymakers, law enforcement agencies, customs and 
tax authorities, supervisors, the Attorney General’s Chambers, and the intelligence 
services.190 STRO coordinates with the IAC to develop the Singapore’s NRA for the 
relevant persons to understand the national and international ML/TF risks threaten-
ing Singapore financial system.191 Finally, the STRO has participated with the IAC 
                                                 
188 Sections 34, 55 of the CDSA 1992, Part IV of the CPC; s 20 of the TSOFA. The CNB established 
its own specialist investigative unit to investigate, search, seizure of evidence regarding money laun-
dering, terrorist financing, or relevant predicate offences; see International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
Singapore: Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes-FATF Recommendations for Anti-
Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism Staff Country Reports No. 09/66 (IMF 
February 2009) 5. 
189 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 184. 
190 ibid 21. 
191 ibid 6. 
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to improve the process of the implementation of international standards in Singapore 
successfully.192 The next section examines the role of tertiary authorities. 
 
5.3.3 The Role of Tertiary Authorities 
 Industry association and other key stakeholders can involve in the AML re-
gime in Singapore in order to protect themselves from being abused from the purpose 
of money laundering.193 The tertiary AML authorities have supported and worked 
with the STRO in regards to the management of the STRs regime and risk of money 
laundering. The STRO associates with the MAS to issue the NRA report for the REs 
and public in order to raise awareness of such risks and develop international and 
national networks to fight money laundering and its associated crimes.194 The next 
explains the role of an Association of Banks in Singapore.  
 
5.3.3.1 The Association of Banks in Singapore 
 Since Singapore is the FATF’s member, all banks in Singapore must consider 
and conduct their business actions in compliance with the FATF Recommendations 
and Singapore AML legal framework.195 Association of Banks in Singapore (ABS) 
is a non-profit organisation that represents the interests of the commercial and in-
vestment banking community, upholds the integrity of its members, and cooperates 
with the international and domestic organization under the purpose of the ABS.196 
The ABS, which consists of eight banks, is also a member of the Steering Group. 
                                                 
192 ibid 37. 
193 ibid 133. 
194 ibid 37. 
195 The Financial Action Task Force 40+9 Recommendations.  
196 Association of Banks in Singapore (ABS), ‘About us’ <https://abs.org.sg/about-us/our-role> ac-
cessed 2 February 2019.  
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The ABS cooperates with MAS and CAD in order to improve the AML regime.197 
For example, the MAS and the ABS launched two critical guidelines: the ABS 
Guidelines on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism 
on 13 November 2015, and the ABS’s Guidelines on Tax Crimes and the Private 
Banking Industry Group’s Industry Sound Practices for all banks to reduce the 
money laundering risk and increase the quality of the STRs obtained from the 
banks.198  
 The 2016 FATF MER showed that the STR reporting regulation is generally 
well understood by banking and financial sector in order to conduct properly regard-
ing the AML regulation’s requirements.199 Consequently, there were 29,082 STRs 
in 2014, which increased by approximately 30% from 2013.200 The ABS takes steps 
to decrease the money laundering risk by encouraging all banks to comply with AML 
legislation’s requirements.  
 ABS, co-chaired with the MAS and STRO in the Anti-Money Laundering 
and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Industry Partnership (ACIP), has raised 
awareness on AML/CFT and encouraged the increase in quantity and quality of 
STRs filing to the STRO through its effective guidelines, which can support the 
STRO in producing useful intelligence for LEAs for investigations and prosecu-
tions.201 The next section explores the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the 
Financing of Terrorism Industry Partnership. 
 
                                                 
197 Monetary Authority of Singapore (n 106). 
198 Association of Banks in Singapore (n 83) 7; see also Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 113. 
199 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 8. 
200 Association of Banks in Singapore (n 83) 8. 
201 Commercial Affairs Department (n 60) 15. 
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5.3.3.2 The Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terror-
ism Industry Partnership 
 The Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism In-
dustry Partnership (ACIP), which was established in April 2017, is the public-private 
collaboration between the industry and the government authorities such as MAS and 
CAD to exchange information and view on AML/CFT in order to identify, assess, 
and mitigate the international risks of money laundering and terrorist financing in 
Singapore.202 ACIP improves the level of communication between the regulated sec-
tor and the regulators, which enhances the preventive measure, especially the STR 
requirements, by sharing financial information between them in order to understand 
and de-risk money laundering.203  
 Leng, the former Assistant Managing Director (Banking & Insurance) of 
MAS, supports that the ACIP institutionalises the close relationship and partnership 
between the relevant industries and Singapore government concerning with the 
AML/CFT matters because such collaborative method brings about various perspec-
tives to analyse, identify and solve the transnational risks in order to better detect, 
deter and defend the country from international crimes.204 Furthermore, Chew, the 
former Director of CAD, also stated that ACIP enhances both regulated sector and 
regulator to apply ACIP as best practice and share the relevant products to develop 
a better understanding the risks and the STR requirements.205 It was clearly seen on 
                                                 
202 Internal Security Department (ISD), a specialised and dedicated squad of investigators that gathers 
and analyses financial intelligence regarding all terrorism-related activities, and the terrorist financing 
activities, also works with and uses STRO’s intelligence in supporting its investigation; see Monetary 
Authority of Singapore (n 106); see also International Monetary Fund (n 177) 6. 
203 Straits Times, ‘New Singapore offensive against money laundering, terrorism financing’ (Straits 
Times, 25 April 2017) <http://www.straitstimes.com/business/banking/offensive-against-money-
laundering> accessed 31 January 2018.  
204 Monetary Authority of Singapore (n 106). 
205 ibid. 
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14th May 2018 that ACIP issued two best practice guidelines on approaches towards 
the trade-based money laundering and the misuse of legal persons in order to advo-
cate private sectors and public agencies to identify the ultimate beneficial owners.206  
 FATF identifies trade-based money laundering as the process of hiding the 
process of crime, as well as transferring value via the exercise of trade transactions 
in order to legitimate their criminal origins, particularly the countries that are the 
financial and trade hub like Singapore and the UK.207 Moreover, ACIP also created 
a sub-group, namely Legal Persons Working Group (WG), to provide suggestions to 
the private sector.208 Consequently, ACIP helps to enhance a good understanding of 
money laundering risks, including the money laundering typologies, as well as sup-
port a good risk culture within the FIs.  
 STRO acts as a buffer between the financial sector and LEAs. ACIP is a pri-
vate-public partnership that helps the STRO in bringing together the regulators, FIs, 
financial sector, LEAs, and other government entities to understand, identify, evalu-
ate, and reduce risks of money laundering and its associated predicate crimes threat-
ening Singapore.209 The STRO provides its feedback or recommendations via ACIP 
best practices paper to enhance national risk understanding of the FIs and other en-
tities.210 The next section examines Singapore Exchange Limited. 
                                                 
206 Low Jun Xiang, ‘Singapore’s ACIP releases guidance on Legal Persons and Trade-Based Money 
Laundering’ (AML-CFT, 15 May 2018) <https://aml-cft.net/singapores-acip-releases-guidance-on-le-
gal-persons-and-trade-based-money-laundering/> accessed 31 May 2018.   
207 ibid.   
208 ibid.   
209 The ACIP working group on Trade-Based Money Laundering (TBML) concentrates common 
TBML ‘red flags’ and emerging typologies as industry best practices for the identification and reduc-
tion of TBML risks; see Association of Banks in Singapore (ABS), ‘AML/CFT Industry Partnership 
(ACIP)’ (18 May 2018) <https://www.abs.org.sg/industry-guidelines/aml-cft-industry-partnership> 
accessed 20 July 2019.  
210 ibid; see also Law Society of Singapore, “Anti-money laundering (‘AML’) and countering the 
financing of terrorism (‘CFT’) industry partnership (‘ACIP’) best practices pa-
pers”<https://www.lawsociety.org.sg/For-Lawyers/Running-Your-Practice/Anti-Money-Launder-
ing-and-Counter-Terrorism-Financing/AML-and-CFT-Industry-Partnership-Best-Practices-Papers> 
accessed 20 July 2019.  
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5.3.3.3 The Singapore Exchange Limited 
 The Singapore Exchange Limited (SGX), a self-regulatory organisation, acts 
as a regulator to develop a marketplace with respective transparency, fairness and 
safety through the monitoring and supervising under the regulations of the Singapore 
Exchange Securities Trading Limited (SGX-ST) Listing Manual (the Listing Man-
ual).211 It also reviews the listed companies on the SGX-ST that are required to 
strictly comply with the Listing Manual on regular basis, or else they would be in-
vestigated and imposed for violating such regulations by the SGX.212 For example, 
the SGX enables to issue guidance, administer the rules for the relevant marketplace, 
monitor surveillance on the conduct of its stakeholders, enforce compliance with the 
rules, and impose financial sanctions or warn the companies which breach its regu-
lations.213 The SGX has issued a financial trade surveillance handbook on market 
misconduct to support brokerages or the business of brokers to deter, detect, defend 
and stop the market rigging.214 However, only the investigations in relation to anti-
money laundering and counter-terrorist financing would be under the supervision of 
the MAS.215  
 Although Singapore has the strong AML legislation framework it has also 
faced several money-laundering cases and delisting that has weakened its position as 
                                                 
211 Chan, Leow and Shiau (n 93) 228.  
212 Ong Chong Tee, the MAS Deputy Managing Director; see Aaron Low, ‘MAS to up its market 
surveillance capability, says SGX should remain a self-regulatory organisation’ (The Straits Times, 
28 January 2016) <http://www.straitstimes.com/business/companies-markets/mas-to-up-its-market-
surveillance-capability-says-sgx-should-remain-a> accessed 7 September 2017. 
213   Nish Shetty, Janice Goh and Wan Ho, ‘Financial services compliance’ (Getting The Deal 
Through, May 2018) <https://gettingthedealthrough.com/area/107/jurisdiction/58/financial-services-
compliance-singapore/> accessed 2 February 2019.  
214 Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC), ‘Managing Upstream Risk’ (2016) 22 Regulatory Reform Re-
view: An Asian Perspective 1, 21. 
215 Aaron Low (n 212).  
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an international financial centre. Even though in the Singapore stock market, the 
SGX regulatory committee set recently that all foreign-listed firms have a Singapore-
based auditor, in an offer to strengthen investors’ confidence about the SGX 
stocks.216  
 STRO plays a key role to exchange information with the SGX in order to 
receive information regarding securities and capital markets lodged by FIs and dis-
seminate to LEAs to conduct further investigations and prosecutions of money laun-
dering and associated predicate offences under the CDSA 1992.217 The STRO works 
with the SGX to improve the transparency of the process and the ability to comply 
with the AML regulations.218 Therefore, the STRO database contains the crucial fi-
nancial intelligence that can help LEAs deal with a variety of crimes.219 The next 
section examines the Establishment of Singapore Financial Intelligence Unit. 
 
5.4 The Establishment of Singapore Financial Intelligence Unit  
 Section 3A of the CDSA 1992 established the STRO as a Singapore’s central 
body to receive, analyse financial information from obliged entities, including from 
government agencies and reporting entities upon request, and then distribute to rele-
vant law enforcement and/ or regulatory authorities.220 Section 39 of the CDSA 1992 
determines for all persons to submit the STRs to the STRO if they know or have 
                                                 
216 The Economist, ‘Advantage Singapore’ (22 July 2020) <https://www.eiu.com/n/advantage-singa-
pore/> accessed 25 December 2020.  
217 ‘Court extends ban on Airocean’s ex-director’. 
218 Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), ‘Capital Markets Enforcement’ (January 2016) at 25 
<https://www.mas.gov.sg/-/media/MAS/News-and-Publications/Monographs-and-Information-Pa-
pers/MAS-Capital-Markets-Enforcement.pdf> accessed 20 July 2019. 
219 ibid. 
220 Section 3A of the CDSA 1992 (2000 Rev Ed). 
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reasonable grounds to suspect that any assets involve drug dealing or criminal con-
duct.221 Therefore, the STRO officers can obtain additional information and docu-
ment from obliged entities to conduct its analysis.222 The STRO applies all infor-
mation to improve the strategic analysis to deal with money laundering and associ-
ated crimes, and then uses such information and statistics in the national risk assess-
ment report (NRA).223 While Thailand’s FIU, AMLO, has the power to order any 
person to provide a statement or give a written explanation or any account, docu-
ments or other evidence for examination or analysis.224 
 STRO can directly access to all online information of the law enforcement 
and other government authorities, including the SPF’s system, namely CRIMES II, 
which allow the STRO to link with all database regarding the enforcement activities 
operated by the SPF.225 STRO issues its guidelines to ensure the intelligence deliv-
ering to the relevant authorities, including the foreign FIUs with the effective, se-
cured, dedicated, and protective approaches under s 41(1) of the CDSA 1992.226 
STRO creates security vetting on its officers and manages its training for its staff on 
the understanding of their duties in dealing with confidential and sensitive intelli-
gence. STRO has developed its standard operating procedure (SOP) to ensure its 
operation meeting international standards.227 
                                                 
221 Sections 39, 48C of the CDSA 1992 (2000 Rev Ed). 
222 Section 39 of the CDSA 1992 (2000 Rev Ed). 
223 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 182. 
224 Section 38 of the AMLA 1999; see Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (n 2) 181. 
225 STRO has developed a Web-based Intelligence Analytic and Graphical Visualisation System 
(WINGS), which is a very specialised analytical instrument to effectively analyse and integrate all 
various information from CRIMES and commercial databases for the STRO; see Financial Action 
Task Force (n 2) 182. 
226 ibid 182. 
227 ibid 183. 
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 STRO has the power and ability to decide and operate its function inde-
pendently.228 It has its specific budget allocated from the overall SPF budget.229 It 
has full autonomy in deciding on its deployment to organize its functions and man-
power under s 2 of the CDSA 1992.230 While Thailand’s FIU is not under the Prime 
Minister Office, Ministry, or Sub-Ministry, but directly reports to the Prime Minister 
in order to conduct its function independently and neutrally.231 Consequently, the 
FATF noted that Thailand’s FIU has still faced a minor deficiency regarding ade-
quate operational independence. For example, the Anti-Money Laundering Board 
(AMLB) has a significant power over the Transaction Committee (TC), the AMLO, 
and the Secretary-General of the AMLO although the Thailand AMLA 1999 em-
powers the AMLO as an independent body, not within the structure of another au-
thority.232 The FATF rated ‘compliant’ for Singapore level of compliance with the 
FATF Recommendation 29, whilst Thailand was rated ‘largely compliant’.233 
 Paragraph 13.3 of the MAS Notice on the Prevention of Money Laundering 
and Countering the Financing of Terrorism guides that the suspicions of circum-
stances include the event when the relevant financial sector for any person cannot 
complete the AML measures as required by paragraphs 6, 7 and 8, or when the client 
is reluctant, unable or unwilling to present any information asked by such relevant 
financial sector, and demands to withdraw a pending application to initiate business 
relations or a pending transfer, or to quit existing business relations.234 Nevertheless, 
                                                 
228 ibid 183. 
229 ibid 183. 
230 Section 2 of the CDSA 1992. 
231 Section 40 of the AMLA 1999; see Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (n 2) 182. 
232 Sections 25, 40 of the AMLA 1999, which has been analysed in chapter 6; see Asia/Pacific Group 
on Money Laundering (n 2) 183. 
233 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 183; see Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (n 2) 183. 
234 Paragraph 13.3 of the Notice to Holders of Stored Value Facilities, MAS Act 1970, CAP. 186; see 
also Monetary Authority of Singapore (n 98) 26.  
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in the 2016 MER, the FATF rated ‘compliant’ for Singapore in implementing the 
FATF Recommendation 29 while Thailand was rated ‘largely compliant’ for this 
Recommendation.235  
 The FATF said that the insurance sector in Singapore has not well understood 
the STR requirements by submitting the defensive reporting to the FIU,236 which can 
illustrate that such insurance sector had insufficient compliance resources to operate 
its role properly, including the denial about the AML risks that are originated by their 
businesses without analysis.237 Besides the fear of financial sanctions, the obliged 
entities lack the knowledge on money laundering typologies and fail to adopt such 
knowledge and risk-based strategic policies and procedures that can bring about the 
defensive reporting.238  
 Singapore realised that all obliged entities must also focus on their staff train-
ing in relation to the entire suspicious transaction reporting requirements in order to 
prevent from the issue of a flood of poor quality of suspicious transaction reports or 
defensive reporting, which are submitted by the fear of sanctions and the lack of 
precise guidelines.239 However, the STRO has not received the low quality and 
usefulness of the STRs by submitting without much consideration of whether there 
are bases for suspicion, but fear of sanctions. For example, there are 10,931 STRs in 
2009; 11,312 STRs in 2010; 12,024 STRs in 2011; 15,917 STRs in 2012; 18,297 
STRs in 2013 and 24,483 STRs in 2014. The STRs are increasing every year, but 
                                                 
235 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 183.   
236 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 91. 
237 Michael Levi, ‘E-gaming and money laundering risks: a European overview’ (2009) 10 ERA Fo-
rum 533, 544. 
238 Jayesh D’Souza, Terrorist Financing, Money Laundering, and Tax Evasion: Examining the Per-
formance of Financial Intelligence Units (CRC Press 2011) 128. 
239 Jean-Francois Thony, ‘Processing Financial Information in Money Laundering Matters: The Fi-
nancial Intelligence Unit’ (1996) 4 EUr. J. Crime Crim. L. & Crim. Just 257, 261. 
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some reporting entities filed the unnecessary STRs to the STRO such as the money-
lender and insurance.240  
 Thus, the MAS and the STRO, including relevant law enforcements, should 
enhance their guidance and mutual communication practically to direct and indirect 
each other rather than motivating them with administrative or criminal sanctions for 
any breaches.241 Therefore, banks in Singapore have paid about US$2.8M           per 
year for such compliance cost, and in consequence the budgets of AML compliance 
cost might increase at least 20 per cent in 2016.242  
 Banks in Asia have spent approximately US$1.5bn (SG$2bn) per year for 
AML compliance to prevent the banking system from financial crimes at banks and 
this burden has kept rising.243 The STRO analyses STRs by using tools like data an-
alytics. It also observed steady growth in STRs filed in recent years. It must develop 
the process of enhancing STRO’s data analytic engine to increase its effectiveness 
of Singapore’s FIU.244 
                                                 
240  Law Society of Singapore, ‘Suspicious Transaction Reporting’ <https://www.lawsoci-
ety.org.sg/For-Lawyers/Running-Your-Practice/Anti-Money-Laundering-and-Counter-Terrorism-
Financing/Suspicious-Transaction-Reporting> accessed 22 December 2018; see Financial Action 
Task Force (n 2) 99. 
241 Manuel Beccar Varela, Maximilianao D’Auro, Franciaco Zavalia and Tadeo Leandro Fernandez, 
‘Argentina’ in Nicolas Bourtin (ed), The International Investigations Review (7th edn, Law Business 
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242 Jamie Lee, ‘Anti-money laundering compliance costs Asia banks SG$2 billion a year’ (The Busi-
ness Times, 17 June 2010) <http://www.asiaone.com/business/anti-money-laundering-complicance-
costs-asia-banks-2-billion-year-report>  accessed 5 September 2017. 
243 LexisNexis received 210 responses on a survey conducted in late 2015-respondents included those 
from China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. 
244 Commercial Affaires Department (n 60) 5.  
CHAPTER FIVE: Analysis of Competent Authorities and Financial Intelli-
gence Unit in Singapore  
243 
 The STRO is the Singapore FIU, located within the CAD,245 aiming to deal 
with the receipt and analysis of the STRs,246 financial information, the Cash Move-
ment Reports (CMRs), the Cash Transaction Reports (CTRs), in order to dissemi-
nate247 the intelligence to relevant law enforcement authorities to deter, detect, seize 
proceeds of crime.248 The STRO’s responsibilities include providing instructions, 
guidance, case studies, and feedback to improve the quality of the STRs obtained 
from the reporting entities.249 For example, STRO works with CAD to improve its 
procedures to enhance the intelligence and its exchange of intelligence with other 
FIUs.250 As a member of the Egmont Group, the STRO also supports the interna-
tional cooperation and exchange FIU intelligence among the Egmont Group mem-
bers, including the global forums and regional organisations in the international 
AML/CFT efforts.251 Therefore, the foreign FIUs’ feedback supports the effective 
cooperation from the STRO, especially the quality and the timeliness of the intelli-
gence granted.252 
 The CDSA 1992 empowers the STRO to have the powers to communicate 
and share intelligence disclosed to the relevant authorised officer to a corresponding 
                                                 
245 The STRO is now located under the Intelligence Group (IG) in the CAD of the SPF. The reporting 
entities should submit the copy of STR to the MAS for updated information; see Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers (PWC), ‘Know Your customer: Quick Reference Guide’ <https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/fi-
nancial-services/publications/assets/pwc-anti-money-laundering-2016.pdf> accessed 19 January 
2019.  
246 Section 3A(a) of the CDSA 1992 (2000 Rev Ed). 
247 Section 3A(b) of the CDSA 1992 (2000 Rev Ed). 
248 Competent authorities include relevant enforcement and regulatory authorities; see Commercial 
Affairs Department (CAD), Commercial Affairs Department Annual Report 2014 (CAD 13); see also 
Cox (n 10) 616. 
249 Singapore Police Force (SPF), ‘Suspicious Transaction Reporting Office (STRO)’ (2 March 2018) 
<https://www.police.gov.sg/about-us/organisational-structure/specialist-staff-departments/commer-
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250 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 54. 
251 The STRO is a member of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units (Egmont Group); see 
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252 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 127. 
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authority253 of a foreign jurisdiction.254 However, due to the low number of the Let-
ters of Undertaking and Memoranda of Understanding,255 STRO is limited in the 
number of foreign FIUs to directly access, exchange and share relevant information 
and some tax information from the Customs because there were some restrictive reg-
ulations on the share of information.256  
 Under the Egmont Group Principles of Exchange, STRO has developed the 
standard operating procedure to support the exchanging intelligence between foreign 
counterparts, including undertake joint money laundering investigations with foreign 
partners in order to identify possible money laundering.257 Therefore, the mutual in-
ternational cooperation between the foreign FIUs and foreign regulatory agencies in 
a close working relationship with international FIUs through the Egmont Group, as 
well as doing the investigations of this case, is important to the STRO to obtain rel-
evant information, documents and evidences from other FIUs in order to help fight 
money laundering effectively. Therefore, STRO issued its ‘Guidelines (STRO) on 
                                                 
253 Corresponding authority means the authority of foreign jurisdiction accountable for gaining infor-
mation that corresponds to anything needed to be disclosed to an authorised agency under the s 39(1) 
of the CDSA 1992. Section 39(1) of the CDSA 1992 and Part VA of the Legal Profession Act and 
the Legal Profession (Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism) Rules 2015 de-
termine that STRO communicates any intelligence disclosed to any authorised officer relating to the 
knowledge and/or suspicion that any property is obtained from crime or drug trade. This Provision 
provides that the law practice or legal practitioner must reveal the matter and submit the STRs to 
STRO or a relevant authorised officer via the e-filing system; see Law Society of Singapore (n 228). 
254 Sections 40, 41 of the CDSA 1992 (2000 Rev Ed) allow the STRO can share financial intelligence 
with its foreign counterparts or foreign FIU, based on the reciprocity and confidentiality through their 
memoranda of understanding (MOUs); see Sharpe, Morris and Selvam (n 142) 29.  
255 The terms ‘Letters of Undertaking’ hereinafter ‘LOU’; the term ‘Memoranda of Understanding’ 
hereinafter ‘MOU’; STRO had signed 30 MOUs with the foreign FIUs, as well as had received two 
LOUs from the Switzerland and Norway FIUs; see United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), Country Review Report of Singapore Review by Lebanon and Swaziland of the Imple-
mentation by Singapore of articles 15-42 of Chapter III “Criminalisation and law enforcement” and 
articles 44-50 of Chapter IV. “International cooperation” of the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption for the review cycle 2010-2015 (at 194) <https://uncaccoalition.org/files/Cycle1-Country-
Report-Singapore.pdf> accessed 13 December 2018.  
256 Recommendation 40; see Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 204. 
257 Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units Prin-
ciples for Information Exchange between Financial Intelligence Units (Egmont Group 2013) 4; see 
also Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 56, 127. 
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International Request for Third Party dissemination’ and ‘Guidelines on Outgoing 
request for assistance from STRO to foreign FIUs’ to improve the capacity of rele-
vant sectors in identifying possible money laundering risk.258 Such guidelines assist 
STRO in ensuring the dissemination of the STRs through dedicated, secured, protec-
tive, and effective ways,259 as well as enhancing the cooperation between competent 
authorities.260     
 Additionally, STRO and MAS closely work to issue the rules on the ‘know 
your customer’ (KYC) principles which are inconsistent with the Recommendations 
of the FATF to improve the quality and quantity of the STRs, as well as promoting 
the AML/CFT awareness of private sector.261 STRO and other law enforcement au-
thorities have used STRs to detect a broad kind of financial crime and terrorist fi-
nancing, especially money laundering.262 The STRO has also attempted to evolve 
the red flag indicators, which are used as the criteria for private and public sectors in 
order to reduce money laundering risk in their sectors.263  
 The 2008 FATF Mutual Evaluation Report (MER), the FATF Recommenda-
tion 26 requires the FIUs to focus on detecting and identifying money laundering 
                                                 
258 Section 41 of the CDSA 1992; see Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 56, 204, 208. 
259 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 182. 
260 ibid 42. 
261 The STRO and law enforcement authorities (LEAs) work with other relevant competent agencies, 
including private sector to enhance the red flag indicators by using the database from the national risk 
assessment (NRA) in order to develop the detection of money laundering in public and private sectors; 
see Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 17; see also Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Ministry of 
Finance (MOF), and Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), Singapore National Money Launder-
ing and Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment Report (MHA, MOF and MAS 2014); see also Law 
Gazette, ‘Red flag indicators – Reporting suspicious transactions: Your reporting obligations’ 
<https://lawgazette.com.sg/practice/compass/red-flag-indicators-reporting-suspicious-transactions/> 
accessed 8 December 2018. 
262 Law Society of Hong Kong, ‘Unclear whether suspicious transaction reports helping to win the 
AML/CFT fight’ Hong Kong Lawyer (October 2016) <http://hk-lawyer.org/content/unclear-whether-
suspicious-transaction-reports-helping-win-amlctf-fight> accessed 14 January 2019.  
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cases rather than on detecting and identifying the predicate offences.264 According 
to the 2008 MER, the FATF rated ‘Large Compliant’ with the operational independ-
ence of Singapore’s FIU (i.e. the STRO).265 In the 2011 FATF Second Follow-up 
Report, the FATF stated that Singapore has enhanced its degree of compliance with 
the FATF Recommendations of ‘Largely Compliant’ at a minimum.266 Then, in 2016 
the FATF rated Singapore FIU a ‘Compliant.’ The improved rating indicated that 
Singapore effectively met the FATF requirement.267  
 The STRO has provided its publications and training session to the reporting 
entities in order to update the latest information regarding the typologies of money 
laundering268 and also detect the STRs submitting to the STRO.269 For example, 
since 2000 the CAD has used the STR information to seize US$ 111m of the pro-
ceeds of crime.270 Furthermore, the STRO reported that in 2012 there were 17,975 
STRs, 22,417 in 2013 and 29,082 in 2014.271 The STRO reported that a third (about 
10,080 STRs) came from the banking sectors, while there were 6,737 STRs from 
casinos and 6,645 STRs from the money-changers or remittance agents.272 In 2016 
there was an increase of 12 per cent of the STRs (total of 34,129 STRs), which were 
                                                 
264 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Third Mutual Evaluation Report Anti-Money Laundering 
and Combating the Financing of Terrorism: Singapore (FATF/OECD 2008) 65. 
265 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 65 and 181. 
266 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of 
Terrorism – Singapore Mutual Evaluation Second Follow-Up Report (FATF 2011) at para 15. 
267 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 183, 207. 
268 The STRO analyses the data into financial intelligence to detect money laundering, including ter-
rorism financing and associated criminal offences; see Commercial Affaires Department (n 60) 26. 
269 There was a 4 per cent increase in the number of STRs submitted to the STRO compared to 2016; 
see Commercial Affaires Department (n 60) 27. 
270 Cox (n 10) 616. 
271 Today Weekend, ‘30,511 suspicious financial transactions reported in Singapore in 2015’ (To-
dayonline, 20 September 2016) <http://www.todayonline.com/singapore/30511-suspicious-financial-
transactions-reported-singapore-2015> accessed 17 September 2017. 
272 The figure sharply increased to 30,511 in 2015; see Today Weekend (n 271). 
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more than one-third of STRs filed from the banking sector submitted to the STRO.273 
However, the STRO argued that such increase implied a higher level of awareness 
of anti-money laundering efforts by the reporting entities only.274 These reporting 
activities play a significant role in fighting money laundering in Singapore.275  
 The STRO has the power to directly access relevant law enforcement infor-
mation; also, the Singapore Police Force (SPF) has direct access to the STRO intel-
ligence.276 However, the 2016 FATF MER assessed that Singapore has restricted ac-
cess to trade and tax information.277 According to the 2016 FATF MER, the STRO 
has to deal with the issue of sufficient intelligence regarding the trade and tax to 
conduct its responsibilities.278 
 Section 21 of Part IV of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) and s 39(1) of 
the CDSA 1992 oblige relevant regulated sector, including individuals, to submit the 
suspicious transaction reports (STRs) to the STRO when they know or have reason-
able grounds to suspicious that any asset involves the proceeds of crime or intends 
to link to the criminal conduct pursuant to an offence under s 44(1)(a) of the CDSA 
1992.279 Under the CDSA 1992, the person that reveals potential offences receives 
                                                 
273 Aperio Intelligence, ‘UK publishes 2017 National Risk Assessment of money laundering and ter-
rorist financing’ (October 2017) Financial Crime Digest 1, 24 <https://www.aperiointelli-
gence.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/aperio_intelligence_fcd_october2017.pdf?utm_source=Oc-
tober+2017++Financial+Crime+Digest&utm_campaign=b552c9bf13Aperio_Intelligence_FCD_Oc-
tober_2017&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1bcf699e5b-b552c9bf13-198192249> accessed 3 
November 2017; see also Tan Tam Mei, ‘12% increase in suspicious transactions reported: Commer-
cial Affairs Department’ (Straits Times, 9 October 2017) <http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/12-
increase-in-suspicious-transactions-reported-says-commercial-affairs-department> (accessed 30 Jan-
uary 2018).   
274 Aperio Intelligence (n 273).  
275 Singapore Police Force (n 248).  
276 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 7. 
277  ibid 6. 
278 Singapore criminalised the laundering of proceeds from tax offences as money laundering predi-
cate offences pursuant to ss 62, 63 of the Goods and Services Tax Act; see also The Second Schedule 
of the CDSA 1992.  
279 Section 21 of Part IV of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) and ss 39, 44(1)(a) of the CDSA 1992 
(2000 Rev Ed); Ang Jeanette v PP [2011] 4 SLR 1. 
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legal protection such as the legislative immunity against civil proceedings and ano-
nymity.280 Failure of these regulations would be imposed on criminal sanctions.281 
Therefore, the CDSA 1992 obliges a member of the reporting sector to report the 
grounds of suspicion of ML activities or associated predicate offences to the 
STRO.282  
 After receiving information from REs, the STRO delivers intelligence to the 
MAS or competent authorities to initiate their investigations and prosecutions appli-
cable to money laundering offence as set out in the CDSA 1992’s requirements.283 
However, the STRO noted that there are a large and increasing number of STRs 
submitted by defensive reporting (i.e. filing STRs without sufficient consideration 
of whether there are grounds for suspicion).284 In R v Da Silva, the Court considered 
that the FIs must think that the term ‘suspicion’ means beyond the possibility that is 
more than imaginary, unrealistic or fictitious, and closely connected to facts exist.285 
Additionally, the law does not need the suspicion to be clearly or absolutely 
grounded and fixed on exact facts or specified on reasonable ground.286 Similar to 
Singapore, the High Court Judge also adjudicated in Ow Yew Beng v PP287 and Koh 
Hak Boon & Ors v PP288  that the term ‘suspicion’ for the relevant sector means a 
level of conviction of money laundering offence that is lower than certainty, but a 
higher one than speculation.  
                                                 
280 Sections 39(6), 40 and 40A of the CDSA 1992 (2000 Rev Ed). 
281 Notice on Reporting of Misconduct of Representatives by Financial Advisors [Notice No. FAA-
N14]. 
282 CDSA 1992, s. 39(1). 
283 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 98. 
284 ibid 98. 
285 [2006] EWCA Crim 1654. 
286 R v Da Silva [2006] EWCA Crim 1654. 
287 [1993] 3 SLR 427 
288 [2003] 1 SLR 536. 
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 The CDSA 1992 protects a person (including an officer, an employee or an 
agent), who submits an STR or relevant information to STRO as soon as possible 
after knowledge regarding suspicious transactions had been received, under section 
39 of CDSA 1992, from money laundering offences.289 Therefore, reporting entities 
that fail to file an STR to the STRO can be imposed of a money laundering offence.290 
Then, the FIs must deal with the situation after the STR such as how to avoid a risk 
of tipping-off.291 In WBL Corporation ensLtd v Lew Chee Fai Kevin, the WBL Cor-
poration (Corp.) suspected Kevin Lew Chee Fai (Lew), the former chief financial 
officer at the WBL Corp., that he had involved in insider dealing activity that could 
be money laundering offence.292 The WBL Corp. had earlier filed an STR to the 
STRO.293 The Court considered that s 40 of the CDSA 1992 discharged the WBL 
Corp. that filed a proper STR from legal liability for money laundering offence.294 
Consequently, MAS took civil action against Lew for insider dealing, but no criminal 
prosecution.295   
 After that, in 2015 MAS, AGC, CAD and STRO have instigated a legal in-
vestigation of the 1MDB case, which was suspected to involve with the money laun-
dering proceeding.296 Consequently, the MAS stated that Falcon Private Bank has 
been shut down by withdrawing its bank license because it related to the suspicious 
1MDB transactions.297 Furthermore, the eight banks, consisting of the BSI Bank, 
                                                 
289 Section 40 of the CDSA 1992 (2000 Rev Ed) removes the mental factor of a possible money laun-
dering charges, without which the money laundering offence could not be imposed. 
290 Section 39(1) of the CDSA 1992 (2000 Rev Ed); Koh Hak Boon & Ors v Public Prosecutor [1993] 
3 SLR 427. 
291 Section 48 of the CDSA 1992 (2000 Rev Ed). 
292 [2012] 2 SLR 978 at [31]. 
293 Sections 39(1), 40, 44 of the CDSA 1992 (2000 Rev Ed). 
294 WBL Corporation Ltd v Lew Chee Fai Kevin [2012] 2 SLR 97. 
295 Lew Chee Fai Kevin v MAS [2012] SGCA 12. 
296 Chan and Shiau (n 93) 239. 
297 Section 28(5) of the MAS Act 1970. The MAS also fined Falcon Private Bank, which owned by 
the International Petroleum Investment Company from Abu Dhabi, about S$4.3m for AML breaches; 
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Falcon Bank, DBS Bank, UBS AG,298 Standard Chartered Bank,299 Coutts & Co 
Ltd,300 Credit Suisse and United Overseas Bank, had been fined a total of SG$291 
million for different violations of the MAS’s AML requirements, especially the 
breaches of the MAS Notice 1014 and 626.301  
 However, several individuals were convicted and sentenced to prison for 
money laundering offences, failing to report the STRs and market misconduct.302 For 
example, Jens Sturzenegger, the Singapore branch manager of the Falcon Bank, was 
arrested by the CAD on 5 October 2015.303 Yak Yew Chee, a former Managing Di-
rector of BSI Singapore Bank, was sentenced to 18 weeks’ imprisonment and fine of 
S$24,000 on 11 November 2016 for concealing the net worth of Low Taek Jho and 
for failing to report the STRs of funds by Low Taek Jho.304 Yeo Jiawei, the former 
                                                 
see Ann Williams, ‘MAS shuts down Falcon Private Bank in Singapore, slaps fines on DBS and UBS 
after 1MDB probe’ (Straits Times, 11 October 2016) <https://www.straitstimes.com/business/bank-
ing/mas-shuts-down-falcon-private-bank-in-singapore-slaps-fines-on-dbs-and-ubs-after > accessed 
20 January 2019.  
298 Falcon Private Bank Ltd, Singapore Branch (Falcon Bank) was withdrawn license of the merchant 
bank status because of its serious failure in AML controls and inappropriate conduct by its senior 
management at the head office in Switzerland and the Singapore branch (i.e. it failed to adequately 
evaluate irregularities in activities regarding customer accounts, and STRs); see Williams (n 297). 
299 Singapore Branch. 
300 Singapore Branch. 
301 The former chairperson influenced the Singapore branch related to the processing the suspicious 
transaction despite several red flags under the Guidelines to MAS Notice 1014 on Prevention of 
Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (24 April 2015) (i.e. this guideline to 
all merchant banks) and the Guidelines to MAS Notice 626 on Prevention of Money Laundering and 
Countering the Financing of Terrorism (24 April 2015) (i.e. this guideline to all banks); see also 
Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), ‘Financial penalties imposed on Credit Suisse and UOB 
for 1MDB-related transactions’ <http://www.mas.gov.sg/News-and-Publications/Media-Re-
leases/2017/Financial-Penalties-Imposed-on-Credit-Suisse-and-UOB-for-1MDB-Related-Transac-
tions.aspx> accessed 9 September 2017. 
302 ibid.  
303 Jens Fred Sturzenegger was imprisoned 28 weeks and fined SG$128,000 over six charges; Public 
Prosecutor v Jens Fred Sturzenegger Singapore State Courts; see Commercial Affaires Department 
(n 60) 46. 
304 Williams (n 297). 
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Wealth Planner at BSI Bank, involved with several 1MDB related suspicious trans-
actions around SG$26m.305 Eventually, he was sentenced to 30 months’ imprison-
ment, the longest jail term in the 1MDB case in Singapore, and faced seven charges 
pending before the Court (i.e. two charges for money laundering, four charges of 
cheating and one charge of forger, respectively.)306 
 The STRO created the Project STRO Data Management, Analytics and Re-
porting System (Project STRARS), to make its information technology system easy 
and secured for the reporting entities when filling the form and submitting the STRs 
to the STRO for collecting, analysing, and delivering financial intelligence, espe-
cially helping to raise the AML awareness in the financial industry.307 This experi-
ence illustrates that the STRO has realised that technological system is an important 
tool to fight money laundering effectively.  
 The CDSA 1992 empowers the STRO to obtain and analyse information, and 
then disseminate intelligence to LEAs and its foreign counterparts, subject to na-
tional legislative and operational framework.308 The STRO has full autonomy in de-
ciding on its budget and resource to carry out its core functions through independent 
arrangements for information exchange with national competent agencies and for-
eign counterparts that can support the role of STRO to meet international stand-
ards.309 The next section examines the model of Singapore’s FIU. 
 
                                                 
305 Commercial Affaires Department (n 60) 46. 
306 ibid 47. 
307 In 2016, the STRO achieved two national and international awards (namely the National Team 
Excellence Symposium, and the International Exposition for Team Excellence Competition) for this 
Project. In 2017 the STRO also obtained a Gold award for the Project at the International Convention 
on Quality Control Circles (ICQCC) in Philippines; see Commercial Affaires Department (n 60) 28. 
308 Financial Action Task Force and Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (n 2) 204. 
309 ibid 183. 
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5.5 The Model of the Singapore Financial Intelligence Unit 
 The Singapore financial intelligence unit is the STRO, which was established 
in 2000 under the Intelligence Group (ING) of the Commercial Affairs Department 
(CAD) of the Singapore Police Force (SPF).310 Section 3A of the CDSA 1992 pro-
vides the STRO to act as the principal agency accountable for receiving and analys-
ing the reports of suspicious transactions, namely the suspicious transaction reports 
(STRs), which consist of all kinds of reports from reporting entities, including infor-
mation from reporting entities and government authorities upon request and then dis-
seminating the financial intelligence to relevant law enforcement bodies.311  
 Additionally, STRO has its budget, which was delivered from the overall 
SPF’s budget to support its independent functions.312 The CDSA 1992 determines 
that the Minister appoints a STRO to work under the purposes of this Act.313  Singa-
pore FIU model is an administrative-type FIU similar to the UKFIU model.314 Unlike 
Thailand, its FIU model is a hybrid-type FIU, which combines the administrative, 
judicial and law enforcement-type FIUs.315 Thony noted that the administrative-FIU 
model should be completely independent.316  
 In relation to the independence of the Singapore FIU, the 2016 FATF MER 
of Singapore rated ‘compliant’ on Recommendation 29, which presented that Singa-
pore meets the requirement of the FATF Recommendations effectively. The FATF 
noted that the Singapore FIU has the authority and ability to handle its core functions 
independently. It seems that the FIU receives its appropriate own distinct budget, 
                                                 
310 ibid 181. 
311 Section 3A of the CDSA 1992 (2000 Rev Ed). 
312 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 183. 
313 Section 2(1) of the CDSA 1992 (2000 Rev Ed).  
314 Pieth and Aiolfi (n 36) 420. 
315 Ashley Lee, ‘Asia’s anti-money laundering focus sharpens’ (2015) International Financial Law 
Review 1, 1.  
316 Thony (n 238) 257, 268. 
CHAPTER FIVE: Analysis of Competent Authorities and Financial Intelli-
gence Unit in Singapore  
253 
resources and full autonomy in deciding on its operations to manage its responsibil-
ities. In accordance with the CDSA 1992, the AML/CFT Steering Committee and 
the ACIP supports the independence of the Singapore FIU effectively.  
 As the above investigation on Singapore system, Thailand can learn im-
portant lessons from Singapore in order to improve the system and fight against the 
money laundering, including learning the FIU model of Singapore and emphasising 
the operational independence of the STRO. In addition, Thailand government should 
establish the committee consisting of the private and public sectors to strengthen the 
STRs regime and develop the independence of the Thailand like Singapore do.  Such 
lessons can help the Thailand government support the role of STRO in dealing with 
its duty. The next section assesses the evaluation of the implementation of AML 




5.6 Evaluation of Implementation of AML policy of Singapore 
 This thesis compares the legislation regarding the role of the Singapore’s FIU 
at the domestic level in dealing with money laundering with the UK’s and Thailand’s 
under the implementation of the FATF Recommendation 29.317 In the 2008 FATF 
Mutual Evaluation Report (MER), the FATF assessed that the Singapore had an ex-
tensive legislative framework and robust AML/CFT system.318 Cox noted that Sin-
gapore’s AML provisions are the most robust financial crime prevention laws and 
                                                 
317 The former FATF Recommendation 26. 
318 Singapore conducted a compliant with 11; largely compliant with 32; partially compliant with 
four; and non-compliant with two of the FATF 40 + 9 Recommendations; see Financial Action Task 
Force (n 2) 128; see also Yeo and Tan (n 28) 1148; see also Chanjarorn (n 43), see also Cox  
(n 10) 615.           
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procedures in Asia.319 In 2011, the FATF indicated that Singapore has achieved the 
level of compliance with the FATF Recommendations, i.e. the ‘Largely Compliant’ 
at a minimum.320 The FATF’s assessment showed that Singapore has enhanced its 
AML regime in line with the FATF’s recommendations in the 2008 MER.321 How-
ever, the FATF noted that deficiencies still existed regarding statistical data , the wire 
transactions, the AML guidance, the feedback, the transparency, the beneficial own-
ership of legal persons, as well as the politically exposed persons (PEPs).322 The 
FATF concluded that the Singapore’s financial intelligence unit (FIU), the STRO 
used well-structured systems and robust coordination mechanism to deal with FIU 
intelligence information into the relevant competent agencies to support identifica-
tion and investigation of money laundering activities.323 
 The 2016 MER concluded that Singapore has a strict legal framework, which 
has increased the number of the money laundering investigations, prosecutions and 
convictions.324 Therefore, this has been improved by Singapore legislation, money 
laundering investigation policies, and the financial intelligence.325 For example, Sin-
gapore implemented the FATF standards by complying with the level of ‘Compliant’ 
for 18 and ‘Largely Compliant’ for 16 of the FATF 40 Recommendations.326 Alt-
                                                 
319 Cox (n 10) 396. 
320 Yeo and Tan (n 28) 1148. 
321 ibid 1148. 
322 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 3, see also Cox (n 10) 615. 
323 Radish Singh and Ankur Shukla, ‘A closer look at the FATF Mutual Evaluation Report for Singa-
pore’ (Deloitte & Touche Financial Advisory Services 2016) 3 <https://www2.deloitte.com/con-
tent/dam/Deloitte/sg/Documents/finance/sea-fas-closer-look-at-the-fatf.pdf> accessed 3 January 
2019; see also Cox (n 10)  615. 
324 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 6. 
325 Johnathan W Lim, ‘A facilitative model for cryptocurrency regulation in Singapore’ in David Lee, 
Handbook of Digital Currency: Bitcoin, Innovation, Financial Instruments, and Big Data (Academic 
Press 2015) 361. 
326 Know Your Country, ‘Singapore’ <https://www.knowyourcountry.com/singapore1111> accessed 
4 September 2017.   
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hough Singapore has an excessive robust investigative framework, it has not suffi-
ciently illustrated the effectiveness in identifying or investigated money laundering 
regarding foreign criminal offences, which involved Singaporean shell companies 
and money mules in receiving the proceeds of foreign wire transfer crimes.327 There-
fore, the FATF recommended that Singapore should bridge the gaps in money laun-
dering regime, including strengthening the comprehensive risk assessment of all 
types of legal person to verify money laundering, improving the effectiveness of su-
pervision of non-financial institutions, as well as investigating more offences of the 
laundering of foreign proceeds of crime in relation to the money mules and shell 
companies.328   
 According to the 2016 FATF MER, the level of effectiveness of Singapore’s 
AML system and the level of compliance with the FATF standards can contribute to 
the knowledge for Thailand to improve its AML policies. Levi asserted that the pos-
itive working relationship between the efficiently trained and motivated staff in FIs 
and the FIUs and relevant law enforcements can develop the AML regime in order 
to achieve an AML regime like the UK.329 Thus, Singapore has also attempted to 
increase an extensive international cooperation network for improving the supervi-
sion, regulation, law enforcement and financial intelligence in combating money 
                                                 
327 Neil Boister, An Introduction to Transnational Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2018) 169; 
see Michael Findley, Daniel Nielson and Jason Sharman, ‘Global shell games: Testing money laun-
derers’ and terrorist financiers’ access to shell companies’ (Griffith University Centre for Governance 
and Public Policy 2012) 3 <http://www.michael-findley.com/up-
loads/2/0/4/5/20455799/global_shell_games.media_summary.10oct12.pdf> accessed 2 January 
2019. 
328 Chanjarorn (n 43).         
329 Michael Levi, ‘Banks, policing and the regulation of money laundering in England and Wales’ in 
Joseph J Norton and George Walker (eds), Bank: Fraud and Crime (2nd edn, Informa Law from 
Routledge 2000) 46. 
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laundering.330 The FATF rated Singapore’s FIU as ‘compliant’ in line with its Stand-
ards.331 
 The CDSA 1992 established STRO as a Singapore’s FIU and an independent 
agency in dealing with money laundering and its associated crimes, particularly 
STRs regime, by working with LEAs and competent authorities to detect such 
crimes.332 It is responsible for receiving and analysing from REs, as well as dissem-
inating intelligence regarding money laundering to relevant LEAs as the administra-
tive-FIU model, and this systematic process can support the operational independ-
ence of the STRO.333 As a result, the FATF and APG rated compliant for the effec-
tiveness of the STRO in line with the international standards.334 
 Regarding the independence of the Singapore FIU, the cooperation between 
the STRO and the Attorney-General’s Chambers (AGC) is a key element to ensure 
that strong enforcement action is carried out money laundering, in particular the op-
erational independence of the FIU. In addition, the MAS is a statutory board335 with 
acts as the central bank of Singapore, in particular is not a part of the Government, 
therefore, it has greater independence and flexibility in its operations, which could 
also support the independence of the Singapore FIU while carry out its functions 
without political influence and interference.336 Furthermore, the Anti-Money Laun-
                                                 
330 Ministry of Home Affairs (n 4).  
331 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 183. 
332 CDSA 1992, s 3A; see Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 17. 
333 CDSA 1992, s 39). 
334 Financial Action Task Force (n 2) 183. 
335 The MAS’s Board Directors consist of Cabinet Members; see Veltrice Tan, ‘The art of deterrence: 
Singapore’s anti-money laundering regimes’ (2018) 25(2) Journal of Financial Crime 1, 7 
<http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/88777/1/Tan_The%20Art%20of%20Deterrence_Accepted.pdf> accessed 25 
December 2020. 
336 Veltrice Tan, ‘The art of deterrence: Singapore’s anti-money laundering regimes’ (2018) 25(2) 
Journal of Financial Crime 1, 7 <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/88777/1/Tan_The%20Art%20of%20Deter-
rence_Accepted.pdf> accessed 25 December 2020. 
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dering and Countering Financing Terrorism Steering Committee (AML/CFT Steer-
ing Committee), as well as the ACIP would be the great example of best practices to 
assist the Singapore FIU to operate its function independently. The Singapore FIU is 
best practice for the independence of the FIU it was rated ‘compliant’ for Recom-
mendation 29. As reasons mentioned above, the Thailand government also learn the 
valuable lessons from Singapore to enhance its independence of the FIU effectively. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
 The primary objective of this chapter was to demonstrate the role of compe-
tent authorities and FIU towards tackling money laundering in Singapore. This chap-
ter has revealed several AML legislations and the result of their operations in STR 
regime, including several key similarities and differences between their roles in order 
to meet the international requirements. To achieve the FATF Recommendations, the 
Singapore government by MAS issued and revised the MAS to Notice 626 and 1014 
to assure that the financial sector in Singapore would strongly comply with the in-
ternational AML legal requirements, especially the STR requirements. The STRO is 
responsible for the examination for compliance of AML requirement by receiving, 
analysing the STRs and other financial information and delivering the intelligence 
to the relevant regulatory and law enforcement agencies under the CDSA 1992. 
 The robust collaboration and continuous cooperation between the MAS and 
private sector are significant to support the obliged entities to increase their under-
standing of money laundering risks in order to prevent the financial institutes from 
being used, intentionally or unintentionally for the purpose of criminal activities. 
However, the STRO should improve more sophisticated data analytics capabilities 
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to gain the financial intelligence and disseminate to relevant law enforcement au-
thorities.  
 In line with the FATF Recommendations, the FATF considered that Singa-
pore has implemented its AML regime with a strong commitment to the international 
standards effectively. In consequence, the Singapore government has acted proac-
tively in establishing and refocusing the deterrent and preventive measures pursuant 
to the FATF standards to control FIs and individuals to comply with such measures. 
Along with other AML facilitation initiatives, such as the Egmont Group and the 
APG, the cooperation between jurisdictions seeks to increase the ease of preventing 
the financial market from money laundering. For instance, the most common AML 
strategy used in Singapore, the UK and Thailand has been the imposition of financial 
sanctions and investigation of alleged breaches of AML requirements on FIs to pre-
vent the FIs and relevant persons from being used for future money laundering ac-
tivities. In Singapore, the Attorney-General, as the Public Prosecutor has the legal 
power to prosecute money laundering, similar to the UK’s Crown Prosecutor Service 
and Thailand’s Attorney-General. However, The FIU of Singapore adopts the similar 
model to the UK’s which is administrative model FIU, while Thailand’s FIU has 
been using hybrid type FIU. In summary, Singapore, as an international financial 
market and transportation centre, should develop more strategic information sources, 
namely the global electronic fund transaction reports, market data, to improve the 
existing reports that allow awareness and understanding of the threat of money laun-
dering. Singapore has developed STRs system to improve its information technology 
system to be secured and convenient for the reporting entities when filing the STRs 
to the STRO. MAS, STRO and industry sector regulators would also create their 
guidelines on AML measures such as CDD, the handbook of STRs, and the kind of 
CHAPTER FIVE: Analysis of Competent Authorities and Financial Intelli-
gence Unit in Singapore  
259 
suspicious transactions for each reporting entity, including the NRA, which are usu-
ally publicly available.  
 Therefore, the MAS and STRO should enhance a much better understanding 
of money laundering risks with the reporting entities by improving the level of mu-
tual communication and information sharing between the reporting entities and law 
enforcement authorities, including delivering the feedback from the STRO and rele-
vant authorities to the reporters effectively. These approaches can develop the quality 
of the STRs filed. However, in Singapore the STRO is not able to impose financial 
penalties on the REs for failing the STR regulations, but the MAS is able to impose 
such penalties in order to prevent future money laundering offence. Similar to the 
UK’s FIU, NCA cannot impose any sanctions on the REs. Still, the enforcement 
strategy of Singapore can be in contrast to that used in the UK by the FCA who can 
initiate criminal proceedings for a broad scope of financial crime related to criminal 
offences, especially money laundering. The AMLO, Thailand’s FIU, is able to im-
pose financial fines and instigate criminal proceedings for money laundering offence 
because the AMLA 1999 provides the judicial and law-enforcement powers (i.e. hy-
brid-FIU model) to the AMLO to utilise it in the duty.  
 In relation to the independence of the FIU, the Singapore AML/CFT Steering 
Committee, as well as the ACIP are the key elements to enhance the Singapore FIU 
to operate its functions free from the undue interference and influence.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
Analysis of Competent Authorities and Financial Intelligence Unit in Thailand 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 Thailand requires foreign investment to develop the country’s economy.1 
However, the risk of money laundering from a number of criminal activities continues 
to threaten Thailand,2 but has also affected the reputation of its financial system.3 
Examples of money-laundering activities in Thailand include hiring a nominee to 
open an account for the true beneficial owner for criminal purposes and the use of 
trading transactions to hide the money trail.4 In 1999 Walker estimated the annual 
amount of money laundering in Thailand was approximately US$ 32,834m. 5  
In 2016, the National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA) concluded 
that the total amount of money laundered in Thailand was over THB 400bn (approx-
imately £9.3bn) annually.6 Thailand also continues to exist significantly as a transit 
jurisdiction for the illegal trafficking of drugs and a centre for money laundering 
                                                 
1 Seng Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna, ‘Interstate and intrastate dynamics in Southeast Asia’s War on 
Terror’ (2004) 24(1) SAIS Review of International Affairs 91, 97. 
2 For example, drugs, illicit remittances, cross-border crimes, illegal narcotics, logging and wildlife 
trafficking, illegal gaming, official corruption, underground lotteries, prostitution, human trafficking, 
counterfeit medicine, luxury automobile contraband smuggling, including arm trade; see U.S Depart-
ment of State, ‘International Narcotics Control Strategy Report Volume II Money Laundering and 
Financial Crimes’ (US Department of State, 2017) 8, 172 <https://www.state.gov/documents/organi-
zation/268024.pdf> accessed 15 August 2018; see also Know Your Country, ‘Thailand’ 
<http://www.knowyourcountry.com/thailand1111.html> accessed 28 May 2017. 
3 Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO), ‘Summary of 2016: National Money Laundering and Ter-
rorism Financing Risk Assessment’ <http://www.amlo.go.th/amlo-intranet/media/k2/attach-
ments/NRAYSumY2559YEN_7527.pdf> accessed 31 May 2018.  
4 Trade-based money laundering is the process of disguising the proceeds of crime and moving value 
via the use of trade transactions in an attempt to legitimate their illegal origins; see Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF), ‘Trade Based Money Laundering’ (FATF 2006) 3 <https://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Trade%20Based%20Money%20Laundering.pdf> accessed 21 
July 2019; see also Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO), ‘Money Laundering Situation in Thai-
land’ at 1, 3 <http://www.amlo.go.th/amlo-intranet/media/k2/attachments/TypoYEng_3117.pdf> ac-
cessed 20 May 2018.  
5 John Robert Walker, ‘How big is global money laundering?’ (1999) 3(1) Journal of Money Laun-
dering Control 25, 34. 
6 Thai currency is Thai Bath hereinafter ‘THB’; see Anti-Money Laundering Office (n 3).  
CHAPTER SIX: Analysis of Competent Authorities and Financial Intelligence 
Unit in Thailand 
261 
activities.7 It is estimated that 40 per cent of Thailand’s GDP (i.e. US$ 2bn) is laun-
dered by enormously illicit drug traders annually through financial institutions (FIs) 
in Thailand.8  
 In 2016, the Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO), Thailand’s FIU, esti-
mated that illegal proceeds in Thailand exceeded THB 400bn per year comprising of 
corruption about 34.46%, drugs about 23.15%, tax evasion about 12.84%, stock mar-
ket manipulation about 8.71%, and customs evasion about 8.02%. The activities ac-
count for 87.18% of total proceeds from all 28 predicate offences.9 For these reasons, 
the Thailand government must address the weaknesses in its money laundering pol-
icies and by producing up-to-date risk assessments and mitigation measures, as well 
as training AML staff, financial sector staff, and customs-check-point staff in order 
to prevent the financial sector from being abused by criminals.10 
                                                 
7 Peter Chalk, ‘Southeast Asia and the Golden Triangle’s Heroin Trade: Threat and Response’ (2000) 
23(2) Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 89, 91. 
8 Zachary Abuza, ‘Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al Qaeda and 
Jemaah Islamiyah’ (2003) 25(2) Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Stra-
tegic Affairs 169, 188, 193. 
9 Anti-Money Laundering Office (n 3).  
10 ibid.  
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 The Thailand government has implemented the international AML stand-
ards11 into its national legislation which includes AML preventive regulations re-
garding the suspicious transaction reports (STRs),12 civil asset seizure, and forfei-
ture, as well as the international cooperation.13 The government also established the 
Thailand’s financial intelligence unit as key agency to deal with the STRs regime in 
line with international AML instruments.14  
 The FATF Recommendation 29 refers to the independence of the FIU that 
Thailand has implemented into the AMLA 1999, s 40 already.15 However, it is es-
sential to find the degree of the independence of the Thailand FIU, as well as the 
influence or interference that hinder the independence of its FIU while acts as the 
national agency fighting money laundering, in particular how effective Thailand 
meet the international AML standards under the military coup regime (political in-
fluence).  
                                                 
11 The principal International standards consist of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traf-
fic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988 (Vienna Convention), United Nations Con-
vention Against Transnational Organised Crime, 2000 (Palermo Convention), and the United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption 2003 (Merida Convention), the FATF Recommendations, as well as 
best practices and industry guidelines. See discussion in chapter 3. 
12 The Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO) is Thailand’s FIU. The three main tasks of the AMLO 
comprise (1) the legal enforcement and the proceeding of legislative actions against the assets asso-
ciated with money laundering/terrorist financing offences; (2) the supervision of the obliged entities 
in AML/CFT matters; and (3) analysing the financial intelligence, and conducting strategic analysis, 
including acting as a domestic and international coordinator on anti-money laundering (AML) poli-
cies, as well as AML/CFT monitoring and supervision; see Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO), 
‘Background’ (6 October 2011) <http://www.amlo.go.th/index.php/en/2016-05-21-21-37-20/back-
ground> accessed 27 November 2018.    
13 Thailand Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO) is the Thailand FIU in the form of the hybrid-
FIU model (administrative, judicial, and law enforcement-FIU models). Each country can choose its 
preferred model FIU independently, such as administrative, law enforcement, judicial or prosecuto-
rial, and hybrid-type FIUs; see The Nation, ‘AMLO seeks law to block funding for weapons of mass 
destruction’ (The Nation, 9 October 2015) <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/national/AMLO-
seeks-law-to-block-funding-for-weapons-of-mas-30270498.html> accessed 12 September 2017. 
14 Anti-Money Laundering Act B.E.2542 (1999), s 40. 
15 Anti-Money Laundering Act B.E.2542 (1999), s 40. 
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 According to the FATF and Egmont Group standards, an operational inde-
pendence of an FIU is considered as a basic condition to an effective AML frame-
work, then the results of FIUs having such independence of its functions has a sig-
nificant effect on the efforts to fight money laundering.16 Regarding the independ-
ence of the FIU, the Thailand FIU was rated ‘largely compliant’ in implementing the 
FATF Recommendation 29, nevertheless there was an issue in term of its degree of 
operational independence, not sufficiently independent, which Thailand needs to im-
prove it when deal with the STRs regime.17 The 2017 Thailand MER criticized the 
Thailand FIU in relation to such weakness, in particular s 25(3) of the AMLA 1999 
on the independence of the FIU that can significantly undermine the performance of 
the FIU in fighting money laundering.18 In contrast, Thailand has several military 
coups, which such situations implied the unusual exploitation of the Thailand FIU’s 
functions for the benefits of the government under the coups regime. The thesis ar-
gues that the Thailand FIU may suffers from the lack of independence since there 
were several coups and the FIU is often subjected to the supervision of military gov-
ernment or political authorities that could be influenced and interfered by those who 
are outside the Thailand FIU. Therefore, it is vital to clarify this issue in order to find 
out the way to lead the FIU to meet the international AML standards19 efficiently. 
 Thus, this chapter reviews and focuses on the independence and role of the 
AMLO, Thailand’s FIU to implement,20 under the AMLA 1999 by comparing with 
                                                 
16 Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, Understanding FIU Operational Independence and 
Autonomy A Product of the Egmont Centre of FIU Excellence and Leadership (ECOFEL) (Egmont 
Group 2018) 3. 
17 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist 
financing measures – Thailand Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (APG 2017) 183. 
18 ibid. 
19 The FATF Recommendation 29 and the best international practices such as the Egmont Group of 
Financial Intelligence Units and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 
20 For example, receiving, analysing, disseminating, collecting evidence, and investigating in order to 
prosecute money laundering and predicate offences. 
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the UK’s and Singapore’s to understand how Thailand’s FIU deals with international 
AML standards.21 The chapter also examines how effective the Thailand’s FIU has 
implemented international AML standards.22 The chapter then proceeds to highlight 
the certain loopholes and weaknesses regarding the independence of the Thailand 
FIU within the AML legal framework of Thailand. Consequently, the Thailand AML 
framework can effectively be improved in addition to regulating the role of FIU. The 
next section examines the Thailand’s AML legislative framework. 
6.2 Thailand Anti-Money Laundering Legislative Framework 
 Thailand, as member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) 
and is duty-bound to implement international AML initiatives into its national regu-
lations.23 As previously outlined, this comprises the 1988 Vienna Convention, the 
2000 Palermo Convention, the 2003 Merida Convention, the FATF Recommenda-
tions and Basel Core Principles.24 The effective implementation of such international 
instruments on money laundering into domestic legislation is dependent on a stable 
and democratic system of government, but in Thailand there have been several mil-
itary coups against the democratically elected government and these political inter-
ruptions have adversely affected the action to enact and reform the legislation.25 
                                                 
21 A comparison of three countries (the UK, Singapore and Thailand) is to identify differences and 
similarities, strengths, weaknesses and loopholes for improving Thailand’s capability in implement-
ing the FATF standards. 
22 Goredema suggested that the AMLO is an interesting pattern for an institution to deal with money 
laundering; see Charles Goredema, ‘Measuring Money Laundering in Southern Africa’ (2005) 14(4) 
African Security Review 27, 36.  
23 Thailand and many other APG countries are signatories to the three principal UN AML conventions 
(consisting of the Vienna, Palermo and Merida Conventions). 
24 The implementation of the international AML standards and industry guidelines, as soft law, are 
discussed in chapter 3; see Seehanat Prayoonrat, An Overview of the Legal Framework of Thailand’s 
AML-CFT Activities (Anti-Money Laundering Office 2006) 9.  
25 Thailand had never been colonised, but instead had faced several military coups from 1932 to 1973, 
recently had on 22 May 2014; Akihiko Kawaura, ‘Generals in defense of allocation: Coups and mil-
itary budgets in Thailand’ (2018) 58 Journal of Asian Economics 72, 73; see also Shalendra D 
Sharma, The Asian Financial Crisis New International Financial Architecture: Crisis, Reform and 
Recovery (Manchester University Press 2003) 100; see also Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering 
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Consequently, Thailand has progressed slowly in implementing its operating plan to 
establish and take all action plans to determine and freeze terrorist assets, as well as 
closely supervising AML activities.26 However, the Thailand government has strictly 
adopted the international standards into its domestic legislation to strengthen the 
AML regime.27  For instance, the Thailand government enacted the Anti-Money 
Laundering Act B.E. 2542 (1999)28 that criminalising money laundering and estab-
lished the AMLO.29  
 Under the 1999 Act, Financial Institutions (FIs),30 Designated Non-Financial 
Business and Professions (DNFBPs)31 must report any cash transaction with the 
value of THB2m (approximately £47,600) or more and any property transaction val-
ued THB5m (estimate £119,000) or higher to the AMLO.32 If they fail to comply 
with such STR obligations, they will be fined up to THB 1m (approximately 
                                                 
(APG), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures: Thailand Mutual Eval-
uation Report (APG 2017) 14.  
26  Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘FATF Public Statement - 16 February 2012’ 
<https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-risk-and-other-monitored-
jurisdictions/documents/fatfpublicstatement-16february2012.html> accessed 7 November 2015, see 
also Nophakhun Limsamarnphun, ‘Thailand under new pressure on anti-money laundering laws’ (The 
Nation, 18 February 2012) <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/Thailand-under-new-pres-
sure-on-anti-money-launderi-30176140.html> accessed 11 September 2017, see also Financial Ac-
tion Task Force (FATF), ‘FATF Public Statement - 19 October 2012’ <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions/documents/fatfpublicstatement-
19october2012.html> accessed 11 September 2017.   
27 Price Water House Coopers Consulting (PWC), Economic Crime in Thailand (PWC 2016) 32. 
28 The Anti-Money Laundering Act B.E. 2542 (A.D.1999) hereinafter ‘AMLA 1999’. 
29 Since 1999 Thai government has made five times of the amendments of the AMLA 1999 in order 
to update, strengthen, and improve such law to meet the international AML standards (namely, the 
amendments in 2003, 2008, 2009, 2013, and 2015); see Peeraphan Prempooti, ‘Effective counter-
measures against money laundering in Thailand’ (March 2005) at 158 <http://www.unafei.or.jp/eng-
lish/pdf/RS_No67/No67_18VE_Prempooti.pdf> accessed 25 May 2018.  
30 Section 3 of the AMLA 1999 defines the term ‘financial institution’. 
31 Section 16 of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.3) B.E.2552 (2009) 
defines the term ‘designated non-financial business and professions (DNFBPs)’. 
32  The AMLA 1999 does not define a specific amount of the threshold degree for each financial 
transaction. However, under s 13(1) of the AMLA 1999, the Ministerial Regulation No.2 determines 
that cash transaction values THB 2m or more, and s 13(2) of the AMLA 1999, such Regulation states 
that any property transaction value THB 5m or more. 
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£23,800) and an additional amount not greater than THB 10,000 (approximately 
£240) for each day until the rectification is complete.33 
 In Thailand, the definition of ‘suspicious transaction’ is determined by s. 3 
of the AMLA 1999 to provide guidance on what amounts to suspicious activity.34 
Yingvoragan noted that transactions of unidentified cash to the high-risk countries 
from Thailand’s banks might be reported by the Money Laundering Reporting Of-
ficer (MLRO) to the AMLO because these transactions constitute grounds for suspi-
cion.35 As mentioned above, the thesis illustrates that Thailand’s AML provisional 
law identifies the definition of the term ‘suspicion’ more perspicuously than in the 
UK.36 However, it is important to understand that s 3 of AMLO 1999 defines suspi-
cious transactions with a broad explanation and general perspectives. Thus, the legal 
interpretation will be based upon the consideration of the relevant competent author-
ities when making their decision on each transaction.37 
                                                 
33 Section 62 para 1 of the AMLA 1999. 
34 Section 3 of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.4) B.E.2556 (2013); on 
the other hand, the UK POCA 2002 does not provide what the definition of suspicion is; see discussion 
regarding ‘suspicion’ in the UK in the case of R v Da Silva and K Ltd v National Westminster Bank 
Plc in chapter 4.   
35 Pakorn Yingvoragan, ‘Impact of anti-money laundering measures on banks and consumer custom-
ers in United Kingdom and A comparative study with Thailand’ 1, 9 
<http://www.oia.coj.go.th/doc/data/oia/oia_1498638576.pdf> accessed 24 May 2019. 
36 See discussion regarding definition of ‘suspicion’ in chapter 4. 
37 Section 3 of the AMLA 1999 defines ‘suspicious transaction’ as a transaction with reasonable 
grounds to believe that it is conducted to avoid the application of this Act, or transaction connected 
or possibly connected with the commission of a predicate offence or terrorist financing offence, not-
withstanding the transaction being single or multiple, and shall include an attempt to conduct such a 
transaction’; see also Yingvoragan (n 35). 
CHAPTER SIX: Analysis of Competent Authorities and Financial Intelligence 
Unit in Thailand 
267 
 However, given its inability to follow the stringent FATF guidelines and to 
make sufficient progress in 2012, Thailand was placed in the category of non-coop-
erative countries and territories (NCCTs),38 which meant the country lacked both ef-
fective AML/CFT strategies.39 The Thailand government had attempted to address 
these shortfalls by amending the AMLA 1999 via with the AMLA (No. 4) B.E. 2556 
(2013) and the Counter-Terrorism Financing Act B.E. 2556 (2013).40 This includes 
statutory provisions that criminalised terrorist financing, establishing and imple-
menting adequate procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets, as well as further 
strengthening AML/CFT supervision. 41  These amendments established the 
AML/CFT regulatory and legislative framework and strengthened the levels of  com-
pliance in order to meet the national AML Action Plan regarding the strategic 
AML/CFT deficiencies.42  As a consequence, Thailand was removed from the FATF 
NCCTs list.43 The FATF noted that Thailand had improved its AML regime and in-
dicated that Thailand has established the legal and regulatory framework in its Action 
                                                 
38 Financial  Action Task Force (FATF), ‘About the Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories 
(NCCTs) Initiative’ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdic-
tions/more/aboutthenon-cooperativecountriesandterritoriesncctinitia-
tive.html?hf=10&b=0&s=desc(fatf_releasedate)> accessed 29 November 2018; see also Financial  
Action Task Force (FATF), ‘Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: On-going Process – 22 Feb-
ruary 2013’ (Thailand) <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdic-
tions/documents/improvingglobalamlcftcomplianceon-goingprocess-22february2013.html#thai-
land> accessed 2 November 2015; see also John Fotiadis, ‘Thailand and the Financial Action Task 
Force’ (2012) 6(8) E-Finance & Payments Law & Policy 14, 14. 
39 Chat Le Nguyen, ‘Towards the Effective ASEAN Mutual Legal Assistance in Combating Money 
Laundering’ (2012) 15(4) Journal of Money Laundering Control 383, 387. 
40 The Thai Parliament just passed an amendment to the AMLA 1999 as amended in accordance with 
the AMLA (No. 4) B.E. 2556 (2013) and enacted the Counter-Terrorism Financing Act B.E. 2556 
(2013), hereinafter ‘the CTPF Act’, has become effective since 31 December 2016. 
41  U.S. Department of State, ‘2015 Investment Climate Statement’ 
<http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2015/241763.htm> accessed 27 June 2015; see also Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand, ‘Press Releases: FATF remove Thailand from Public 
Statement on Money Laundering/ Financing of Terrorism’ (Media Centre 1 May 2013) 
<http://mfa.go.th/main/en/media-center/14/34910-FATF-removes-Thailand-from-Public-Statement-
on-Mon.html> accessed 16 August 2018. 
42 Financial Action Task Force (n 38).   
43 The non-cooperative countries and territories (NCCTs) list roles as the FATF dark list for the fail 
jurisdiction in fighting money laundering; see Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO), Annual Re-
port 2013 (Text and Journal Publication 2014) 7; see also Financial Action Task Force (n 33).    
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Plan to meet the FATF standards by responding to the strategic deficiencies that the 
FATF had identified in February 2010.44 Thailand was, therefore, no longer subject 
to FATF’s monitoring process under its ongoing global AML compliance process.45 
Nevertheless, Thailand has still worked with the Asia-Pacific Group on Money 
Laundering (APG) and continues to achieve the full range of AML issues identified 
in its Mutual Evaluation Report (MER).46 
 In 2015 Thailand also revised the AMLA 1999.47  The revision required the 
obliged reporting entities to ensure their AML policies, and internal handbooks were 
also revised and updated in line with the new legislation amendment in order to 
bridge the gaps, especially to ensure the confidentiality of STRs.48 The 2015 amend-
ment introduced three important issues. Firstly, the Parliament added more predicate 
offences regarding human trafficking,49 misappropriation and associated crimes,50 
online gambling,51 unfair securities dealing practice and associated crime,52 as well 
as armaments.53 Secondly, the AMLA 1999 extends the range of the money launder-
ing offences by including knowingly obtaining, possessing, or using property linked 
                                                 
44 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), International Standards on Combating Money Laundering 
and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation (FATF 2012) 7. 
45 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘Improving global AML/CFT compliance; On-going process 
– 3 November 2017’ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdic-
tions/documents/fatf-compliance-november-2017.html> accessed 3 May 2019.  
46 The 2007 MER relating to the implementation of the FATF Standards rated that Thailand was con-
sidered ‘Compliant’ for two and ‘Largely Compliant’ for four (i.e. it was partially compliant or non-
compliant for all six of the Core FATF Recommendations); see International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
Thailand: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of 
Terrorism (IMF 2007). 
47 The AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No. 5) B.E. 2558 (2015). 
48 The AMLA 1999; see Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Anti-Money Laundering 
and Counter-Terrorist financing measures – Thailand Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (APG 
2017) 168.  
49 Section 3(2) of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No. 5) B.E. 2558 (2015). 
50 Section 3(4) of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No. 5) B.E. 2558 (2015). 
51 Section 3(9) of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No. 5) B.E. 2558 (2015). 
52 Section 3(20) of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No. 5) B.E. 2558 (2015). 
53 Section 3(21) of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No. 5) B.E. 2558 (2015). 
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to criminal activities.54 Additionally, the AMLA 199955 does not require the AMLO 
to prove intent before seizing the asset linked to illegal activities.56   
 
6.3 The Establishment of the Competent Authorities in Thailand 
 As previously outlined in the thesis, money laundering needs a globally co-
ordinated response.57 Therefore, the FATF requires an effective administration to 
stop, mitigate or tackle money laundering.58 Each jurisdiction should implement in-
ternational AML policy into its domestic AML legislation in order to meet the stand-
ards.59 The FATF identifies that the main mechanisms to tackle these issues are the 
creation of competent authorities, including FIUs.60  Due to the substantial linkages 
in an important policies between the Recommendations and the UN Conventions and 
UN Security Council resolutions, every country are required to comply with the 
standards, including the principle of independence of the FIU in line with Recom-
mendation 29.61 The FATF Recommendations establish the competent AML author-
ities’ powers, responsibilities and other institutional measures such as investigative, 
                                                 
54 Section 5(3) of the AMLA 1999 added in accordance with the AMLA (No. 5) B.E. 2558 (2015).  
55 The AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AML (No. 5) B.E. 2558 (2015). 
56 AMLA 1999. 
57 Ayodeji Aluko, ‘The impact of money laundering on economic and financial stability and on polit-
ical development in developing countries: The case of Nigeria’ (2012) 15(4) Journal of Money Laun-
dering Control 442, 443. 
58 Gregory Rose (ed), Following the Proceeds of Environmental Crime: Fish, Forests and Filthy Lu-
cre (Routledge 2014) 59. 
59 ibid 59. 
60  Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘High-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions’ at 10 
<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdic-
tions/?hf=10&b=0&s=desc%28fatf_releasedate%29> accessed 1 December 2015; see also Nicholas 
Ryder, Money Laundering – An Endless Cycle? A Comparative Analysis of the Anti-Money Launder-
ing Policies in the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada (Routledge 
2012) 25.  
61 FATF Recommendation 29; the Vienna Convention; the Palermo Convention; the Merida Conven-
tion; and the UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 as well as 1373; for a discussion on these stand-
ards see chapter 2; see also Neil Jensen and Cheong-Ann Png, ‘Implementation of the FATF 40+9 
Recommendations: A perspective from developing countries’ (2011) 14(2) Journal of Money Laun-
dering Control 110, 111. 
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law enforcement and supervisory authorities in order to enhance the transparency of 
business ownership, including making it more difficult to conceal the proceeds of 
crime.62 
 The competent authorities, as part of the disclosure of financial information 
required, are also key mechanisms under AML standards in dealing with money 
laundering because they can help supervise the national AML policy, prosecute the 
money launderer and exchange intelligence with foreign FIUs.63 In Thailand, there 
are several government agencies in relation to AML regulation and enforcement of 
the Thailand’s AML legislation. The competent authorities can be categorised into 
three kinds of competent authorities comprising: primary authorities, secondary au-
thorities and tertiary authorities.64 Tan and Ramakrishna noted that sometimes there 
are deficiencies such as a lack of communicative coordination between different 
Thailand intelligence authorities or institutional rivalries that may hinder efforts in 
fighting money laundering in Thailand.65 As the reason mentioned above, the FATF 
suggested that the AMLA 1999 should provide more sufficient powers to the Thai-
land competent AML authorities, including designing proper and transparent inves-
tigations in order to increase the greater effective AML control in Thailand.66  
 Therefore, the thesis notes that the competent authorities are the end users 
receiving financial intelligence from Thailand’s FIU to use in their investigations 
and prosecutions of money laundering offences, including preventing Thailand’s ju-
risdiction from being criminal heavens. This section illustrates and analyses the role 
                                                 
62 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Best Practices Paper: The Use of the FATF Recommenda-
tions to Combat Corruption (FATF 2013) 11. 
63 European Union (EU), ‘Preventing money laundering and terrorist financing across the EU: How 
does it work in practice?’ <https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/diagram_aml_2018.07_ok.pdf> 
accessed 2 May 2019.  
64 Ryder (n 60) 25.  
65 Tan and Ramakrishna (n 1) 91, 98. 
66 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist 
financing measures – Thailand Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (APG 2017) 100. 
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of the competent authorities and determines how important they have been in imple-
menting international standards (i.e. the FATF Recommendations) in Thailand. The 
next section explores the role of the primary authorities with regard to AML policies.  
 
6.3.1 The Role of Primary Authorities 
 The FATF suggests that countries should formulate their national AML pol-
icies which focus on the review of the money laundering risk and the coordination 
of competent authorities and FIUs.67 The FATF determines that competent authori-
ties refer to policy-makers, the FIU, law enforcement authorities (LEAs) and super-
visors68 who facilitate the development and implementation of national AML poli-
cies.69 Ryder identified that primary authorities supervise the national AML policy 
and promote its implementation of international standards.70  In Thailand, the pri-
mary competent agencies71  manage AML policies to meet the international stand-
ards’ requirements.72 However, each of these offices coordinates with several offi-
cials and secondary authorities.73 This includes for example, the Royal Thai Police 
(RTP), the Department of Special Investigation (DSI), the AMLO, Royal Thailand 
Customs (RTC), Office of Narcotics Control Board (ONCB) and National Anti-Cor-
ruption Commission (NACC), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).74  
 
                                                 
67 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), International Standards on Combating Money Laundering 
and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation: The FATF Recommendations (FATF 2018) 6. 
68 The term ‘supervisor’ is defined as ‘the designated competent authorities or non-public bodies with 
responsibilities aimed at ensuring compliance by financial institutions (i.e. financial supervisors) 
and/or designated non-financial businesses/professions (DNFBPs) with requirements to combat 
money laundering and terrorist financing; see Financial Action Task Force (n 60) 122. 
69 Financial Action Task Force (n 38) 11. 
70 Ryder (n 60) 25.  
71 See discussion regarding definition of primary authorities in chapter 3. 
72 See discussion in subtopics 6.3.1.1 and 6.3.1.2 
73 See discussion regarding definition of secondary authorities in chapter 3. 
74 See discussion in subtopic 6.3.2.7. 
CHAPTER SIX: Analysis of Competent Authorities and Financial Intelligence 
Unit in Thailand 
272 
6.3.1.1 Ministry of Justice  
 The Ministry of Justice of Thailand (MOJ), is the primary authority that over-
sees the criminal justice system. Furthermore, the Minister of Justice is the Vice 
Chairman of Anti-Money Laundering Board (AMLB).75 The MOJ provides the no-
tification relating to ideas, problems, and obstacles in the application of the regula-
tion.76  The MOJ supervises the Department of Special Investigation (DSI), which is 
a specialist in law enforcement agency responsible for investigating money launder-
ing predicate offences, as well as other relevant international regulations.77  
 
6.3.1.2 Ministry of Finance  
 The Ministry of Finance (MOF) is a primary AML authority that issues the 
national AML policies, rules, procedures, and conditions for competent authorities 
to apply against money laundering. It also acts as a licensing authority for commer-
cial banks, specialised banks, finance companies, credit providers, money changers, 
money transfer agents, securities companies, investment advisor companies and in-
surance companies.78 Sections 5 and 6 of the Commercial Bank Act B.E. 2505 
(1962) (CBA) does not provide power to the MOF and the Bank of Thailand (BOT) 
to allow the banking license of the shell banks in Thailand in line with the interna-
tional standards.79 The MOF is not only the effective administrator of Thailand’s 
                                                 
75 Section 24 of the AMLA B.E. 2542 (1999) as additionally amended by the Order of the Head of 
the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) No. 38/2560 (2017) Re: The Revision of the Pow-
ers and Duties of the Anti-Money Laundering Board. 
76 Anti-Money Laundering Office (n 43) 66. 
77 See discussion in subtopic 6.3.2.2; see also Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Anti-
Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist financing measures – Thailand Fourth Round Mutual Eval-
uation Report (APG 2017) 27. 
78 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist 
financing measures – Thailand Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (APG 2017) 32. 
79 Sections 5 and 6 of the Commercial Bank Act B.E. 2050 (1962) (CBA) as amended by ss 4 and 5 
of the CBA (No.2), B.E. 2522 respectively. 
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AML policy, but the MOF also manages the fund for the AMLO to fight money 
laundering efficiently.80 In July 2012, the AMLO opened an account named ‘Anti-
Money Laundering Fund’81 from which the Office can deposit and withdraw money 
through the system of the MOF.82 For example, the AMLO transfers half of the sei-
zure and forfeited assets83 to the MOF84 in accordance with the AMLA 1999, includ-
ing other related laws.85 The AMLO reported that the total US$6,529,980 was pro-
vided to the AML Fund, while funds sent to the MOF are about US$25,262,561.86 
These figures and collaboration measure how effective the national AML policies 
have been in implementing international standards. In addition, the MOF and the 
AMLO incorporated the amendment of the AMLA1999 and other related laws to 
enhance the disclosure system for the detection of a cross border transaction of cur-
rency and expand competent AML agencies’ power to detect, seize and forfeit the 
illegal proceeds of crime.87  
 In the UK the primary authorities are the HM Treasury, the Home Office and 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.88 On the other hand, Singapore’s primary 
authorities include the Ministry of Finance (MOF), Monetary Authority of Singapore 
                                                 
80 Sections 49 or 51 para two amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.5) B.E. 2558 (2015); see 
also Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (n 17) 64. 
81 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist 
financing measures – Thailand Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (APG 2017) 63. 
82 Anti-Money Laundering Office (n 43) 54. 
83 Section 51 para two amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.5) B.E. 2558 (2015). 
84 Anti-Money Laundering Office (n 43) 25. 
85 In 2016, there are funds sent to the MOF about US$6,063,484; see Asia/Pacific Group on Money 
Laundering (APG), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist financing measures – Thailand 
Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (APG 2017) 63. 
86 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist 
financing measures – Thailand Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (APG 2017) 183.63. 
87 Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO), The Kingdom of Thailand: National Strategy for Com-
bating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism 2010-2015 (Office of the Welfare Promo-
tion Commission for Teachers and Educational Personnel 2011) 22. 
88 See discussion in Chapter 4, subtopic 4.3.1. 
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(MAS), as well as the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Ter-
rorism Steering Committee.89 In term of independence of the FIU, Thailand primary 
authority launches the appropriate AML policies including the independence of the 
FIU to support it in conducting its functions effectively. The primary authorities im-
plement the range of soft law such as the UN Conventions, the FATF, the Egmont 
Group and Basel into national AML legislation regarding the AMLA 1999 which are 
in line with the substantial AML principles of those international standards. How-
ever, the primary authorities have to support the FIU as an independent agency 
whether administrative model, law-enforcement model, judicial/prosecutorial model 
or hybrid model.90 Even thought, there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ model for transposing 
into each country and because there are several differences in their legal contexts, 
especially Thailand regarding the situations of military coups. Therefore, the thesis 
investigates to find the answer the research questions. The next section presents the 
role of secondary involving with the independence of the Thailand FIU. 
 
6.3.2 The Role of Secondary authorities 
 The secondary authorities support the primary authorities and implement do-
mestic AML policy efficiently.91 Moreover, they also help the AMLO and the Thai-
land government to improve the AML regime by enhancing, amending, and enacting 
AML legislation to respond to the better implementation of international standards.92 
Here, the secondary authorities include Thailand’s FIU (AMLO), law enforcement 
                                                 
89 See discussion in Chapter 5, subtopic 5.3.1. 
90 See discussion in Chapter three; see also International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, 
Financial Intelligence Units: An Overview (IMF and World Bank 2004) 10. 
91 Ryder (n 60) 25.  
92 Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO) Annual Report 2017 (Amarin Printing 2018) 11, 60. 
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authorities (the Royal Thailand Police (RTP), the Department of Special Investiga-
tion (DSI), the Office of Narcotics Control Board (ONCB), the Royal Thailand Cus-
toms (RTC), the National Anti-Corruptions Commission of Thailand (NACC)), and 




6.3.2.1 The Royal Thailand Police 
 The Royal Thailand Police (RTP) is a law enforcement authority that reports 
directly to the Prime Minister (i.e. the RTP is under the control of the Prime Minis-
ter).93 The Police Commissioner General is also appointed by the Prime Minister and 
subject to the cabinet and royal approval.94 The prime responsibility is to maintain 
public order via enforcement of Thailand’s law.95 A Director-General of the RTP is 
also a member of the AMLB.96 Thailand Criminal Procedure Code empowers the 
RTP to detect, identify, investigate, interrogate, and gather evidence regarding crim-
inal cases, especially money laundering offences under the Criminal Procedure and 
several Criminal Acts in order to forward the case to the public prosecution.97 The 
RTP also has extensive powers of investigation, search and seizure under Thailand 
law similarly to other regulatory authorities, including the DSI, the Revenue and 
                                                 
93  ASEANAPOL Secretariat, ‘The Royal Thai Police’ (ASEANAPOL E-Bulletin) 
<http://www.aseanapol.org/information/royal-thai-police> accessed 10 May 2019.  
94   U.S. Department of States, ‘2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Thailand’ (11 
March 2010) <https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/eap/136010.htm> accessed 13 September 
2017. 
95   ibid. 
96 Section 24 of the AMLA 1999 as additionally amended by the Order of the Head of the National 
Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) No.38/2560 (2017) Re: The Revision of the Powers and Duties 
of the Anti-Money Laundering Board; see also Anti-Money Laundering Office (n 43) 72. 
97  Netipoom Maysakun, ‘Money Laundering in Thailand’ <https://www.unafei.or.jp/publica-
tions/pdf/RS_No73/No73_13PA_Netipoom.pdf> accessed 7 June 2019. 
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Customs Departments.98 The RTP is working with the AMLO by receiving the in-
telligence involving money laundering offences and charging base on a list of pred-
icate offences of money laundering.99  
 
 
6.3.2.2 Department of Special Investigation  
 Under the Special Cases Investigation Act B.E. 2547 (2004), the Department 
of Special Investigation (DSI) is a legalised department of the Ministry of Justice of 
Thailand.100 To complement the RTP, the DSI independently operates the investiga-
tion of the certain ‘special cases’, including complex criminal cases, the cases in-
volving organised criminal organisations, cases connecting with high-ranking gov-
ernment officials, and cases relating to national security.101 The Special Cases Inves-
tigation Act 2004 empowers the DSI to conduct investigations on the special cases.  
For example, DSI as competent authority has a legal basis to share confiscated pro-
ceeds of crime on request of foreign counties under the AMLA 1999.102 DSI inves-
tigated the fake government-to-government rice export case, AMLO has been pur-
suing charges against Siam Indica Company over the exploit of fraudulent govern-
ment-to-government (G-to-G) contracts.103 In addition, the case of conspiracy to 
                                                 
98 Melisa Uremovic and Visitsak Arunsuratpakdee, ‘Thailand’ in Nicolas Bourtin (ed), The Interna-
tional Investigations Review (7thedn, The Law Reviews 2017) 273. 
99 King-Oua Laohong, ‘AMLO, banks team up in anti-gambling effort’ (Bangkok Post,19 June 2018) 
<https://www.bangkokpost.com/news/crime/1487874/amlo-banks-team-up-in-anti-gambling-effort> 
accessed 10 May 2019.   
100 Special Cases Investigation Act 2004. 
101 Section 21 of the Special Cases Investigation Act 2004 as amended by ss 4, 5 and 6 of the Special 
Case Investigation Act (No. 2) B.E. 2551 (2008).  
102ibid.  
103 The defendants did not export the rice to China on a G-to-G basis as announced by the Thai Com-
merce Ministry, but instead repackaged the rice purchased from the previous government’s rice-
pledging scheme from domestic sales. Previous, over Baht7 bn worth of assets owned by Siam Indiga  
Company and its major shareholder were confiscated by authorities pending further legal actions; The 
Nation, ‘DSI takes up 7 special cases including corruption files’ (Politics, 4 November  2017) 
<https://www.nationthailand.com/news/30330843> accessed 24 November 2020.  
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commit money laundering and jointly laundering money and obtaining stolen prop-
erty because of the discovery of the proceeds of crime in Klongchan Credit Union 
Cooperative Limited case paid to Wat Phra Dhammakaya, Phra Dhammmajayo, and 
the related people by 27 cheques valued more than Baht1.4m. This case was com-
pleted and its files were submitted to the Office of the Attorney-General for prose-
cuting 5 alleged offenders.104 Furthermore, AMLO disseminated financial intelli-
gence reports to DSI on the basis of STRs around 24 reports in 2016, which increased 
from 10 reports in 2015.105 In 2017, DSI was requested by AMLO to investigate Mr 
Panthongtae Shinawatra and his four accomplices with conspiracy to commit money 
laundering.106 The Act provides the power for the DSI to investigate certain special 
cases under the Revenue Code, Customs Law, the Foreign Business Act, the Com-
puter Act, or the Patent Act.107 For example, when the DSI completes an investiga-
tion, the case will be submitted to the Public Prosecutor to file an indictment.108 The 
DSI and AMLO signed the Ordinance on the Coordinated Implementation of the 
Special Investigation Law to Serve the Operations under the Anti-Money Launder-
ing Act 2014.109  
 
                                                 
104 The Special Case No.27/2016; see Department of Special Investigation (DSI), ‘DSI’s important 
performance in the fiscal year 2017 and the operational direction for the next year’  
<https://www.dsi.go.th/en/Detail/DSIaposs-important-performance-in-the-fiscal-year-2017-and-the-
operational-dire-T0002326> accessed 24 November 2020.  
105 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist 
financing measures – Thailand Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (APG 2017) 46. 
106 Special case no.25/2017 is the case requested for DSI’s investigations by AMLO regarding MR 
Panthongtae is Mr Thaksin Shinawatra’s son; Mr Thaksin was overthrown in military coup in 2006; 
see Department of Special Investigation (DSI), ‘DSI’s important performance in the fiscal year 2017 
and the operational direction for the next year’<https://www.dsi.go.th/en/Detail/DSIaposs-important-
performance-in-the-fiscal-year-2017-and-the-operational-dire-T0002326> accessed 24 November 
2020.  
107 Special Cases Investigation Act B.E. 2547 (2004); Melisa Uremovic and Visitsak Arunsuratpak-
dee, ‘Thailand’ (The Law Reviews, July 2018) <https://thelawreviews.co.uk/edition/the-international-
investigations-review-edition-8/1172150/thailand> accessed 20 February 2019.   
108 Tom Obokata, Transnational Organised Crime in International Law (Hart 2010) 125. 
109 Anti-Money Laundering Office (n 43) 93. 
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6.3.2.3 The Royal Thailand Customs  
 The Customs Act of B.E. 2496 (1926) was taken place by the Customs Act 
B.E. 2560 (2017) because of a number of ambiguities, creating difficulties for per-
sons and companies to ensure compliance.110 For example, s 27 chapter IV of the 
1926 Act defined the terms ‘customs evasion’ and ‘customs avoidance’ as different 
offences.111 However, s 3(7) of the AMLA 1999 defines term ‘custom avoidance and 
custom evasion’ as the ‘smuggling under the customs law’ as the predicate ML of-
fence.112 Therefore, the Royal Thailand Customs (RTC) has participated with the 
AMLO, DSI and RTP to expand capacity in dealing with money laundering effec-
tively, covering powers of seizure of suspicion currency.113 However, an alleged of-
fender’s assets may be subject to confiscation by the AMLO for breach of ‘customs 
avoidance’.114 
 The AMLO itself has the power to confiscate the currency on suspicion of 
predicate offences or money laundering offences in the case that the RTC may not 
                                                 
110 Michael Ramirez, ‘Long awaited changes to the Thai Customs Act signed into law’ (2017)3 Thai-
American Business, p. 38 <https://www.tilleke.com/sites/de-
fault/files/2017_Jul_Long_Awaited_Changes_Thai_Customs_Act.pdf> accessed 24 November 
2020. 
111 Section 27 of the Customs Act of B.E. 2496 (1926); see the Supreme Court of Thailand Judgment 
No. 967/2507 [1964], 612-613/2511 [1968] and 6925/2538 [1995].  
112 Section 3 of the AMLA 1999 ‘Predicate offence’ means any offences including ‘s3(7) relating to 
smuggling under the customs law.’ 
113 Exchange Control Act (No. 2) B.E. 2559 (2016). 
114 ibid. 
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conduct a timely confiscating or stopping of such currency at the border after receiv-
ing the issued order from the AMLO.115 Moreover, it has established effective struc-
tures for LEAs and AMLO’s money laundering investigations and instituted the rel-
evant AML policies, as well as procedures for LEAs nationally.116 Normally, the 
Customs Agency must report the information in case of grievance or allegation or 
must arrest for proceedings regarding predicate offence of money laundering. For 
example, the Customs officers confiscate a large amount of cash that has been 
brought into the jurisdiction.117 The next section demonstrates the role of the Office 
of Narcotics Control Board (ONCB). 
 
6.3.2.4 Office of Narcotics Control Board 
 The Office of Narcotics Control Board (ONCB) is an independent boy under 
the Minister of Justice preventing and suppressing illegal drug-related offences un-
der the Narcotics Control Act B.E.2519 (1976).118 The ONCB is also responsible for 
investigating narcotics predicate offences and the confiscation of the proceedings 
associated with drug offences.119 The Measures for the Suppression of Offender in 
an Offence relating to Narcotics 1991 provides the power for the LEAs to seize, 
                                                 
115 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Mutual Evaluation of Thailand: 1st Follow-Up 
Report (APG 2018) 4. 
116 Anti-Money Laundering Office (n 43). 
117 Section 3(7) of the AMLA 1999, s 242 of the Customs Act 2017, and the Clause 4 of the Prime 
Minister Office Regulation on the Coordination in Compliance with the AMLA 1999, 2001.  
118 Provision of drug-related offences are determined in a raft of laws differently defined in the Act 
on Measures for the Suppression of Offenders in an Offence Relating to Narcotics B.E.2534 (1991) 
the two most important Acts are the Narcotics Act 2522 (1979) and the Psychotropic Substances Act 
B.E. 2518 (1975); see Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (n 17) 28; see also Office of the 
Narcotics Control Board (ONCB), ‘About us’ <https://www.oncb.go.th/EN_ONCB/Pages/back-
ground.aspx> accessed 27 November 2020; see   Siam Legal, ‘Criminal Drug Offences in Thailand’ 
<https://www.siam-legal.com/litigation/criminal-defence-drug-offences-in-thailand.php> accessed 
15 May 2019. 
119 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist 
financing measures – Thailand Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (APG 2017) 28. 
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restrain, or forfeit all proceeds of the drug trade, as well as prosecuting offences that 
are committed outside the jurisdiction.120 
 The ONCB has participated with AMLO and other domestic authorities (such 
as the Office of the Attorney General (OAG), RTP, DSI, Office of National Anti-
Corruption Commission (NACC)) via signing the Agreement of Operations in Cases 
among State Organisations in line with the Anti-Participation in Transnational Or-
ganised Crime Act B.E. 2556 (2013) in order to identify threats and risks, review 
risk mitigation strategies, design and implement appropriate policy responses.121 
Specifically, this aspect of Thailand uses the risk assessment to help ascertain the 
main criminal and terrorist threats and the key vulnerabilities that allow them to dis-
play and to identify appropriate responses for the LEAs to deal with those threats, 
including to produce the AML policy and strategy effectively.122  
 
6.3.2.5 The National Anti-Corruption Commission of Thailand  
 By the virtue of the Organic Act on Counter Corruption B.E. 2542 (1999) 
(Anti-Corruption Act) and the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2560 
(2017) established, the National Anti-Corruption Commission of Thailand (NACC) 
created an independent commission responsible for the prevention of bribes to public 
officials.123 More recently, its remit was extended to the bribery of foreign and public 
international officials.124 The 2017 Constitution ensures that the NACC performs its 
                                                 
120 Section 5 of the Act on Measures for the Suppression of Offenders in an Offence Relating to Nar-
cotics B.E.2534 (1991). 
121 Anti-Money Laundering Office (n 87) 56. 
122 The Anti-Money Laundering Board Notification regarding Listing and Delisting of Designed Per-
sons under Resolution or Notification under the United Nations Security Council; see also Anti-Money 
Laundering Office (n 87) 11, 83. 
123 Organic Act on Counter Corruption B.E. 2542 (1999), s 232 of the Constitution of the Kingdom 
of Thailand B.E. 2560 (2017).  
124 Organic Act on Counter Corruption B.E. 2542 (1999), s 232 of the Constitution of the Kingdom 
of Thailand B.E. 2560 (2017). 
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duties independently in line with this Constitution and the laws.125 Therefore, the 
1999 Act empowers the NACC to investigate allegations that governmental and po-
litical officials conduct malfeasance regarding corruption, unusual wealth, unex-
plained wealth, and money laundering in their offices.126  
 Under the Thailand Criminal Code B.E. 2499 (1956) and the AMLA 1999, 
the NACC and the AMLO have the power to conduct investigations on offences 
which are committed outside the Kingdom of Thailand.127 Under the Agreement of 
Operations in Cases among State Organisations in line with the Anti-Participation in 
Transnational Organised Crime Act 2013, the NACC has also participated with the 
AMLO to increase presently committed resources.128 For example, to prosecute the 
State official for corruption, the NACC has the authority to enquire into facts and 
collect evidence or the offence to be proven, and for the offender to be prosecuted 
and then penalised.129 Furthermore, the NACC has the power to institute the prose-
cution of its action or designate an attorney to initiate the prosecution on its behalf.130 
For example, s 123 of the Organic Act on Counter Corruption 1999 regarding State 
official’s corruption as the predicate offence of money laundering in the AMLA 
1999.131  
 
6.3.2.6 Office of Attorney General  
 Office of Attorney General (OAG), namely the State Attorney organ, inde-
pendently administer criminal cases, safeguard national benefit, protect civil rights, 
                                                 
125 Section 215 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2560 (2017). 
126 Section 103/3 of the Organic Act on Counter Corruption 1999. 
127 Section 8 of the Criminal Code 1956 and s. 6 of the AMLA 1999. 
128 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (n 17) 59. 
129 Section 26(1) of the Organic Act on Counter Corruption 1999. 
130 Section 97 para 2 of the Organic Act on Counter Corruption 1999. 
131 Section 3(5) of the AMLA 1999 and s. 123 of the Organic Act on Counter Corruption 1999   
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and provide legal assistance, develop international legal cooperation, produce the 
quality research, improve the laws in Thailand, including file lawsuits, and proceed 
with criminal procedures as a sole prosecution agency.132 Additionally, the Consti-
tution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E.2560 (2017) ensures that the status of the 
OAG as an independent in consideration and disposition of cases with the honest and 
fair performance of duties in line with the Public Prosecution Organ and Public Pros-
ecutors Act B.E. 2553 (2010) in order to assure the OAG’s independence of its op-
eration.133 On the other hand, the 2017 Constitution does not identify the AMLO’s 
status like the OAG, which can manage the personnel, budgetary affairs, and other 
activities of the OAG independently, 134   but the AMLA 1999 only assures the 
AMLO’s status in s.40 of the AMLA 1999 that the AMLO is an office to work inde-
pendently and neutrally, i.e. not under the Prime Minister Office, Ministry, or Sub-
Ministry.135 Consequently, the AMLO shall certify its status by the 2017 Constitu-
tion to ensure that its staff functions independently without political interference and 
intervention. 
 The OAG requires coordination with the LEAs’ investigators under the 
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act B.E.2535 (1992) (MACM) because of 
the complex matters, including involving cross-border evidence collection, asset re-
straint and recovery.136 Therefore, the OAG proposed Extradition Act B.E 2551 
                                                 
132 Section 248 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand 2017, and ss. 14, 21 23 of the Public 
Prosecution Organ and Public Prosecutors Act B.E 2553 (2010); see Asia/Pacific Group on Money 
Laundering (APG), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist financing measures – Thailand 
Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (APG 2017) 27; Office of the Attorney General (OAG), 
‘Authorities and functions’ <http://www.ago.go.th/agoen/function_2.php> accessed 28 May 2019. 
133 Office of the Attorney General (OAG), ‘About us’ <http://www.ago.go.th/agoen/history.php> ac-
cessed 28 May 2019.  
134 Section 248 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand 2017. 
135 Section 40 of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.2) B.E.2551 (2008).  
136 Sections 6, 7 of the MACM 1992; Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Anti-Money 
Laundering and Counter-Terrorist financing measures – Thailand Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation 
Report (APG 2017) 7. 
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(2008), as well as the treaties on the Mutual Legal Assistance to seek the support and 
cooperation from other LEAs.137 For example, the U.S. Department of Justice coop-
erated with the OAG to extradite the international illegal arms trafficker Viktor Bout 
to the United States for trial.138  
 When compared to Singapore’s Attorney General’s Chambers (AGC) and 
the UK’s Crown Prosecutor Service (CPS), the OAG in the same way coordinates 
with the FIU and other competent authorities’ investigation such as cross-border 
transactions, the asset recovery, and restraints in relation to money laundering.139  
Under s. 55 of the AMLA 1999, the OAG can submit the Transaction Committee 
(TC)’s order, namely the ‘ex parte restraining order’ to convert to the Court order in 
order to seize suspicious assets involving money laundering.140 As mentioned above, 
the AMLO submits the TC’s order to the OAG for obtaining the court order to seize 
the criminal property to the State. 
 It is important to note that the OAG is independent in issuing orders in cases 
with expeditious and just performance with no any prejudice, especially when such 
order shall not be considered as an administrative order.141 Thailand’s AMLO order, 
conversely, is an administrative order that can petition the Administrative Court to 
revoke the AMLO order.142 However, the 2017 Constitution does not certify the 
                                                 
137 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist 
financing measures – Thailand Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (APG 2017) 27. 
138 James H Freis, ‘The role of the FIU in combating transnational organised crime, including working 
within government, with oversees governments and with business’ (2011 Anti-Money Laundering 
and Counter-Terrorism Financing Conference, Sydney, Australia, 7 November 2011) at 14 
<https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/20111110.pdf> accessed 23 May 2019.  
139 The AMLO is a Thailand’s FIU; see Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Anti-Money 
Laundering and Counter-Terrorist financing measures – Thailand Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation 
Report (APG 2017) 7. 
140 Section 55 of the AMLA 1999.  
141 Section 248 para two of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2560 (2017). 
142 Section 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act B.E.2539 (1996). 
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AMLO’s independence like the OAG.143 Furthermore, the AMLO is not the Inde-
pendent Constitutional Organisation like the NACC.144 As mentioned above, this 
thesis noted that the AMLO should be an Independent Constitutional Organisation 
like the NACC or like the OAG, which obtains certified independence according to 
the 2017 Constitution in order to support the AMLO to meet the FATF’s requirement 
effectively and prevent the AMLO from the political interference or influence. Alt-
hough, the AMLO has become an independent authority under the direct supervision 
of the Prime Minister to ensure more independence and impartially of the Office.145 
The next section explains the role of the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
 
6.3.2.7 Securities and Exchange Commission  
 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is an independent and su-
pervisory public organisation which seeks to achieve a sustainable, efficient, fair, 
and transparent capital market.146 Under the Securities and Exchange Act B.E. 2535 
(1992), the SEC supervises a broad range of sectors, including investment firms, 
asset management firms and financial advisors.147 The Secretary-General of the SEC 
is a member of the AMLB for making the AML policy on money laundering is-
sues.148 
                                                 
143 Section 248 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2560 (2017). 
144 Sections 232, 234 para two of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2560 (2017). 
145 See discussion in Subtopic 6.4.1. 
146 The SEC was established on 16 May 1992 under the Securities and Exchange Act B.E. 2535 
(1992); see Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), ‘Introduction’ 
<http://www.sec.or.th/EN/SECInfo/LawsRegulation/Pages/IntroductoryLaw.aspx> accessed 17 Feb-
ruary 2016. 
147 Section 3(20) of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.5) B.E. 2558 
(2015).  
148 Section 24(2) of the AMLA 1999 as additionally amended by the Order of the Head of the National 
Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) No. 38/2560 (2017) Re: The Revision of the Powers and Duties 
of the Anti-Money Laundering Board. 
CHAPTER SIX: Analysis of Competent Authorities and Financial Intelligence 
Unit in Thailand 
285 
 The SEC collaborates with AMLO and the Bank of Thailand (BOT) in order 
to support Thailand’s compliance with the FATF Recommendations by creating ef-
fective preventive measures such as the Know Your Customer (KYC) and Customer 
Due Diligence (CDD) rules for the securities sector to fight money laundering and 
terrorist financing offences.149  In March 2007 the SEC launched an enforceable 
AML/CFT Notification, which explained the preventive measure on CDD for the 
securities organisation.150 Therefore, all securities and asset management sectors 
must comply with the issuance of the CDD and KYC by filing the suspicious trans-
action report (STR) to the AMLO.151 The SEC Act requires all operators of securities 
businesses to have reporting obligations under the AMLA 1999.152 The securities 
body has the best practice of compliance with the requirements of the FATF Stand-
ards to diminish the risks of money laundering and to promote an effective form of 
protection for investors and/or consumer, and also to create a regime that encourages 
related securities sector to operate with the respective legislative framework. For ex-
ample, the securities companies153 have the legal obligation to report the STRs to the 
AMLO.154 The SEC focuses on the verification of the financial information report to 
ensure its member sectors to comply with the AML regulations strictly.155 In 2016, 
                                                 
149  Anti-Money Laundering Forum, ‘Thailand’ (Central Authority for Reporting, 23 June 2009) 
<https://www.anti-moneylaundering.org/asiapacific/Thailand.aspx> accessed 29 December 2018.  
150 International Monetary Fund (n 46).   
151 Sections 13 to 16 of the AMLA 1999. 
152 Santhapat Periera, Dussadee Rattanopas and David Duncan, ‘Jurisdiction update: Thailand – Se-
curities & Banking’ (13 March 2012) <https://www.tilleke.com/sites/default/files/2012_Mar_Com-
pliance_Securities_Banking_Thailand.pdf> accessed 12 May 2019.  
153 Under section 3 of the AMLA 1999, the FIs include a securities company under the law on secu-
rities and exchange; see the AMLO’s issuance of the Counter-Terrorist Financing Act B.E.2556 
(2013); Notification No. Kor Lor Tor. Kor Thor. (Wor) 23/2557 (2014) Re: Risk Management to 
Prevent the Use of Securities Business for Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism 
<https://capital.sec.or.th/webapp/nrs/data/6330se.pdf> accessed 18 May 2019. 
154 Section 3(4) of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.5) B.E. 2558 (2015).  
155 Yingyong Karnchanapayap, ‘Amendments to the Securities and Exchange Act B.E.2535 (1992)’ 
(December 2008) 1 <https://www.tilleke.com/sites/default/files/Amendments-SEC-Act.pdf>  
accessed 18 May 2019.  
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Thailand’s SEC conducted the Memorandum of Agreement Regarding Cooperation 
for the Purposes of Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Ter-
rorism with the AMLO in order to improve the effectiveness of coordination on su-
pervision over securities sector to control and suppress money laundering and Thai-
land AML supervision structural framework.156 The SEC in line with the guidance 
issued by the AMLO supports the efficiency of the risk management regarding the 
KYC/CDD and STRs principles enough for the prevention of the use of securities 
firms for money laundering that could destroy the reputation of the financial mar-
ket.157  
 The thesis clarifies the primary authorities in the three counties. Thailand’s 
primary authorities consist of the MOF and MOJ. The UK’s primary authorities in-
clude the HM Treasury, the Home Office, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Of-
fice.158 Singapore primary authorities comprise the MOF, the MAS, and the Anti-
Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Steering Commit-
tee.159 Among the three countries, most of the primary authorities have the power to 
make and supervise the AML/CFT strategies and guidelines in each country’s juris-
diction. However, only the MAS’s duty of AML supervision can impose financial 
                                                 
156 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist 
financing measures – Thailand Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (APG 2017) 9, 60; see also 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), ‘SEC keeps close watch on announcement of FATF 
blacklist’ (13 February 2012) <https://www.sec.or.th/EN/Pages/News_Detail.aspx?SECID=4574> 
accessed 18 May 2019. 
157 Clause 30(1) of the Notification of the Capital Market Supervisory Board No. Tor Thor. 35/2556 
(2013) Re: Standard Conduct of Business, Management Arrangement, Operating System, and Provid-
ing Services to Clients of Securities Companies and Derivatives Intermediaries dated 6 September 
2013. 
158 See discussion in chapter 4. 
159 See discussion in chapter 5. 
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penalties on the FIs such as warnings/reprimands to criminal prosecution and re-
moval of the license, including the fine for REs who fail to comply with the CDSA’s 
requirement.160  
 The AMLO is the key agency accountable for seeking, restraint of illegal 
proceeds and investigating predicate offences similarly to other competent authori-
ties such as the DSI and the RTP, who can instigate asset restraint proceedings via 
the OAG.161 The AMLO, NACC, ONCB and RTC are able to investigate elements 
of money laundering and associated predicate offences. However, they have to sub-
mit such cases to the DSI or RTP in order to complete any money laundering inves-
tigation, and they also have to make a decision whether or not to hand over the matter 
to the OAG for prosecutions.  
 The thesis illustrates that the second competent authorities in Thailand seem 
more effective in supporting the Thailand FIU when dealing with money laundering 
offence.162 For example, the NACC is the independent agency acting as a role in 
preventing, investigating corruption predicates, which are the money laundering of-
                                                 
160 Section 71 of the Singapore Banking Act 1970 also empowers the MAS to fine any bank which 
contravenes any of the provision in this 1970 Act; see discussion in subtopic 5.3.1.2; see Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) and Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Anti-Money Laun-
dering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures – Singapore Fourth Mutual Evaluation Report 
(FATF and APG September 2016) 8; see also Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), ‘MAS im-
poses penalties on Standard Chartered Bank and Coutts for 1MDB-related AML breaches’ (2 Decem-
ber 2016) <http://www.mas.gov.sg/news-and-publications/media-releases/2016/mas-imposes-penal-
ties-on-standard-chartered-bank-and-coutts-for-1mdb-related-aml-breaches.aspx> accessed 5 De-
cember 2017; see also Stanley Lai, Francis Mok and Tham Kokleong, ‘Singapore: payment systems 
– proposed payments framework’ (2017) 32(1) Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 
1, 1. 
161 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist 
financing measures – Thailand Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (APG 2017) 51. 
162 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist 
financing measures – Thailand Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (APG 2017) 183. 
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fences. Unlike the Thailand FIU, the NACC and the OAG are the constitutional bod-
ies, which become more independent than the AMLO in operating its functions under 
the Anti-Money Laundering Board (AMLB) regime.163  
 Regarding the FIU model, the Thailand FIU employs the FIU hybrid model, 
which takes actions much more quickly than the FIU in line with the administrative 
type like the UK.164 In spite, the 2017 FATF MER rated ‘largely compliant’ for Thai-
land in implementing the Recommendation 29.165 However, the FATF criticised that 
Thailand FIU had been experienced an issued of an insufficient independence of the 
FIU. In contrast, the UKFIU was rated ‘partially compliant’ by the FATF in imple-
menting the Recommendation 29, but the FATF raised the UK as best practice.166 
Regarding the independence of the UKFIU, the Joint Financial Analysis Centre 
(JFAC) is hosted by the NCA and works together officials, analytical ability, skills 
and intelligence from four authorities, comprising the NCA, Her Majesty’s Revenue 
and Customs, the Financial Conduct Authority and the Serious Fraud Office – in a 
collaborative and innovative working ecosystem in order to develop into an effective 
units for wider financial analysis to produce the intelligence to improve existing in-
vestigation, intelligence and independence development of the competent authorities 
                                                 
163 Section 25(3) of the AMLA 1999 as additionally amended by the Order of the Head of the National 
Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) No. 38/2560 (2017) Re: The Revision of the Powers and Duties 
of the Anti-Money Laundering Board.; see also Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), 
Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist financing measures – Thailand Fourth Round Mutual 
Evaluation Report (APG 2017) 28. 
164 See discussion in chapter 4. 
165 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist 
financing measures – Thailand Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (APG 2017) 183. 
166 FATF Recommendation 29; see Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Anti-Money Laundering 
and Counter-Terrorist financing measures – United Kingdom Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Re-
port (FATF 2018) 224. 
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and the FIU in dealing with SARs regime without undue influence and interfer-
ence.167 Apart of the JFAC, the Joint Money Laundering Intelligence Taskforce 
(JMLIT) comprises the LEAs and the financial sector to exchange and analyse fi-
nancial information and intelligence regarding money laundering threat, which also 
supports the independence of the UKFIU by generating positive result since its es-
tablishment in 2015 and is deemed internationally to become an example of best 
practice.168 As reasons mentioned above, the JFAC and FMLIT would be the key 
elements of the UK to enhance the independence of the UKFIU that Thailand should 
learn this valuable lessons from this best practice. 
 In regard to independence of the FIU, Thailand has made several amend-
ments to the AMLA 1999 to the FIU provisions regarding its role and duties, admin-
istration and its degree of the independence from the influence of the Thailand gov-
ernment.169 The thesis stresses on the unusual powers of the AMLB, which can in-
fluence and interfere of the independence of the Thailand FIU.170 This thesis aims to 
examine what the lessons Thailand can learn from best practices whether the UK or 
Singapore in order to improve the independence of the FIU. 
 
6.3.3 The Role of Tertiary authorities 
 The tertiary authorities comprise the Bank of Thailand (BOT), the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Thailand Chamber of Commerce (TCC) 
                                                 
167 National Crime Agency (NCA), ‘Money laundering and illicit finance’ <https://www.nationalcri-
meagency.gov.uk/what-we-do/crime-threats/money-laundering-and-illicit-finance> accessed 23 De-
cember 2020.   
168 National Crime Agency (NCA), ‘Money laundering and illicit finance’ <https://www.nationalcri-
meagency.gov.uk/what-we-do/crime-threats/money-laundering-and-illicit-finance> accessed 23 De-
cember 2020.   
169 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist 
financing measures – Thailand Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (APG 2017) 181. 
170 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist 
financing measures – Thailand Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (APG 2017) 183. 
CHAPTER SIX: Analysis of Competent Authorities and Financial Intelligence 
Unit in Thailand 
290 
which comply with the AML legislation in order to support the reporting entities to 
comply with the STR regulations stringently and effectively. The next section ex-
plains the role of the Bank of Thailand. 
 
6.3.3.1 Bank of Thailand   
 Efforts to tackle money laundering are conducted by the FIUs, which has a 
close working relationship with banks who are susceptible to money laundering ac-
tivities.171 Thus, the banks are the most important actors in the AML regime because 
they act as the gatekeepers to restrain, prevent, protect, and reduce the threat of 
money laundering crime before monies are transacted in the placement stages of 
money laundering.172  
 To safeguard fiscal stability and monitor banking supervision, the Bank of 
Thailand (BOT), as the Thailand central bank and prudential regulator supervisor, 
plays the key role in ensuring that it complies with the FATF Recommendations and 
co-operates with the AMLO, the MOF and the SEC.173 The BOT is accountable for 
the MOF, but it has considerable autonomy regarding its operations.174 It enacts the 
                                                 
171 Peter Ellinger, Eva Lomnicka and Chistopher Hare, Ellinger’s Modern Banking Law (Fifth edn, 
Oxford University Press 2009) 92. 
172 Nicholas Ryder, ‘The Financial Services Authority and money laundering: A game of cat and 
mouse’ (2008) 67(3) Cambridge Law Journal 635, 638.  
173 Section 16 of the AMLA 1999 amended by the AMLA (No.5) B.E. 2558 (2015) and ss 24 and 77 
of the Commercial Banking Act B.E. 2505 (1962) (CBA); General Guide to Account Opening ac-
cording to the Guidelines on sound Management of Risks related to Money Laundering and Financing 
of Terrorism; see John Taskinsoy, ‘Asian Miracle, Asian Tiger, or Asian Myth? Financial Sector and 





Enhancing-Bank-Supervision-in-Thailand.pdf> accessed 20 May 2019; see also the Bank of Thailand 
Notification No. FPG. 7/2559 (2016) Re: Regulations on Acceptance of Deposits or Money from 
Customers 1 <https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d353.pdf> accessed 20 May 2019.  
174 Santhapat Periera, David Duncan and Supanon Triumnuk, ‘Jurisdiction update: Thailand-Securi-
ties & Banking’ (8 May 2019) <https://www.tilleke.com/sites/default/files/2013_May_Com-
plinet_Securities_Banking.pdf> accessed 11 May 2019.  
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banking regulations, issues banking licenses, and supervises banks, FIs, including 
regulated firms, as well as controlling AML/CFT operational risk.175 Furthermore, 
the Governor of Bank of Thailand is one of 14 ex-officio members of the AMLB in 
order to improve the AML policy, risk management, and supervise the financial reg-
ulatory agencies (such as commercial banks) regarding the effective fight against 
money laundering and the promotion of the Thailand financial system.176    
 In addition, the BOT has launched several AML guidelines that are reliant on 
the participation and co-operation from FIs because the advisory guidance estab-
lishes the internal and external controls (namely, the internal reporting system and 
the process after the nominated official receiving financial information respectively), 
including measures to avoid money launderers to use the financial market without 
detection.177 Therefore, the BOT introduced measures and practical guidance to stem 
the capital inflows and effectively maintain Thailand’s economy. For example, it 
issued the ‘2005 Guidelines for On-site Examination on AML/CFT Compliance’ in 
order to evaluate whether strategies and measures, including the operational proce-
dure of the information system regarding AML/CFT of the FIs, are compliant with 
the FATF and Basel Regulations.178 Furthermore, in 2006, the BOT prohibited FIs 
from issuing and selling means of exchange in Thailand to non-residents that made 
                                                 
175 The BOT has licensing and supervisory authority for the following sector: asset management 
firms; money transfer agents; personal loan firms; e-money service providers; credit card service pro-
viders, and e-payment service providers under the s 3 of the Bank of Thailand Act B.E. 2485 (1942) 
as amended by s. 3 of the Bank of Thailand Act (No.4) B.E. 2551 (2008); see also Asia/Pacific Group 
on Money Laundering (n 17) 32. 
176 Section 24 of the AMLA 1999 additionally amended by the Order of the Head of the National 
Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) No. 38/2560 (2017) Re: The Revision of the Powers and Duties 
of the Anti-Money Laundering Board. 
177 International Monetary Fund (IMF) Factsheet, ‘The IMF and the fight against money laundering 
and the financing of terrorism (September 2013) at 1 <https://www.imf.org/exter-
nal/np/exr/facts/pdf/aml.pdf> accessed 23 May 2019. 
178 Bank of Thailand (BOT), ‘Guidelines for On-site Examination on AML/CFT Compliance’ (BOT 
2005) at 1, 3 <https://www.bot.or.th/english/financialinstitutions/prureg_hb/riskmgt_manual/do-
clib_documentfordownload/riskmanagementexaminationmanaul_08_antimoneylaundering.pdf> ac-
cessed 20 May 2019. 
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the effective fighting against money laundering.179 To meet the Basel and FATF 
Standards,180 the BOT formulated its Policy Statement on 19 January 2007, which 
describes the KYC and CDD practices for FIs under the supervision of the BOT 
pursuant to the Ministerial Regulation on Designating Types of Transactions where 
FIs and Business and Professions under Section 16 are required to have their cus-
tomers identify themselves (B.E. 2554) (2011).181  
 In 2011, Thailand government responded to the international standards by 
encouraging all relevant FIs and non-FIs to comply with the AMLA 1999 to meet 
the AML standards.182 The BOT signed the Memorandum of Agreement Regarding 
Cooperation in the Supervision of Institutions under the Bank of Thailand’s Mandate 
for the Purposes of Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Ter-
rorism’ with the AMLO on 10 April 2015 in order to promote supervisors’ 
knowledge and build the capacity of their operational performance effectively.183 
Therefore, this thesis noted that the problem arises from ignorance of AML rules and 
guidelines, and this brings about organisational defection. The competent authori-
                                                 
179 Bruno Coelho and Kevin P Gallagher, ‘Capital Controls and 21st Century Financial Crises: Evi-
dence from Colombia and Thailand’ (January 2010) Working paper series Number 213.  
180 Financial Stability Institute (FSI), FSI Survey: Basel II, 2.5, and III Implementation (Bank for 
International Settlements 2015) 1,38. 
181 By the virtue of s 16 of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.3) B.E.2552 
(2009), the Ministerial Regulation Designating Types of Transactions where Financial Institutions 
and Business and Professions under Section 16 Are Required to Have Their Customers Indentify 
Themselves (B.E. 2554) (2011) requires a broad range of customer identification information and 
transaction report reportable to the AMLO, such as cash transactions, asset transactions, and transac-
tions regarding moveable assets over 700,000 Thai Baht that connect with the transaction or payment 
of money via electronic ways in cash. 
182 The Thailand government considered that the compliance of international AML standards was 
very crucial policy amended by amending the 1999 Act accordance with the AMLA (No.3) B.E. 2552 
(2009). 
183 Anti-Money Laundering Office (n 87) 59. 
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ties’ control and monitoring system for transactions reporting to the AMLO and rec-
ord keeping184 is vital in dealing with money laundering and improving the Thai-
land’s AML/CFT supervision structural framework.185 For example, ss 35 and 36 of 
the AMLA 1999 provide the power to the TC to issue a written order withholding 
the suspicious transaction depending on the evidence.186 As a result of the TC’s or-
der,  the customers whose transactions are withheld cannot use such money in their 
bank accounts until the specific time passed.187 The next section concerns the role of 
the Thailand Chamber of Commerce. 
 
6.3.3.2 Thailand Chamber of Commerce  
 Under the Chambers of Commerce Act B.E. 2509 (1966), in 1966 the Thai-
land Chamber of Commerce (TCC) serves as the central coordinating agency be-
tween the Private and Government Sector in order to support Thailand’s business 
and trade, safeguard Thailand’s commercial interests with other countries equally.188 
The TCC has also instituted an arbitration commission to deal with arguments be-
tween members, who are a unit of people working for supporting trade, industry, 
agriculture, finance, or economy, without seeking benefits or sharing revenues.189  
                                                 
184 Bank of Thailand (n 174) 1, 14.  
185 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (n 17) 32. 
186 Sections 35 and 36 of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.2) B.E. 2551 
(2008). 
187 However, s 48 para four provides that such customers may produce evidence that the money in 
such transactions are not the money linked with the commission of the predicate or money laundering 
offences in the written order that the seizure order may be revoked. 
188 Section 4 of the Chambers of Commerce Act 1966; see Thai Chamber of Commerce (TCC), ‘His-
tory’ <https://www.thaichamber.org/en/about> accessed 20 May 2019.  
189  International Monetary Fund (IMF), ‘ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ 
<https://asean.elibrary.imf.org/abstract/IMF002/08866-9781451969429/08866-
9781451969429/08866-9781451969429_A001.xml?redirect=true> accessed 20 May 2019.  
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 Under s 15 of the Chambers of Commerce Act B.E. 2509 (1966), the Board 
of Trade of Thailand consists of the Thailand Chamber of Commerce, foreign cham-
bers of commerce, trade associations, State enterprises, and co-operatives.190 The 
Trade Association Act B.E. 2509 (1966) also defines the term ‘trade association’ as 
an institution established by several persons, who are engaged in enterprises, for the 
promotion of the enterprises rather than for sharing profit or income.’191 The objec-
tive of the Trade Association Act is to regulate laws and contribute extensive 
knowledge to firms within the industry in Thailand, and to protect the Thailand econ-
omy from being used by the grouping of entrepreneurs, particularly issues on coun-
tering organised crime (i.e. money laundering) and terrorism.192 In addition, the TCC 
supports the AMLO to promote the knowledge regarding the risk of money launder-
ing and the connection with the AMLO to counter money laundering and strengthen 
international trade and investment opportunities.193 The next section explains the 
role of the Office of Insurance Commission. 
 
6.3.3.3 Office of Insurance Commission  
 The financial system is broadly linked and complicated system, which allows 
the vulnerability of international economy to affect the Thailand’s economy and gen-
erates risk to the financial stability of FIs, especially the insurance business.194 The 
Office of Insurance Commission (OIC) is the Thailand prudential regulator and su-
pervisor of the insurance industry, which has licensing and supervisory authority for 
                                                 
190 Section 15 of the Chambers of Commerce Act 1966. 
191 Section 4 of the Trade Association Act B.E. 2509 (1966). 
192 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (n 17) 171. 
193 International Monetary Fund (n 46) 226. 
194 Office of Insurance Commission (OIC), Annual Report 2017 (OIC 2018) 133.  
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life insurance firms and operational adherence to regulations via market supervi-
sion.195 The Insurance Commission Act B.E.2550 (2007) established the OIC as an 
independent government agency accountable for the Department of Insurance, Min-
istry of Commerce.196 Under the supervision of the MOF, it participates with the 
AMLO to promote the programmes regarding transferring supervisor’s knowledge, 
to enhance ability at the AMLO in order to improve the Thailand’s AML/CFT su-
pervision structural framework, and to reduce the risks in financial market effec-
tively.197 For instance, the AMLO and OIC cooperate  in evolving supervisory tools 
to develop the risk-based approach, including AML guidelines by signing the Mem-
orandum of Agreement Regarding Cooperation in the Supervision of Insurance Busi-
ness for the Purposes of Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of 
Terrorism with the AMLO in 2011 in order to ensure the Thailand insurance industry 
remains globally benchmarked.198 The OIC also issued its Notification on Rules and 
Procedures, Methods and Conditions for Setting Minimum Requirements for risk 
management by Insurance company, which comprises the provision regarding risk 
management system and policies.199  Furthermore, the OIC has worked with the 
AMLO to amend AMLA 1999 to include the legal power to supervise compliance 
with preventive measures FIs prudential supervisors pursuant to the AMLA 1999 
and Ministerial Regulations.200 The next section explores the role of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Cooperatives.  
 
                                                 
195 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (n 17) 9. 
196 Insurance Commission Act B.E. 2550 (2007). 
197 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (n 17) 9. 
198 ibid. 
199 Office of Insurance Commission (n 194) 137. 
200Anti-Money Laundering Office (n 82); see Anti-Money Laundering Office (n 86) 57. 
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6.3.3.4 The Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives  
 Thailand’s agricultural cooperatives relate to several activities such as loans, 
credit, savings and the supply of agricultural input.201 The Ministry of Agriculture 
and Cooperative (MOAC) promotes regulations and oversees all cooperatives to en-
sure the performance202 is in line with the law on cooperatives, especially taking de-
posits and offering credit in order to prevent the use of all cooperatives for the money 
laundering activities.203 The MOAC participates in the development of the regime 
for cooperatives, which falls within the FATF’s definition of a financial institu-
tion.204 Furthermore, the MOAC provides guidance regarding the national strategy 
on AML associated with the support of the use of innovation to improve the cooper-
ation from government and private parties.205  
 The tertiary competent authorities in Thailand supports the AMLO to in-
crease the effectiveness of the operation in controlling and fighting money launder-
ing. Similar to the tertiary competent authorities in the UK and Singapore, they dis-
seminate financial intelligence for the LEAs for their investigation and prosecution 
of predicate and money laundering offences.206 The FATF introduces the AML re-
porting systems as a measure of effectiveness in fighting money laundering.207 How-
ever, this thesis found that the STRs regime requires the good quality of STRs to 
                                                 
201 Nicolas Faysse and Wattanai Onsamrarn, ‘The differing strategies of agricultural cooperatives in 
Thailand: from managing market links to self-reliance’ (2018) 11(3) Journal of Community develop-
ment Research (Humanities and Social Sciences) 13, 15. 
202 Section 3(5) of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.2) B.E.2551 (2008) 
defines ‘financial institution’ includes ‘cooperatives under the law on cooperatives, limited to a co-
operative with operating capital exceeding two million Baht of total share value and having objectives 
of its operation relating to acceptance of deposits, lending of loans, mortgage, pawning or acquiring 
of money or asset by any means’.  
203 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (n 17) 32, 40, 177. 
204 Anti-Money Laundering Office (n 43). 
205 Anti-Money Laundering Office (n 87) 87. 
206 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (n 17) 54. 
207 FATF Recommendation 33 regarding the statistics of STRs received, disseminated; on ML/TF 
investigations, prosecutions, convictions; on property frozen, seized, confiscated, and on mutual legal 
assistance or other international requests for cooperation. 
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support the FIU producing the financial intelligence for investigation and prosecu-
tion of predicate and money laundering offences.208 The starting point of the STR 
reporting process is the term ‘suspicion’ in the mind of a regulated person, competent 
authorities, or FIs’ employees who interpret or consider suspicious activities or 
transactions (namely, a subjective test)209 and then report to the official in the internal 
control system of the STRs regime. In the UK, Goldby comments that s 330 of the 
POCA 2002 encourages FIs, especially banks, to file the over-SARs report to the 
NCA without the consideration of the grounds for suspicion because the POCA de-
termines the liability of the breach of s 330 for filing the SAR to the FIU.210  
 Similar to the UK, Thailand FIs possibly submit numerous insufficient STRs 
to the AMLO because s 62 of the AMLA 1999 imposes a financial fine and impris-
onment to any person who does not comply with such STRs requirement.211 In Thai-
land, s 3 of the AMLA 1999 defines the term ‘suspicious transaction’ for the REs to 
consider, while in the UK, the POCA 2002 does not define such a term in the stat-
ute.212  
 Section 35 of the AMLA 1999 provides the power to the TC to give a written 
order withholding the suspicious transaction for a fixed period, which shall not be 
                                                 
208 Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), Suspicious Activity Reports Regime Annual Report 
2010 (SOCA 2010) 14, 15; see also NC Morrison, ‘Money laundering legislation in the UK’ (1995) 
14(1) International Banking and Financial Law 3, 3. 
209 See the decision of the Court of Appeal in K Ltd v National Westminster Bank [2007] 1 WLR 311 
CA (Crime Div); [2006] EWCA Civ 1039, Judge Longmore identified that the existence of suspicious 
is subjective fact and so there was ‘no legal requirement that there should be reasonable grounds for 
the suspicion. The state of suspicion does not need a solid ground, and it depend on subjective test; 
see Ellinger, Lomnicka and Hare (n 171) 158.   
210 Section 330(2) of the POCA 2002; Ahmad v HM Advocate [2009] HCJAC 60; [2009] SCL 1093 
at 30; see Miriam Goldby, Ani-money laundering reporting requirements imposed by English Law: 
measuring effectiveness and gauging the need for reform’ (2013) Journal of Business Law 367, 375. 
211 Section 62 of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.5) B.E. 2558 (2015). 
212 See detail of the term ‘suspicion’ in the court decision of R v Da Silva [2007] 1 WLR 303 CA 
(Crim Div); K Ltd v National Westminster Bank [2007] 1 WLR 311 CA (Crime Div); [2006] EWCA 
Civ 1039 in chapter 4. 
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longer than three working days if there is probable cause to suspect and enough evi-
dence to believe that the transaction is related or possibly related to the commission 
of the predicate or money laundering offences213 (i.e. where there is convincing evi-
dence regarding such offences, the TC can order to withhold the transaction for a 
fixed period, which shall not be over than ten working days).214 In this case, the 
banks do not want consent from the TC to manage transactions unless the TC pro-
vides a written order withholding the transaction, and the banks will not interrupt the 
reported transaction.215 But in Thailand after submitting the STR, the CDSA 1992 
does not determine that the banks require the consent of the Suspicious Transaction 
Reporting Office (STRO).216  Consequently, the bank can proceed with the client’s 
transaction.217  
 Contrary to the UK, when the SAR has been submitted to the NCA, the trans-
action is immediately frozen and requires the appropriate consent from the NCA, and 
this means the banks cannot execute any action on the transaction after reporting the 
SAR to the NCA because there is an immediate effect to such the transaction.218 
Although the FATF Recommendation 33 promotes the effectiveness of AML 
measures, it still generates the cost of AML compliance that the FIs in every juris-
diction must take into account such costs.219 For example, the cost of compliance 
with STR requirements affecting the benefits of the FIs includes hiring AML experts, 
                                                 
213 Section 35 of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.2) B.E. 2551 (2008).  
214 Section 36 of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.2) B.E. 2551 (2008).  
215 Yingvoragan (n 35). 
216 Law Society of Singapore, ‘FAQ guidance from the Suspicious Transaction Reporting Office of 
CAD on lodging a suspicious transaction report’ <https://www.lawsociety.org.sg/For-Lawyers/Run-
ning-Your-Practice/Anti-Money-Laundering-and-Counter-Terrorism-Financing/FAQ-guidance-
from-the-Suspicious-Transaction-Reporting-Office-of-CAD-on-Lodging-a-Suspicious-Transaction-
Report> accessed 28 May 2019.  
217 ibid.  
218 Sections 335, 336 of the POCA 2002. 
219 FATF Recommendation 33. 
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training, and expensive technology for best practice compliance procedures.220 How-
ever, the non-compliance with AML laws and regulations could bring about large 
fines.221 
  This thesis investigates that the AMLA 1999, s 38 provides AMLO the direct 
and indirect access to a broad scope of information to enable it to appropriately con-
duct its functions.222 As reasons mentioned above, AMLO is extremely empowered 
by the AMLA 1999, s 40 under the FIU administrative, law-enforcement and judi-
cial/prosecutorial models (hybrid model).223 In contrast, the UK and Singapore are 
under the FIU administrative type, but the FATF raised them as best practices. It is 
essential to learn the valuable lessons, in particular the independence of the FIU from 
those countries to enhance the Thailand FIU in order to meet the international stand-
ards.  
 
 6.4 The Establishment of the Thailand Financial Intelligence Unit  
 The FATF Recommendation 29 states that countries should institute an FIU 
to serve as a national centre for receiving, analysing financial information regarding 
potential money laundering,224 associated predicate offences and terrorist financing, 
and then disseminating the outputs of such analysis of information in order to support 
                                                 
220 David Chaikin, ‘How effective are suspicious transaction reporting system?’ (2009) 12(3) Journal 
of Money Laundering Control 238, 243-244; see also Rowan Bosworth-Davies, ‘Money laundering 
– chapter five: the implications of global money laundering laws’ (2007) 10(2) Journal of Money 
Laundering Control 189, 189. 
221 Pornsan  Chuaphanich, ‘Anti-money laundering (AM)/countering terrorist financing (CTF)’ (Price 
waterhouse Coopers (PWC), 30 November 2018)  <https://www.oic.or.th/sites/default/files/insti-
tute/course/88436/public/aml_knowledge_sharing_oic_nov18.pdf> accessed 24 May 2019. 
222 AMLA 1999, s 38. 
223 AMLA 1999, s 40 amended in accordance with the Anti-Money Laundering Act (No.2) B.E. 2551 
(2008). 
224 Section 3(21) para 4 of the AMLA 1999 as amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.4) B.E. 
2556 (2013) defines suspicious transaction as a transaction with reasonable grounds to believe that it 
is acted to avoid the compliance of this Act, or such transaction to linked or possibly linked with the 
perpetration of a predicate offence or terrorist financing offence; however, the transaction can be 
single or multiple and shall cover an attempt to act such transaction. 
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their capacity to fight money laundering.225 As a result, the FIU is a type of state 
authority to tackle money laundering.226 Under the domestic AML legislation, each 
FIU must receive further information from reporting entities, as well as having ac-
cess to relevant financial, administrative and law enforcement information 
properly.227 Furthermore, the FATF Recommendations determine the FIU should 
support the information exchange between other competent authorities and interna-
tional FIUs.228 
 As Thailand’s FIU, the AMLO229 is a founder and a member of Asia-Pacific 
Group on Money Laundering (APG), i.e. FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs) for 
the Asia-Pacific region in combating money laundering consistent with the FATF.230 
The AMLO is also a member of the Egmont Group, which enables the exchange of 
information with other international FIUs based on the mutual agreement pursuant 
to the Egmont Group’s Principles.231 Under the AMLA 1999, the main legal princi-
ple of AML legislation can be divided into three core bodies consisting of the AMLB, 
                                                 
225 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), International Standards on Combating Money Laundering 
and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation: The FATF Recommendations (FATF 2016) 24. 
226 Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing 
of Terrorism of Council of Europe, ‘Financial intelligence units’ <https://www.coe.int/en/web/mon-
eyval/implementation/fiu> accessed 14 January 2019.  
227 FATF Recommendation 29. 
228 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Standards, ‘FATF 40 Recommendations’ (October 2013) 
<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/FATF%20Standards%20-%2040%20Recommen-
dations%20rc.pdf> accessed 30 May 2015. 
229 Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO) is a Thailand’s FIU. 
230 The mission of the APG also deals with the combat against terrorist financing. However, this dis-
sertation does not discuss this issue; see Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) ‘Overview 
of APG Member’ <http://www.apgml.org/ members-and-observers/page.aspx?p=8c32704a-5829-
4671-873c-7b5a23ced347> accessed 31 May 2015; see also Egmont Group of Financial Intelligent 
Units, ‘List of Member FIUs’ <http://self.gutenberg.org/articles/ egmont_group_of_financial_intelli-
gence_units> accessed 31 May 2015; Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), ‘Members & 
observers’ <http://www.apgml.org/members-and-observers/members/default.aspx> accessed 14 Sep-
tember 2017. 
231The Egmont Group facilitates to shape the FIUs as the operational autonomy and independence; 
see U.S. Department of State, ‘The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units’ 
<https://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2015/vol2/239473.htm> accessed 25 June 2018.  
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the TC, and the AMLO. 232  According to the AML preventive measures, 233  the 
AMLA 1999 requires the reporting entities such as FIs, regulated professions, or the 
Land Offices234 to report a suspicious transaction reporting (STRs) to the AMLO in 
order to process, examine, and analyse such information into intelligence.235 The 
submission of an STR is the initiating point of the AML measures in the UK, Singa-
pore and Thailand.236 The STR can instigate the Thailand AML process in asset pro-
ceedings because the TC is able to have the power to issue a written order a seizure 
or attachment of asset connected with the commission of the predicate or money 
laundering offences.237 From these procedures, the AMLO by the court order could 
vest the suspected property to the State in order to interrupt the flow of illegal money 
to the organised crimes or criminals.238  
 
6.4.1 Role of Thailand Financial Intelligence Unit 
 This section critically analyses the power and role of the Thailand’s FIU, 
AMLO, in implementing the international239 and domestic240 standards in order to 
                                                 
232 The AMLA 1999.  
233 Ryder (n 60) 92. 
234 Section 16 para one of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No. 3) B.E. 2552 
(2009). 
235 Under Ministerial Regulation Designating the Cash Threshold Which Businesses and Professions 
under Section 16 Shall Report to the Anti-Money Laundering Office (B.E. 2554) (2011) and the s 13 
of the AMLA 1999, financial institutions are duty-bound to report the transactions regarding the cash 
transactions of THB700,000 and above; or wire transfers or electronic transactions of THB50,000; all 
cash transactions equal to or above THB2m, as well as electronic transactions the threshold is 
THB100,000.  
236 Sections 13 to 16 of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.3) B.E.2552 
(2009) determine the STR system obliging the reporting entities (REs) in Thailand. Whilst the suspi-
cious activity reporting regulation in the UK is enacted in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, and the 
suspicious transaction reporting rule in Singapore is determined in the Corruption, Drug Trafficking 
and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act 1992 (Chapter 65A). 
237 Section 48 of the AMLA 1999. 
238 Sections 48 and 49 of the AMLA 1999. 
239 FATF Recommendations. 
240 The principal Thailand’s legal framework is the AMLA 1999. 
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support the effective investigations and prosecutions in combating money launder-
ing.241 The AMLO is Thailand’s FIU, which has an institutional autonomy to operate 
its functions and resources responsible for receiving the STRs submitted by the re-
porting entities (REs).242 The AMLO’s primary objective is to collect and then ana-
lyse the relevant financial report from various FIs for the investigation and prosecu-
tion by relevant law enforcement authorities.243 In other words, Morrison noted that 
the reporting of suspicious transactions regarding laundered funds is the most signif-
icant instrument for the AMLO to instigate legal proceedings in fighting money laun-
dering.244 Therefore, the analysis of the STR is focused on detecting, tracing and 
identifying money laundering in order to deliver the financial intelligence to the rel-
evant LEAs to investigate and prosecute the case.245 
 In Thailand, the AMLO can impose financial penalties on a person who fails 
to comply with the AML procedures.246 Similar to the UK and Singapore, Thailand’s 
AMLA 1999 provides expanded criminal offences, especially predicate and money 
laundering offences that have been enacted to target launderers and anyone who as-
sists the launderer.247 Section 3 of the AMLA 1999 determines the 28 groups of the 
predicate offences, namely the underlying criminal offence that leads to criminal 
                                                 
241 Comparing with the UK and Singapore’s legal framework, which discussed in chapter 4 and 5. 
242 By the virtue of s 40(2) of the AMLA 1999 and the Part 4 of the Ordinance of the Anti-Money 
Laundering Office Concerning the Anti-Money Laundering Office’s Administration, B.E. 2556 
(2013), the Financial Intelligence Division within the AMLO has powers to receive the STRs from 
the reporting entities. Additionally, s 16 of the AMLA 1999, the ‘Ministerial Regulation Designating 
Types of Transactions where Financial Institutions and Business and Professions under Section 16 
Are Required to Have Their Customers Indentify Themselves (B.E. 2554) (2011)’ also requires a 
broad range of customer identification information and transaction report reportable to the AMLO, 
such as cash transactions, asset transactions, and transactions regarding moveable assets over 
THB700,000 that connect with the transfer or payment of money via electronic ways in cash. 
243 Anti-Money Laundering Forum (n 149). 
244 Morrison (n 208) 3. 
245 Sections 40, 48 of the AMLA 1999. 
246 Section 64/1 of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.4) B.E. 2556 (2013).  
247 Section 3 of the AMLA 1999. 
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proceeds, which are the subject of money laundering offence.248 However, in Singa-
pore the First and Second Schedules of the CDSA 1992 identify the predicate of-
fences as more than 400 serious offences,249 whilst the UK’s POCA determines that 
all serious crimes are predicate offences.250 Thus in order to achieve the better prac-
tice, the Thailand AMLA 1999 should increase the predicate offences to cover all 
serious crimes similar to Singapore and the UK to deal with the typologies of money 
laundering. Moreover, the AMLA 1999 should list all predicate offences in Schedule 
of AMLA 1999 to enhance the clear understanding for the relevant FIs, competent 
authorities, lay people, and FIUs to implement such offences. Currently, the AMLA 
1999 identifies ‘predicate offence’ in s 3 as any offences relating to criminal activi-
ties, and this could lead to confusion in interpreting what activities relate to the pred-
icate offences.251 It causes uncertainty about what many predicate offences are and 
what definition of each offences is. For example, s 3(3) of the AMLA 1999 deter-
mines that the predicate offence is the offence ‘relating to public fraud under the 
Penal Code or offence under the law on loans of a public fraud nature’.252  According 
to s 3(3) of the AMLA 1999, people and FIs need to find out how the exact section 
of the Penal Code concerned with this predicate offence, i.e. there are eight offences 
(namely, from sections 341 to 348), involving with the fraud offence in the Thailand 
Penal Code.253 Moreover, this predicate offence also concerns s 4 of the Emergency 
Decree on Loans of Money Amounting to Public Cheating and Fraud B.E. 2527 
                                                 
248 Section 3 of the AMLA 1999; the CDSA 1992; and the POCA 2002. 
249 The First and Second Schedules of the CDSA 1992. 
250 POCA 2002. 
251 AMLA 1999, s 3. 
252 Section 3(3) of the AMLA 1999. 
253 Section 341-348 of the Thai Penal Code B.E. 2499 (1956). 
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(1984).254 The thesis advises that the Thailand Government learn a lesson from the 
UK and Singapore and change the provisional AMLA 1999. Furthermore, s 40 of 
the AMLA 1999 provides that the AMLO should function independently and neu-
trally in fighting money laundering and financing terrorism effectively.255 However, 
the AMLO has to carry out acts in the implementation of resolutions of the AMLB 
and the TC, and to perform other administrative tasks under AMLA 1999.256 
 The FATF confirms that the STR/SAR benefits the countries, especially the 
FIUs, to detect money laundering and trigger the investigation.257 Under the AMLA 
1999, the AMLO, therefore, has both direct and indirect power to access to additional 
financial and law enforcement information from FIs and relevant law enforcement 
authorities database legally and timely.258 Therefore, the AMLO analyses the STRs, 
then delivers and exchanges the financial intelligence for the execution of the AMLA 
1999 or relevant laws, or under a memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed be-
tween domestic or foreign authorities.259 This is comparable with the UK’s FIU and 
Singapore’s FIU, which have the power to gain the proper information in order to 
assist FIUs’ analysis and dissemination of STRs/SARs.260 For the reasons mentioned 
above, all relevant FIs must comply with the AMLA 1999 by reporting three types 
of transactions to the AMLO. They three types of transactions include cash transac-
tions in the amount of THB 2m or above,261 transactions involving assets worth THB 
                                                 
254 Section 4 of the Emergency Decree on Loans of Money Amounting to Public Cheating and Fraud 
B.E. 2527 (1984).  
255 Section 40 of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.2) B.E. 2551 (2008).  
256 Section 40(1) of the AMLA 1999. 
257 Morrison (n 208) 3, 4. 
258 Section 46 of the AMLA 1999 para one amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.2) B.E. 2551 
(2008). 
259 Section 40(3) of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.4) B.E. 2556 
(2013).  
260 See discussion in chapter 4 and 5. 
261 Section 13(1) of the AMLA. 
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5m or above,262 and lastly suspicious transactions regardless of the values specified 
under first or second.263 In addition, to meet the FATF requirements, s 16 of the 
AMLA 1999 requires nine groups of professions accountable for reporting the STRs 
to the AMLO.264 If they do not comply with the STRs requirements, the AMLO has 
the provisional power to issue an order, or else such professions who fail to comply 
with the provision of ss 16 and 62 of the AMLA 1999 can be fined.265  
 It is questionable that all STRs with the number of suspicious transactions to 
the AMLO (for example, a total of the STRs: 166,578 STRs in 2011; 110,835 STRs 
in 2012; 266 74,596 STRs in 2013; 13,964 STRs in 2014;267 8,953 STRs in 2015; 
18,191 STRs in 2016; and 32,209 STRs in 2017) have all appropriate quality of the 
STRs because some FIs may fear of the civil penalty from the AMLO when they fail 
to comply with the AML regulations, and this can be called ‘defensive reporting’.268             
 On the other hand, the thesis illustrates that there were a larger number of the 
STRs with more suspicious transaction reports in 2011 and in 2012 than in 2013 to 
2017. The AMLO noted that the number of the STRs received from 2013 to 2017 
had obviously decreased because the Supervision and Examination Division of the 
AMLO rechecked such STRs and sent back to those reporting entities to revised 
them again if they are incomplete reports.269 Similar to the UK and Singapore, Thai-
land has faced this problem and it has affected the AMLO’s operation such as the 
                                                 
262 Section 13(2) of the AMLA. 
263 Section 13(3) of AMLB, see also Anti-Money Laundering Office (n 38) 47. 
264 Section 16 para one of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.3) B.E.2552 
(2009). 
265 Sections 16 and 62 of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.5) B.E. 2558 
(2015).  
266 Anti-Money Laundering Office (n 43) 48. 
267 Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO), Annual Report 2014 of Anti-Money Laundering Office 
(AMLO 2015) 36. 
268 Anti-Money Laundering Office (n 87) 37. 
269 Anti-Money Laundering Office (n 267) 36.  
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delay of the analysis and dissemination of the intelligence to the LEAs. The FIs are 
also impacted by the cost of AML compliance, including budgets for AML experts 
and high technology to detect money laundering.270 Thus, to enhance the understand-
ing of the AML regulations, the AMLO has a function to issue AML guidelines on 
KYC/CDD for all REs to focus on the compliance with the AMLA 1999, as well as 
guidelines and relevant regulations which are conducted by the ordinance of the 
AMLB.271 
 In order to connect with crime and submit the good quality of the STRs, the 
staff need to understand the term ‘suspicious transaction’ that has been redefined to 
cover any transactions which are believed to be performed for the objective of avoid-
ing the obligation of the AMLA 1999.272 Likewise, it includes a transaction which 
concerns or might concern the proceeds of predicate offences, regardless of whether 
it is a single or series of transactions, including an attempt to enter into such transac-
tion.273 Therefore, if the staff lack the AML training, they will submit insufficient 
quality of the STR because they really fear of the financial sanction from the 
AMLO.274 
 Therefore, the AMLO has its three main tasks: first, the enforcement of law 
and the proceeding of legal action against the assets associated with money launder-
ing and financing terrorism offences; second, the supervision of the reporting entities 
in AML/CFT matters; third, the financial intelligence analysis in order to conduct 
strategic analysis, coordination of policies, and financial intelligence exchange for 
                                                 
270 Section 25 of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.5) 2558 (2015).  
271 Section 40(3/1) of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.4) B.E. 2556 
(2013).  
272 Section 3 of the AMLA 1999. 
273 Section 3 of the AMLA 1999. 
274 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (3rdedn, Oxford University Press 2012) 15, 282. 
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both domestic and international levels.275 Therefore, the AMLO requires its officials 
and relevant competent authorities to comply with the relevant laws strictly, espe-
cially maintaining confidentiality regarding the STRs and financial intelligence pur-
suant to s 37 of the AMLA 1999.276 
 According to s 40(3/2) of the AMLA 1999, the AMLO needs to conduct the 
national risk assessment (NRA) in supporting the AML/CFT policy and strategy, and 
then report to the AMLB and the Cabinet, as well as delivering it to the relevant 
sectors such as competent authorities, REs under ss 13 and 16 of the AMLA 1999 
for improving their understanding and adapting their AML/CFT policies and strate-
gies.277 This 1999 Act determines that the AMLO shall issue such NRA to the per-
sons involving the provision of s 40(3/2) of the 1999 Act. Actually, the AMLO only 
publicises its 2016 NRA via its website with a brief version (i.e. Thailand’s NRA 
has 10 pages), which makes general people who want to understand the situation of 
AML/CFT risk cannot use such a report for supporting the relevant sector or indi-
viduals to recognise the current AML/CFT risks and trends.278 However, the situa-
tion in Singapore is different. The government in Singapore requires FIs to take NRA 
                                                 
275  Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO), ‘Mission and Responsibilities’ (5 June 2016) 
<http://www.amlo.go.th/index.php/en/2016-05-21-21-37-20/2016-06-04-15-32-54> accessed 22 
May 2018.  
276 Section 37/1 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.5) B.E. 2558 (2015).  
277 Section 40(3/2) of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.5) B.E.2558 
(2015).  
278 Anti-Money Laundering Office (n 3); see Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), ‘National Risk 
Assessment’ (26 November 2016) <http://www.mas.gov.sg/regulations-and-financial-stability/anti-
money-laundering-countering-the-financing-of-terrorism-and-targeted-financial-sanctions/anti-
money-laundering-and-countering-the-financing-of-terrorism/national-risk-assessment.aspx> ac-
cessed 1 February 2018; see also HM Treasury and Home Office, ‘UK national risk assessment of 
money laundering and terrorist financing’ (15 October 2015)  <https://www.gov.uk/government/pub-
lications/uk-national-risk-assessment-of-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing> accessed 1 Feb-
ruary 2018.    
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report findings into account when they create their risk assessments.279 Thus, any 
person can download a full version of Singapore’s NRA from the website (i.e. Sin-
gapore’s NRA has 94 pages),280 and this practice is similar to the UK (i.e. the UK’s 
NRA has 110 pages).281 Thus, the AMLO should be more transparent and allow the 
full version of the NRA to be downloaded by public in order to increase their partic-
ipation for responding to the ML/FT risk properly. 
 Under s 40 of AMLA 1999, one of the important AMLO functions is to con-
duct crucial projects with regard to the dissemination of knowledge, the providing of 
education, and the training involving the execution of this Act, including support to 
both Government and private sectors to organised such projects.282 Consequently, 
AMLO can bring the knowledge to launch and design the specialised training or 
educational program for relevant competent authorities and the public in order to 
disseminate essential information, educate, and provide training regarding the provi-
sions of this Act.283 
 Therefore, it is crucial to note that there is an expectation that the AMLO will 
be more proactive than its performance by commencing more money laundering 
cases and imposing stronger financing penalties for any person who fails to comply 
with the AML regulations under the AMLA 1999.284 On the other side, the UK’s 
                                                 
279 Anti-Money Laundering Office (n 3); see also Kyle Wombolt, William Hallatt, Siddhartha Sivara-
makrishnan and Pamela Kiesselbach, ‘Enhanced anti-money laundering regime in Singapore: an up-
date’ (Lexology, 31 July 2015) <https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b5294fb8-c631-
4c48-b015-64f27decb3ce> accessed 17 January 2018.  
280 Monetary Authority of Singapore (n 278). 
281 HM Treasury and Home Office (n 278).    
282 Section 40 of the AMLA 1999 determines the function of the AMLO. 
283 Asian Development Bank (ADB), Technical Assistance to the Kingdom of Thailand for Promoting 
International Cooperation on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism 
Financed by the Cooperation Fund for Regional Trade and Financial Security Initiative (ADB 2005) 
1; see also Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO), ‘Botswana Conference’ 
<http://www.amlo.go.th/amlofarm/farm/en/index.php?option=com_con-
tent&id=11438&catid=1&lang=th> accessed 14 December 2015. 
284 AMLA 1999. 
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Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Singapore’s MAS are responsible for 
financial-related crimes matters as the administrative body regarding producing 
AML regulatory regulations, including supervising, monitoring, prosecuting and im-
posing the financial penalty to regulated the FIs if they violate the AML statutory 
provisions.285 The UK’s FIU (i.e. NCA) and Singapore’s FIU (STRO), conversely, 
have the power and duties only to receive, analyse, and disseminate the financial 
information to relevant LEAs.286  
 This thesis seeks to find out an appropriate role of the FIU, which improves 
the Thailand’s independence in dealing with its functions without influence and in-
terference from government, politics and industry. The UK is the member states of 
the EU community and the G7, the co-founder of the FATF that may influence on 
the FATF MER when rate to the UK. Even though, the UK becomes vulnerable to 
be the world’s money laundering capital, i.e. a lot of scale of money laundering im-
pacting annually in the UK approximately the hundreds of billions of pounds,287 was 
laundered in the UK, but the UK has never been categoried as the NCCT yet.288 In 
contrast, Thailand was grouped as the NCCT in 2012. The research needs to under-
stand what Thailand should improve to meet the international standards, such as the 
amendment of the AML legislation on the role of FIU. National Crime Agency 
(NCA) has responded to conduct the UK a hostile atmosphere for money laundering 
by targeting people engaged in money laundering with a view to securing their pros-
                                                 
285 Yingvoragan (n 32). 
286 See discussion in chapter 4 and 5, respectively. 
287 National Crime Agency (NCA), ‘Money laundering and illicit finance’ <https://www.nationalcri-
meagency.gov.uk/what-we-do/crime-threats/money-laundering-and-illicit-finance> accessed 23 De-
cember 2020.  
288 London could become the world’s next money laundering capital; see also Adrian Zorzut, ‘London 
could become global cash laundering epicenter after Brexit, report warns’ (The New European Sep-
tember 17, 2020) <https://www.theneweuropean.co.uk/brexit-news/london-uni-claims-britain-will-
be-money-laundering-epicentre-88546> accessed 23 December 2020.  
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ecution and conviction and disrupting their techniques; recovering, seizing and con-
fiscating criminal proceedings; training financial investigators and competent au-
thorities from across the UK law enforcement; and performing it harder to abuse the 
UK’s financial system, but the UK has not refer to the independence of the UKFIU 
yet. NCA argued that it emphasises on the cooperation with domestic and interna-
tional partners to deal with the international threat of money laundering, as well as 
works alongside main FIs enables them to detect and interrupt money laundering 
activities in the national and international levels.289 This thesis focuses on the en-
hancement of the AML laws regarding the independence of the FIU. The study of 
the proper FIU model is necessary to answer the research questions. The next section 
examines the FIU model in Thailand. 
 
6.5 The Model of the Thailand Financial Intelligence Unit 
 The AMLO, Thailand’s FIU, is overseen, monitored, and evaluated by the 
AMLB.290 AMLO is an independent, neutral, and autonomous state agency, which 
directly reports to the Prime Minister. 291  The Thailand government asserts that 
AMLO and Secretary-General are free from undue influence and interference.292 
AMLO receives, analyses, delivers, and exchanges its intelligence to relevant agen-
cies nationally and internationally under the Ministerial Regulation under the AMLA 
                                                 
289 National Crime Agency (NCA), ‘Money laundering and illicit finance’ <https://www.nationalcri-
meagency.gov.uk/what-we-do/crime-threats/money-laundering-and-illicit-finance> accessed 23 De-
cember 2020. 
290 Section 25(3) of the AMLA 1999 as additionally amended by the Order of the Head of the National 
Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) No. 38/2560 (2017) Re: The Revision of the Powers and Duties 
of the Anti-Money Laundering Board. 
291 Section 40 of the AMLA 1999. 
292 Section 41 of the AMLA 1999. 
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1999, which demonstrates AMLO’s type FIU as an administration-type FIU.293 Sec-
tions 35, 36 and 48 of the AMLA 1999 provide AMLO to issue orders for seizure, 
restraint or forfeiture of assets, and these are in line with a prosecutorial-type FIU.294 
Additionally, s 38 of the AMLA 1999 empowers the AMLO to have a law enforce-
ment power such as the power for authorising to search, pursue, examine, seize, or 
attach the asset or evidence when there is reasonable ground to believe that the delay 
happening in the receiving of a warrant of the search could make such property or 
evidence to be concealed, moved, converted, and eliminated from its original status, 
including conducting electronic surveillance for collecting the evidence connected 
with the commission of the money laundering offence, which is consistent with a 
law-enforcement-style FIU.295 As the reason above, AMLO combines with three FIU 
models, namely a hybrid-model FIU.296 Therefore, Thailand’s FIU has authority to 
use its extensive enforcement power, to instigate criminal proceedings, or to impose 
the financial penalties on reporting entities by itself. For instance, if any person fails 
to comply with the STRs regime, the AMLO can fine not over THB 1m (approxi-
mately £23,800) and an additional amount not over 10,000 Thai Baht (approximately 
£238) for each following day until rectification is achieved.297 
 Conversely, the UK and Singapore adopt the type FIU as administrative-type 
FIU.298 It is important to note that the UK’s FIU, National Crime Agency (NCA), 
does not have an extensive array of civil enforcement power to instigate criminal 
                                                 
293 Section 40(4) of the AMLA 1999. 
294 Sections 35, 36, 40(5) and 48 of the AMLA 1999. 
295 Section 38 of the AMLA 1999; see Prempooti (n 29).  
296 Seehanart Prayoonrat, ‘The Need and Compliance Issues of Thailand’s Regime on Anti-Money 
Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism’ (DJuridical Science thesis, Chulalongkorn 
University 2007) 250; see also Prempooti (n 29).  
297 Section 40(5) of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.2) B.E.2551 (2008), 
s 62 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.5) B.E.2558 (2015) and s 64/1 of the AMLA 1999 
added in accordance with the AMLA (No.4) B.E.2556 (2013).  
298 See discussion in chapter 4 and 5, respectively.  
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proceeding, but it can disseminates the financial intelligence to relevant agencies 
such as the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) to investigate and prosecute the 
money laundering and its associated predicate offences.299 Similarly, Singapore’s 
FIU, (STRO), delivers the intelligence to other authorities such as the MAS, namely 
the regulatory authority, to impose a financial penalty.300 Such penalty proceedings 
are conducted by the MAS while criminal proceedings are operated by the Public 
Prosecutor.301 In Thailand, the AMLO, namely hybrid model FIU, can investigate, 
fine, seize, and arrest in money laundering and its associated predicate offences.302 
 This thesis anticipates exploring of the alternative FIU type consistent with 
the AML strategy to strengthen the implementation of the international standards in 
Thailand by comparing it with the FIU model of the UK and Singapore. The next 
section illustrates the key role of the Anti-Money Laundering Board (AMLB). 
 
6.6 Anti-Money Laundering Board (AMLB) 
 As discussed earlier, the significant part of the accountability framework for 
the AMLO is the Anti-Money Laundering Board (AMLB).303 The thesis noted that 
the Board is an important mechanism to drive the effectiveness of AMLO perfor-
mance because ss 24 and 25 of the AMLA 1999 provide the extensive authority for 
the AMLB, which shall have the power and authorities to support and monitor the 
AMLO in dealing with money laundering pursuant to the AMLA 1999.304 However, 
                                                 
299 See discussion in chapter 4.  
300 See discussion in chapter 5. 
301 Lev Bromberg, George Gilligan and Ian Ramsay, ‘Financial market manipulation and insider trad-
ing: an international study of enforcement approaches’ (2017) 8 Journal of Business Law 652, 657. 
302 Sections 38, 40 and 48 of the AMLA 1999.  
303 Sections 3 as amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.2) B.E. 2551 (2008) and s 25 of the 
AMLA 1999 as amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.2) B.E. 2551 (2008). 
304 Section 24 Para one as additionally amended by the Order of the Head of the National Council for 
Peace and Order (NCPO) No. 38/2560 (2017) Re: The Revision of the Powers and Duties of the Anti-
CHAPTER SIX: Analysis of Competent Authorities and Financial Intelligence 
Unit in Thailand 
313 
the 2017 Thailand Mutual Evaluation Report (MER) by APG assessed that the 
AMLO was not sufficiently independent in dealing with their responsibilities, par-
ticularly the STRs pursuant to the AMLA 1999 and international standards.305 In 
other words, the 2017 MER demonstrated that the AMLB had the power over the 
AMLO, the TC including the Secretary-General obviously.306  
 The AMLB consists of 14 members, including six qualified experts posi-
tioned by the Cabinet, three Permanent Secretaries of the MOF, the Ministry of For-
eign and MOJ respectively, including Secretary-General of the National Security 
Council, Attorney General, Commissioner-General of the RTP, Governor of the 
BOT, Secretary-General of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Secretary-
General of the NACC, and the Secretary-General of the AMLO as members.307 It is 
questionable if most of AMLB members involved with the Government or appointed 
by the Cabinet308 will have any interference or influence on the future independent 
operation of the AMLO.  
 The process of the AMLB is advanced by using a sub-committee that in-
cludes representatives from some of AMLO's principal external domestic stakehold-
ers.309 However, the government by the Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha 
as the chief of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) can use the Article 
44 of the Interim Constitution of Thailand, which gives the regime absolute power 
to shift the AMLO Secretary-General Pol Maj-General Romsit Wiriyasan to the 
                                                 
Money Laundering Board and s 25 of the AMLA 1999 as amended in accordance with the AMLA 
(No.2) B.E. 2551 (2008).  
305 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (n 17) 182. 
306 Section 25 of the AMLA 1999 in accordance with the AMLA (No.5) B.E. 2558 (2015). 
307 Section 24 of the AMLA 1999 additionally amended by the Order of the Head of the National 
Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) No.38/2560 (2017) Re: The Revision of the Powers and Duties 
of the Anti-Money Laundering Board. 
308 Sections 24 and 25 of the AMLA 1999 in accordance with the AMLA (No.5) B.E. 2558 (2015). 
respectively. 
309 Anti-Money Laundering Office (n 267). 
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Prime Minister’s Office after four months of this position (i.e. from February to June 
2018).310 The Thailand Government responded that a shift is urgently needed to 
properly and effectively adjust human resources management in order to address the 
administration problems and prevent damages from occurring.311 
 The AMLO is actually not under the Prime Minister and the cabinet, but it is 
directly answerable to the Prime Minister under s 41 of the AMLA 1999.312 This 
quite different when compared to the UK as the National Crime Agency (NCA), the 
UK’s FIU, is completely a Non-Ministerial Department reporting through the Home 
Secretary to Parliament.313 To facilitate the efficient response to the money launder-
ing threat, the UK has an agency, namely ‘the NCA Remuneration Review Body’ 
(NCARRB), which was established as the independent mechanism to review and 
advise the UK government on the pay and allowances of NCA officers designated 
with operational powers.314 This organisation shows that the UK government’s aspi-
ration to assure the operational independence of the UK’s FIU effectively. Addition-
ally, the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group (JMLSG) promotes good practice 
                                                 
310 The Nation, ‘PM uses Article 44 power to shift AMLO head Romsit to PM’s Office’ (The Nation, 
14 August 2018) <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/detail/politics/30352156> accessed 24 May 
2019.  
311 The National Council for Peace and Order (NCOP; or Junta)’s absolute power under Article 44 of 
the Interim Charter of Thailand provide the PM or the Junta leader to issue any order considered 
essential to ‘strengthen public unity and harmony’ or to prevent any act that undermines public peace 
and security. For example, the provision permits soldiers to detain person for up to seven days without 
a court warrant and to prosecute person for national security crimes; see The Nation (n 103); see also 
The Straits Times, ‘What you need to know about Article 44 of Thailand’s interim constitution’ (The 
Straits Times, 7 April 2015) <https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/what-you-need-to-know-
about-article-44-of-thailands-interim-constitution> accessed 24 May 2019.   
312 Section 41 of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.5) B.E. 2558 (2015).  
313 The NCA set by the Crimes and Courts Act 2013, s 1; National Crime Agency (NCA), Annual 
Report and Account 2014-15 (Williams Lea Group 2015) 5 <http://www.nationalcri-
meagency.gov.uk/about-us> accessed 18 February 2016. 
314 ibid. 
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for relevant parties in fighting money laundering, as well as providing practical help 
in interpreting the MLRs.315  
 On the other hand, Singapore has the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-
ing the Financing of Terrorism Steering Committee (AML/CFT Steering Commit-
tee)316 comprising the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Perma-
nent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance, including Managing Director of the Mon-
etary Authority of Singapore.317 This Committee published a national AML/CFT 
Policy Statement in order to prevent the integrity of the Singapore financial market 
from money laundering and other criminal acts.318  
 Furthermore, this Committee also issues the National Risk Assessment 
(NRA) to the public in order to identify the risks of money laundering and terrorist 
financing and to promote the awareness of such criminal activities.319 AMLO has 
produced only two reports of the summary of 2012 and 2016 NRA through its web-
site very briefly when compared with the NRA of the UK and Singapore.320   The 
AMLO has kept its full NRA version as confidential, but it would be useful for the 
public to access the full version rather than the brief version in order to understand 
                                                 
315 Joint Money Laundering Steering Group (JMLSG), ‘Joint Money Laundering Steering Group 
(JMLSG)’<http://www.jmlsg.org.uk/> accessed 28 May 2019.  
316 See discussion in subtopic 5.3.1.3. 
317  Ministry of Finance (MOF), ‘Singapore’s AML/CFT Policy Statement’ (4 December 2017)  
<http://www.mof.gov.sg/Policies/Anti-Money-Laundering-Countering-the-Financing-of-Terrorism-
AML-CFT/Singapores-AML-CFT-Policy-Statement> accessed 6 December 2017.  
318 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (n 17) 65.  
319 Ministry of Home Office, Ministry of Finance (MOF) and Monetary Authority of Singapore 
(MAS), Singapore National Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment Report 
2013 (Ministry of Home Office, MOF and MAS 2014). 
320 Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO), ‘Thailand’s ML/FT Risk profile by sector: An excerpt 
from the NRA conducted with the IMF’s technical assistance between 2011-2012’ 
<http://www.amlo.go.th/amlo-intranet/media/k2/attachments/Thailands_MLFT_Risk_Pro-
file_by_Sector_2011-2012_5124.pdf> accessed 30 May 2019; see also Anti-Money Laundering Of-
fice (n 3).   
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and be aware of the money laundering risk. The next section discusses the role of the 
Transaction Committee.321 
 According to the independence of the AMLO, it is important to criticize 
s 25(3) of the AMLA 1999, which may affect the operational independence of the 
AMLO, TC, and the Secretary-General because of the intervention of the AMLB.322 
For example, the AMLB has the power to hold or restrain any act or AMLO’s order 
if the Board considers such an act or order as discrimination or violation of basic 
human rights.323 Actually, the court has the judicial power to consider this issue, but 
the AMLB uses this power to proceed with this issue instead. It is important to amend 
s 25(3) of the AMLA 1999 by transferring the AMLB power to the court in order to 
reduce the AMLB’s power in interrupting the operational independence of the 
AMLO to meet the FATF Recommendation 29 regarding the independence and au-
tonomy in its operation.324 On the other hand, the UK and Singapore have non board 
like the way Thailand has (i.e. the AMLB). Additionally, to avoid political influence 
and interference, the AMLO should be reconstituted as an independent body in the 
same way as the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) be.325  
 Moreover, the government should amend the AMLA 1999 to reduce 
AMLB’s powers, especially s 25(3) of the AMLA 1999 regarding the AMLB’s re-
sponsibilities, and then change the AMLO’s model from hybrid-Model FIU into ad-
ministrative-model FIU, which is similar to the UK and Singapore. Consequently, 
                                                 
321  Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO), ‘National Risk Assessment Reports’ 
<http://www.amlo.go.th/index.php/en/national-risk-assessment/national-assessment-reports> ac-
cessed 30 May 2019.  
322 Section 25(3) of the AMLA 1999 as additionally amended by the Order of the Head of the National 
Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) No. 38/2560 (2017) Re: The Revision of the Powers and Duties 
of the Anti-Money Laundering Board. 
323 ibid. 
324 FATF Recommendation 29. 
325 The Organic Act on Counter Corruption B.E. 2542 (1999); ss 215, 232 of the Constitution of the 
Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2560 (2017). 
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the Secretary-General will be selected by the Parliament for a term of four years 
pursuant to the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand. The reshaping AMLO as 
an independent and autonomous agency will accept a guarantee of the AMLO’s in-
dependence, neutrality, and autonomy. 326  These changes can better prevent the 
AMLO from being abused by its absolute power by the government than the old 
style.  
   
 6.7 Transaction Committee 
 By a virtue of the ss 32 and 34 of the AMLA 1999, the AMLB establishes a 
Transaction Commission (TC) to consider a transaction or asset connected with the 
commission of the predicate or money laundering offences, and issue an order with-
holding the suspicious transactions, carry out the act pursuant to s 48, supervise the 
AMLO’s operation, and issue AML regulations and guidance.327 Section 38 of the 
AMLA 1999 also empowers a member of the TC, the Secretary-General and the 
competent official to request information concerning the STRs from the REs, gov-
ernment bodies, and any related to parties for its examination or analysis.328 For in-
stance, the AMLO under the TC’s order uses stringent measures (i.e. a written order 
to withhold the suspected assets and money in the transaction) to prevent crimes, 
especially the predicate offences and money laundering.329  
 Even though the FATF Recommendation 29 determines that the FIU should 
be independent body, certain AML legislation may undermine its independence, for 
                                                 
326 Vinay Bhargava and Emil Bolongaita, Challenging Corruption in Asia: Case Studies and a Frame-
work for Action (World Bank 2004) 197. 
327 Section 32 of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.5) B.E.2558 (2015) 
and s 34 of the AMLA 1999 in accordance with the AMLA (No.2) B.E.2551 (2008).  
328 Section 38 of the AMLA 1999. For example, AMLO can order the concerned person or FIs to send 
their related officials for giving statements or provide written explanations, document, or evidence 
for the AMLO’s examination or consideration under s 38(1) of the AMLA 1999.  
329 Section 34(2) of the AMLA 1999.  
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example, the AMLB’s powers provided by s 25(3) of the AMLA 1999. This thesis 
illustrates that its powers can adversely affect the AMLO’s independence, which will 
be critically assessed in the following subsection. The next section investigates the 
implementation of the independence of the Thailand FIU in the STRs regime in order 
to meet the requirements of the international standards.  
 
The Implementation of Independence of Financial Intelligence Unit in Thailand       
 The AMLO, is considered a hybrid model which combines between the LEA, 
administrative and judicial model that does not act as a link between the REs and the 
LEAs when dealing with the STRs. There is a direct communication between the 
REs and the LEAs in the STR regime, which could increase the defensive reports or 
insufficient quality STRs to AMLO. The UN Convention against Corruption 2003 
encourages each country to provide the authorities the vital independence to support 
them to carry out their independent functions and free from any unjustified and un-
due influence and interference.330 FATF Recommendation 29 determines that the es-
tablishment of the FIU could be either within an existing authority or as an independ-
ent national body.331 However, the functions of the FIU has to be independent free 
from any unduly political, governmental or industrial interference or influence in its 
operational independence.332 It is very interesting to know that the Thailand FIU of-
ten suffers from a lack of independence because there are several military coups in 
Thailand and the military governments require to supervise the FIU in order to use 
the FIU to control the opposite of the government, such as the case of Suthichai Yoon 
                                                 
330 Article 6: Preventive anti-corruption body or bodies of the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption 2003 <https://www.unodc.org/pdf/corruption/publications_unodc_convention-e.pdf> ac-
cessed 29 November 2020.       
331 FATF Recommendation 29. 
332 FATF Recommendation 29 and Interpretative Note to FATF Recommendation 29. 
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and groups vs AMLO.333 therefore, the Thailand FIU has been subjected to the su-
pervision of political body or its analytical duty is also interfered and influenced by 
political and military persons who are outside the Thailand FIU.334 
 This section focuses on the role which the Thailand FIU, AMLO, plays in the 
fight against ML and its responsibilities to meet international standards, especially. 
Its core and non-core duties are critically evaluated, and it is examined how inde-
pendent the Thailand FIU is and the relationship which it has with the REs and the 
LEAs. More importantly, the section compared analyses the similarity and difference 
between the UK and Singapore FIUs and learn the valuable lessons from best prac-
tices.  
 Section 25(3) of the AMLA 1999 provides the power to the Anti-Money 
Laundering Board (AMLB) which may undermine the operational independence of 
AMLO in dealing with its functions of Thailand FIU.335 The National Council for 
Peace and Order (NCPO) issued Order 38/2560 (2017) which could interfere and 
influence on the independence of AMLO, especially holding or restraining any act 
of the Transaction Committee, the AMLO or the Secretary-General which the 
AMLB considers as breach of basic human rights.336 The thesis notes that the AMLA 
                                                 
333 Suthichai Yoon and Groups filed the AMLO to conduct an illegal investigation into the properties 
and financial transaction of Yoon and several journalists who criticised Thailand Prime Minister 
Thanksin Shinawatra in 2002. The AMLO officials had requested their financial transactions from 17 
financial institutions. In 2002, the prime minister was a board chair in the AML Committee by the 
AMLA 1999. After that, Yoon and his groups sued a petition with the Administrative Court against 
the AMLO officials and Shinawatra as the AMLB chair. Yoon and his groups believed that the gov-
ernment had ordered the AMLO secretly to investigate such properties and transactions by citing only 
the anonymous letters, which still lacked credibility to make it believable that any property connected 
with criminal assets and predicate offences of money laundering; see Suthichai Yoon and Groups v. 
AMLO [2002] Administrative Court 1251, 1252/2545 (2002) 
334  As in the case of Suthichai Yoon and Groups v. AMLO [2002] Administrative Court 1251, 
1252/2545 (2002) where the government influenced and interfered the independence of the Thailand 
FIU. 
335 Section 25(3) of the AMLA 1999 and The National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) Order 
38/2560 (2017). 
336 Section 25(3) of the AMLA 1999 and The National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) Order 
38/2560 (2017). 
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1999 does not provide any guideline, example and the definition of the terms of 
‘basic human rights’. Therefore, the AMLB can hold or restrain ‘any act of AMLO’ 
whatever it requires without transparent guidance. The thesis suggests that the Thai-
land Constitution and AMLA 1999 should assure the independence of AMLO in its 
functions preventing from the judicial power and interfere or influence of the AMLB 
under s 25(3) of AMLA 1999 in order to protect AMLO in using its powers in STR 
regime by cutting off s 25(3) of AMLA 1999.  
 The AMLB’s power under s 25(3) of the AMLA 1999 could conflict with 
objective of the FATF Recommendation 29 and negatively affect the independence 
of responsibility for taking the decision of AMLO in analyzing cases and dissemi-
nating the resulting financial intelligence under the STR regime.337  
 
  
6.8 Evaluation of the Implementation of FATF Recommendations of Thailand 
 According to the 2007 MER, the APG and FATF rated Thailand’s level of 
compliance with the FATF Recommendation 26 regarding the FIU as the ‘partly 
compliant’.338 However, the 2017 MER, the APG rated Thailand as the ‘largely com-
pliant’ with the FATF Recommendation 29 (i.e. former FATF Recommendation 26). 
But, Singapore was rated ‘compliant’ and the UK was rated ‘partially compliant’ 
with such the Recommendation.339 According to the latest APG MER, it illustrated 
that Thailand has significantly developed the compliance with the AML/CFT 
measures and the strong political support for the reforms and the cooperation at the 
policy and operation levels since the 2007 MER. To develop the compliance with 
                                                 
337 Section 25(3) of the AMLA 1999 and The National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) Order 
38/2560 (2017) and FATF Recommendation 29. 
338 Now is changed into Recommendation 29; see International Monetary Fund (n 46) 101. 
339 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (n 17) 181, 183; see also Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures – United Kingdom 
Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (FATF 2018) 225. 
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the FATF in Thailand, the 2016 NRA Report suggested that the deeper understand-
ing of risk and context, including information sharing, is significant to the REs, com-
petent authorities, and the FIU for complying with the international AML stand-
ards.340  
 According to the operational independence of the AMLO, the thesis consid-
ers that it is questionable to analyse the roles of government and the AMLO in case 
that the Thailand government was accused of intervening the AMLO’s independent 
operation, and this could affect Thailand’s reputation for good governance. For in-
stance, in the case of Suthichai Yoon and Groups v AMLO,341 Yoon and Groups filed 
the AMLO to launch an illegal investigation into the assets and monetary transaction 
of Yoon and several journalists who criticised the Thailand government under Prime 
Minister Thanksin Shinawatra regime in 2002.342 The AMLO officials had requested 
their financial information from 17 banks.343 In 2002, the prime minister was a board 
chair in the AML Committee by law (namely, the AMLA 1999).344 After that, Yoon 
and his groups sued a petition with the Administrative Court against the AMLO of-
ficials and the Prime Minister Thanksin as the AMLB chair.345 Yoon and his groups 
believed that the government had ordered the AMLO secretly to investigate such 
properties and transactions by citing only the anonymous letters, which still lacked 
credibility to make it believable that any property connected with criminal assets and 
predicate offences of money laundering.346 The AMLO accused that the anonymous 
                                                 
340 Anti-Money Laundering Office (n 3).  
341 [2002] Administrative Court 1251, 1252/2545 (2002). 
342 Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s government. 
343 Suthichai Yoon and Groups v. AMLO [2002] Administrative Court 1251, 1252/2545 (2002). 
344 Section 24 of the AMLA 1999 
345 Suthichai Yoon and Groups v. AMLO [2002] Administrative Court 1251, 1252/2545 (2002). 
346 Clause 1 of the Ministerial Regulation No. 8 B.E. 2543 (2000) Issued under the provisions of the 
AMLA 1999. 
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letter alleged that Yoon and his groups had joined in extortion and blackmail activi-
ties of predicate offences with the organised crime group.347 He noted that this in-
vestigation was breached the AMLA 1999 because of no suspicious transactions.348 
Therefore, the AMLO did not have the legal authorities from the AMLA 1999 to 
request financial information about his money transaction from the FIs.349 Yoon con-
sisted that the political factors (i.e. Prime Minister Thaksin secretly ordered the 
AMLO to investigate) intervened in the independent operation of the AMLO in such 
illegally investigating his business transaction.350 Finally, the AMLO removed such 
order to investigate Yoon and Groups cases following the Administrative Court’s 
judgement.351 
 According to the AMLA 1999, it identifies the duties and responsibilities of 
the AMLO to conduct the NRA report, and then submit the result to the AMLB, 
including the Cabinet, as well as disseminating the report to relevant competent 
agencies which supervise the REs,352 to understand and make their AML policies 
and guidelines in fighting money laundering regime.353 Moreover, the AMLO also 
issues the AML action plan, jointly with relevant government agencies in imple-
menting the AML strategy for combating the terrorist financing.354 To supervise the 
obliged reporters, the AMLO notifies the lists of REs,355 who do not fully comply 
                                                 
347 Sections 3, 40 of the AMLA 1999; see Southeast Asian Press Alliance (SEAPA), ‘AMLO scandal: 
Thaksingate’ (20 March 2002) <https://www.seapa.org/amlo-scandal-thaksingate/> accessed 30 May 
2019.  
348 Section 3 of the AMLA 1999. 
349 Section 40 of the AMLA 1999.  
350 His business included the Nation Group (i.e. media and publication); see Nation Group, ‘History 
of the Nation Group’ <http://www.nationgroup.com/about_2.php> accessed 13 May 2019.  
351 Suthichai Yoon and Groups v. AMLO [2002] Administrative Court 1251, 1252/2545 (2002). 
352 The agencies supervising the REs under ss 13, 16 of the AMLA 1999. 
353 Section 40(3/2) of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.4) B.E. 2556 
(2013).  
354 Section 40(3/3) of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.5) B.E. 2556 
(2015).  
355 Under Sections 13, 16 of AMLA 1999. 
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with this Act or the AML/CFT law, to respective supervisory agencies to consider 
taking action under relevant laws.356  
 The AMLO promotes the cooperation in sharing information for combating 
the money laundering and financing of terrorism.357 The AMLO gathers and collects 
data or statistics. Then, the AMLO examines, monitors, and evaluates the implemen-
tation of this Act, analyses reports or data related to suspicious transactions, and as-
sesses the money laundering risk.358 The AMLO gathers evidence for the purpose of 
taking legal proceeding against offenders under this Act in order to investigate and 
prosecute any violator under the provisions of this Act.359 After that, the AMLO de-
livers the intelligence or other information related to financial transactions in accord-
ance with the requirements of the Act.360 Furthermore, it is important for the AMLO 
to conduct the projects with regard to the dissemination of knowledge, the giving of 
education and the training in the field involving the execution of the Act. It is also 
important to provide assistance or support to both Government and private sectors in 
organising such projects in order to raise the awareness of the money laundering 
risks.361 For example, the delegation is sent to attend the relevant conferences in or-
der to raise awareness of the significance of the AML regime regarding investiga-
tions, AML techniques, typologies of money laundering, and the way to deal with 
the international organised crime. 
                                                 
356 Section 40(3/4) of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.5) B.E. 2556 
(2015).  
357 Section 40(3/5) of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.5) B.E. 2556 
(2015).  
358 Section 40(4) of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.4) B.E. 2556 
(2013).  
359 Section 40(5) of the AMLA 1999. 
360 Section 40(3) of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.4) B.E. 2556 
(2013). 
361 Section 40(6) of the AMLA 1999. 
CHAPTER SIX: Analysis of Competent Authorities and Financial Intelligence 
Unit in Thailand 
324 
 The FATF Recommendation 29 regarding the role and responsibilities of the 
FIU in preventing money laundering determines that the FIU shall be responsible for 
acting as a national centre to deal with the STRs/SARs regime (such as a receipt, 
analysis of STRs/SARs, and dissemination of intelligence depending on the FIU 
models in each jurisdiction).362 This Recommendation does not prejudge or identify 
which model should be applied in each country. In Thailand, the country has adopted 
the hybrid-model FIU, which includes receipt, analysis of STRs, dissemination of 
intelligence, investigation of money laundering case, confiscation of asset connected 
with money laundering offence, as well as prosecution of offenders in terrorism fi-
nancing case under the law on money laundering (including, counter-terrorism fi-
nancing).363 Such absolute power may be abused by the politician as it is seen in the 
case of Suthichai Yoon and Groups v AMLO in 2002.364 The administrative-model 
FIU as utilised in the UK and Singapore may be more appropriate for Thailand’s FIU 
because this style of the FIU does not have the judicial or law-enforcement power to 
impose any sanctions. This FIU model might prevent the FIU from being abused by 
the political influence. For the reason above, this style would encourage the opera-
tional independence of FIU without the undue interference in Thailand. 
 Although the three countries imposed large financial sanctions on offending 
financial institutions, there is an obvious difference between the enforcement stance 
implemented by Thailand, the UK and Singapore: the capacity to pursue criminal 
proceedings regarding money laundering. The criminal offence of money laundering 
                                                 
362 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendation 29.  
363 Sections 40, 46/1 of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.5) B.E.2558 
(2015). 
364 [2002] Administrative Court 1251, 1252/2545 (2002). 
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in Thailand is mainly enforced by AMLO.365 The AMLO’s ability to prosecute 
money laundering cases is provided by the AMLA 1999.366 For example, in 2016 
there were 148 investigations; 83 prosecutions and 29 convictions of money laun-
dering or predicate offences.367 Furthermore, in 2017 the AMLO filed 138 cases to 
the public prosecutor with a total asset worth of 26,027,988,407.94 baht.368 In the 
same year, the AMLO investigated transactions or assets connected with a commis-
sion of money laundering or predicate offences in a total of 363 cases and seized or 
restrained such assets in a total of 148 orders.369 On the other side, the UK’s LEAs 
achieved approximately 7,900 investigations; 2,000 prosecutions and 1,400 convic-
tions for money laundering and predicate offences per year.370 Whilst, in 2014 Sin-
gapore had 217 money laundering cases investigated; 354 individuals prosecuted; as 
well as 343 individuals convicted for money laundering.371 These figures refer to the 
statistics in three countries and lead to the point that Thailand should be criticised 
for the low number of such investigations, convictions and prosecutions.   
 However, it is necessary to remember that money laundering is so complex 
and lengthy that the AMLO may have limited capacity to obtain more criminal con-
victions. The number of money laundering convictions obtained by the AMLO 
clearly shows the difficulty in investigating and pursuing criminals. To deal with 
these problems, the AMLO has concerned the pursuing administrative financial 
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sanctions and the optional model of FIU, i.e. administrative-model FIU similar to the 
UK and Singapore. 
6.9 Conclusion 
 The current situation of money laundering in Thailand is critical because the 
highest money laundering risk is mostly found in public entities such as the financial 
institutions, especially the channel of finance and banking sector.372 Thailand has 
implemented international legal AML standards, such as the UN Conventions and 
the FATF Recommendations, in countering money laundering regime, but its provi-
sion has not still reached such international AML standards. However, the Thailand 
government has attempted to transpose the FATF standards by enacting the AMLA 
1999 in line with the international AML standards, including best practices and in-
dustry guidelines. However, due to the lack of the effectiveness of AML strategies, 
Thailand has still not met the FATF standards. Therefore, in 2012 the FATF catego-
rised Thailand into the NCCT list as a fail jurisdiction to fight with money launder-
ing. However, in 2013 the FATF withdrew Thailand from the FATF public statement 
because the FATF was satisfied with Thailand in implementing the FATF Recom-
mendations.373 For example, Thailand implemented the risk-based AML policy of 
preventive measures, the robust legislation (i.e. Thailand has enacted the AMLA 
(No.4) 2013; enacted the Counter Terrorism Financing Act B.E.2556 (2013)).374 
This legislation has enhanced the KYC, CDD, customer recorded-keeping, and the 
guidelines on AML/CFT in order to reduce the risk of money laundering effectively. 
                                                 
372 Sutthi Suntharanurak and Napat Jantatanatip, ‘Audit to Detect Fraud and Corruption: Evaluation 
of the Fight against Corruption and Money Laundering Country paper of Thailand’ Research Project 
No. 3 of the Office of the Auditor General Fiscal Year 2015, 5. 
373 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand (n 41). 
374 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘Press releases: FATF removes Thailand from Public State-
ment on money laundering/financing of terrorism’ (1 May 2013) <http://www.mfa.go.th/main/en/me-
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Therefore, the AMLO should continue improving such AML guidelines and best 
practice for supervision, including the implementation for the REs to assure that the 
risk-based approach (RBA) is engaged at the same level.  
 However, the stringent AML regulations have been enacted considerably in 
order to prevent money laundering and helped Thailand meet the international AML 
requirements. Consequently, the pro-active legislation regarding the STR regime 
may also affect the FIs, the competent authorities, and the AMLO. For instance, such 
as the AMLA 1999 empowers the AMLO to temporarily withhold any transaction 
where there is any evidence or possible cause to believe the asset might be connected 
with the commission of money laundering or its associated predicate offences.375 
 The evaluation of the compliance with the FATF Standards regarding the 
roles, responsibilities, administration, and the degree of the operational independ-
ence of Thailand’s FIU is hi-lighted in this thesis although it is argued that the AML 
regulations in three countries cause the burdensome responsibilities to the relevant 
people and FIs, such as the banks paying expensive money to hire experts and high 
technologies to detect suspicious transaction, which can be called ‘the cost of the 
AML compliance’. Consequently, the FIU is a key role in implementing AML policy 
and measures in line with international standards. 
 Nevertheless, it is questionable that the model of Thailand FIU, hybrid-model 
FIU, may not be useful and appropriate for the AMLO because the REs produce the 
poor quality of the STRs, namely the defensive reporting, to the AMLO. They submit 
the STR because they fear of the sanctions if they fail to comply with the STR re-
quirements. On the other side, the UK and Singapore have adopted the administra-
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tive-model FIU, and their FIUs become the buffer between the FIs and LEAs. There-
fore, the latter model assists the REs and LEAs in having better atmosphere and 
communication between them rather than the hybrid-FIU model in Thailand, of 
which the AMLO acts as the roles of FIU and LEA at the same time. The AMLO is 
responsible for receiving, analysing, disseminating the intelligence, investigate, and 
then imposing penalty on the FIs when failing the STR regulations. 
 As the thesis found out that s 25(3) of the AMLA 1999 provides the judicial 
power of the AMLB to hold or restrain any act of the TC, the AMLO, or the secre-
tary-General if the AMLB scrutinises such order involving discrimination, or 
breaches fundamental human rights.376 Such power obviously interrupts the FATF 
Recommendation 29 regarding the operational independence and autonomy of the 
AMLO.377 Therefore, it is essential to amend this section by cutting off this power 
of the AMLB to meet the international standards because there is the court’s respon-
sibility to consider these issues. On the other hand, the UK and Singapore do not 
have the legal provision regarding the absolute power as Thailand does. This thesis 
also recommends that the Thailand government should change the form of the 
AMLO onto an independent constitutional agency, similar to the NACC and the 
OAG, in order to prevent the AMLO from political intervention. According to the 
independent constitutional agency, the Thailand Parliament will select the Secretary-
General for the term of four years in accordance with the Constitution of the King-
dom of Thailand 2017. The 2017 Constitution ensures that the AMLO is an inde-
pendent and autonomous agency. 
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 According to the hybrid-model FIU of the AMLO, it causes that the AMLO 
has a large number of burdens in operating such as receiving, analysing, disseminat-
ing, investigating and prosecuting, and all of these can be called ‘absolute power’ 
that certain governments or politicians may abuse the AMLO to work for the political 
benefit as Yoon and Groups v AMLO.378 On the other side, the FIU of the  UK and 
Singapore adopt the administrative-model FIU that is accountable for receiving, an-
alysing and delivering financial intelligence only. FIUs in both countries focus on 
their duties and then disseminate the information to the relevant LEAs to investigate 
and prosecute. 
 The AMLO is independent of the executive regulatory agency that can have 
the sufficient funds, resources or official training, including proper technology inde-
pendently and effectively. However, the AMLO has to enhance and update a code of 
conduct or ethics for AMLO staff in order to promote good governance (such as 
transparency of investigation or confiscation, accountability of the fiscal budget use 
and citizen participation via AMLO website)  and best practices of the preventive 
role of AML by minimising the risk of money laundering. The AMLO can promote 
the robust risk-based approach and STR system through preventive roles of the FIU, 
strengthen internal control for the REs to reduce money laundering chances via the 
internal control and proactive AML strategy, and raise public awareness regarding 
the NRA report via AMLO website. The AMLO requires the preventive role that 
includes promoting the effective internal control in the REs to reduce the defensive 
reporting from the reporter, emphasising proactive AML strategic plan to reduce the 
cost of compliance, as well as coordinating with mass media in combating money 
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laundering to enhance the communication among governmental sector and private 
sector. 
 Furthermore, the AMLA 1999 should permit the public’s right to know in-
formation related to the NRA in order to improve the awareness of the money laun-
dering risk that the FIs and individuals can acknowledge by publishing the full ver-
sion of the NRA. These changes have distributed a conducive atmosphere for possi-
bly powerful AML coalitions and positive developments in Thailand. The thesis pro-
poses best practices referred to the FIUs of the UK and Singapore. Both of them are 
popularly regarded as successful models in combating money laundering. However, 
the FIU model should be tailored to these techniques in order to create proper man-
dates for Thailand. 






COMPARISON OF OPERATIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, 
SINGAPORE AND THAILAND 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 The thesis examines the implementation of the international anti-money laundering (AML) 
standards regarding the role of FIU under the FATF Recommendations. The research questions 
are: 
1. What is the AML policy relating to the roles of the Thailand FIU?  
2. How effective has Thailand’s FIU been in implementing the FATF standards? 
3. What additional strategies should Thailand implement to fight money laundering? 
4. What are the lessons that Thailand should learn lessons from the UK and Singapore? 
 
Based on the previous examination on the implementation of the international standards regarding 
the operational independence and transparency of the Financial Intelligence Units (FIU) of the 
United Kingdom (UK), Singapore and Thailand, this chapter provides a comparative analysis of 
the implementation of the operational independence and transparency of the FIUs in the three 
selected countries. Purposes served by the chapter are twofold.  First, it highlights similarity and 
difference features of the operation independence and transparency of the FIUs in three 
jurisdictions while implementing the international standards. Second, it provides 
recommendations for Thailand to improve the effectiveness of its operational independence and 
transparency via an evaluation of the lessons offered by the UK and Singapore. In pursuit of its 
purposes, this chapter is consisted of three sections. The first section relates to the comparative 





legal research and the implementation of soft law in the three countries, which is the basis for 
guiding the comparison of the operational independence of the FIUs in three jurisdictions. The 
second section illustrates a comparative analysis of three FIUs for similarities and differences of 
each jurisdiction to adapt an appropriate model for the Thailand’s FIU. The thesis compares the 
three FIUs following the role of the FIU, the operational independence of FIU and transparency of 
the FIU. The final section of this chapter offers Thailand recommendations to enhance the 
effectiveness of its FIU, based on the best practices found in the results of the comparison and 
suggests what Thailand should learn and commit to facilitate an appropriate process for these 
practices to achieve.  
 
7.2 Concept of Comparative legal approach  
 The thesis examines the role of the Thailand FIU to find an appropriate model to implement 
under the international standards. The approach explores the differences and similarities between 
the single legal system or the different legal systems and works out the solutions of the legal issue 
under the examination.1 The goal of comparative law had a purely scientific objective, which aims 
to clarify the causes which underline the origin, development and extinction of legal institutions 
in order to make as a science of knowledge with its own an independent science.2 
Hoecke noted that comparing domestic law with the one or more countries has become 
obligatory in the doctrinal legal research.3 Zweigert and Kotz added that the basic methodological 
principle of the comparative law is an important tool enhances domestic legislation.4  Dehousse 
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argued that the researcher should study the different competences of each body in order to write a 
full picture of similarities and differences analyse the functions of such bodies, including and the 
relations among the various bodies in order to understand the implementation of the international 
standards.5  
Zweigert and Kotz argue that the dominant approach to comparative law is functionalism 
focusing on the function of laws6 what laws really do to reach the social purpose.7 There are three 
premises of functional method, comprising (i) legal systems face the same issues; (ii) solving the 
same problem, various legal systems emerge different results; as well as (iii) despite various 
measures selected, legal systems achieve similar solutions.8 The functional comparisons involve 
the tool for channelling the human behaviour and also claim that the law contribute to social needs.9 
Therefore, the application of the functional method in comparative starts with the establishment of 
the problem-solution approach and then chooses a particular practical problem in order to examine 
how such issue is solved by the law in different legal system.10 The next step, similarities and 
differences between the results would be listed, explained, considered and assessed in order to 
address the social problem that the current function of legal institutions is a matter for sociological 
consideration.11 The researchers may achieve the similar or same practical solutions, but if they 
find that there are great differences, they should recheck the answer to ensure the research quite 
wide enough.12 The comparative research is not perfect until it has been illustrated that the legal 
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systems under consideration achieve similar solutions in similar circumstances.13 Brand concludes 
that functional approach scrutinised explaining how rules are similar or different from one country 
to another, how such rules are transferred, as well as how they are expressed in differing or similar 
types of laws. However, the results that the researchers find in the different countries must be cut 
loose from their conceptual context and stripped of their national doctrinal overtones so that they 
may be viewed purely in the light of their current function, as an effort to satisfy a specific legal 
requirement.14 Legrand argues that the researcher should understand and examine a legal rule in a 
political, economic, social and ideological context to find the actual meaning attributed to the rule 
under the legal system.15 Similar to Hoecke, he focuses on the significance of equally deeming the 
doctrinal framework and concludes that comparative legal research methods can be used to carry 
out the comparative law, namely the function method; the analytical approach (i.e. analysing legal 
concept and rule); the structural approach (i.e. analysing the framework of the rule); the historical 
approach (i.e. analysing legislative development); as well as the law-in-context approach (i.e. 
emphasising on social context, politics, economy and culture).16 Hoecke notes that such methods 
can be employed in the comparative legal research, and used the selection of such approach to 
design research objectives, including research questions in the thesis.17 In summary, the 
comparative research focuses on the similarities and differences between the various legal systems 
or contexts, which cannot use only the surface of law or doctrinal legal framework because the 
comparative research develops the deeper understanding of the issue, background and context that 
arranges the compared legal systems. 
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This thesis needs an assessment of the relevant legal systems (common and civil law) and 
FIU styles (administrative and hybrid FIU models) in three jurisdictions in order to compare the 
legislation on independence of the FIU. The UK FIU and Singapore FIU employ the FIU 
administrative model, which are different to the Thailand FIU hybrid type. The FATF rated the 
UK and Singapore a number of positive comments about their implementation of the FATF 
standards.18 According to comparative legal research, this thesis focuses on the specific issues, 
namely the independence of the FIU by comparing the three national FIUs – the UK, Singapore 
and Thailand, because they have the same core function in line with the FATF Recommendations 
in fighting money laundering. However, the UK and Singapore use the administrative-FIU model, 
Thailand uses the hybrid-FIU type.19 Therefore, the thesis examines the FIUs in the three countries 
within their legal AML framework and context in line with the same best international practices, 
such as the FATF, Egmont Group and Basel standards.20 
Comparative legal research in this thesis mainly contributes to new knowledge by 
illustrating the similarities and differences of the legislation regarding the roles of FIUs in three 
countries, besides the doctrinal legal method and socio-legal approach.21 Furthermore, it can be a 
tool for making the contribution to knowledge, especially the creation of an appropriate model of 
FIU for Thailand under the international standard regime.22 This research method guides the thesis 
to assess how the adaption of legislation, which have been complied in other countries, may 
provide the appropriate solution to other country like Thailand.23 
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In this thesis, it is essential to compare the role of the FIUs in those jurisdictions, in 
particular their independence in operating their functions by reviewing from their FATF MERs, 
which illustrated their performance under the best international practices in fighting money 
laundering. The research also studies the competent AML authorities in order to examine their 
relationship with the FIUs and such authorities how effective they involve with the independence 
of the FIU in each country.24 In order to understand what the three FIUs work with the international 
standards because the 2018 FATF MER rated ‘partially compliant’ for the UK in implementing 
the FATF Recommendation 29 while the 2016 FATF MER rated ‘compliant’ for Singapore’, 
whilst the 2017 APG MER rated ‘largely compliant’.25    
 In summary, in this thesis the comparative legal research focused on identifying any 
similarities or differences between the legislation of the role of FIU, especially regarding the 
independence and transparency of the FIU in three countries. The thesis aims to understand how 
far Thailand FIU is far from the standards and learn what the valuable recommendations and 
lessons from the UK FIU and Singapore FIU. The comparison of the independence and the role of 
the FIUs in the three countries assists the doctrinal legal principles and the social-legal approach 
for deeper understanding the implementation of the international soft law, such as the FATF 
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7.3 The implementation of international soft law 
 Watson refers to the legal transplantation as a phenomenon where a legislative regulation 
transposes from one jurisdiction to another and notes that there is no linkage between legislation 
and the societal context, in which it performs; for this reason, legislation can move easily to 
jurisdictions that are various from the place of its origin.26 For example, Watson finds legislative 
transplantation has the most significant contribution in changes in several legal systems by citing 
cases of transmitting the European law to several international jurisdictions.27 As a consequence, 
the recipient jurisdiction’s social, economic, cultural and political forces impact on the decision of 
the legal transferability, which creates the legislative texts similar to the recipient jurisdiction or 
different from such origin.28 However, Kahn-Freund argues that the political differentiation other 
than other social forces has performed as a major obstacle of legislative transplantation.29 
Therefore, the significance of legal implementation as a central study to comparative law to allow 
comparative law-makers and law lawyers to appreciate similarities and differences between the 
legal systems and to be in a place to produce the recommendations.30 
 As soft law, the FATF has spearheaded global efforts to counter financial crime, which 
was established as a joint UK-U.S. engage at the 1989 Group of 7 (G7) Paris Summit to deal with 
the proceeds of drug trafficking.31 Recommendation 29 provides that the national legislation be 
transposed to ensure the operational independence of the FIU from the government and industry.32 
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Each country shall implement the standard in order to meet its requirements. For example, the FIU 
should be operationally independent in carry out it functions freely.33 Moreover, this 
Recommendation suggest countries should apply for the Egmont Group and implement its 
Statement of Purpose and Principles for Information Exchange Between Financial Intelligence 
Units for Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Cases.34 Such Egmont Group Statement was 
also considered as soft law that countries have to comply with the Principles.  
 Recommendation 29 requires to countries to ensure that the FIUs have operational 
independence without the influence or interference in order to increase an effective AML/CFT 
system, which mainly consists of the stable institutions (i.e. FIUs) with transparency, integrity, 
accountability.35 The lack of such operational independence of the FIUs could cause significant 
weakness and shortcomings in implementing an effective AML/CFT framework. The Thailand 
government must ensure adequate operational independence to illustrate the transparency of its 
governance of the implementation of the international standards requirement efficiently. 
Otherwise, Thailand might be announced as the NCCT, which had strategic AML/CFT 
deficiencies, like the situation of the 2012 FATF Public Statement again.36   
 According to the STRs/SARs regime and the implementation of risk-based approach 
throughout the FATF Recommendations, it is approximated that 3.1 per cent of worldwide 
turnover (about $1.28trn) is spent fighting financial organised crime.37 For example, FIs in Europe 
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alone have spent approximately $83.5bn on AML/CFT compliance in 2017.38 By comparison, the 
FIs in Asia have spent around $1.5bn on such compliance in 2016. Furthermore, the FIs in North 
America were estimated at $25.3bn.39 As reasons mentioned above, the costs of AML compliance 
become too high for each FI as well as the sanctions compliance costs also continue to increase, 
this impacts on the implementation of the AML soft law in such country.40 
 In 2017 FATF launched a Supplement on customer Due Diligence to its 2013 Guidance on 
Financial Inclusion, which would prevent the unserved or undeserved clients resorting to cash and 
unregulated channels that causes limitation of transparency and increases the ML risk.41  
 An efficient AML system generally requires some structural elements to be in place, for 
instance: political stability; high-level commitment to solve AML issues; stable institutions with 
accountability, integrity, and ‘transparency’; the rule of law; a capable, effective and ‘independent’ 
judicial system.42 In this thesis focuses on the role, operational independence and transparency of 
the FIU that governments should be required to engage in order to meet the international 
standards.43 
 
7.4 The application of the comparative law and the implementation of the soft law to the 
research  
 Regarding the independence of the FIU, the UN Conventions (the Vienna Convention and 
Palermo Convention) may not refer to the independence of FIU, unlikely the Merida Convention 
refers to it in order to encourage its member states to implement the international AML standards 
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efficiently. Similar to the Anti-Corruption Agencies, an important element of the FIU is the 
operational independence, transparency and autonomy without undue interference and influence 
in order to ensure that the FIU under the globally AML standards is able to perform its functions 
effectively.44 
 Moreover, the Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on money 
laundering were launched for being another AML soft law for its member states to implement and 
recognised as the global standards for countering money laundering, including the EU, which has 
transposed six EU directives (1991, 2001, 2005, 2015, 2017 and 2020) on the issue.45 One of the 
most important FATF Recommendations (Recommendation 29) provides that countries shall set a 
FIU that act as a national and neutral centre for the FIU core functions.46 
 Scherrer argued that FIU’s budget independence and adequacy of human resources 
available increase the FIUs’ ability to deal with their functions in SARs/STRs regime for example 
the EU FIU gains budget from €600,000 to above €14m annually.47  
 With regard to the independence of the FIU, the thesis analyses and compares that the three 
countries have a variation of economic sizes, criminal typologies and crime rates, but there are the 
FIUs to do the FIU’s core functions under the SARs/STRs regime. As reasons mentioned above, 
then they differentiate between FIUs depending on whether or not they have a national legislation 
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on the FIUs. The thesis seeks to find out the approaches which best practices apply to enhance 
their FIU concerned the independence of each FIU and its role. 
 The case of the Thailand FIU is an appropriate example supporting Kahn-Freund claim’s 
that in the modern time of international societal, economic factors there are no other forces than 
politics (i.e. several military coups in the two decades in Thailand) that has worked as the major 
hindrance to the procedure of the democracy and legal transplantation. The military governments 
has attributed the failure of implementation of the international standards that caused Thailand 
suffering from the sanction of the NCCT list in 2012.48  
 The UK and Singapore are outstanding examples of developed countries following the 
international standards effectively. The UK and Singapore base their actions on reasoning and 
global rules rather than emotion or politics under the principle of individualism, which support the 
value of the independence, autonomy and liberty.49 As previously examined, both countries 
preserve their international reputations as the world financial centres.  
 With reference to the independence of the UKFIU, the FATF rated a high level of 
independence of the UK FIU under the implementation of the Recommendation 29.50 However, in 
2018, the FATF rated only partially compliant on the Recommendation 29 for the UK FIU because 
of the lack of human resources for proper working in the FIU.51 The UK government has attempted 
to establish the cooperative committees or the groups, such as the JMLIT, JMLSG or JFAC to 
enhance the independence of the UK FIU similar to the Singapore government that has tried to 
                                                          
48
 See discussion in chapter 6. 
49
 Mark Van Hoecke, ‘Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law’ (1998) 47(3) International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 495, 503-505. 
50
 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures - United Kingdom Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (FATF 
2018) 204. 
51
 Lord Bates, ‘The UK’s Mutual Evaluation Report by the Financial Action Task Force on its Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing regime’ Statement UIN 
HLWS1131 (10 December 2018) <https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2018-12-10/hlws1131> accessed 24 December 2020; see also Financial 
Action Task Force (n 50) 159, 224-225.    





enhance the independence of the FIU by establishing the Singapore AML/CFT Steering 
Committee, and the ACIP as the key factors to support the Singapore FIU’s independence in order 
to perform its functions efficiently. Comparatively, Singapore FIU was rated compliant for the 
implementation of the FATF Recommendation 29 in 2016.52 
 This thesis examines the independence of FIU. In Thailand, the national AML legislation 
does not provide sufficient operational independence of FIU, but determines the exceeding powers 
of AMLB over the Thailand FIU through the AMLA 1999, s. 25(3).53 The AMLA 1999, s. 40 
provides that the FIU as an independent body not under the Prime Minister Office, Ministry, or 
sub-Ministry, to function independently and neutrally such as core functions of the FIU, including 
taking legal proceedings against offenders.54 Nevertheless, the Thailand FIU becomes under the 
order of the AMLB in line with the AMLA 1999, s. 25(3), which could undermine the operational 
independence of the FIU under the international AML standards.55 As reasons mentioned above, 
the thesis illustrates that there is insufficient for operational independence of the AMLO in 
functioning its duties.  
 The thesis displays that the AMLB may monitor the FIU for certain reasons such as it can 
ensure operational independence by allowing the government (military coup) to control the 
AMLO, such as appointing its Secretary-General from the coup’s staff. Therefore, it is essential to 
ensure the degree of the FIU independence to guard against such pressure (interference and 
influence). 
 
                                                          
52
 See discussion in chapter 6. 
53
 AMLA 1999, s. 25(3) amended in accordance with the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) Order 38/2560 (2017); see also Adrian Vermeule, ‘Conventions of Agency 
Independence’ (2013) 113 Columbia Law Review 1163, 1181.  
54
 AMLA 1999, s. 40 amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.2) B.E. 2551 (2008). 
55
 AMLA 1999, s. 25(3) amended in accordance with the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) Order 38/2560 (2017); the FATF Recommendation 29 in this chapter is as 
the soft law that Thailand needs to implement it into national legislation effectively.  





7.5 Comparative analysis of FIUs in three jurisdictions 
 In Thailand, the AMLO is the FIU and it serves as a national centre for the core functions 
such as the receipt and analysis of STR, other information regarding ML and its associated 
predicate offences, as well as for the dissemination of the results of that analysis to the relevant 
LEAs and foreign FIUs.56  
 The international standards determine that FIU regulation, responsibilities, access to 
financial information57 when deciding relating to the category of data/information that FIU may 
have direct deliver to, each government should take into consideration the international 
requirements regarding operational independence of FIUs.58 Therefore, FIU should be an 
independent body from the law enforcement authority (LEA) in each country as a buffer between 
reporting entities and LEAs in the STR regime in order to disseminate intelligence to the 
appropriate local authorities (e.g. a prosecutor or law enforcement agency, including sharing with 
a foreign FIU when relevant).59 The judicial or prosecutorial FIU could be politically independent 
and be get investigated STRs without the delay, however it would have not a natural connection 
for the REs.60 The thesis considers that the hybrid FIU may combine the strength of each style of 
the FIU to support its main functions. As above reasons, the absolute power of the FIU can bring 
about the political influence or interference. Certain undeveloped countries might suffer from the 
lack of governance to deal with this power, especially the countries under the military coups. 
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 AMLA 1999, s. 40. 
57
 See FATF Recommendations 29 and 40 and the related Interpretative Notes. 
58
 See FATF Recommendation 16 and the related to Interpretative Notes. 
59
 Boudewyn Verhelst, ‘The Organisation of a Financial Intelligence Unit,’ Paper presented to a training seminar for Council of Europe evaluators, Brussels, March 25, 2013; see 
Interpretative Note C to FATF Recommendation 29. 
60
 Ioana Deleanu, ‘FIUs in the European Union – facts and figures, functions and facilities’ in Brigitte Unger, Joras Ferwerda, Melissa van den Broek and Ioana Deleanu, The 
Economic and Legal Effectiveness of the European Union’s Anti-Money Laundering Policy (Edward Elgar 2014) p. 98. 





 In the UK, the idea of operational independence is applied quite widely across government, 
via both public-sector bodies, and the myriad of private companies who are contracted to carry out 
public functions. While this may sound like a good idea to be an effective tool for the UK 
government under Gordon Brown as Chancellor, implemented central bank independence in 1997, 
on the basis that having monetary policy under the direct control over the government, as it had 
used to be, was too vulnerable to harmful short-term electioneering moves. 
 
7.6 The operational independence of the FIU 
 The issue of FIU independence has been the subject of the thesis. However, this thesis has 
mainly stressed on the principle themes (i.e. role of FIU, operational independence and 
transparency). The implementation of the soft law (i.e. international AML standards) is a great 
challenge in Thailand. The fundamental point that this thesis to illustrate is that the AML legal 
provisions are essential, but not sufficient to ensure the FIU independence. The issues have been 
extensively examined and are normally undisputed. It is not complex to understand why the FIU 
independence is vital in modern financial market including monetary systems. In the STR regime, 
the FIU independence is a way to protect AML officials against any undue interference or 
influence. However, this might be a reason why the FIU independence appears to be weakly by 
the AML legal provision.61 The 2017 Thailand MER considered the Thailand FIU regarding its 
role and responsibilities, administration and its level of operational independence from 
government.62  AMLO Secretary-General is responsible for the retention and utilization of all 
financial information and intelligence held by AMLO under s. 38 of the AMLA 1999, then 




Section 25(3) of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) Order 38/2560 (2017). 
62
 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures: Thailand Mutual Evaluation Report (APG December 
2017) p. 181. 





dissemination to the relevant LEAs, as well as collection of the evidence for the purpose of 
examination of the transactions or assets or to restrain transactions, seize or restrain or act including 
take legal proceedings against offenders under the 1999 Act.63  
 According to s. 40 of the AMLA 1999, the Thailand FIU is an office not under the Prime 
Minister Office, Ministry, or Sub-Ministry that it did not under the Ministry of Justice oversight 
as in the past.64 Then s. 41 of the AMLA 1999 provides that the AMLO Secretary-General’s powers 
to freely supervise its staff and resources.65 The Secretary-General should perform his roles and 
duties independently as provided by the AMLA 1999 but he has to be directly answerable to Prime 
Minister instead.66 Moreover, it creates ambiguous that the AMLA 1999 provides the significant 
power to the AMLB over the AMLO, Secretary-General and Transaction Committee under s. 25(3) 
of the AMLA 1999 that can undermine the operational independence and transparency of the 
Thailand FIU (namely, AMLO).67  
 Nevertheless, APG criticized that there are severe penalties that any persons, such as the 
Prime Minister, a Minister or a person holding political positions could be sentenced if they 
commit or order the Transaction Committee, AMLO Secretary-General or a competent official of 
AMLO to examine transactions, seize or restrain or act under this 1999 Act without proper 
evidence for the purpose of persecution or bring about damage or harm another or for political 
reason or acting so mala fide could obtain three to thirty years imprisonment or a fine from sixty-
thousand to six hundred thousand Baht or both.68 Similar to a Transaction Committee member, the 
Secretary-General, Deputy Secretary-General or competent official who follow the direct 
                                                          
63
 Sections 38 and 40 of the AMLA 1999.  
64
 Section 40 amended in accordance with the Anti-Money Laundering Act (No.2) B.E. 2551 (2008).  
65
 Section 41 of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the Anti-Money Laundering Act (No.5) B.E. 2558 (2015).  
66
 Paragraph 2 of section 41 of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the Anti-Money Laundering Act (No.5) B.E. 2558 (2015).  
67
 AMLA 1999, s. 25(3) amended in accordance with the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) Order 38/2560 (2017). 
68
 Section 61/1 of the AMLA 1999 added in accordance with the Anti-Money Laundering Act (No.2) B.E. 2551 (2008).  





instruction or the order under Paragraph one of s. 61/1 of the AMLA 1999 illegally under this Act 
would receive such penalties.69 Furthermore, s. 11 of the AMLA 1999 determines heavy penalties 
(i.e. three times as much penalty as that provided) for an offence of malfeasance in office that force 
both public officers and politicians.70   
 Section 40(3) of the AMLA 1999 meets the FATF standard requirement and encourages 
AMLO to engage independently with other competent authorities and foreign FIUs on the 
exchange of information.71 The APG noted that the 1999 Act clearly provides AMLO as an 
independent body since it does not within the structure of another agency.72 In summary, the FIU 
independence shall not only rely on the location of the FIU but also the level of operational 
independence its functions without the interference and influence whether government or 
industry.73  
 
7.7 Recommendations for Thailand to improve the independence of the Thailand FIU 
 Thailand should establish and strictly enforce, heavy sanctions for interference or non-
cooperation with independent investigations.74 The Thailand FIU should maintain political 
independence and impartiality at all times by carrying out all duties impartially and without 
discrimination on such grounds as race, colour, sex, language, religion or politics.75 The purpose of 
investigation should be to secure independent evidence.76  Thailand should amend a clear statement of 
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 Paragraph one of section 61/1 of the AMLA 1999 added in accordance with the Anti-Money Laundering Act (No.2) B.E. 2551 (2008).  
70
 Section 11 of the AMLA 1999. 
71
 Section 40(3) of the AMLA 1999 amended in accordance with the Anti-Money Laundering Act (No.4) B.E. 2558 (2013).  
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 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (n 62) 181. 
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 Interpretative Note to FATF Recommendation 29. 
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  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Human Rights Standards and Practice for the police: Expanded pocket book on Human Rights for the 










AML/CFT policy, and corresponding orders, requiring full disclosure and the cooperation of all officials 
with operational independence.77 
 In case of an agency that is given budgetary independence from the government by 
submitting the financial support of the regulated industry, an inappropriate sense of loyalty to the 
donors may arise.78 The FIU is shielded from the political vagaries of budget making, which 
contributes to the independence of the FIU 
 
7.8 Conclusion 
 FIU are an important component of the global counter money laundering and related crime 
by using the intelligence as a key element for investigating and prosecuting such offences. The 
independence of the FIU is a challenge in the design and establishment of the FIU because there 
is no set formula to ensure the effectiveness of the FIU in each country, which relying on the 
existing contexts of the jurisdictions. Each FIU has to tailor to the particular situation of the country 
under the international AML standards. However, the FIU’s model, the resources available for the 
responsibility, the criminal typology, as well as the legal and administrative systems of such 
jurisdiction are considered to design the form of FIU. This thesis has illustrated several weaknesses 
of the Thailand FIU and compare to best practices, in particular the UK and Singapore to learn the 
valuable lessons from such countries to adapt into its FIU.  
 The thesis shows that the significance of the FIU shall be the FIU’s independence in operate 
its functions without undue influence and interference whether politics or industry because the 
FATF Recommendation 29 determines that the FIU shall have the independence while conducting 
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its responsibilities. Therefore, beyond complying with the standards, each government including 
the competent authorities require to ensure that its FIU contributes the independent function 
efficiently. Furthermore, the FIU should be the independent and credible agency capable of dealing 
with the reporting entities, relevant LEAs, the foreign FIUs and international counterparts finally. 
 This chapter has provided a comparison on the role, the operational independence and the 
transparency of the FIUs of the UK, Singapore and Thailand with the objectives of highlighting 
the best practice emerging in each jurisdiction and thereby providing recommendations for 
Thailand to enhance the effectiveness of its FIU. Based on the discussion on the theories of 
comparative law and soft law, this comparison seeks similarities and differences of the FIUs under 
the different legislative frameworks of FIU in each country context by applying the theory of 
comparative law and international soft law that required the countries to transpose the global 
standards into their national legislation. This thesis analyses the results and provides Thailand 
recommendations to enhance its FIU based on the valuable experiences of the UK and Singapore. 
 The significant similarity among FIUs of the three countries is that all of them follow the 
international AML soft law, i.e. FATF Recommendation 29, which aims to promote the 
operational independence and transparency of the FIUs in each country without any undue 
political, government or industry influence or interference, which might undermine the FIU’s 
operational independence. Thesis illustrates both similarities and differences of the three FIUs 
emerging from the comparison. In employing the role of the FIUs, the UK FIU (NCA) is similar 
to the Singapore FIU (STRO), which employ their core mandate and functions of a FIU and 
provides further clarity on the rules contained in the international standards. Both FIUs play a 
central role in, the countries’ AML/CFT operational networks, and support to the work of other 
competent authorities and LEAs. However, they consider that there are various FIU roles and 





models, FATF Recommendation 29 does not influence a country’s choice for a specific model, 
and use equally to all of FIUs. 
 The thesis compares Thailand FIU with the FIU of the UK and Singapore from the 
assessment of their MERs. The challenges of Thailand are the need to improve the independence 
of its FIU to engage in core functions, in particular its operational independence which may be 
undermined, influenced and interfered by the powers of AMLB under s25(3) of the AMLA 1999.79 
Moreover, removing legal obstacles, such as the current military coup regime in Thailand which 
controlling the Thailand government in writing the effective legal AML legislation in order to 
develop and improve the independence of Thailand FIU to meet the standards. 
 As reasons mentioned above, the thesis assesses that the Thailand FIU could adapt the FIU 
administrative model as the UK and Singapore in order to fulfil the functions of the Thailand FIU 
to meet the international AML standards effectively.   
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 AMLA 1999, s. 25(3) amended in accordance with the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) Order 38/2560 (2017). 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1 Research Questions and Literature Review 
 The purpose of this thesis is to examine the anti-money laundering (AML) 
legislation regarding the role of the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU)1 and the imple-
mentation of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations2 in Thai-
land.  
 Generally, an FIU’s institutional design, which includes its placement within 
the governmental structure, has an effect on its functions, nevertheless, there is ‘no 
one size fits all’ being appropriate for all jurisdictions and there is the best institu-
tional setup for FIU under the government structure or political regime.3 Each of FIU 
models has advantages and disadvantages; certain models should be sensitive to the 
current situations in each country including the political circumstances, legislative 
system, the risk-environment and resources of the specific jurisdiction. However, it 
is important that best international practices for FIUs have been identified regarding 
the operational independence of the FIUs in continuing their core functions. Trans-
parency International claim that coupled with accountability and transparency mech-
anisms, the operational independence of the FIUs is a key element of the effective 
                                                 
1
 Anti-Money Laundering Act B.E. 2542 (1999) (AMLA), s. 40 regarding the powers and responsi-
bilities of Thailand’s Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), or ‘AMLO’. 
2
 Forty Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations, in particular, the FATF Recommen-
dation 29 and the related Interpretative Note. 
3  Transparency International, ‘Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs): Effective institutional design, 
mandate and powers’<https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/helpdesk/financial-intelligence-units-
fius-effective-institutional-design-mandate-and-powers> accessed 25 December 2020.  
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FIU.4 Therefore, each country should adapt the appropriate measures from the FATF 
standards. 
 The aim of this thesis was to determine whether the Thailand AML legisla-
tion regarding the role of FIU achieves the FATF Recommendations. In achieving 
the purposes of this thesis, ‘appropriate’ was defined as meaning that the AML leg-
islation must promote the FIU in carrying out its functions independently, and be 
capable of applying the FATF standards.5  
 The research questions were designed to respond to the FATF’s evaluation6 
of the Thailand FIU, the Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO), with reference to 
the operational independence, which means the Anti-Money Laundering Board 
(AMLB) has significant power over the AMLO under s. 25(3) of the AMLA 1999.7 
The FATF criticised the operational independence of the AMLO, which could com-
promise its ability to operate properly.8 As a consequence, the FATF rated Thailand 
a ‘largely compliant’ level for Recommendation 29.9 Thailand had faced several mil-
itary coups which has resulted in the Thailand government being unable to enact the 
AML/CFT laws in line with the FATF requirements.10  The FATF removed Thailand 
from its blacklist in 2013 because new legislation was introduced, the AMLA (No.4) 
                                                 
4 Transparency International (n 3). 
5
 FATF Recommendation 29 focuses on the operational independence of the FIU in carrying out its 
functions freely without any undue political interference and influence. 
6
 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist 
Financing Measures – Thailand Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (APG 2017) 182. 
7
 AMLA 1999, s 25(3) amended in accordance with the AMLA (No.5) B.E.2558 (2015).  
8
 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (n 6) 182.  
9
 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (n 6) 183. 
10
 Nophakhun Limsamarnphun, ‘Thailand under new pressure on anti-money laundering laws’ (The 
Nation, 18 February 2012) <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/Thailand-under-new-pres-
sure-on-anti-money-launderi-30176140.html> accessed 11 September 2017; see also Asia/Pacific 
Group on Money Laundering (n 6) 14; see also Akihiko Kawaura, ‘Generals in defense of allocation: 
Coups and military budgets in Thailand’ (2018) 58 Journal of Asian Economics 72, 73. 
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B.E.2556 (2013) and the Counter Terrorist Financing Act B.E. 2556 (2013),11 which 
addressed the concerns identified by the FATF. The Egmont Group noted that an 
independent FIU is significant to an effective AML/CFT regime because it supports 
the work of LEAs, AML/CFT supervisors, and its counterparts in order to promote 
the AML/CFT investigations and prosecutions.12 However, the crucial evaluation of 
the role of AMLO under the AMLA 1999 is that its operational independence is 
insufficient to support the AML legislation regarding the role of AMLO to meet the 
international standards. Therefore, it is important to clarify these issues in this thesis.  
 In reviewing the existing literature on the subject, this thesis observed that 
there were no published resources that examined the role of AMLO regarding its 
operational independence when comparing with best practices (i.e. the UK and Sin-
gapore). Conversely, the existing literature focused on individual issues such as the 
AML legal framework, the implementation of the international standards, the rela-
tionship between the role of the competent authorities and the FIU in fighting money 
laundering and its associated predicated offences, the establishment of the FIU, the 
model of FIU, and the evaluation of FIU in the implementation of international stand-
ards.13 Therefore, it is important to address the issues of the appropriate role of the 
                                                 
11
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand, ‘Press release: FATF removes Thailand 
from Public Statement on Money Laundering/Financing of Terrorism ’(1 May 2013) 
<http://www.mfa.go.th/main/en/media-center/14/34910-FATF-removes-Thailand-from-Public-
Statement-on-Mon.html> accessed 21 July 2019. 
12
 Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, ‘Understanding FIU operational independence and 
autonomy’ A product of the Egmont Centre of FIU Excellence and Leadership (ECOFEL) (October 
2018) <https://www.egmontgroup.org/sites/default/files/filedepot/FIU_Independence_and_Auton-
omy/20181019%20Understanding%20FIU%20Operational%20Independence%20and%20Auton-
omy_FINAL%20VERSION.pdf> accessed 21 July 2019; see also Nomzi Gwintsa, ‘Challenges of 
establishing financial intelligence units’ in Charles Goredema (ed), Money Laundering Experiences, 
A Survey   Monograph No 124, Institute for Security Studies (June 2006) <https://issafrica.org/chap-
ter-3-challenges-of-establishing-financial-intelligence-units> accessed 27 July 2019.   
13
 See discussion in chapter 2 and 3. 
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AMLO under the supervision of the AMLB by examining how the Thailand govern-
ment has interpreted and amended the AMLA 1999 to support the appropriate role 
of the AMLO in carrying out its functions without political interference and influ-
ence. This thesis was initiated to demonstrate that the role of AMLO under the 
AMLA 1999 was suitable to counter money laundering. The principal arguments 
were established in the disagreement that the AMLA 1999 should not provide the 
AMLB the judicial powers over the AMLO.14 The next section of the chapter dis-
cusses the conclusion drawn from this thesis. 
 
8.2 Conclusions  
 Chapter three concluded that the effectiveness of the control of money laun-
dering depends on the application of the international AML standards and the level 
of compliance with such instruments.15 There are three levels of international AML 
policy: international legal framework; regional legal framework; and global best 
practices and industry guidelines.16 For example, the Merida Convention determines 
that the FIUs shall have the operational independence in undertaking their functions 
and work without any political interference or influence.17 Furthermore, the Egmont 
Group also supports the operational independence of the FIUs because in their opin-
                                                 
14
 AMLA 1999, s. 25(3). 
15
 Nicholas Ryder, Money Laundering – An Endless Cycle?: A Comparative Analysis of the Anti-
Money Laundering Policies in the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Australia and Can-
ada (Routledge 2012) 2, 11 
16
 International legal framework (e.g. the UN AML conventions); regional legal framework (e.g. the 
EU AML Directives); as well as global best practices and industry guidelines (e.g. the FATF Recom-
mendations). 
17
 United Nations Convention against Corruption, 2003 (Merida Convention), art 36. 
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ion an independent FIU promotes the effectiveness of the control of the money laun-
dering regime.18 Thus, the insufficient operational independence might interfere with 
the efficiency of the FIU in conducting the investigations and prosecutions of money 
laundering and its associated predicate offences.19 As a soft law, the FATF Recom-
mendations do not bind the countries to comply with its standards, but the FATF can 
identify such jurisdictions that have AML strategic deficiencies as the high risk and 
Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCTs).20 It is questionable how each 
country implements the international standard to pass the FATF’s assessment to 
avoid its sanctions and which model of FIU (namely, judicial, law-enforcement, ad-
ministrative, and hybrid models) each jurisdiction should employ to fight money 
laundering successfully.21 The chapter concluded that the deeper understanding of 
the international AML instruments regarding the role of FIU, the money laundering 
risks, and the assessment of such risks could assist in dealing with the threat effi-
ciently.22  
                                                 
18
 Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, ‘New publication: understanding FIU operational 
independence and autonomy’ (October 2018) <https://egmontgroup.org/en/content/new-publication-




 For instance, the FATF identified Thailand as the NCCT jurisdiction that has strategic deficiencies 
in countering money laundering regime; see Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘FATF Public 
Statement – 19 October 2012’ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/s-t/turkey/documents/fatfpublic-
statement-19october2012.html> accessed 25 March 2018; see also Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF), ‘About the Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT) Initiative’ <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/aboutthenon-cooperativecountriesandterritoriesncctini-
tiative.html> accessed 10 April 2018; see also Financial Action Task Force (FATF), High-risk and 
non-cooperative jurisdictions <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdic-
tions/> accessed 22 July 2019.   
21
 Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, ‘Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs)’ <https://eg-
montgroup.org/en/content/financial-intelligence-units-fius> accessed 8 July 2019.  
22
 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), State of Implementation of the United Na-
tions Convention against Corruption: Criminalisation, Law Enforcement and International Cooper-
ation (2nd edn, UN 2017) 168. 
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 Chapter four examined the implementation of the international standards in 
the UK. In particular, the chapter focused on the incorporation of FATF Recommen-
dation 29 into its AML legal framework regarding the role of the FIU. The FATF 
praised the UK’s legal AML framework, particularly the Proceeds of Crime Act 
2002 (POCA) and Money Laundering Regulations 2017 (MLRs) as best practices 
which go beyond the international AML requirements.23  
 However, the reporting entities have submitted an increased number of SARs 
to the National Crime Agency (NCA) as a result of ‘defensive’ or ‘preventive’ re-
porting. This has proven to be problematic for the NCA as the intelligence provided 
by the related SARs is of a very poor quality, which negatively impacts the quality 
of the intelligence disseminated by the NCA to the related LEAs. One of the main 
reasons for the increased number of SARs submitted by reporting entities in the UK 
is a fear factor created by the number of financial penalties imposed in the UK for 
weak AML reporting systems.24 The chapter concluded that the administrative-style 
FIU has a significant level of operational independence because the FIs are well con-
nected with primary authorities such as the central bank or treasury ministry in com-
plying with the SARs requirements.25 This model of FIU acts as a safeguard, which 
                                                 
23
 Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), ‘Examining the future of anti-money laundering regulations’ 
<https://www.fca.org.uk/news/speeches/examining-future-anti-money-laundering-regulations> ac-
cessed 28 October 2016; see also Karen Harrison and Nicholas Ryder, The Law Relating to Financial 
Crime in the United Kingdom (2nd  edn, Routledge 2017) 223; see HM Treasury, ‘Transposition of 
the Fifth Money Laundering Directive: Consultation’ (Crown April 2019) 21, 59 <https://assets.pub-
lishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/795670/20190415_Consultation_on_the_Transposition_of_5MLD__web.pdf> ac-
cessed 11 July 2019. 
24
 The NCA reported that between 2015 and 2016 there was an increase of 44 per cent in order to 
protect themselves from money laundering investigations or prosecutions; see Home Office and HM 
Treasury, Action Plan for Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Finance (Home Office 
2016) 43. 
25
 Guy Stessens, Money Laundering – A New International Law Enforcement Model (Cambridge 
University Press 2008) 188, 189; see also see also Danato Masciandaro and Alessio Volpicella, ‘De-
signing financial supervision: The puzzling case of the FIUs against money laundering ’(2016) 2(1) 
Journal of Financial Regulation 79, 79. 
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enhances the cooperation and communication between the REs and LEAs, as well as 
improving the effective intelligence contribution to fighting the money laundering 
regime.26 The UK’s AML legislation determines the role of NCA in order to receive, 
analyse, and disseminate the information to the relevant authorities for further inves-
tigations and prosecutions.27 In summary, the UK’s AML framework ensures that 
the NCA has its operational independence and ability to cooperate and exchange 
intelligence amongst FIUs in line with the Recommendation 29 effectively.28  
 Chapter five examined the implementation of international initiatives in Sin-
gapore, which concentrated on the Recommendation 29 into its AML legal frame-
work regarding the role of the FIU. This chapter also examined the roles of compe-
tent authorities and FIU towards incorporating to tackle money laundering. This 
chapter determined the AML legislation and the result of their compliance with STR 
requirements, including primary similarities and differences between their roles. The 
Singapore government Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) seeks to enhance 
the understanding and compliance of the AML regulations by issuing guidelines in 
order to ensure that the REs strongly comply with the international and national AML 
legal requirements. 
                                                 
26
 Donato Masciandaro, ‘Financial Supervisory Unification and Financial Intelligence Units ’(2005) 
8(4) Journal of Money Laundering Control 354, 360. 
27
 The Crime and Courts Act 2013, Sch 8(2) para 158; the 2013 Act provides that the NCA is to have 
the functions conferred by the POCA 2002, ss.1(3)(b), 1(5); see Government Digital Service, ‘Serious 
Organised Crime Agency has closed’ <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/serious-organ-
ised-crime-agency> accessed 18 July 2019. 
28
 FATF Recommendation 29 and art 14 (1)(b) of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
2003; see also International Monetary Fund (IMF) & World Bank, Financial Intelligence Units: An 
Overview (IMF 2004) 3; see also Ryder (n 15) 21; see also House of Lords, Money Laundering and 
the Financing of Terrorism Volume I: Report of European Union Committee (19th Report of Session, 
The Stationery Office 2009) 22; see also Dong Hopton, Money Laundering: A Concise Guide for All 
Business (2nd edn, Routledge 2009) 19-20, 192. 
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 The FATF concluded that Singapore has adopted its AML regime with a 
strong commitment to the international instruments efficiently.29 As a consequence, 
the Suspicious Transaction Reporting Office (STRO) has acted as a proactive agent 
by concentrating on the STRs regime and coordinating with the competent authori-
ties. The STRO adopts an administrative-FIU model similar to the NCA while the 
AMLO applies a hybrid-FIU style. The Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Se-
rious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act 1992 (CDSA) does not provide any pow-
ers of investigation or prosecution for the STRO that support the STRO sufficient 
operational independence in dealing with its functions effectively. Contrary to the 
STRO, the AMLO can impose sanctions on FIs and instigate criminal proceedings 
by the virtue of AMLA 1999 that empowers the judicial and law-enforcement powers 
to the AMLO.30 The chapter concluded that the STRO concentrates on its duties and 
responsibilities regarding the STRs regime with the operational independence recti-
fied by the CDSA 1992.  
 Chapter six examined the implementation of international standards in Thai-
land by focusing on the FATF Recommendation 29 into its AML legal framework 
regarding the role of the FIU. This chapter reviewed and concentrated on the role of 
the AMLO,31 in line with the AMLA 1999 to understand how the AMLO incorpo-
rates international AML instruments by comparing it with the UK and Singapore.32 
                                                 
29
 Mark Pieth and Gemma Aiolfi, ‘Synthesis: Comparing international standards and their implemen-
tation’ in Mark Pieth and Gemma Aiolfi (eds), A Comparative Guide to Anti-Money Laundering - A 
Critical Analysis of Systems in Singapore, Switzerland, the UK and the USA (Edward Elgar 2004) 
416; see also Dennis Cox, Handbook of Anti Money Laundering (Wiley 2014) 615. 
30
 AMLA 1999, s. 40. 
31
 For example, receiving, analysing, disseminating, collecting evidence, and investigating in order 
to prosecute money laundering and predicate offences. 
32
 A comparison of three countries (the UK, Singapore and Thailand) is to identify differences and 
similarities, strengths, weaknesses and loopholes for improving Thailand’s capability in implement-
ing the FATF standards. 
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The chapter examined how effective Thailand’s FIU has been in adopting interna-
tional AML regulations.33 The chapter proceeded to highlight certain weaknesses 
and loopholes within Thailand’s AML legal framework to recommend the Thailand 
government to amend the AML legislation regarding the role of FIU to meet the 
FATF Recommendations. As a result of the military coups, the Thailand government 
could not enact the AML/CFT legislation to meet the FATF requirements because 
of the effectiveness issue of the democratic process in Thailand’s Parliament in such 
a period.34  
 The chapter determined that the government should revise the legislation. For 
example, the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand 2017 should make sure that 
the AMLO is an independent agency as certified by the Constitution as the National 
Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) and Office of Attorney General (OAG). This 
is significant to support the regulatory reforms that reduce opportunities for political 
intervention and interference in the AMLO’s operation by not reporting to the Prime 
Minister, but the President of the Representatives. 
 The thesis concluded that the government should consider adopting an ad-
ministrative-FIU model to Thailand’s FIU in order to improve the operational inde-
pendence and develop the effectiveness of the AMLO in fighting money laundering 
practically. 
 In the light of the current deficiencies and disadvantages of the AMLO in 
counteracting money laundering, it is difficult to retain the current model of the 
AMLO. The current functions of the AMLO, along with deficiencies therein, were 
                                                 
33
 Goredema suggested that the AMLO is an interesting pattern for an institution to deal with money 
laundering; see Charles Goredema, ‘Measuring Money Laundering in Southern Africa ’(2005) 14(4) 
African Security Review 27, 36.  
34
 Limsamarnphun (n 10). 
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evaluated in chapters three and six. There is no harm in briefly recalling the follow-
ing main deficiencies of the AMLO that cause ambiguity, namely (1) its operational 
independence from the AMLB and Government; (2) its role in sufficiently analysing 
STRs on money laundering in order to provide feedback to the reporting entities and 
increase the quality of the STRs; (3) the relationship between REs and LEAs; (4) the 
absence of strategic analysis in order to formulate a strengthened strategy for its fu-
ture work; and (5) opening the NRA report to the public widely. For these reasons, 
the Thailand government should consider the role of the AMLO, particularly opera-
tional independence in dealing with the STRs to meet the international requirements. 
 Generally, the AMLO is a hybrid-style FIU, which is a combination of an 
administration-FIU, judicial-FIU and law enforcement-FIU models. Unlike Thai-
land, the NCA and STRO use the administrative-FIU model. The change from hybrid 
into administrative-FIU model enhances corporation between the REs and LEAs be-
cause the FIU (i.e. AMLO) will be the buffer between the REs and LEAs, and this 
can create a proper atmosphere and relationship in the STRs reporting regime. Fur-
thermore, the AMLO and relevant competent authorities should issue more compre-
hensive and clear guidelines regarding STRs reporting and the term ‘suspicion’ for 
helping the REs to produce STRs more good quality submitting to the AMLO. This 
process can reduce the poor quality of the STRs from the REs and the cost of AML 
compliance of the REs at the same time. 
 The AMLO should develop and implement a communication strategy for 
publishing money laundering trends and typologies and annual reports to share with 
REs and other AML/CFT partners in a timelier manner. In addition, the AMLO 
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should review its production of statistics on AML/CFT matters to confirm the truth-
fulness of such statistics and strengthen its ability to produce effectively consistent 
and accurate statistics.  
 To ensure the operational independence and avoid conflict of interest, the 
Thailand FIU should have a duty to report to the Parliament, not to Prime Minister. 
Furthermore, the Head of Thailand FIU should be appointed from the Committee of 
Parliament, not by the cabinet. Moreover, s. 25(3) of the AMLA 1999 should be used 
to limit the judicial power of the AMLB because of the intervention of the opera-
tional independence of the Transaction Committee (TC), the AMLO, and the Secre-
tary-General. It is important to limit the power of the AMLB in order to develop the 
operational autonomy and independence of the AMLO that will promote the Thai-
land AML laws to meet the international standards. Furthermore, the Thailand gov-
ernment should sufficiently contribute additional budgetary resources for the AMLO 
to enhance the dedicated capacity of its responsibilities such as human and techno-
logical resources.  
 The chapter concluded that this thesis has been undertaken with a view to 
propose the optimal model for the Thailand FIU in counteracting money laundering. 
The recommendations describe the optimal model for the Thailand FIU so that STRs 
can deal with it more effectively and provide the key factors that ensure the success 
of the proposed FIU model. 
 There are several lessons that Thailand could learn from the UK and Singa-
pore: the administrative-FIU model and the robust AML policy regarding the opera-
tional independence of FIU. Moreover, in Thailand and Singapore, the banks still 
execute the suspicious transaction even though they filed the STRs to Thailand’s FIU 
(i.e. AMLO). Unlike the UK, the UK banks cannot execute the suspicious transaction 
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after submitting the SARs to the UK’s FIU (i.e. NCA) because the POCA 2002 stops 
such transactions immediately. The FATF stated that the UK has the vital structural 
elements needed for an efficient AML/CTF system, including institutional and 
political stability, governmental accountability, rule of law, and a professional and 
independent legal profession. 35  As mentioned above, the Thailand government 
realises that political stability is also key element for Thailand to improve the 
independence of the FIU without the politic influence, in particular from the military 
coups in the STRs regime under the AMLA 1999. 
 
8.3 Recommendations 
 One of the aims of understanding the appropriate legislation regarding the 
role of FIU in line with international standards is to support the Thailand government 
to enhance the issues in the AML law. This thesis has argued that s. 40 of the AMLA 
1999 might fulfil the functions of the AMLO in accordance with the FATF Recom-
mendation 29. It empowers the AMLO in dealing with money laundering and its 
associated predicate offences. When the AMLO has performed its responsibilities, 
such as receiving the reports from FIs for disseminating intelligence to LEAs36 or 
gathering evidence for taking legal proceedings against offenders37 under the AMLA 
1999. This thesis has illustrated that certain provisions of the AMLA 1999 require 
the improvement in order to meet the requirements of international standards, espe-
cially the powers and responsibilities of the role and operational independence of the 
                                                 
35 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing 
Measures - United Kingdom Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (FATF 2018) 21. 
36
 Anti-Money Laundering Act B.E. 2542 (1999), s. 40(3). 
37
 Anti-Money Laundering Act B.E. 2542 (1999), s. 40(5). 
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AMLO by amending the AMLA 1999 regarding such issues that enhance the imple-
mentation of the FATF Recommendations. Furthermore, the applicable UK and Sin-
gapore legislation regarding the role of FIU provides that the optional FIU model as 
an administrative-FIU model should be adopted by Thailand. The application of the 
administrative-FIU style will support the AMLO’s operational independence from 
being abused by political interference and influence. Moreover, this model will pre-
vent the AMLB from using s. 25(3) of the AMLA 1999 to intervene and control the 
AMLO by holding or restraining the act of AMLO, which the AMLB sees as a breach 
of basic human rights.38 As a consequence, the person having made the transaction, 
whose asset has been confiscated, may produce evidence that the asset in such trans-
action does not involve with the commission of the offence so that the confiscation 
may be revoked under the Ministerial Regulation.39 Furthermore, the person also 
files a petition to the Court to claim the return of the asset.40 The thesis has pointed 
out that the AML provisions on the role of AMLO can meet the requirements of the 
FATF Recommendations by amending the AML provision concerning the role of 
AMLO and its operational independence. This success is demonstrated in the 
FATF’s MER that raised the UK’s AML legal framework to be an example of best 
practices to benchmark for the development of Thailand’s AML legal framework.41 
FATF also raised Singapore that its success was the implementation of systems by 
government agencies such as the STRO, MAS and LEAs, as well as the enhanced 
                                                 
38
 Anti-Money Laundering Act B.E. 2542 (1999), s. 25(3) amended in accordance with the AMLA 
(No.5) B.E.2558 (2015).  
39
 Anti-Money Laundering Act B.E. 2542 (1999), s. 48. 
40
 Anti-Money Laundering Act B.E. 2542 (1999), s. 51/1 para two amended in accordance with the 
AMLA (No.5) B.E.2558 (2015). 
41
 Financial Action Task Force (n 35) 6, 47. 
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awareness among FIs.42 Thus, Thailand can learn lessons from best practices in order 
to develop its AML legislation to meet international standards. This is argued that 
best practices use the common law system, but Thailand employs civil law system 
in how Thailand can benchmark from such jurisdiction. However, it is clear from the 
FATF MER that FATF and Egmont Group network have supported all member 
states to develop their legislation to meet the international requirements. 
 Therefore, it is challenging as the future success of the implementation of the 
FATF Recommendations depends on the application of a national legal provisions 
that should consider the role of FIU without political interference and influence. The 
thesis focuses on how to improve the AML legislation regarding the role of FIU and 
the operational independence among limited capacity and resources for implemen-
tation of international standards.43 This is a challenge for Thailand government to 
amend the AMLA 1999 in line with the best practice of international standards. 
 The National Risk Assessment Report (NRA)44 in Thailand should be pub-
lished in order to raise public awareness of the growing money laundering threat and 
its typologies in jurisdiction. The NRA has been published only a brief version on 
the AMLO’s website, which is still not sufficient to enhance the deeply understand-
ing concerning the money laundering risk in Thailand effectively. 
                                                 
42
 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Anti-
Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures – Singapore Fourth Round Mutual 
Evaluation Report (FATF and APG 2016) 183; see also Benjamin Cher, ‘Singapore lauded by anti-
money laundering global taskforce but more could be done, says FATF’ (The Edge, 27 September 
2016) <https://www.theedgesingapore.com/article/singapore-lauded-more-can-be-done-combat-
money-laundering-terrorism-financing> accessed 21 July 2019. 
43
 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (n 6) 48. 
44
 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘NRA’. 
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 The predicate offences set forth in the AMLA 1999 do not meet the FATF 
Standards because the AMLA 1999 determines only 28 designated categories of of-
fences.45 Thus, the list of predicate offences should be extended to comprise the min-
imum list of offences as defined in the General Glossary of the FATF Recommen-
dations with a view to fulfilling the relevant FATF Recommendations in this regard. 
This is unlike the UK AML system, where the POCA 2002 adopts an ‘all crime’ 
basis for money laundering. When Singapore has more than 400 predicate offences 
in the Schedules of the CDSA 1992, the AMLA 1999 should added the number of 
predicate offences and illustrate such lists in the Schedules of the CDSA 1992 in 
order to help users clearly understand and meet the FATF requirements. 
 The oversight of the FIU is the crucial lesson that Thailand should learn from 
the UK because the UKFIU has several effective private and public committee, such 
as the JMLSG, JMLIT, JFAC, SARs Regime Committee, to monitor and supervise 
the AML policies regarding the SARs regime, in particular the independence of the 
FIU without the political influence. Similar to Singapore, the Singapore’s Anti-
Money Laundering and Countering Financing Terrorism Steering Committee 
(AML/CFT Steering Committee), as well as the ACIP would be best practices to 
increase the independence of the Thailand FIU because they comprise the private 
and public sector to enhance the STRs regime, especially when the Thailand FIU 
operate its functions. As reasons mentioned above, the thesis considers that the AML 
Committee, which consists of the several sector can improve the independence of 
the FIU whether the quality of STRs/SARs or the key element to empower the Thai-
land FIU in conducting its functions without the interference and influence of the 
AMLB or government under the military coup. 
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8.4 Further Areas for Research 
 The thesis focused on the examination of the AML legislation regarding the 
role of FIU under the international standards, the FATF Recommendation 29 in par-
ticular. It would be useful to examine this legislation to compare the legislation re-
lated to the role of FIUs in the UK and Singapore in implementing such international 
standards. This would illustrate a clearer picture of the legislative framework regard-
ing the effective role of FIU to meet the international standards requirements. An-
other area for examination was the role of AMLB under s. 25(3) of the AMLA 
1999.46 It would be beneficial to examine this issue in the context of international 
standards to see whether the Act would provide an appropriate power of the AMLB 
in controlling the TC,47 the AMLO48 and the Secretary-General49 in line with the 
FATF Recommendation 29 which provides operational independence to them.50   
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